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Abstract 
Strategic initiative implementation has evolved in recent years as a new and 
progressive form of strategy making. In this regard, strategic initiative implementation 
constitutes one of the central topics of strategic management regarding how firms can 
renew their most valuable sources of competitive advantage: the firm's idiosyncratic 
resources and knowledge base. 
Strategic management concepts and practical guidelines are still lacking on how 
strategic initiative implementation affects a company's idiosyncratic resources and 
knowledge base and what kinds of challenging effects may evolve during the strategic 
initiative implementation. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to enhance our 
understanding of how strategic initiative implementation affects a firm's most 
valuable sources of competitive advantage. To achieve this aim, a qualitative case 
study approach is used to collect empirical evidence and describe the phenomena of 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions in the context of renewing a firm's sources of 
competitive advantage. The fieldwork started in October 2004 and finished in June 
2007, and it comprised three in-depth case studies, based on three strategic initiatives; 
namely, the Sun Sigma initiative, the CRM Convergence initiative and the Balanced 
Scorecard initiative. The collected data were used to conceptualise strategic initiative 
related dysfunctions in accordance with the principles of grounded theory. 
The study contributes to the strategy making literature in the area of resource based 
theory, the theory of dynamic capabilities, and know ledge based theory of the firm by 
extending the strategic initiative related strategy making concepts through proposing a 
new theory that depicts the dysfunctional effects of strategic initiative 
implementation. New relations between the resource based view and the strategic 
initiative concept are proposed in the context of strategic initiative implementation 
and the interactions between ongoing initiatives. Furthermore, the study highlights the 
role and value of strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities. New insights into 
the challenges and limitations of extending and recombining the emerging knowledge 
bases from ongoing initiatives depict the evolution of dysfunctional knowledge. 
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1 Introduction 
Strategic initiative implementation as a new form of strategy making has evolved in 
recent years, especially within companies operating in highly competitive sectors like 
the information technology (IT) industry. IT companies have increasingly shifted 
from a yearly strategic planning process to a continuous strategy development one 
based on strategic initiatives (Marx, 2004). Strategic initiatives represent a 
progressive form of strategy implementation, whereby the idiosyncratic key sources 
of a firm's competitive advantage are mobilised and renewed (Bower, 1970; Bower 
and Christensen, 1996; McGrath et aI., 1995; Marx, 2004). In this regard, strategic 
initiative implementation constitutes one of the central topics of the strategic 
management disciplines regarding how firms can expand their resources and 
knowledge bases in order to improve their existing capabilities, or develop new ones, 
and thereby renew their key sources of competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 
1982; Wemerfelt, 1984; Daft and Weick, 1984; Maidique and Zirger, 1985; McGrath 
et aI., 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996; McGrath, 1996; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Furthermore, strategic initiative 
implementations are result-oriented and flexible, and they extend the static strategic 
planning process into a more dynamic one by combining strategic thoughts and 
implementation at the same time as involving a wide range of different stakeholders 
within a company, from top management to almost all members of the organisation 
(McGrath et at., 1995; Lechner et al., 2003; Wielemaker; 2003; Marx, 2004). 
However, there is still a lack of strategic initiative implementation concepts within the 
strategic management theories (McGrath, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Chung et aI., 2000; 
Lechner et aI., 2003; Wielemaker; 2003; Marx, 2004), especially on how strategic 
initiative implementation affects a company's idiosyncratic resources and knowledge 
base and what kinds of challenging effects may emerge during the implementation. 
Moreover, guidelines are still required on how strategic initiative implementation can 
be managed professionally to assure the quality and results of the firm's strategy 
making process. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is twofold: a) to improve the 
understanding of how strategic initiative implementation affects a firm's most 
10 
valuable sources of competitive advantage, namely, the firm's idiosyncratic resources 
and know ledge base, and b) to determine what kinds of challenges (dysfunctions) 
arise during the initiative implementation process. Specifically, the research defines a 
strategic initiative as a vehicle for the implementation of strategic objectives that were 
predominantly originated by the top management and/or key decision makers of the 
firm. Based on this notion, this research positions the top management and key 
decision makers as the change agents within the organisation. Therefore, to view a 
strategic initiative as being functional or dysfunctional will largely depend on the 
outcome of the initiative and how much the results vary compared to the outcome 
anticipated by the top managers. 
1.1 Research objective and focus 
The challenges which emerge during the strategic initiative related renewal process 
are still insufficiently observed and conceptualised (McGrath, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; 
Chung et aI., 2000; Lechner et aI., 2003; Wielemaker; 2003; Marx, 2004). By 
examining the challenges related to strategic initiative implementation, this study 
combines and extends the resource based theory, the concept of dynamic capabilities, 
and the knowledge based theory from the perspective of the strategic initiatives. 
From the perspective of the resource based theory, idiosyncratic resources are the 
most valuable source of a firm's competitive advantage. The mobilisation and re-
combination of the existing firm resources with new ones are critical aspects of 
successfully renewing the firm's sources of competitive advantage (Daft and Weick, 
1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; Block and MacMilan, 1985; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
However, the traditional resource based view gives an inadequate account of the 
dynamic aspect of renewing a firm's resource base (Collis, 1991; Teece and Pisano, 
1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). In particular, the dynamic context of strategic 
initiative implementations is not fully discovered and linked to the resource based 
theory. Missing links between the resource based theory and the strategic initiative 
concept show a theoretical gap in how strategic initiative implementations may givc 
rise to competitive bundles of resources or challenges by utilising initiative specific 
dynamic capabilities. These arguments cxtend the debate on the resource based theory 
1 1 
and integrate the dynamic capability concept and the knowledge based theory of the 
firm into the research focus. 
Dynamic capabilities enable a strategic initiative to transform and deploy a finn's 
individual resources to create and renew the finn's sources of sustainable competitive 
advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et at., 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). In this context, dynamic capabilities are 
fragile and unstable processes which reconfigure a finn's or another initiative's 
existing resource base through specific functionalities described in the literature as 
resource creation, resource integration, resource re-combination, and resource release 
(Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). Therefore, strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities are not themselves 
sources of competitive advantage because their value resides in their ability to 
reconfigure a firm's existing resource base by relying strongly on situation-specific 
knowledge. In this regard, strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities have not 
been conceptualised comprehensively according to their role and value in contributing 
to the success of strategic initiative implementation. In particular, it is unclear how 
dynamic capabilities are relevant to strategic initiative implementations which 
successfully achieve their objectives and goals. The perspective that strategic 
initiatives develop and leverage individual dynamic capabilities to renew existing 
resources and extend existing knowledge bases incorporates the knowledge based 
theory of the finn into the research focus. 
The increasing importance of knowledge as a strategic enabler for finns has 
superseded the static nature of the resource based view of the finn, and it has created 
a growing body of research studies on knowledge in organisations (Grant and Baden-
Fuller, 1995). In this context, the perspective of strategic initiatives as knowledge 
creating entities focuses this study's discussion on how emerging knowledge bases 
are affectcd by strategic initiative implementations. Idiosyncratic knowledge bases are 
thc sourccs from which initiative related dynamic capabilities draw specific 
knowlcdge to drive rencwal of the finn's sources of competitive advantage. During 
this rcncwal process, strategic initiative implementation activities create nc\\' 
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knowledge which, in its tum, is stored and combined with other strategic initiative 
specific knowledge bases. From this emerges a theoretical gap regarding which kind 
of challenging effect may arise during this knowledge creation process, and the role 
and value of the strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities during this renewal 
process. Clarification of this unresolved area strengthens the assumption that 
knowledge is the most important resource within a firm: some scholars still deem it 
crucial to consider the strategic value of knowledge because not all knowledge IS 
equally valuable (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). 
Various research objectives derive from the reVIew of the mam bodies of the 
literature. Firstly, the aim of this study is to observe how strategic initiatives affect a 
firm's most valuable sources of competitive advantage: their idiosyncratic resource 
and knowledge base. 
By observing how strategic initiative implementations affect the firm's most valuable 
resources of competitive advantage, the dissertation focuses its observations on the 
interactions between the ongoing initiatives and interactions between the strategic 
initiative and the firm's organisational context. Secondly, by observing the 
interactions of the strategic initiatives this study analyses the emerging challenges that 
arise from different interactions and discusses the drivers of such challenges. In 
particular, concerning how a firm's idiosyncratic resources and knowledge base are 
influenced by strategic initiative interactions, this study aims to show how a strategic 
initiative affects the resources and emerging knowledge of a firm and other ongoing 
strategic initiatives. Furthermore, discussing how idiosyncratic resources and a firm's 
knowledge base are affected by strategic initiative interactions, the study seeks to 
discover what kinds of challenges emerge, how potential challenges arise during 
initiative implementations, and what drivers facilitate challenges against strategic 
initiative implementation. Finally, the intention of the dissertation is to furnish an 
integrated perspective on strategic initiative implementation and additional theoretical 
insights into the relative dysfunctions, thereby enriching the current concepts of 
strategic initiative related strategy implementations and their potential challenges 
13 
(McGrath, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Soda and Usai, 1999; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; 
Chung et at., 2000; Lechner et at., 2003; Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). 
1.2 Research Methodology and Design 
Empirical evidence is necessary to answer the above research question, and to fulfill 
the research objectives, so a qualitative approach was appropriate for investigating the 
phenomenon of strategic initiative related dysfunctions in the context of renewing a 
firm's sources of competitive advantage (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). Based on the seminal works by Glaser and Strauss (1967), Yin (1984) 
and Miles and Huberman (1984) and Eisenhardt's (1989) generative account of using 
case studies for theory building provides useful guidance for the research design. The 
rationale of the case study research design adopted in this thesis is its flexibility in the 
use of multiple data collection methods, as well as its ability to articulate insightful 
stories embedded within the chosen social context (Van Maanen, 1983). A single case 
study approach has been selected to investigate the phenomena of strategic initiative 
related dysfunctions by defining the strategic initiative as the unit of analysis. The 
development of a case study protocol was appropriate for clarifying the necessary 
procedures and enhancing the reliability of the study (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). 
Necessary for this purpose was finding a company engaged in strategic renewal 
through strategic initiative implementation. Furthermore, the company should provide 
access to such relevant data as non-public information on strategic initiative insights. 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. was identified as the case company. Sun's primary approach 
to implementing its strategies related strongly to the approach of strategic initiatives. 
The fieldwork started in October 2004 and finished in June 2007. Beginning with 
pilot interviews, the first aim was to select and verify the strategic initiatives for the 
in-depth case studies by collecting relevant background information on the company's 
strategic focus and business strategies at the same time. After the pilot interviews, 
three in-depth case studies were conducted on the strategic initiatives selected: Sun 
Sigma initiative, CRM Convergence initiative and the Balanced Scorecard initiative. 
To increase the range of the data collection for triangulation purposes. the researcher 
collcctcd and compared data from different sources, including internal documentation, 
1-+ 
published company information, on-site observations and semi-structured interviews 
with different stakeholder groups. In detail, fifty-one semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with different stakeholder groups that lasted between 1 and 3 hours, 
followed by various follow-up meetings and phone-calls to clarify and review the 
forgone interview topics and results. 
A grounded theory approach was selected to analyse and interpret the data and 
conceptualise the new theory of strategic initiative related dysfunctions (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) and 
in accordance with the principles of the grounded theory, different types of coding 
methods namely open coding, axial coding and selective coding were used. The 
different stages of open, axial, and selective coding were enriched by employing 
different analysis techniques. A line-by-line analysis, questioning and flip-flop 
techniques were applied to identify the relevant concepts and categories and their 
properties and varieties. Coding result comparisons were used to reduce the large 
number of emerging categories and a literature comparison was iteratively conducted 
to enhance the validity of the research. The comparison was supported by various 
tree-root-structures, mind-maps and memos to reduce the huge amount of qualitative 
data and advance the theory building process. Finally, the researcher developed 
lessons learnt from applying the ground theory to this dissertation to address the 
challenges of a grounded theory approach. In summary, all of the elements described 
in the methodology chapter show how the research was operationalised, and they help 
to make the research approach transparent for other researchers. 
1.3 Theoretical relevance and contribution 
This dissertation establishes a link between the resource based VIew and the 
knowledge based view in the context of strategic initiative implementation to renew a 
firm's most valuable sources of competitive advantage. Furthermore, the study 
highlights the role and value of strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities with 
regard to renewing the firm's most valuable sources of competitive advantage: its 
existing resourccs, and especially knowledge bases from other ongoing strategic 
initiati\'cs. The study thus contributes to the strategy making literature in the area of 
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the resource based theory, the theory of dynamic capabilities, and the knowledge 
based theory of the firm by extending the strategic initiative related strategy making 
concept. 
1.3.1 Strategic Initiative related Strategy Making 
One of the main contributions of this study is its integrative and novel perspective on 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions in the context of successful strategy 
implementations. The study goes beyond the discussion of how strategic initiatives 
can facilitate the renewal of a firm's unique sources of competitive advantage. It 
describes the challenges and consequences that emerge during the process of 
renewmg a firm's sources of competitive advantage through strategic initiatives. 
These consequences are termed 'dysfunctional effects', which constitute strategic 
obstacles against a firm's implementation of its strategies through strategic initiatives. 
Furthermore, the dissertation extends the work of strategic initiative related studies by 
highlighting the complexities of strategic initiative interactions with the firm's 
organisational context and other ongoing initiatives (Lechner et a!., 2003; 
Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). Finally, the findings enable this study to furnish an 
integrated perspective on initiative related strategy making by enhancing the existing 
strategy implementation concepts in the context of strategic initiatives (McGrath, 
1996; Uzzi, 1996; Soda and Usai, 1999; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Chung et a!., 
2000; Lechner et a!., 2003; Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). 
1.3.2 Resource Based Theory 
The findings of this study improve our theoretical understanding of how the existing 
resources are combined with new resources in the context of strategic initiative 
implementation. According to Black's (1994) concept of "cogency relationships", a 
firm's resources are surrounded by various kinds of relationship which are established 
and extended through strategic initiative related interactions between the strategic 
initiative and the organisational context or interactions between ongoing initiatives 
(Teecc. 1982; Barney, 1991). These interactions combine old and existing firm 
resourccs to shape new bundles of resources, but it is uncertain whether thc cxpectcd 
results can be achievcd because every strategic initiativc enters uncharted territory to 
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some extent. Furthermore, emerging strategic initiative interactions explain how new 
bundles of resources arise from strategic initiatives and why it is uncertain that the 
expected results will be obtained. Every strategic initiative interaction carries the risk 
of creating challenges which lead to dysfunctional effects and the failure to achieve 
the desired results. Another contribution of this study is that it connects the resource 
based theory and the strategic initiative concept together. The interconnection with the 
strategic initiative concepts outlined by the study helps to overcome the highly static 
nature of the resource based theory and provides answers about why successful finns 
that are able to allocate sufficient resources to renew their sources of competitive 
advantage can potentially fail (Reed and Robert, 1990; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 
1991 ; Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Peteraf and Barney, 2003). 
1.3.3 Strategic Initiative related Dynamic Capabilities 
The findings of this study contribute in different ways to the dynamic capability 
literature. Firstly, dynamic capabilities may be crucial for successful initiative 
implementation. According to this study, five different strategic initiatives related 
dynamic capabilities are the key factors in successful initiative implementations. This 
finding enriches the current understanding on the key sources of successful initiative 
implementations. Secondly, the value of the initiative related dynamic capabilities 
identified by this study resides mainly in their ability to improve the finn's existing 
bundles of resources and knowledge bases. In this regard, the strategic initiative 
related dynamic capabilities observed relate to a finn's idiosyncratic knowledge base: 
they provide for all the recognised core functionalities of integrating, reconfiguring, 
gaining and releasing resources and the extending current knowledge base to facilitate 
the renewal process of the finn's competitive advantage (Teece et a!., 1997; Mitchell 
et al., 1999; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Thirdly, the 
initiative related dynamic capabilities identified by this study perfonn a twofold role 
in the successful implementation of a finn's strategic objectives and goals through 
strategic initiatives. On the one hand, the strategic initiative related dynamic 
capabilities perfonn a key role in supporting the implementation of new strategies and 
business directions. However. on the other hand. dynamic capabilities create 
additional challenges for the firm and ongoing initiatives which produce destructive 
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outcomes for the business, termed by this study "dysfunctional effects". These 
dysfunctional effects are generated mainly by the five initiative related dynamic 
capabilities, and they result from the production of supportive and dysfunctional 
knowledge stored within initiative specific knowledge base. 
1.3.4 Knowledge Based Theory 
This study contributes in different ways to the knowledge based theory. In particular, 
it furnishes new insights into how strategic initiatives affect the new knowledge 
emerging from other ongoing initiatives. Highlighted in the study is how strategic 
initiative interactions establish connections among the distinct knowledge bases of 
different ongoing strategic initiatives to create new and strategic initiative driven 
knowledge. Furthermore, these interactions generate limitations and incompatibilities 
among the emerging knowledge base combinations in the context of strategic 
initiatives. These limitations relate to incompatibilities among the idiosyncratic 
knowledge bases of strategic initiatives (e.g. initiative individual sense making 
routines etc.) which serve specialised strategic initiative purposes in implementing a 
specific strategic objective of the firm. The consequence of these specialisations is 
that strategic initiative related knowledge bases are limited in their capacity to be 
combined with other knowledge bases to create new knowledge. In this regard, the 
study comes to the conclusion that not all the knowledge created or triggered by 
strategic initiative interactions is equally valuable for the firm, and that it may even 
become business destructive (dysfunctional). Dysfunctional knowledge may emerge 
from strategic initiative implementation; it may be stored in different initiative 
specific knowledge bases; and it may be generated by different strategic initiative 
interactions between the strategic initiative and the firm's organisational context or by 
interactions among all of the ongoing initiatives. 
Another contribution of this study concerns the connection discovered between 
strategic initiatives related to dynamic capabilities and idiosyncratic knowledge bases. 
Dysfunctional knowledge within the initiative related knowledge base can tum the 
dynamic capabilities involved into destructive processes which iteratively generate 
challenges which give rise to dysfunctional effects that hamper the firm's value 
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creation process and its ability to renew its sources of competitive advantage. Finally, 
the study discusses the challenges emerging from the initiative implementation and 
draws up a classification of dysfunctional effects which increases the understanding 
of strategic initiative directed strategy making and strengthens the concept of strategic 
initiatives as entities able to create both business supportive and business destructive 
(dysfunctional) knowledge. 
1.4 Practical relevance and contribution 
Given the growing importance of successful strategic initiative implementation in 
management practice, this research provides guidelines on how the strategic initiative 
implementations can be managed professionally. This dissertation aims to provide 
insights and specific suggestions for practitioners. More specifically, it intends to 
highlight the following aspects. 
Firstly, this dissertation shows that strategy making in the context of strategic 
initiatives requires reinforcing the management of strategic initiative related 
interactions with the firm's organisational context and other ongoing initiatives. 
Reducing the complexities of strategic initiative related interactions - especially with 
other ongoing initiatives - can help managers to avoid producing unexpected and 
negative outcomes and limiting the firm's ability to renew its sources of competitive 
advantage based on the interactions among ongoing initiatives. A strategic initiative 
may have a strategic rationale for the firm in isolation. However, the integrated 
perspective of different ongoing strategic initiatives may comprise inefficient 
interactions which give rise to business destructive outcomes in ongoing initiatives. 
Hence, managers need to monitor and judge ongoing and emerging interactions 
among strategic initiatives according to their potential range and impact. 
Secondly, during their implementation, strategic initiatives develop their own 
knowledge bases which connect with other strategic initiative specific knowledge 
bases. Managers should manage these connections and knowledge base combinations 
by focusing their attention on potential synergies and limitations in the firm's 
emerging knowledge basco Strategic initiativc related knowlcdge bases comprise 
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strategic and valuable knowledge which is idiosyncratic and resists being combined 
with the firm's other specialised knowledge, especially during strategic initiative 
implementation. In this context, initiative specific knowledge bases may not always 
be amenable to connection with other specialised knowledge bases. Synergies can 
tum into inefficient overlaps which may restrict the effectiveness of initiative-specific 
knowledge bases because every initiative-specific knowledge base is specialised in 
addressing a strategic rationale of the firm. 
Thirdly, the managers should understand and prioritise the strategic importance of 
emerging knowledge across their organisation. According to the findings of this 
dissertation, not all the knowledge emerging from strategic initiatives is of equal 
strategic importance and value for the same period of time. Moreover, the knowledge 
emerging from the strategic initiatives may be supportive, less supportive or even 
dysfunctional. In this regard, this study identifies dysfunctional knowledge which can 
help managers to increase their understanding of irrelevant knowledge and create 
profiles on their dysfunctional knowledge in order to eliminate it through the 
prioritisation of strategic initiative implementation activities. Furthermore, the 
continuous prioritisation of initiative related resources may help to protect scarce firm 
resources and minimize the creation of ineffective knowledge. 
Fourthly, the case studies presented by this dissertation highlight the fact that 
challenges may arise during strategic initiative implementation. These challenges 
must be detected at an early stage in order to prevent problematic situations from 
arising during initiative implementations. Two challenging situations of growing 
resistance, boundaries and barriers against or between ongoing strategic initiatives, 
and conflicting perspectives and dependencies among ongoing strategic initiatives, 
provide indicators for managers on initiative implementation challenges which can 
iteratively generate new ones. Managers must be aware of these problematic 
situations because they represent critical and unexpected environments for the 
strategic initiative implementation activities. Furthermore, if managers understand 
these challenges, they are able to identify problematic initiatives and decide on 
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activities to prevent challenging outcomes for the firm and secure the strategy 
implementation process. 
Finally, the management team needs constantly to enhance the value creation of a 
strategic initiative by preventing the escalation of potential challenges from producing 
various dysfunctional effects for the entire company. Through challenges, strategic 
initiatives may give rise to dysfunctional effects (Drifting Targets, Emerging 
Resource Lacks, Neglect of Available Resources, Operational Complexities and 
Problem Multiplier) which can produce business destructive outcomes during the 
strategy implementation process. Furthermore, this outcome restricts the value 
creation of individual strategic initiatives and IS a new strategic threat for the 
company as it implements its strategies through strategic initiatives. Therefore, 
constantly enhancing and energizing the value creation of ongoing strategic initiatives 
requires managers to perform the roles of initiative-driven explorers and innovators. 
1.5 Outline of the dissertation 
The main aim of this dissertation is to increase our understanding and to develop an 
integrated concept of strategic initiative related dysfunctions in the context of 
renewing a firm's sources of competitive advantage. The nine chapters of this 
dissertation are briefly outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Chapter 1 ("Introduction") provides a general description of the research problem by 
outlining the primary research gap identified. The research objectives and scope are 
then presented, and the dissertation's main research question is stated. Subsequently, 
the theoretical and practical relevance of the study's research question and findings 
are outlined. 
Chapter 2 ("Literature Review") conducts a comprehensive review of the literature 
and concepts relevant to the dissertation's research problem. The chapter begins with 
a review of the literature on the strategic initiative, which is the basis and unit of 
analysis of the study. This is followed by reviews of the resource based theory, the 
dynamic capability literature and the knowledge based theory of the firm. Finally, the 
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chapter outlines the research questions derived from an examination of the current 
literature. 
Chapter 3 ("Research Methodology") describes and explains the dissertation's 
research methodology. Firstly, the methodological approach is presented, and a 
justification is given for its qualitative research approach, including the philosophical 
stance, design, and research objectives. The case study design is then outlined with 
regard to the preparation and data collection phases. The preparation phase comprises 
the case study protocol, the single case study approach, and the reflexivity of the 
researcher, outlining the strategies employed to avoid potential bias. The data 
collection phase comprises the different data collection sources, including semi-
structured interviews, on-site observations and documentation, and how the researcher 
obtained access to the case study company. The aim is to fulfill the defined research 
objectives and to find answers to the derived research question by conducting the 
three in-depth strategic initiative case studies. The data analysis and interpretation 
section states how the data analysis and interpretation led to the generation of the new 
theory. Firstly, it illustrates the different types of coding methods used to analyse, 
reduce, organise and compare the data collected from the case. Secondly, it illustrates 
how a theory of dysfunctional effects in the context of strategic initiative 
implementations was generated from the data analysis, cross-case comparison and 
interpretation results. Finally, this section also discusses the issues of literature 
comparison, validation and thesis writing. 
Chapter 4 ("Fieldwork: Case Study Company Overview") introduces the case 
company, providing background information relevant to the three in-depth case 
studies. This background information concerns the company's vision, mission, market 
presence and challenges. It also provides explanations of the company's planned 
strategic agenda and new business strategies. Finally, the chapter furnishes further 
information about the company's strategic initiatives. 
Chaptcrs 5, 6 and 7 ("Case Studies") set out the three in-depth cases: The Sun Sigma 
I n i t i a t i n ~ , , the CRM Conyergcnce InitiatiYe, and the Balanced Scorccard Initiati\'c. All 
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three case studies are organised into four sections. The introduction provides 
background information on the strategic initiative, followed by the description of its 
rationale, which includes the definition and vision of the initiative and its strategic 
objectives. The third section describes the implementation of the strategic initiative, 
which is divided into interactions between the strategic initiative and the firm's 
organisational context and interactions among strategic initiatives. The last section 
summarises the individual case study findings. 
Chapter 8 ("Analysis of the Findings") is organised into three main sections. The first 
section outlines the main characteristics and differences, and compares the three 
strategic initiatives observed and analysed. The second section illustrates the 
interactions observed between the organisational context and other ongoing strategic 
initiatives, which are summarised as strategic initiative interactions. Furthermore, the 
section analyses, discusses and compares the challenges observed and classifies the 
dysfunctional effects generated by the strategic initiative implementation activities. 
The last part of the second section describes the strategic initiative related 
dysfunctions which emerged from the initiative implementations. The third and last 
section of the chapter focuses on theoretical reflections and discusses the findings 
from the strategic initiative case studies. The third section discusses the findings of 
the strategic initiative related interactions in the context of the resource based theory 
and the strategic initiative, focusing particularly on problematic aspects of combining 
new and existing firm resources. It then examines the drivers identified in the light of 
the dynamic capability concept and the theoretical debate on the challenges and 
dysfunctional effects. Finally, it discusses the knowledge based theory with regard to 
its implications for knowledge bases and the strategic initiative related knowledge 
creation process. 
Chapter 9 ("Conclusions") concludes the dissertation from a theoretical and 
managerial point of view. The limitations of the study are outlined, and directions for 
further research are described. 
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to this research work, and identifies and 
discusses the theoretical gaps and limitations. Strategic initiatives are becoming a ital 
source for renewing a firm's sources of competitive advantage. In this regard to 
increase our understanding about the strategic initiative implementation process and 
their potential challenges, different main bodies of literature were selected to be 
reviewed: in particular, the strategic initiative concepts, the resource based theory , the 
dynamic capabilities literature and the knowledge based theory of the firm. Figure 1 
outlines the selected main bodies of literature by outlining the interrelations among 
them according to the research focus of this dissertation. 
Figure 1: Selected main bodies of literature. 
Strategy Making I Implementation 
Strategy Initiative (SI) 
renewing Competitive Advantage 
Knowledge-
based Theory 
Organisational 
Knowledge 
Knowledge Creation 
The literature review starts with a discussion of the strategic initiative concept. The 
concept of strategic initiatives has been recognised as a common way to implement a 
firm' trategy by renewing its mo t valuable sources of competitive advantage, 
whi h lead to the u tainability of the firm economic rents and above-average 
retunl (Peteraf 1993; McGrath et 01. 1995; Lo a and Gho hal , 2000). In dynamic 
and competiti e n ironm nt , like th IT indu try, finn ha e hifted mor and m re 
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from a yearly planning process to a continuous strategy development process based on 
strategic initiative implementations (Daft and Weick, 1984; Teece, 1984; Black and 
Boal, 1994; Hamel, 2000; Wielemaker et al., 2001; Wielemaker, 2003). In this regard, 
strategic initiative implementations are faced with the challenge of remaining in the 
market by mobilising and renewing the firm's sources of competitive advantage; 
idiosyncratic resources and knowledge base (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a; 
Burgelman, 1991; Dunbar and Ahlstrom, 1995; McGrath et al., 1995; McGrath, 2001; 
Marx, 2004). Therefore, affecting the firm's existing resource base to establish new 
and competitive bundles of resources is critical for a successful strategic initiative 
implementation. This leads to the debate and review of the resource based theory 
(Daft and Weick, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; Block and MacMilan, 1985; Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993). 
Inspired by Edith Penrose's (1959) theory of the growth of the firm, scholars have 
developed the resource based theory of the firm to determine how a firm's 
competitive advantage can be understood (Chamberlin, 1933; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1986; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). The theory defines a firm's resources as 
the key source of competitive advantage (Bower and Christensen, 1996; Barney, 
1991). However, the resource based view has the shortcoming of providing an overly 
static account of a firm's competitive advantage. Scholars have argued that the 
traditional resource based view misinterprets the notion of renewing competitive 
advantage (Collis, 1991; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). The 
dynamic context of strategic initiative implementations, in particular, is not fully 
linked into the resource based theory on how strategic initiative implementation 
activities can lead to competitive bundles of resources. Furthermore, the assumption 
emerges that strategic initiatives require idiosyncratic dynamic capabilities 
successfully to implement their objectives and goals by leveraging and enhancing the 
existing knowledge base of a firm to establish competitive bundles of idiosyncratic 
firm resources. These arguments led to the decision to integrate the theories of 
dynamic capabilities and the knowledge based theory of the firm into the scope of the 
literature review. 
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Dynamic capabilities provide the opportunity to overcome and enhance the static 
nature of the RBV by providing the theoretical background to define the sources 
which enable a strategic initiative to transform and deploy a firm's individual 
resources to create and renew its sources of sustainable competitive advantage. ( Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et aI., 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). Therefore, the strategic initiative related strategy 
implementation approach requires initiative specific dynamic capabilities as a 
prerequisite for successful strategy implementations (Teece and Pisano, 1994). In this 
regard, the theory of dynamic capabilities also provides answers to the challenges that 
firms face during the process of renewing their sources of competitive advantage. 
Firms are highly path-dependent, and the current core capabilities relevant to a firm's 
current success may become traps or rigidities for its future success (Levitt and 
March, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1992). Therefore, dynamic capabilities provide 
promising insights into renewing and sustaining the sources of competitive advantage 
for companies through strategic initiatives, and into why previously successful firms 
may fail to maintain their competitive advantages. Nevertheless, the theory lacks an 
explanation of how firms fail within their strategy implementations. In particular 
which kind of dynamic capabilities are relevant for strategic initiatives successfully to 
implement their objectives and goals? Moreover, strategic initiative related research 
has focused on the process of initiative development, rather than integrating the 
concept of dynamic capabilities in the context of critical resource effects that emerge 
during strategic initiative implementations (Bryson and Bromily, 1993; McGrath et 
al., 1995; McGrath, 1996; McGrath, 2001; Wielemaker, 2003). The lack of theoretical 
background and insufficient explanations of how firms fail by using strategic 
initiatives are therefore apparent, and, in particular, the conceptualisation of the 
challenges that arise when a firm tries to renew its resources and knowledge base. In 
this regard, theoretical gaps emerge regarding what kind of consequences - especially 
resource-effccts and influencing factors - occur and surround the renewal of an 
existing firm resource and knowledge base during the transformation into new sources 
of competitive advantage. Hence, the perspective that strategic initiatives develop and 
leverage individual dynamic capabilities to renew existing resources and extend the 
existing knowledge bases by combining. utilising and extending the existing 
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knowledge of the firm and other ongoing initiatives, leads to the fourth main body of 
literature: the knowledge based theory of the firm. 
The knowledge based theory of the firm enriches the theoretical discussion and 
conceptualisation of renewing a firm's sources of competitive advantage through 
strategic initiatives in two main ways. Firstly, strategic initiative related dynamic 
capabilities facilitate the combination of new and old resources by accelerating the 
creation of new knowledge in the context of shaping competitive bundles of firm 
resources. Secondly, new and emerging knowledge from initiative implementations 
extends the relevant idiosyncratic knowledge base of the firm from where initiative 
specific dynamic capabilities iteratively utilise their knowledge. Those aspects 
concern the important debate on the strategic importance of knowledge as an enabler 
for firms, which has created a growing body of literature on knowledge in 
organisations (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 
1996; Spender, 1996; Eisenhardt and Santos, 2001; Patriotta, 2003). In this regard, the 
increasing understanding of how strategic initiatives affect a firm's individual 
resources and knowledge base can be enhanced through new aspects of supportive 
and destructive knowledge creation. New and emerging knowledge may not always 
be helpful in reshaping a firm's sources of competitive advantages through strategic 
initiatives. Therefore, the knowledge based view of the firm is necessary to explain 
the impacts and consequences of the emerging challenges and the effects of the 
resource transformation process in the context of initiative related dynamic 
capabilities utilising the knowledge base of the firm. Moreover, an increased 
understanding of the side-effects that arise during the initiative implementation 
process in the context of knowledge creation heightens the understanding and value of 
the emerging knowledge bases of the firm (including knowledge bases from other 
ongoing initiatives). Finally, based on the main bodies of literature reviewed and the 
identified theoretical gaps, the last section of this literature review describes the 
research questions derived from the literature review. 
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2.1 Strategic Initiatives 
The concept of 'strategic initiative' concerns a progressive form of strategy making 
(Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983b; Burgelman, 1988; Burgelman, 1991; Lovas and 
Ghoshal, 2000; Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; Wielemaker, 2003). Strategic initiatives 
can playa key role for companies in the strategic renewal process. Strategic initiatives 
enable firms to deploy and employ their resources, and they facilitate individual 
dynamic capabilities to renew a firm's sources of competitive advantage (McGrath et 
aI., 1995). They reflect the means by which a firm's management team expects to 
achieve its strategic goals and visions as reflected in value creation and sustainable 
growth (Dunbar and Ahlstrom, 1995; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000). In this regard, 
successful strategic initiatives create and accumulate the new knowledge necessary to 
fulfil targets (Winter, 2000; McGrath, 2001; Wielemaker, 2003). The concept of 
strategic initiative has been given various and complementary definitions within the 
academic literature. A general and common definition in relation to the wide range of 
complementary studies in the literature is provided by McGrath et. al (1995, p. 13): 
"Strategic initiatives are a principle mechanism 
through which organisations develop new competitive 
advantage" 
On this basis, various researchers have focused on specific strategic initiative aspects 
and different perspectives. Therefore, a broad range of possible differences within the 
concept of strategic initiatives has been discussed. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) 
distinguish initiatives between deliberate and emergent. Deliberate initiatives are 
characterised by processes where the development of long-term goals and action 
programmes reflect and prefigure the implementation of the initiative over time. 
Emcrgent strategic initiatives are developed gradually over time and merge into a 
coherent pattern without first being explicitly formulated (Mintzberg and Waters, 
1985). Othcr researchcrs distinguish bctwecn induced and autonomous stratcgic 
initiativcs (Burgclman, 1983b). Induccd initiativcs are part of a firm's current 
stratcgy, while autonomous initiatives lie outside the bordcrs of thc firm's current 
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strategy. In the light of Burgelman' s (1983) classification, this thesis distinguishes 
between strategic initiatives that relate to the firm's top management agenda and 
includes deviations due to a firm's existing capabilities. 
Another group of researchers relate the concept of strategic initiatives to any kind of 
change (McGrath, 1996; Birkenshaw, 1997; Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000). Change is 
the baseline and reason for the launching and driving of strategic initiatives by an 
executive management team. Thus, strategic initiatives are regarded as strategic 
change journeys aimed at initiating and driving change - sometimes radical change -
across an organisation. According to some researchers, the top management generally 
begin with exploratory initiatives - new managers, in particular, are motivated to 
develop and sponsor new initiatives that are intended to drive new ideas and explore 
new areas. Other scholars focus on the possible outcomes of strategic initiatives, 
similar to the concepts of project goal achievements (Bryson and Bromily, 1993; 
McGrath, 2001). Initiatives enable an organisation to create and sustain a competitive 
advantage based on improved financial performance. Bryson and Bromily (1993) 
investigated how process and context factors, such as technological change, stability, 
communication, forcing, and problem-solving skills, directly and indirectly influence 
an initiative's outcome. McGrath et al. (1995) analysed the importance of a strategic 
initiative related to the range of the management team's competencies and their 
aptitude in planning, managing and executing initiative-relevant tasks. Yet, other 
researchers have examined the development of learning capabilities as a potential 
outcome of firms' initiatives and global programmes (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Bryson 
and Bromily, 1993; McGrath, 2001). McGrath (2001) reported that the goals and 
initiative supervisory autonomy for learning effectiveness in explorative and 
exploitative environments relate to the development of learning capabilities and the 
potential outcomes of a strategic initiative. 
More recent research on strategic initiatives relates the concept to knowledge based 
perspectives. Strategic initiatives are the means by which a firm seeks to justify its 
existence and to appropriate economic value from its environment (Lovas and 
GhoshaL 2000; HameL 2000). Therefore, successful strategic initiatives are 
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undertaken to create and accumulate the new knowledge that is necessary to achicye 
the firm's objectives (Winter, 2000; McGrath, 2001; Wielemaker, 2003). Strategic 
initiatives are intended to create novel insights, to establish and facilitate tests of 
uncommon cause-effect relationships and to retain the acquired experience. This is 
mostly done by performing a variety of learning activities until a satisfactory solution 
emerges and capability learning comes to a preliminary end (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Winter, 2000). Learning activities are behavioural procedures for intuiting, 
interpreting, integrating, and institutionalising the knowledge needed for the 
successful development of new strategic initiatives (Crossan et at., 1999). Strategic 
initiatives comprise activities through which members of different action units 
acquire, share, and combine knowledge into a collective product through experience 
with each other (Argote et al., 2000). By extension, Wielemaker (2003) develops the 
knowledge based perspective and focuses on how strategic initiatives are 
conceptualised and defined. From this perspective, initiatives are processes that 
combine previously disconnected and emerging knowledge domains of the strategic 
initiative with the firm's knowledge base. The strategic initiative creates its own 
knowledge base over time. Therefore, initiatives are knowledge creating entities 
acting as alliances among independent knowledge domains within an organisation, be 
they individuals, teams or organisations (Weick, 1982; Chatterjee and Wemerfelt, 
1991). This aspect of strategic initiatives includes the problem that initiatives may 
deviate strongly from an organisation's established skills and knowledge base. In this 
context, organisational core capabilities may change into core rigidities and hamper 
the progress of a strategic initiative (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Nevertheless, core 
rigidities represent only a minor aspect of strategy making threats because 
organisations in general undertake different initiatives and key programs alongside 
their daily business operations. This stimulates two additional assumptions. Firstly, an 
organisation is limited in its ability to execute strategic initiatives. Such ability relates 
to its capacity to create new capabilities. Secondly, initiatives face the problem of 
incompatibility, because a firm's knowledge base and resources have limited 
possibilities of being combined. In this context, this thesis proposes a conceptual 
definition based on the work of McGrath (2001), Floyd (2000), Chatterjee (1991), 
Wiclemaker (2003), and Bryson and Bromily (1993): Strategic initiatiycs are defincd 
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as action units initiated through new ideas and strategies with the intention of creating 
or renewing a firm's sources of competitive advantage. In this context. strategic 
initiatives are undertaken to achieve strategic (change) goals by recombining a firm's 
resource base and overcoming problems that arise during the recombination process. 
Strategic initiatives therefore entail a certain amount of uncertainty. Initially, 
decisions concerning a new initiative are made on assumptions similar to project 
goals, rather than on well-understood relationships among the many strategic 
variables involved (Burgelman, 1983b; Kanter, 1983; Block and MacMilan, 1985). 
This uncertainty includes potential gaps, since research projects have focused more on 
the process of initiative development than on the resource effects surrounding 
initiatives or the factors influencing initiative success. Hence, the outcome that is 
important for this research thesis is addressing the theoretical gaps by conceptualising 
different resource transition effects and influential factors during the transformation of 
a firm's existing resource base (Huff et aI., 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). For the 
purposes of this thesis, strategic initiatives involve strategic processes for the renewal 
of an organisation's core competencies. Thus, incremental product or service changes 
and other, operational, initiatives or programmes that do not contribute to the firm's 
strategy making processes are beyond the scope of this study. 
Strategic initiatives reflect the range of a firm's strategic alternatives: they coordinate 
smaller agendas into broader, more ambitious policies and directions (Corsi, 1992; 
Volberda, 2004). They are sometimes described as strategic plans in which a change 
in a carefully chosen area has a major and sometimes dramatic impact on the existing 
structures, and especially on an organisation's existing resource configurations and 
capabilities (McGrath, 2001). In a wider sense, strategic initiatives can be described 
as concepts for launching single or multiple area-impact and programme-based 
activities. This approach can be expanded from single non-strategic project activity 
which fits within a broader overall movement to a truly strategic initiative, 
representing a movement that pursues visionary, far-reaching, and long-term company 
goals based on its own organisational form, administration, and roles. 
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2.1.1 Ambiguity of Strategic Initiatives 
Strategic initiatives often occur for a specific strategic reason - strategic change, 
repositioning of the firm, realising new business opportunities - or they result from 
relatively unplanned activities undertaken without particular reference to a conscious 
corporate strategy ("autonomous" behaviour). These characteristics mean that 
strategic initiatives comprise a certain degree of autonomous behaviour which 
constantly surrounds an initiative management team and stakeholders with ambiguity 
(Khanna et al., 2000; Kownatzki, 2002; Zott, 2003). Hence, initiatives often occur in 
conditions and environments where information is either missing or difficult to 
interpret. Furthermore, strategic initiative related decisions and actions always include 
a certain amount of uncertainty and ambiguity. The assumption is that the planning 
and control of strategic initiatives and the related learning effects that are essential in 
more mature and predictive business environments for management teams become 
unimportant or even destructive - especially for emerging strategic initiatives. The 
teams and stakeholders that manage and support an initiative's progress are likely to 
experience gaps between the initiative's objectives and the actual results ( Kanter, 
1983; Daft and Weick, 1984; Block and MacMilan, 1985; Maidique and Zirger, 1985; 
Dunbar and Ahlstrom, 1995). In this regard, strategic initiatives reflect what the 
organisation wants to do to ensure its existence and the resources that flow into a 
strategic initiative to realize the planned undertaking. However, additional challenges 
may arise from strong deviations in a firm's established skills and knowledge base, 
and transfonn the existing core capabilities into core rigidities which raise additional 
obstacles to the success of strategic initiatives (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Managerial 
oversight of new initiatives may also playa certain role (Duck, 1993; Frost et al., 
2002). McGrath (2001) examines the impact of managerial influence on new business 
projects and differentiates between goal and supervision autonomy. Goal autonomy 
refers to the ability of action units as strategic initiatives to set their own perfonnance 
goals, while supervision autonomy concerns control exerted over operational 
decisions and activities by supervising the management and stakeholders. Research 
shows that action units with high degrees of both goal and supervision autonomy 
outperform more strictly led teams (McGrath, 2001). Hence, the next assumption is 
that strategic initiati\'cs arc difficult to plan and control. As many strategic initiati\'cs 
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enter uncharted territory, repeated practices and subsequent trial-and-error processes 
are lacking, and the initiative requires a significant amount of learning-by-doing. 
Therefore, strategic initiatives are similar to journeys - journeys with limited 
forecasting opportunities and unexpected outcomes (Tegarden et al., 1999). These 
outcomes are still undiscovered within the academic literature and they reflect a gap 
in the theory of strategic initiatives: especially on how strategic initiatives support, 
contribute to, and drive a firm's strategy making processes to create and sustain its 
competitive advantages. 
2.1.2 Competitive Advantage through Strategic Initiatives 
Strategic initiatives may produce a competitive advantage III a number of ways 
(McGrath et al., 1995; Tushman and O'Reilly III, 1996; Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; 
McGrath, 2001; Wielemaker et aI., 2001). Firstly, firms start their strategic initiatives 
in order to utilise resources already at their disposal in order to enter new market areas 
with lower costs and greater efficiency, or with a more competitive offer than 
competitors (Burke and Litwin, 1992). The global company, General Electric 
Financial Services, developed its financial services systems, skills and capabilities 
over two decades, and, through strategic initiatives, it transformed its instalment loan 
portfolio into a broad range of financial service offerings (Volberda, 2004). Secondly, 
the start-up of new strategic initiatives may relate to the intention to contribute to the 
firm's "absorptive capacity" (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In order to enter small and 
less challenging markets, companies are able proactively to develop new markets, 
products or technological assets (Burgelman, 1991; Vollmann, 1996; Baden-Fuller 
and Volberda, 1997). When companies like Kyocera or Sternplastic GmbH & Co. 
KG, making scissor blades, first entered the field of industrial ceramics, they did not 
only substitute steel blades. They undertook initiatives with the intention of building 
processes and technological assets in the long term, despite the modest profits in the 
first markets entered. As McGrath et al (1995) describe, an extension of this strategy 
for taking new initiatives is the simultaneous pursuit of numerous products, markets. 
and technologies with modest investments in any given effort. This approach relates 
closely to the concept of the "option" strategy (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). Therefore. 
the concept of strategic initiatives enables firms to choose the strategic option that is 
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best suited to them and realise it through the execution of the strategic initiatiye. 
Thirdly, firms sometimes create a new source of competitive advantage through 
chance. The famous "Post-It" note produced by the 3M Corporation provides an 
example of an organisation which actually possessed an attractive combination of 
proprietary assets, but only recognised and capitalised on those assets after a 
considerable delay. However, the ambiguity of new initiatives relates to the idea of 
change in the existing business environments. As Richard P. Carlton, the fonner 3M 
CEO in 1950, said: "You're right, our Corporation stumbled over new products, but 
you shouldn't forget that you can stumble over something if you move" (Szamosi and 
Duxbury, 2002, p.24). The statement comprises some of the core characteristics of 
strategic initiatives. In order to change the existing and well-established resource 
configurations, the initiative must be deliberate and emerge over time without a linear 
and designed plan. In extension, strategic initiatives are journeys with unpredictable 
outcomes. Their results may be business-supportive, as illustrated by the "Post-It" 
example, or they may be business-destructive. Hence, strategic initiatives include a 
certain degree of unpredictable power and dynamic effects for an organisation. 
Finally, the concept of strategic initiative entails that all rent-generating competitive 
advantages will erode over time (Vollmann, 1996; Wielemaker et al., 2001). This is 
where strategic initiatives address the key problem for strategists: supporting and 
managing the development of new sources of competitive advantage by replacing or 
changing those resources and capability configurations which are no longer able to 
yield rent. According to Bargeman's (1988) concept of retrospective rationalisation, 
competitive advantages are only recognised retrospectively after a strategic initiative 
has been launched and executed. Hence, to use the terms of the resource based theory, 
the "distinctive competencies" that will be generated through a strategic initiative are 
often not known at the beginning (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). Nevertheless, the 
retrospective view plays an important role in discovering and developing new 
competitive advantages by reflecting the somehow unpredictable path and outcomes 
of an initiative journey. The unpredictable path is often characterized, problemtized 
and complicated by a resistance from various stakeholders. Due to its importance, the 
following section will discuss various challenges which can potentially emerge during 
the implementation of strategic initiatives. 
2.1.3 Strategic change initiative implementation problems 
Implementing changes through strategic initiatives includes the risk of failure. Corbett 
et al. (2007) found that at least a third of new product development initiatives failed 
and suggest the importance of learning from those failed initiatives. According to 
them, termination can occur in three different ways. Firstly, it is called undisciplined 
termination, which indicates a quick decision to "kill" a project or initiative without 
considering its possible learning opportunities. Secondly, it is called strategic 
termination, as it occurs when the overall objective of a strategic initiative is no 
longer aligned with the firm's strategic goals. Therefore, initiatives can be terminated 
due to their strategic values. Thirdly, initiatives can be terminated through innovation 
drift which reflects the tendency to allow initiatives to continue even though the 
outcome of the innovation is no longer in line with the aim of the firm. In other 
words, these projects continue without any potential to serve the firm's strategic 
goals. 
Basically, all three types of initiative failure offer some valuable learning 
opportunities (Corbett et aI., 2007). However, fully to articulate the learning 
opportunities will require a deep understanding of the issues and dynamics that led the 
project to fail in the first place. Moreover, in addition to the understanding of failed 
projects, they also argue the importance of unravelling how top performing firms 
handle their constant challenges through balancing between the type and number of 
initiatives. In order to maintain this optimal balance, it is vital to understand how 
ongoing initiatives interact with each other. 
Another group of scholars conceptualised resistance as an important resource for 
change and providing additional insights on challenging implementation aspects (Ford 
et (II., 2008). In thcir context, resistance is an irrational and dysfunctional reaction of 
the change recipients and a function of the quality of the relationship between the 
change agents and recipients. In particular, change oriented initiatives can face 
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resistance from the change recipients, triggered by the top management and decision 
makers acting as the change agents of the organisation. Hence, the top management 
and decision makers acting as change agents can cause resistance for change initiative 
implementation and lead to implementation challenges. 
Another aspect of initiative implementation problems relates to the interactions that 
an ongoing change initiative undergoes during their implementation. In particular, 
strategic change initiatives are creating situations within organisations that interrupt 
the normal patterns of an organisation and calls for participants to enact new patterns, 
involving the interplay between deliberate and emergent processes that can be highly 
ambiguous (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Dent & Goldberg, 1999). These interactions 
between ongoing initiatives or interactions between the initiative and the 
organisational context may stimulate implementation problems as resistance to 
change. In particular, managers and decision makers can break agreements with the 
wider audience of the organisation (the recipients) during the initiative 
implementation period and facilitate the loss of trust, which can raise problems during 
the change implementation process (Cobb et al., 1995; Andresson, 1996; Wamous 
and Austin, 1997). Another change implementation problem relates to the breakdown 
in communication; the top managers and decision maker can stimulate resistance 
through communication breakdown, such as failing to legitimise the change initiative, 
misrepresenting its chances of success and failing to call people to action (Ford et al., 
2008). Nevertheless, the scholars leave the issue unresolved on how the emerging 
resistance between the agent-recipient relationships affects the implementation 
processes of the change initiatives. Hence, conceptualising the emerging dysfunctions 
from strategic change initiative implementation provides the opportunity to increase 
the understanding of the potential impact from upcoming change resistance and their 
challenging outcomes. 
2.1 A Managerial Context of Strategic Initiatives 
In general, strategic initiatives can be classified into two major types. The first type of 
strategic initiative is generally explored, described and initiated by the top 
management team (top-down). From there, the initiativc flows are a second stagc for 
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the implementation teams across the organisation (Selznick, 1957; Chandler, 1962; 
Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). The second type of strategic initiative flows from 
the daily business operation team, which attends to the initiative's exploration and 
definition for the top management teams (bottom-up). These types of initiative can be 
characterised as making sense of new and emerging ideas, facilitating strategic 
decisions and actions and legitimizing the new journey (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Kanter, 1999). In this regard, the firm's organizational form, decision structure and 
hierarchy influence the shaping and launching of new top-down or bottom-up 
strategic initiatives at an early stage (Wielemaker et al., 2001; Wielemaker, 2003). 
However, progressive, radical and globally oriented strategic initiatives may not 
reflect a typically hierarchy-related, top-down or bottom-up, one-directional 
approach. Instead, this kind of strategic initiative follows more interactive and 
deliberate paths across a company's organizational hierarchies, departments and 
levels (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1996). Hence, the interrelations across the different 
management levels represent a challenge of complexity for a strategic initiative. 
Furthermore, besides the interrelations with the organizational context, a strategic 
initiative faces additional complexities due to the interrelations with other ongoing 
initiatives. Strategic initiatives may have to overcome those obstacles to achieve their 
goals and objectives. The assumptions are, firstly, that the interrelations between the 
strategic initiatives are a potential source of complexities in the areas of sense making, 
resource allocation and decision structures, and, secondly, that inefficiencies may 
arise out of the complexities of the interrelations which impact on the performance 
and results of strategic initiatives. 
A group of researchers have found that the degree of organisational embeddedness 
relates to the success of a strategic initiative, because the benefits increase at lower 
levels and the costs increase at higher levels of organisational embeddedness of a 
strategic initiative (Lechner et al., 2003; Marx, 2004). These researchers discuss the 
dependencies and ties between the strategic initiative defined by the action units and 
other related action units within the company network, such as the organizational 
units, departments, and teams. Their discussion is based on the idea that strong ties 
create a large number of relations with other organizational units, so that an action 
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unit can more efficiently develop the information and knowledge base associated with 
a strategic initiative (Wielemaker et al., 2001; Marx, 2004). The debate also 
concludes that strong ties with the rest of the organization are likely to increase the 
action unit's connections with the key stakeholders, which enhances the strategic 
initiative's perceived desirability and acceptability within the organization. 
Nevertheless, these authors neglect the aspect of unexpected outcomes and results -
dysfunctional effects - due to strategic initiative actions and the interrelations 
between the initiative and the organizational context, and between the initiative and 
other ongoing strategic initiatives. Furthermore, the discussion of embeddedness has 
the shortcoming of being too unilateral. A larger amount of relations between the 
strategic initiative action unit and other company-related action units certainly 
generates a higher level of information flow and knowledge creation. Nevertheless, 
the discussion of the knowledge emerging from strategic initiative implementation is 
unresolved. The assumption is that the knowledge created may not always be helpful 
for, compatible with, or supportive of the initiative's progress and the aim of 
renewing a firm's knowledge base. Hence, an increasing number of interrelations 
between the strategic initiative action unit and other company-related action units may 
be problematic and raise obstacles which hamper the initiative's progress and produce 
unexpected side effects. 
2.1.5 Discussion of the Strategic Initiatives Concept 
According to McGrath et al (1995), competitive advantage is unlikely to emerge from 
a strategic initiative unless its responsible entities are able to develop capabilities in 
what they are doing. These capabilities are often outcomes and new combinations of 
firm-specific resources, which enable the organisation to accomplish its task of 
moving in the desired direction (Teece et al., 1997). Hence, in order to increase the 
probability that a new competitive advantage will be created by strategic initiatives, 
companies must focus and manage the convergence between an initiative's objectives 
and its results. Therefore, the assumption is that companies are limited in their abi lity 
to execute strategic initiatives. Various scholars maintain that an initiative's success 
relates to its organisational embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996; Soda and Usai, 1999; 
Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Chung et at., 2000). However, thcy fail to answcr the 
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question regarding which kind of effects emerge and how an organisation can 
overcome these challenges. Moreover, the next assumption is that initiatives create 
incompatible resource reconfigurations. These new configurations face new 
challenges alongside the organisational ones. Hence, single initiatives may generate 
value for an organisation, but several ongoing strategic initiatives may disturb, limit 
and inhibit each other in different areas and ways to achieve their objectives, creating 
value for the overall company. In this regard, increasing ties with other strategic 
initiatives may heighten the complexities and create new knowledge or information 
within the single initiative action unit that may be critical to the progress and success 
of other initiative action units. In detail, the complexities faced by a strategic initiative 
are related to the different surrounded and detached action units of an organisation. 
Those action units provide the initiative's action unit with a great deal of diverse 
information, which induces the initiative to focus too closely on exploration at the 
expense of enhancing existing capabilities (Koka and Prescott, 2002). Therefore, 
access to different strategic initiative action units and interests increases the risk of 
causing confusion within an individual strategic initiative, thus leading to ineffective 
and inefficient action. Especially if the interests are heterogeneous or even 
contradictory, it is difficult or even impossible for the single strategic initiative to 
decide which information and interests are trustworthy and supportive for success, so 
that ineffective actions and side-effects may ensue. The level of confusion increases 
and additional conflicts arise within the initiative's unit, reducing the efficiency of the 
latter. Moreover, higher and stronger levels of relations between strategic initiatives 
stimulate the dynamism of new knowledge across the different initiative action units 
and may create or additionally stimulate unforeseeable outcomes and effects which 
diminish the success of individual initiatives. 
The next consideration concerns the uncertainty and unpredictable nature of strategic 
initiatives, which often occur with a specific strategic reason within a company. These 
undertakings imply that strategic initiatives are similar to journeys, which have a 
certain degree of uncertainty and unpredictability in outcomes, because strategic 
initiatives operate in conditions and environments where information is either missing 
or difficult to interpret. In this context, the planning and controlling of strategic 
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initiatives are limited and may require a different approach by the management team. 
As many strategic initiatives enter uncharted territory, repeated practices and 
subsequent trial-and-error processes are lacking, and the initiative requires a 
significant amount of learning-by-doing. Hence, ongoing dynamics influence the 
progress and success of strategic initiatives either in the context of an initiative's 
organisational environment or in the context of other ongoing initiatives. These 
dynamics may create different outcomes and effects, as new knowledge becomes 
counterproductive for the success of a strategic initiative. The acquisition of a greater 
understanding on how strategic initiatives impact on the existing resource 
configurations and a firm's capabilities provides an opportunity to detail and enhance 
the strategy making process of firms with additional theoretical insights, especially 
with regard to how a new competitive advantage can be developed and scarce 
company resources be better invested and reallocated. 
2.2 Resource Based View of the Firm 
Over the last decade, a large and diverse body of studies has discussed a firm's 
competitive advantage. In this regard, the resource based view (RBV) of the firm 
provides indications about how companies may be able to understand their individual 
sources of competitive advantage as a baseline for renewal (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993). In relation to the strategy making process, the term "competitive 
advantage" has been best defined by Barney (1991, p. 102), who wrote as follows: 
"A firm is said to have a sustained competitive 
advantage when it is implementing a value creating 
strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any 
current or potential competitors and when these other 
firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this 
strategy". 
Until the late 1980s. the resource based view was characterised by a rather fragmented 
process of development. The earliest acknowledgement of the potential importance of 
fillll-specific resources is to be found in the work of economists (Chamberlin, 19)): 
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Robinson, 1933) and was subsequently developed by Penrose (1959). Rather than 
emphasising market structures, these economists highlighted firm heterogeneity and 
argued that the unique assets and capabilities of firms were important factors in 
growth (Penrose, 1959). For example, Chamberlin (1933) identified some of the key 
capabilities of firms as technical know-how, reputation, brand awareness, the ability 
of managers to work together and the ability to create particularly patents and 
trademarks, of which many have been re-examined in the recent strategic 
management literature (Hall, 1992; Day, 1994). These path breaking findings 
generated a large body of research. In order to aid understanding of the levers of 
competitive advantage, this research can be classified into three main strands. The 
first describes how managers drive the development and deployment of a firm's 
resources (Barney, 1986; Schoemaker, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney 
and Zajac, 1994; Lei and Bettis, 1996). The second strand focuses more on the scope 
of the firm and on the relationships between resources (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Markides and 
Williamson, 1996; Williamson, 1999). The third has sought to identify and develop 
concepts which reflect how a firm's sustainable competitive advantage can be 
understood (Daft and Weick, 1984; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Black and Boal, 
1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). All of these research streams have at least one 
feature in common: all of them have been in some way inspired by Edith Penrose's 
(1959) theory of firm growth. 
2.2.1 Historical context of the RBV - Penrose Influence 
There is no doubt in the academic world that Edith Penrose influenced numerous 
research projects in the field of resource based theory. Various scholars, such as 
Wernerfclt (1984) and Teece (1982), cited Penrose in their early papers. Penrose's 
brilliant insights into discontinuous growth, collective learning, the discovery of 
productive opportunities and the creation of impregnable knowledge bases have 
inspired the development of various components in the resource based models. For 
Penrose, the firm is a pool of resources organized within an administrati\'c 
framcwork. To cxplain the growth of the firm, Penrose developed a process \'ic\\ of 
production and competition which enabled her to conceptualize the distinctions 
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between resources and productive servIces and between productive serVIces and 
productive opportunities. In this context, Penrose incorporated knowledge and 
technology into a dynamic theory of enterprise growth. Within Penrose's model, 
known as the "Penrosian Firm", the firm strategically shapes the market rather than 
reacting passively to it, but does so within a moving, historically contingent 
environment. Firms address upcoming productive opportunities in different ways. 
They consequently develop and use innovative processes, for example strategic 
initiatives, which re-characterize the parameters (products, organizations. 
technologies) of the market and growth. Of relevance to this research work, Penrose's 
(1959) main intellectual contributions can be summarized in two aspects: Firstly, 
Penrose created the perspective from which the firm may be viewed as a collection of 
resources; and, secondly, she showed that an optional pattern of expansion may exist 
which requires a balanced use of internal and external resources in a particular 
sequence. 
2.2.2 Concepts of Firm Resources 
The resource based perspective starts from the assumption that the desired outcome of 
managerial effort within the firm is a sustainable competitive advantage (SeA). 
Achieving an SeA enables the firm to earn economic rents or above-average returns. 
In tum, this focuses attention on how firms achieve and sustain advantages. The 
epicentre of SeA can be identified as firm-specific resources. Following Teece et al 
(1997, p. 511), resources are defined for this research work as: 
"Firm-specific assets are difficult if not impossible to 
imitate. Such assets are difficult to transfer among 
firms because of transactions costs and transfer costs 
and because the assets may contain tactic kno'wledge ". 
In addition, those resources can be heterogeneously distributed and connected across 
firms as different resource configurations, and resource differences persist over time. 
Ban1ey (1991) classified resources into three categories: firstly. physical capital 
resources which include the physical technology used in a firm, a firm' s plant and 
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equipment, its geographic location and its access to raw material; secondly, human 
capital resources, including training, expenence, judgement, intelligence, 
relationships, and the insights of the individual managers and workers in a firm; and, 
thirdly, organizational capital resources, described as a firm's formal reporting 
structure, its formal and informal planning, controlling and coordinating systems, as 
well as informal relations among groups within a firm and between a firm and those 
in its environment. Grant (1991) described six different categories of firm resources: 
financial, physical, human, technological, reputation and organizational. Furthermore, 
together with the resource categories described, the term 'resources' is very often 
given a general and all-embracing definition within the literature. 
Over time, vanous definitions of the term 'resources' have emerged. Moreover, 
several researchers began to describe companies as bundles of resources (Daft and 
Weick, 1984; Block and MacMilan, 1985; Teece et al., 1997). In detail, different 
types of resources can be connected to each other in different ways, so that they 
reflect to different kinds of resources structures within a firm: the so-called 'bundles 
of resources'. Table 1 summarises the different types of resource bundle schemes 
used in the literature. 
Table 1: Different Concepts of Firm Resources. 
Theorist Tangible Assets Intangible Assets Capabilities 
Wernerfelt (1989) Fixed Assets Blueprints Cultures 
Hall (1992) Intangible Assets Intangible Capabilities 
Hallo (1993) Assets Competencies 
Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990) Core Competencies 
Itami (1987) Invisible Assets 
Amit and Schoemaker Intermediate Goods 
(1993) 
Selznick (1957); Hitt Distinctive 
and Ireland (1985); Competencies 
Hofer and Schendel 
(1987) 
Irvin and Michaels Core Skills 
(1989) 
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Tangible assets are the current physical assets within the organization which have a 
fixed long-run capacity (Block and MacMilan, 1985). Tangible assets include 
property of ownership which, contrary to intangible assets (Hall, 1992), are relatively 
easy to measure, usually through the balance sheet valuation of companies. Another 
feature of tangible assets is that they are transparent and the barrier against 
duplication by the competitors is low (Grant, 1991). In general, the kinds of resources 
termed tangible assets are relatively imitable and substitutable. 
Intangible assets include such intellectual property as trademarks and patents, as well 
as brand and company reputation and company networks (Hall, 1992). Intangible 
assets can be observed in the difference between the balance sheet valuation and stock 
market valuation of public quoted companies, as for example in the pharmaceutical 
sector, where patents are business critical (Grant, 1991; Rumelt, 1991). Therefore, the 
capacities of intangible assets are unlimited and firms can leverage their value within 
the market, rent them (e.g. license) or sell them (e.g. selling intellectual property 
rights) (Block and MacMilan, 1985). Barriers to duplication are higher than in the 
case of tangible assets. Dierickx and Cool (1989) describe intangible assets as asset 
stocks like networks and reputation. These assets are relatively difficult to imitate or 
substitute by competitors in the short run. Hence, intangible assets are a stronger 
source of SCA. 
The third group comprises capabilities, which are often described as invisible assets 
(Hami, 1987) or intermediate goods (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Capabilities are 
people skills, cultural strengths, and organizational routines, interactions through 
which all the company's resources are coordinated and allocated (Grant, 1991). 
Capabilities are difficult to evaluate, and they provide limited capacities in the short 
term, because allocating learning and coordinating change creates difficulties for a 
company or organisation (Block and MacMilan, 1985). These limitations in the 
capacities of a finn's individual capability are difficult in the long term (Block and 
MacMilan. 1985). In comparison to the tangible and intangible assets, this group of 
resources may have dynamic aspects. the so-called . dynamic capabilities'. These 
kinds of capabilities are, for example, the firm's ability to integrate. build and 
reconfigure internal and external competences in order to address the rapidly 
changing environments by leveraging the competitive firm resources. Therefore, the 
primary value of this group of resources may not relate to being a source of 
competitive advantage. The primary value of the dynamic capabilities for a firm 
relates to their ability to reconfigure the existing resources to renew their competitive 
advantage. 
In summary, the resource concepts described provide important foundations for this 
thesis. Firm resources can comprise all types of tangible and intangible assets, 
capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information and knowledge 
controlled by a company. In this context, and further to Rugman' s (2001) analysis, 
there are some general resource characteristics. Firstly, the firm's fundamental 
objective in a resource based approach is to achieve sustained, above-normal returns, 
compared to its rivals. Secondly, unique bundles of resources can become the drivers 
for above-normal returns. Thirdly, innovations through new resource configurations, 
company-internal or a mix of internal and external resource configurations, can 
substantially contribute to generating sustainable company returns; and, fourthly, 
capabilities and competencies can be described as specific types of resources with a 
strong impact on a firm's source of sustained competitive advantage and its individual 
performance. All four of these characteristics reflect the concept of firm resources. 
Nevertheless, the RBV has a number of theoretical shortcomings that have emerged in 
relation to such research which can be summed up in the following three aspects. 
Firstly, the different resource categories, including the classifications by Barney 
(1991) and Grant (1991), fail to describe how the different resource groups and 
categories relate to the renewal process of a firm's competitive advantage and 
individual abilities to create above-average rents. Secondly, although the different 
resource concepts may help companies to understand where to start leveraging firm 
specific resources and resource types, they do not increase understanding on how to 
reconfigure the existing resources to establish new resource schemes and structures, 
and on what kind of challenges relate to these reconfiguration processes. Thirdly, 
resource schemes within firms differ in their importance as sources of a firm's SeA . 
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Resources are scarce, and they may resist being reconfigured with other resources to 
establish new resources schemes as a source of SeA. 
2.2.3 Resource Transformations through Strategic Initiatives 
In order to tum the existing company resources into valuable resources as a source of 
new competitive advantage, firms can focus their strategic initiatives on two different 
perspectives. One perspective of SeA is incorporated into customer value - gaining a 
competitive advantage by providing greater value to customers - can be expected to 
lead to superior performance measured in conventional terms, such as market-based 
performance (e.g., market share, customer satisfaction) and financial-based 
performance (e.g., return on investment, shareholder wealth creation) (Bharadwaj et 
at., 1993; Hill and Jones, 1995; Hunt and Robert, 1995). Another perspective of SeA 
concerns differentiation. Some theorists have argued that market-share and 
profitability are both outcomes of the efforts by firms to secure costs and to provide 
differentiation advantages (Buzzell and Bradley, 1987; Jacobsen, 1988; Aaker, 1989; 
Kotler, 1994). 
Both ways of creating competitive advantage can be achieved through the 
successfully launched and implemented strategic initiatives. According to the RBV, 
successfully executed strategic initiatives need to reconfigure a firm's existing 
resources in a way that the new resource configuration reflects specific attributes; 
attributes which designate them as the new sources of SeA. The RBV maintains that, 
through strategic initiatives, a firm can establish new sources of SeA if the new 
resources and resource configurations have specific attributes which are valuable, 
rare, inimitable and not substitutable (Teece, 1982; Barney, 1991). In this regard, 
resources can be defined as units which provide space and the potential capacity to 
determine a firm's competitive advantage. Moreover, those resources can be 
surrounded by different kinds of relationships. These so-called 'cogency 
relationships' (Black and Boal, 1994) may have different characteristics and 
connections with different types and levels of other resource networks. Therefore, 
firms implementing strategic initiatives are faced with the challenge of creating 
specific resource attributes within the reconfigured and new networks of 
interconnected firm resources. Furthermore, according to the RBV. strategic 
initiatives are required to create new resource configurations which are not easily 
duplicated by a firm's competitors. If a firm creates, through its strategic initiatives, 
new resource configurations which cannot easily be duplicated by a firm's competitor, 
SCA can be achieved and gives rise to both an increase in the firm's customer value 
and a stronger level of differentiation. However, explaining the results of strategic 
initiative transformations to establish barriers of resource duplication for a firm's 
competitors is complicated by an inconsistent and, at times, conflicting use of 
terminology. There are several overlapping concepts that strategic initiatives can 
apply in the context of renewing a firm's sources of competitive advantage, including 
asset stock accumulation (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), capability gaps (Coyne, 1986), 
capability differentials (Hall, 1992), ex-post limits to competition (Maidique and 
Zirger, 1985), isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1991; Mahoney and 
Pandian, 1992), uncertain inimitability (Lippman and Richard, 1982), and causal 
ambiguity (Reed and Robert, 1990). Table 2 illustrates the concepts overlapping in the 
theoretical RBV literature. 
Table 2: Alternative Concepts of Barriers of Resource Duplications 
Authors Barriers to Resource Duplication 
Coyne (1986) Business System Gaps, Managerial Gaps, Position 
Gaps, Regulatory Gaps 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) Asset Erosion, Asset Mass Efficiencies, Causal 
Ambiguity, Interconnectedness of Asset Stocks, Time 
Compression Diseconomies 
Hall (1992) Cultural Differentials, Functional Differentials, 
Positional Differentials, Regulatory Differentials 
Lippman and Rumelt (1982) Uncertain Inimitability 
Reed and DeFillippi (1990) Complexity, Tacitness and Specificity 
Rumelt (1984; 1991) * Communication Good Effects, Economies of Scale, 
Mahoney and Pandian ( 1992) Information Impactedness, Producer Learning, 
Reputation, Response Lags, Isolating Mechanisms 
*Note that some of Rumelt's Isolating mechanisms have been omitted because they are 
external to the firm. Advertising and channel crowding are industry conditions. Buyer 
evaluation costs and buyer switching costs are industry features. 
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Transparency can be used across the different types of barriers against resource 
duplication to explain the concept (Grant, 1991). The main problem that a competitor 
may have is an information problem whereby the competitor is unable to identify the 
reasons for a given firm's success because the strategic initiative insights, results and 
upcoming side-effects are not transparent. If the competitors are unable to imitate a 
firm's resources and resource configurations through their strategic initiative related 
transformations, the latter will be able to achieve superior returns and seA. Mahoney 
and Pandian (1992) have added a further barrier to resource duplication which takes 
the form of rent generation, as outlined in the following statement: 
"The crucial aspect for competitive advantage involves 
the productive services of rent-generating resources 
combinations which cannot be easil.v imitated or 
substituted" (Mahoney, 1992, p.ll) 
The statement implies that competitive advantage can be measured through changes 
in rent-generation. However, Penrose (1959), for example, did not view the 
intentional creation of isolating mechanisms and rent generation as a worthwhile 
endeavour, nor did she even assume this to be crucial for understanding the growth of 
firms. Empirical data show that the world's largest 500 multinationals do not earn 
rents over time (Rugman, 2000). The micro-level goal of efficiency-based rent 
creation is now undoubtedly a key objective for most multinational companies. 
Hence, firms are faced with the challenge of launching new strategic initiatives to 
discover new ways of building efficient barriers to resource duplication. However, 
this undertaking includes the challenge that strategic initiatives always comprise a 
certain amount of uncertainty and ambiguity. Strategic initiative management teams 
and related stakeholders are constantly surrounded with ambiguity, and the problem 
of not being able to make clear adjustments due to managerial decisions to improve 
future initiative related resource re-configuration results. This problem relates to the 
RBV concept of causal ambiguity. Various RBV researchers have pointed out an 
ambiguity concerning the connections betwcen actions and results. Causal ambiguity 
not only pre\'cnts managcrs in other firms from understanding the link betwccn 
4R 
resources and performance in the local firm; its effect is also that there is a certain 
amount of ambiguity among managers within the same firm regarding their 
understanding of the causal connections and links between results and actions. 
Therefore, causal ambiguity can be used to establish barriers to resource duplication. 
However, this implies that, if the effect takes place, then successful managers are 
unsure about what they are doing right and how precisely a strategic initiative should 
be launched and implemented to achieve the expected results. If successful, the 
managers are unsure about what they are doing right, so causal ambiguity prevents the 
competitors from understanding the source of a firm's success, and it challenges the 
same firm to develop knowledge and learn from experience (e.g. previous managerial 
decisions) about how success can be achieved through the reconfiguration of their 
resources (Reed and Robert, 1990). 
Besides causal ambiguity, Lippman and Rumelt (1982) put forward a very similar 
concept of "uncertain inimitability". Uncertainty relates to the factors responsible for 
superior company performance, and it explains the efficiency differences between 
both incumbents and potential new entrants, despite the free entry. Uncertain 
inimitability can be facilitated through ongoing strategic initiative related resource re-
configuration activities and positively impact on a firm's rent performance, even if the 
firm is deploying atomistic prices, so that it derives specific market power or 
restricted market entry (Lippman and Richard, 1982). 
2.2.4 Discussion of the RBV 
As a consequence of the different research priorities and overlapped research streams 
of different theoretical concepts within the RBV, the theory includes challenging and 
sometimes controversial aspects. For example, Penrose had an inherent bias against 
profits that would primarily benefit shareholders and lead to high dividends, rather 
than to reinvestment in the firm's growth (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Contrary to 
Penrose, other researchers extended the RBV with core concepts, such as maximising 
profits by establishing sustainable rents (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Foss and 
Knudsen, 2 0 0 3 ~ ~ Peteraf and Barney, 2003). Those overlapping and sometimes 
controversial research streams have given rise to the following difficulties and 
.+9 
--------------
theoretical limitations, in the context of strategic initiatives and the strategy making 
process. The theory became increasingly complex, including the different concepts 
and definitions of firm resources (e.g. Table 1 and Table 2). These overlaps may 
produce uncertainties within the strategic initiative implementation by transforming 
relevant key resources and establishing new configurations during the strategy making 
process. In detail, researchers like Barney (1991) and Grant (1991) have provided 
theoretical schemes and classifications for use in describing resources. Nevertheless. 
there is less clarity on how these resource classifications relate to the renewal of 
competitive advantage through the RBV. Resources are scarce and resist being 
recombined between different types, with the emerging assumption that these 
recombination possibilities may include difficulties and threats for a firm. The RBV 
does not provide perspectives on processes; rather, it provides a more static view, 
which leads to the next difficulty and theoretical limitation. The theory is criticised for 
its overly static view of the firm. There is some agreement among theorists that the 
traditional RBV misidentifies the focus of long-term competitive advantage in 
dynamic markets (Teece et aI., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Through the 
RBV, no adequate explanation is possible on how and why certain firms have a 
competitive advantage in situation of rapid and unpredictable change - and especially 
in changing environments where the competitive landscape is shifting and new 
competitive advantages emerge. Hence, the RBV has limitations and theoretical gaps 
III adequately conceptualising and explaining a firm's dynamic strategy 
implementation process. In particular, the ways in which a firm's unique resources 
can be reshaped through strategic initiatives are insufficiently conceptualised because 
of the resource based theory's excessively static view, and require further 
conceptualisation and explanation. 
The RBV's discussion on causal ambiguity or uncertain inimitability and 
differentiation through barriers to resource duplication gives rise to the proposition 
that competitive advantage can be shaped by a firm's strategic initiative if the 
initiative's actions and transformational results lead to a firm's unique resources. 
capabilities and competencies. This proposition highlights two further difficulties and 
limitations of the RBV in relation to this thesis. Firstly, reshaping a firm's unique 
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resources involves the argument that resource configurations are firm individual and 
relate to the source ofa firm's heterogeneity (Winter, 2003; Hoopes et at., 2003; Foss 
and Foss, 2004). Described as the idiosyncratic competences of firms, heterogeneity is 
often viewed as the source of and limitation on economic rents. Hence, reshaping 
existing resource configurations encounters limitations on creating competitive firm 
resources, because in some way firm individual resources, capabilities and 
competencies are the source of a firm's heterogeneity. The dilemma for strategic 
initiatives is how to identify and protect a firm's idiosyncratic competencies by 
implementing relevant transformations and driving resource re-configurations at the 
same time. Secondly, heterogeneity is closely linked to a company's history. The 
resource configurations and characteristics of any firm will be the result of the firm's 
specific history and the path that it is following. Therefore, creating competitive firm 
resources is highly path dependent, with the consequence that strategic initiatives and 
their relative stakeholders may encounter ambiguities and limitations when defining 
actions to reshape their existing resource configurations (Makadok, 2001). Thirdly, 
the RBV maintains that companies have ambiguities and limitations in their 
understanding of how to define actions to reshape their existing resource 
reconfigurations. Therefore, strategic-initiative related activities and transformation to 
reconfigure firm resources comprise the challenging aspect of unpredictability. 
Hence, additional aspects in a dynamic perspective of reconfiguring firm resources 
may be helpful in overcoming the overly static view of the REV. 
The above discussed theoretical gaps and the overly static view of the firm do not 
provide a comprehensive theoretical basis on which to conceptualise and explain the 
dynamic perspective on how strategic initiatives impact and reconfigure existing 
resource configurations to renew a firm's SeA. Moreover, the process of recombining 
resources through the dynamic concept of strategic initiatives may include the 
boundaries, barriers and difficulties which cannot be explained by the concepts the 
RBV and lead to the more dynamic perspectives of the dynamic capability theory. 
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2.3 Dynamic Capability Theory 
The resource based view became a major paradigm within strategy research, based on 
the increased relevance of a firm's competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the focus of 
this research work and the limitations of the REV provoked various criticisms 
regarding its lack of a dynamic dimension, such as the renewal of competitive 
advantages. Scholars started to enhance the concept of competitive advantage by 
adopting a dynamic perspective of rapid and unpredictable change (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). In this context, researchers sought to overcome the limitations of the 
excessively static RBV and developed the dynamic capability theory. Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000, p. 1112) provide the following definition of dynamic capabilities as 
facilitators to create competitive advantage for a firm: 
"The firm's processes that use resources - specifically 
the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and 
release resources - to match and even create market 
change ". 
Dynamic capabilities are thus " ... the organisational and strategic processes and 
routines used by a firm to facilitate and achieve new resource configurations as 
markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die ... " (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, p. 
1113). Therefore, dynamic capabilities relate to a firm's capacity to deploy resources. 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993, p. 35) extend the definition of dynamic capabilities 
thus: 
.. .. .Information-based, tangible or intangible processes 
that are firm-specific and are developed over time 
through complex interactions among the firm's 
resource. Thev can abstractly be thought as 
.. intermediate goods" generated by the firm to provide 
L'nhanced produclivi(v of its resources, as well as 
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strategic flexibility and protection for its final product 
or service. " 
This is very close to the definitions provided by Grant (1996) and Pisano (1994), who 
state that dynamic capabilities are antecedent to (precede) the organisational and 
strategic routines by which managers alter their resource base - acquire and shed 
resources, integrate them, and recombine them - to generate new value-creating 
strategies. 
The dynamic capability theory (DCT) emerged in the 1990s and enriched the RBV 
with dynamic perspectives. Moreover, dynamic capabilities were applied mainly in 
explanation of a firm's competitive advantage. The DCT furnished additional insights 
into the sources of a firm's competitive advantage by introducing the processes by 
which a firm's competitive advantages are dynamically renewed. In this regard, 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) produced what is generally regarded as the seminal 
paper on the dynamic capability approach. Their study on the dynamic capability 
approach conceptualized an ability of a firm to alter their resource configurations by 
applying certain capabilities and thereby adapt to changing environments through 
renewal of their competitive advantages. Furthermore, Teece et al. (1997) emphasised 
two key aspects; "dynamic" and "capability". The term 'dynamic' refers to a firm's 
capacity to renew its competencies in order to achieve a match with the changing 
environment. The term 'capability' refers to the key role of strategic management and 
its initiatives for the optimal adaptation, integration, reconfiguration of internal and 
external organizational skills, resources, and competencies in order to fulfil the 
requirements of a changing environment. 
Influenced by the dynamic capability approach, several researchers started to 
incorporate the importance of dynamic capabilities into a major strand of research on 
strategic management (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Collis, 1994; Teecc et at., 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). However, alongside the DCT there arose 
a large body of research and theoretical debate on dynamic capabilities. most notably 
as conducted in the following two studies: "Dynamic Capabilities: \Vhat arc They'?" 
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(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and "Understanding Dynamic Capabilities" (\\'inter. 
2003). Nevertheless, a lack of empirical data intensified the general confusion, and 
the need to increase understanding on dynamic capabilities still predominated. 
Researchers continued to criticize the RBV and the DCT for failing to provide robust 
and explicit measures for their concepts and compelling evidence of their capacity to 
explain differences in performance at the firm level (Davis, 2004). In relation to the 
research topics addressed in this thesis, the confusion and the uncertainty surrounding 
the DCT are apparent. The gaps and limitations in the process of renewing a firm's 
competitive advantage provide the opportunity to enhance general understanding of 
the dynamic capability approach. In what follows, therefore, dynamic capabilities are 
reviewed and classified according to their different theoretical locus and managerial 
influences. 
2.3.1 Classification of Dynamic Capabilities 
To aid understanding of how dynamic capabilities relate to the renewal of a firm's 
competitive advantage through the reconfiguration of its resource base, various 
dynamic capability-related studies are reviewed and classified in Table 1, and then 
discussed in the following section. The review and classification take account of both 
conceptual and empirical aspects. 
Table 3: Classification and overview of research on dynamic capabilities. 
I Context of 
Sources of Boundaries Firm 
Theorist dynamic 
dynamic capabilities and barriers performance 
capabilities 
. Leonard-Barton New product Core capabilities Distinct Dynamic 
I 
(1992) development and / core rigidities capabilities to capabilities are 
innovation ! innovate and facilitators of I 
differentiate change 
Teece et al. (1997) Managerial and Managerial Intellectual 
! 
I 
organisational beliefs as properties and 
processes constraining 
, 
complementary 
factors assets 
Van de Ven et al. Managing stages 
(1999) of changes 
Eisenlhardt and Product development, Dynamic Facil,itators to Idiosyncratic and 
Martin (2000) strategiC decision capabilities are improve path dependent 
making, transfer necessary but existing 
processes, resource not sufficient resource 
allocation routines, conditions for configurations 
knowledge creation, competitive and build new 
alliance and advantage resource 
acquisition routines (boundary configurations 
conditions) 
Tripsas and Managerial benefs and 
Gavetti (2000) cognition 
Griffith and Harvey Decision structure, Difficult-to-
(2001 ) resource allocation / imitate resource 
alignments combinations 
Lawson and Innovation 
Samson (2001) management 
Helfat and Peteraf Organisational "Branching" of new 
(2003) processes and capabilities 
procedures ( capability 
duplication) 
Rindova and Change processes; 
Taylor (2003) decision structures 
and customer 
processes 
Verona and Ravasi Knowledge based Ability to 
(2003) processes and innovate 
continuous innovation continuously 
Zott (2003) Factors of 
differentiation 
(timing, cost 
and learning 
effects) 
Ethiraj (2005) Customer processes Repeating Repeating 
interactions with interactions with 
customers (cost customers are 
and benefits) context specific 
The central thesis of Teece et at. (1997) is that capabilities as sources of competitive 
advantage are related to managerial and organizational processes. Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) identify more specific processes which they cite as examples of 
dynamic capabilities; product development (combining \arious skills in cross-
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functional teams), strategic decision making (pooling of various business, functional 
and personal experiences), transfer processes (copying, transferring and recombining 
knowledge based resources), resource allocation routines (distribution of scarce 
resources), strategic co-evolving (synergistic resource combinations, social bonds), 
strategic patching to realign the match between businesses and resources (add, 
combine and split) to change market opportunities, knowledge creation (new thinking, 
linkage between the local firm and outside resources), and alliances and acquisition 
routines (new resources, pre- and post-acquisition routines). These processes 
determine 'how things are done' in a firm (Teece et aI., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). In this regard, dynamic capabilities relate to managerial beliefs and are shaped 
mainly through a firm's intellectual properties or complementary assets and possible 
future strategic paths available to it. Other scholars have observed that managerial 
beliefs may act as constraining influences on the emergence of dynamic capabilities 
(Trips as and Gavetti, 2000, p. 1151). Their findings illustrate "the evolutionary 
trajectory of organizational capabilities" and the influence of managerial cognition on 
the development of new capabilities. 
In regard to organizational and managerial processes and beliefs, other scholars 
maintain that one of the most challenging aspects of management is accomplishing 
transitions between stages of change (Van de Ven et al., 1999). For instance, 
transitions (e.g. transformations from product to solution selling) are difficult because 
they require the change of competencies well-suited to one stage of operation into the 
new competencies required for a different stage of operation. Therefore, transitions 
become difficult because, at a certain point, competencies become traps or rigidities 
(Levitt and March, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1992). Furthermore, Leonard-Barton 
( 1992) locates dynamic capabilities among the processes of new product development 
by companies. In this case, core capabilities are defined as distinctive capabilities that 
strategically differentiate a firm from its competitors. Leonard-Barton (1992) argues 
that core capabilities comprise values which may not only enhance but also inhibit 
innovation in a company. This relationship has been somewhat neglected. Leonard-
Burton (1992) also proposes that traditional systems and values should be challenged 
in order to initiate redefinitions of new core capabilities. Hence, dynamic capabilities 
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are facilitators of change. (Lawson and Samson, 2001) have enriched Leonard-
Burton's argument by adopting a more holistic perspective on the evolution of 
dynamic capabilities whereby they can be seen as pertaining to innovation 
management. Lawson and Samson (2001) have accordingly developed a conceptual 
model of "innovation capability" through an in-depth case study of Cisco Systems. 
A different perspective IS that certain knowledge based processes (knowledge 
creation, absorption, integration, and reconfiguration) play a substantial role in the 
development of dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Verona and 
Ravasi, 2003). Dynamic capabilities are viewed as a source of a company's ability to 
innovate continuously. Alongside the debates on where and how dynamic capabilities 
are localized within a company, other researchers have discussed them according to 
their relationship with individual firm performance (Griffith and Harvey, 2001; Zott, 
2003). Griffith and Harvey (2001) conceptualize dynamic capabilities as a difficult-
to-imitate combination of resources on a global basis - called 'global capabilities' -
which generate a competitive advantage. Global dynamic capabilities relate to 
decision structures among firms and the ability to align related and relevant resources. 
Even if firms may have similar capabilities, only certain factors give rise to different 
performances. The performances of firms differ according to the timing, cost, and 
learning effects of similar dynamic capabilities in different firms (Zott, 2003). Even 
small variations in these effects, especially when combined, may generate significant 
differentials among firm performances within the same industry. 
The discussion of the importance of context specificity of dynamic capabilities has 
influenced a different group of researchers (Collis, 1994; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; 
Rindova and Taylor, 2003; Ethiraj et at., 2005), who find that dynamic capabilities 
are related to the firm or to the nature of that firm's environment, and are therefore 
biased. In this regard, Helfat and Peteraf (2003) discuss the "branching" of 
capabilities - capabilities are a crucial development factor able to generate new ones. 
These researchers conceptualize a dynamic capability lifecycle that describcs the 
general pattern and paths in the evolution of organizational capabilities ovcr time, 
including the founding. development, and maturity stages. Rindova and Tayler (2003) 
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attributed the evolution of dynamic capabilities to change processes that occur at two 
different levels: first the micro-level, where key positions are staffed with experienced 
and skilled top management and responsibilities are delegated to lower levels of the 
hierarchy; second the macro-level, where competencies respond to changing customer 
demands. Customer-specific capabilities evolve by learning from repeated 
interactions with certain customers (Ethiraj et aI., 2005). These kinds of capabilities 
are often context-specific and include different costs and benefits, given that a 
common denominator for the evolution of dynamic capabilities does not exist. 
Several aspects emerge in relation to the different areas of research fields on dynamic 
capabilities, according to their relevance for this thesis. Firstly, dynamic capabilities 
are mostly discussed in terms of specific company processes and routines. These areas 
reflect some of the most important and critical processes of a firm in relation to 
establishing competitive advantage by leveraging firm-specific dynamic capabilities. 
However, literature reports shortcomings in how dynamic capabilities interrelate, 
emerge and shape these processes, and which kinds of challenge emerge within those 
interactions during the reconfiguration of a firm's existing resource base to renew its 
competitive advantage. In addition, capabilities include boundaries and barriers, 
especially in the context of change. Existing capabilities may tum into traps or 
rigidities and jeopardise the change efforts of a company. However, theoretical gaps 
and misunderstandings still exist on how difficulties and challenges can be described 
during these periods of change. 
Alongside those challenges and risks, dynamic capabilities relate strongly to a firm's 
performance; and those with specific characteristics are facilitators for a company to 
establish competitive advantage. Admittedly, those characteristics are often not 
clearly defined within literature according to their creation and possible side-effects, 
especially during periods of change. 
The finding that dynamic capabilities are firm-specific increases the difficulty of 
discussing and conceptualizing more general concepts across firms. Firm resources 
and indi\'idual dynamic capabilities arc context-specific. In detail, a firm's existing 
resource base compnses firm-specific resources and dynamic capabilities which 
interact and change over time. Hence, to increase understanding about what happens 
during the change and reconfiguration period, a firm's resource base may need to be 
taken into account as a combination and summary of finn-specific resources and 
dynamic capabilities. Hence, a further review on the characteristics and contexts of 
the concept of dynamic capabilities is conducted in the following section. 
2.3.2 Characteristics of Dynamic Capabilities 
Dynamic capabilities evolve from path-dependent processes like learning. They give 
rise to codification so that experience is easier to apply and accelerate the building of 
routines (Grant, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). A crucial 
aspect of evolution is selection, not variation, because it is difficult to determine what 
experience should be generalised from the extensive situation-specific knowledge that 
occurs. The implementation of dynamic capabilities is consequential because they are 
often combinations of simpler capabilities and related routines, some of which may be 
foundational to others and hence must be learnt first. 
Dynamic capabilities are often described in prototyping and testing to gam new 
knowledge quickly (Collis, 1994; Grant, 1996). They rely on real-time information 
like early alerts, intuition, parallel consideration and cross-functional relationships 
and intensive communication among those involved in the process. The literature on 
dynamic capabilities exhibits similarities in its definitions and descriptions of 
important characteristics. These characteristics are important for the discussion on 
how existing resource configurations may be managed during reconfiguration periods 
in order to renew a firm's competitive advantage. 
Table 4: Characteristics of Dynamic Capabilities. 
Characteristics Description 
Dynamic Capabilities are highly Well-known learning mechanisms like the firm's past experience 
Path Dependent guide the evolution and characteristics of dynamic capabilities ( 
Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Makadok, 2001). 
Dynamic Capabilities relate to DC resembles the traditional concept of routines. DC are simple, 
market dynamiCS . experimental, and unstable processes that rely on quickly created 
new knowledge and iterative execution to produce adaptive, but 
.--
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unpredictable, outcomes in relation to dynamic market 
environments (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1991) 
Dynamic Capabilities consist of Dynamic Cabpabilities create value for firms within dynamic 
specific and firm individual markets by manipulating resources into new value-creating 
strategic and organisational strategies ( Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Lawson and Samson, 
processes 2001; Griffith and Harvey, 2001; Winter, 2003; Verona and Ravasi, 
2003; He,lfat and Peteraf, 2003; Rindova and Taylor, 2003; Ethiraj 
et a/., 2005). 
Dynamic Capabilities are DC enhance eXisting resources through reconfiguring (function of 
facWtators and enablers to 
reconfigure and create new 
resources 
manipulation) company resources and establishing new resources 
to drive new value-creating strategies (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Griffith and Harvey, 2001; Verona and Ravasi, 2003; Ethiraj 
II et a/., 2005). 
Dynamic capabilities have been conceptualised by various researchers as antecedent, 
specific and identifiable organisational and strategic processes to recombine a firm's 
resource base in order to generate new value-creating strategies (Grant, 1996; Teece 
et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) attribute some more detailed properties to dynamic capabilities: they are not 
vague (they are clear) or tautological, but idiosyncratic (individualized) in their details 
and path dependent in their emergence. Dynamic capabilities are often described as 
"learning mechanisms" like repeated practices, and small losses lead to the 
accumulation of tacit and explicit knowledge and effective learning. In this context, 
dynamic capabilities have significant commonalities in best practices, which are 
effective ways to execute particular dynamic capabilities across a firm. There are 
multiple paths to the same dynamic capabilities; routines are substitutable and 
replaceable across different contexts; and dynamic capabilities per se are not likely to 
be sources of sustained competitive advantage. 
In summary, the attributes of dynamic capabilities are the extensive and frequent use 
of prototyping, real-time information, experimentation, and multiple alternatives. 
They rely on situation-specific knowledge applied in the context of simple boundary 
and priority setting rules. Nevertheless. improvisational processes are dissipative. 
meaning that they require constant energy to stay on track - if they have too little 
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structure, they may easily slide to the edge of chaos. Therefore dynamic capabilities 
are difficult to sustain. Moreover, the threat to competitive advantage arises from 
outside the firm, but also from within it. In particular, further research work is 
required on the experience that companies acquire in applying the extensive situation-
specific knowledge that occurs during the reconfiguration of firm resources. In this 
context, threats from within the firm have been less treated within academic literature 
than have dynamics outside the firm. Those external and market dynamics relate to 
the concept of dynamic capabilities. 
2.3.2.1 Market Dynamics in the Context of Dynamic Capabilities 
Researchers report that the RBV breaks down in high-velocity markets, where the 
strategic challenge is to maintain competitive advantage, because the duration of the 
competitive advantage is unpredictable and time is an essential aspect of strategy 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Ethiraj et al., 2005). In these markets, 
the dynamic capabilities that drive competitive advantage are themselves unstable 
processes which are difficult to sustain. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) propose that the 
traditional views of dynamic capabilities (routines) are valid in regard to moderately 
dynamic markets, but not to very dynamic ones. It is unlikely that sustainable 
competitive advantage can be achieved in high-velocity markets (D'A veni, 1994). 
According to the RBV, sustainable competitive advantages derive from VRIN 
(valuable, rare, inimitable, non-substitutable) dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). Dynamic capabilities are valuable (V), and rare (R). Nevertheless, the 
immobility and inimitability of dynamic capabilities in very dynamic markets are 
irrelevant - they are substitutable. Hence, dynamic capabilities can be a source of 
competitive advantages in very dynamic markets, but not a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. According to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), dynamic 
capabilities vary with market dynamism. 
When the markets are moderately dynamic, capabilities are to be found in routines 
that are complicated, detailed and analytic processes. These processes rely closely on 
existing knowledge and linear execution to produce mainly predictable outcomes. 
Change occurs frequently and along roughly predictable and linear paths with clear 
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market boundaries and known players (competitors, customers, complements). 
Efficient processes can be created as codified detailed routines and sequences of 
problem solving steps, but, in high-velocity markets, rapid and unpredictable changes 
predominate because change becomes non-linear and less predictable. Uncertainty 
cannot be modelled as probability because it is not possible to specify future states a 
priori: the overall industry structure is unclear, market boundaries are blurred, and 
successful complementers are difficult to define and shifting. In high-velocity 
markets, dynamic capabilities are simple, experimental (not analytic), iterative (not 
linear), unstable and fragile processes that rely on quickly-created new knowledge and 
iterative execution to produce adaptive, but unpredictable, outcomes. These processes 
and routines often consist of a few rules that specify boundary conditions on the 
action of managers or indicate priorities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Griffith and 
Harvey, 2001; Verona and Ravasi, 2003). 
In the context of this section and in relation to this research work, the challenge is 
determining how dynamic capabilities are controllable - especially emerging dynamic 
capabilities as defined by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) as unstable and fragile 
processes that rely on quickly-created new knowledge. Furthermore, the assumption 
emerges that dynamic capabilities, especially experimental and iterative ones, may 
generate unexpected dysfunctional effects with unpredictable outcomes. These 
dysfunctional effects are still insufficiently theorized in literature and may provide 
answers on why resource reconfigurations are difficult to approach on the basis of 
their dynamics of dysfunctional effects. In this regard, discussing the value of 
dynamic capabilities will help to curb emerging and unexpected side-effects 
(dysfunctional effects). 
2.3.2.2 Value of Dynamic Capabilities 
The value of dynamic capabilities relates to their production process for the firm, the 
strategic initiative and to the capability itself. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) see the 
value of dynamic capabilities for a firm's competiti\'e advantage as residing in the 
resource configurations that they create, not in the capabilities themselves. 
Functionalities of dynamic capabilities may easily be duplicated within a firm. which 
indicates that dynamic capabilities are valuable, not for maintaining sustainable 
competitive advantages, but rather for building new resource configurations in the 
quest for temporary advantages. Hence, dynamic capabilities are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for competitive advantage - especially for strategic initiatives 
which aim to implement new business strategies to improve a firm's existing resource 
configurations in order to achieve long-term advantages. Nevertheless, dynamic 
capabilities are used to build new resource configurations in pursuit of short-term 
advantages as well. 
It is obvious that market dynamism impacts on the value of dynamic capabilities. The 
sustainability and causal ambiguity of dynamic capabilities vary with market 
dynamism. In moderately dynamic markets, dynamic capabilities are complicated, 
predictable, analytic processes and routines that rely on existing knowledge and are 
causally ambiguous because they are complex and difficult to observe. In high 
velocity markets, dynamic capabilities are simple, experimental, and iterative 
processes and rules to enable emergent adaptation which relies on situation-specific 
knowledge, and are causally ambiguous because they are simple. 
The finding that value resides in the dynamic capabilities which facilitate the 
reconfiguration of the firm resources, and not in the capabilities themselves, raises 
theoretical questions. In this context, the academic literature does not offer concepts 
on the dynamics involved in the creation and utilization of the dynamic capability 
values. Furthermore, it is unclear how threats and difficulties can be conceptualized 
during the activation of those dynamic capability processes, especially during 
strategic initiative implementations. Such threats and difficulties may explain why 
successful companies encounter difficulties in reconfiguring existing resource 
configurations in the context of strategic initiatives to sustain their competitive 
advantage. This aspect leads to discussion of how dynamic capabilities enable and 
facilitate resource manipulations and reconfigurations. 
2.3 .. 2.3 Enabling Functionalities of Dynamic Capabilities in the Context of 
Strategic Initiatives 
Dynamic capabilities are close to the concept of transfonning company resources. 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) described four main functions to manipulate existing 
company resources through dynamic capabilities: resource creation, resource 
integration, resource re-combination, and resource releases. In this context, dynamic 
capabilities are defined as special processes which can be developed and mobilised 
through strategic initiatives (e.g. product development, forming alliances, and 
strategic decision making). 
Building on the concept of Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), Makadok (2001) discusses 
two main capabilities that a firm can develop through strategic initiatives to change its 
resources: first, resource picking, which implies greater emphasis on cognitive and 
informational factors; second, resource building, which implies greater factors on 
process related factors. Resource picking can be understood as the main mechanism 
with which to create economic rent for a firm. However, creating economic rent starts 
before the acquisition of a resource. Firms with superior resource-picking capabilities 
- dynamic capabilities - are better able to discern which resources are winners and 
which are losers. Hence, they can bid on the fonner while avoiding the latter. In 
comparison, Makadok' s (2001) resource-picking function relates more to Eisenhardt 
and Martin's (2000) resource re-combination and new resource releases. Resource 
building relates more to resource creation and resource integration. 
Additionally, other scholars have developed supporting notions on the enabling 
functionalities of dynamic capabilities to reconfigure a finn's business resources in 
the context of acquisitions (Mitchell, 1991; Mitchell et at., 1999; Karim and Mitchell, 
2000). Karim and Mitchell (2000) highlighted that firms which aim to change their 
businesses utilise their enabling functionalities - acquisition-related dynamic 
capabilities - to reconfigure their resource bases. In this regard, the reconfiguration of 
resources involves the retention, deletion, and addition of resources, in a similar way 
to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) four main functionalities of dynamic capabilities. 
Therefore, firm acquisition is an example of how a firm can facilitate idiosyncratic 
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dynamic capabilities to reconfigure its resource base to stay in business. This is 
similar to the concept of strategic initiatives where firms scope to implement their 
strategies by mobilising the reconfiguration of the firm's most valuable sources of 
competitive advantage: resources and knowledge base. 
The assumption arises that those sources of competitive advantage are reconfigured 
through strategic initiative specific dynamic capabilities. Those dynamic capabilities 
are able to mobilise the reconfiguration of firm resources and re-combination of the 
idiosyncratic knowledge base of the firm during the strategic initiative 
implementation period. Furthermore, reconfiguring a firm's resources and knowledge 
base through strategic initiative oriented dynamic capabilities raises the next 
assumption that those dynamic capabilities are able to yield different results within 
the initiative implementation process. As strategic initiative related dynamic 
capabilities are mobilised through strategic initiative implementations, results may 
emerge which are valuable for the firm and results which are challenging for the firm 
and produce constraints on its ability to renew its sources of competitive advantage to 
stay in business. 
2.3.3 Discussion of the Dynamic Capabilities Theory 
Dynamic capabilities provide additional dynamic perspectives on how competitive 
advantage can be renewed by reconfiguring existing company resources through 
strategic initiatives. In this regard, dynamic capabilities are firm specific, and are 
mostly described in literature as idiosyncratic and path dependent and strongly related 
to a firm's history. Moreover, if dynamic capabilities are firm specific the assumption 
emerges that there are dynamic capabilities which are strategic initiative specific and 
critical for the individual strategic initiative implementation success. Furthermore, 
they are fragile and unstable processes and rely on situation-specific knowledge 
applied in the context of simple boundary and priority setting rules. Overall, dynamic 
capabi lities relate closely to a firm's or strategic initiative performance and are not 
themselves sources of competitive advantage or renewal of a firm's competitive 
advantage. Moreover, the value of dynamic capabilities resides in the ability to 
reconfigure a firm's existing resource base through specific functionalities descrihed 
in literature as resource creation, resource integration, resource re-combination, and 
resource releases. Hence, the value of dynamic capabilities in reconfiguring a 
company's existing resources and knowledge base relates strongly to the quality and 
capacities of initiative related implementation processes. Nevertheless, several 
theoretical gaps are apparent in this research. 
Firstly, dynamic capabilities are mostly described and identified in terms of 
idiosyncratic processes and routines (e.g. a strategic initiative resource allocation and 
prioritisation processes or product innovation processes). Around these specific and 
mostly critical processes for the firm, dynamic capabilities can emerge through 
strategic initiatives to interrelate and shape the firm's sources of competitive 
advantage. However, the interrelations among the dynamic capabilities shaping the 
firm's sources through strategic initiatives are still insufficiently conceptualised in the 
theoretical literature, and especially in regard to how idiosyncratic and strategic 
initiative related dynamic capabilities renew a firm's source of competitive advantage. 
How strategic initiatives use and apply dynamic capabilities are not described and 
explained. The assumption therefore emerges that strategic initiative implementation 
may have the dynamic capabilities required to reconfigure the firm's resources and 
knowledge base to renew its competitive advantages. Nevertheless, strategic 
initiatives may differ in their ability to develop and apply the dynamic capabilities 
identified in order to manipulate and reconfigure existing resource configurations. 
Furthermore, dynamic capabilities of different initiatives may differ in their 
possibilities to interrelate and collaborate, and they may create different effects 
(dysfunctional effects) and outcomes during the reconfiguration of a firm's existing 
resource base. This assumption may yield additional insights into why the 
reconfiguration of resources is difficult for an organisation. 
Secondly, some researchers suggest that dynamic capabilities may turn into traps or 
rigidities and jeopardise the change efforts of a company or a strategic initiativc. 
However, theoretical gaps and misunderstandings still persist on how those 
difficulties and challenges can be described - especially during periods of 
transforming a firm's resource base. The assumption is that challenges and threats 
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may exist for a firm and especially for the strategic initiative implementation's 
success during the highly dynamic period of changing the existing resource base, 
which leads to the third aspect of the discussion on the dynamic capability theory. 
Thirdly, most researchers view the threats to competitive advantage as arising outside 
the firm. Few of them discuss the view that threats may also emerge from within the 
firm; especially during the process of renewing a firm's competitive advantage. Those 
threats and challenges may explain why successful firms sometimes fail to renew their 
competitive advantage. Hence, the assumption emerges that companies encounter 
different within-firm experiences and threats during the reconfiguration of their 
resources especially through strategic initiatives which require the further clarification 
partly provided by this research work. 
Fourthly, the reconfiguration process driven by strategic initiative implementation 
activities relates to specific knowledge acquired during the reconfiguration process of 
firm resources. This specific knowledge created in the context of reconfiguring firm 
resources may include difficulties. In this regard, the assumption emerges that 
difficulties may occur during the creation of that strategic initiative-specific 
knowledge and relate to whether dynamic capabilities can facilitate the renewal of a 
firm's resource base. 
2.4 Knowledge Based View of the Firm 
The knowledge based theory of the firm (KBV) emerged from the RBV within the 
field of strategic management, defining the firm as a growing body of knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992). Firms are knowledge creating entities with the capability 
to create and utilise new knowledge. Outlining fundamental definitions, Berger and 
Luckmann (1967, p. 27-30) define knowledge as a 'socially constructed true belief, 
and organisational knowledge as a 'collective socially constructed belief shared by 
some or all of the organisational members '. In this relation, knowledge and 
organisational knowledge relate to individual learning, from where organisational 
learning concepts and processes emerged (Weick, 1991; Argote, 1999). 
Furthermore, scholars have integrated organisational knowledge and routines with the 
dynamic perspective of firms' competitive environments (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
The firm has been understood as a repository of knowledge, consisting of routines that 
guide organisational action (Patriotta, 2003). This has led to the combination of 
organisational learning and innovation with the firm's evolving knowledge base 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nadler and Tushman, 1995; Pettigrew et aI., 2002). This 
perspective implies that a learning organisation comprises multiple communities-of-
practice (Pettigrew, 1987; Pettigrew et aI., 2002). In this context, each community-of-
practice creates experimental and interpretative activities within its environment from 
which sense making emerges. 
Furthermore, knowledge-related concepts can be divided into two categories: 
individual-related concepts of knowledge, and collective ones. Individual-related 
knowledge concepts are often classified into three different groups: skills (Mueller, 
1996; Haines, 1999; Kanter, 1999), experience (Levitt and March, 1988; March et aI., 
1991), and expertise (Starbuck, 1992). These concepts relate to individuals and 
consider individuals to be the principle possessors of knowledge. By contrast, 
collective forms of knowledge relate to the capabilities constructed jointly by 
organisational members as cross-functional teams (Newell and Huang, 2002). 
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Collective forms of knowledge prioritize capabilities (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; 
Grant, 1996). 
Finally, the increasing importance of knowledge as a strategic enabler for firms has 
created a literature on research into knowledge in organisations (Grant and Baden-
Fuller, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996; Eisenhardt 
and Santos, 2001; Patriotta, 2003). Scholars argue that the finn's ability to create and 
utilise emerging knowledge is critical for its success, and is the most important source 
of a firm's sustainable competitive advantage (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995). Moreover, firms are continuously challenged to create valuable 
knowledge to re-vitalise their most important source of competitive advantage: the 
firm's idiosyncratic knowledge base (Grant, 1996). In detail, competitive advantage 
can be achieved and renewed through the dynamic perspectives of knowledge 
creation (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka and 
Konno, 1998), utilisation (Moran and Ghoshal, 1996), and integration (Demsetz, 
1991).These perspectives on the knowledge based theory relate to the concepts of 
dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capabilities define and leverage collective fonns of 
knowledge by renewing and sustaining a firm's sources of competitive advantages 
(Collins, 1993; Blackler, 1995). Besides these fundamentals, the classification of 
knowledge and knowledge based theories are rich in their diversity and research 
focus. 
Alongside the growing KBV literature, some researchers have argued that strategic 
initiatives develop new knowledge and create their own knowledge bases over the 
entire strategic initiative life cycle, from the strategic initiative idea to the strategic 
initiative's implementation (Wielemaker, 2003; Lechner et at., 2003; Marx, 2004). In 
this context, strategic initiatives are conceptualised as distinct knowledge bases which 
become linked to a firm's knowledge base in order to inject new knowledge into the 
firm. Therefore, strategic initiatives create and utilise new knowledge triggered by 
managerial decisions to implement the firm's strategy, which is based on productive 
and environmental decisions. However, the increasing dynamism of the managerial 
environment, with tl-cquent and rapid changes in technology, customer behaviours. 
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and competition, challenges strategic initiatives to make their advantages sustainable. 
or at least to create a temporary advantage (D'A veni, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). In these situations, the ability to learn quickly in order to alter the resource 
configuration in response to market change becomes crucial for a firm's performance. 
Thus renewing the sources of competitive advantage through strategic initiative 
implementation relates to managerial and organisational processes, these being 
defined as the firm's ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies and knowledge in order to address the rapidly changing environments 
(Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
The KBV provides a context in which to consider the combination of firm-specific 
and instanced resources through the utilization of dynamic capabilities and their 
impacts on the idiosyncratic knowledge base of the firm through strategic initiative 
implementation. In this regard, the idiosyncratic knowledge base of a firm relates to 
the definitions and concepts of firm resources and dynamic capabilities. Furthermore, 
the knowledge base perspective provides the opportunity to discuss and enrich the 
concepts of renewing a firm's competitive advantage through the perspective of 
knowledge creation by reconfiguring a firm's resources and utilizing its dynamic 
capability as a whole. According to the research focus of this thesis, the concepts of 
organisational know ledge and know ledge creation are particularly important in 
grasping the theoretical grounds for renewing a firm-related know ledge base by 
utilizing the transformational power of strategic initiatives. 
2.4.1 Theory of Knowledge and Organisational Knowledge 
Knowledge, and especially organisational knowledge, relates to the fundamentals of 
the action-oriented theory of organisational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978). This 
theory is built on the relation between action and cognition in organisations. The 
challenge that cognitive approaches face is how to establish sense making connections 
hetween the 'outside world' and the cognition of the organisation's information 
gathering and processing activities (Winograd and Flores, 1986; Tenkasi and Boland, 
1996). The cognitive theory has been developed from the standpoint of the individual 
and then extended to organisations. The concept implies the existence of an isolated 
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mind (Patriotta, 2003) able to create inner perspectives and interpretations that are 
related to the • outer world'. In this regard, the organisation's mind creates knowledge 
about its outside world and tries to make sense of this information through the 
creation of new meanings as a result of the knowledge creation process (Daft and 
Weick, 1984; Morgan, 1997). Furthermore, organisational hierarchies provide 
effective concepts with which to structure and embed new knowledge creating entities 
as strategic initiatives in existing organisational environments. The process enriches 
existing organisational routines and standard operating procedures, and it acts as a 
new programme of action which includes the capability to create new knowledge for a 
firm by supporting and implementing its decision-making mechanisms. Nevertheless, 
major dilemmas arise within organisations in achieving a balance between control and 
innovation and between static and dynamic efficiencies of operational procedures 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978; Lichtenstein, 1997). Especially in periods of change, 
organisations reinforce resistance to change by interpreting and making sense of their 
environmental threats and trends in different ways. Interpreting, meaning and sense 
making are identified in the academic literature as levers for creating new 
organisational knowledge (Thomas et aI., 1993). In detail, sense making is defined as 
continuous action by an individual or a group of individuals organised into a team 
which deals with ambiguous and ambivalent actions, mostly by interrelating with tacit 
knowledge carriers (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). These dynamics of organisational 
sense making during the interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge relate to the 
knowledge repository concept, which is also defined as the memory and mind of an 
organisation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
The best established knowledge based theories are grounded on the distinction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge. They derive from Polanyi's study of 1966, 
which inspired various scholars to enrich the theory of knowledge with new insights 
and understandings (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 
1996). Explicit knowledge enables the simple transfer of knowledge, whereas tacit 
knowledge reflects often untapped and hidden knowledge that is not easily 
transferable. Tacit knowledge includes experience; and it is idiosyncratic, somewhat 
difficult to identify, and often described as the implicit knowledge that indi\'iduals use 
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to deal with the world (Patriotta, 2003). By comparison, explicit knowledge can be 
codified and articulated and therefore transferred through a formal process. The 
classification of tacit and explicit knowledge enables distinctions to be drawn between 
'knowing how' and 'knowing about', between subjective and objective knowledge, 
and between procedural and declarative knowledge (Grant, 1996) as carriers and 
components of the knowledge creation process. 
2.4.1.1 Knowledge Creation Theories 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) conceptualised knowledge creation as a process of 
continuous and dynamic interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. From this 
viewpoint, organisations are constantly engaged in creating new knowledge based on 
the combination of existing knowledge or through new inventions (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998). Nonaka and Takeuchi's findings are based on empirical evidence on 
research in Japanese firms. They regard knowledge creation as consisting of four 
processes: socialisation, externalisation, combination, and internalisation. 
Socialisation relates to the process of formal and informal social interaction and the 
sharing of experience, whose outcome is knowledge redundancy, which enables 
individuals and groups to exchange knowledge and to learn from each other (Nonaka 
and Konno, 1998). Externalisation converts tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge 
by using metaphors or models to represent thoughts that are otherwise complex to 
communicate. Combination is the crafting and systemising of different concepts into a 
knowledge system. Internalisation embodies explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge 
through two different ways: first, when individuals 're-experience' the experience of 
others who have created such knowledge; second, when individuals create experience 
through doing, a process denoted by the term 'learning-by-doing' (Pavitt, 1991). 
Iterations among these four processes stimulate the creation of new know ledge at the 
Icvel of individuals, collectively at the group level, and at the organisational and inter-
organisational levels. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) stress a number of further features 
of knowledge creation. Firstly, the greater importance of tacit knowledge with respect 
to explicit knowledge, given that the key source of knowledge creation is the 
mobilization and conversion of tacit knowledge by individuals as enablers for 
knowledge and organisational innovation. Therefore, knowledge creation relates 
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closely to the beliefs and commitments of individuals, their interpretations and sense-
making, and it stimulates and guides their actions (Spender, 1996). Secondly, Nonaka 
and Takeuchi's theory of knowledge creation comprises both different types of 
knowledge (epistemological view) and knowledge creating entities (ontological 
perspective). From this viewpoint, knowledge is only created by individuals. Thirdly, 
creating knowledge through the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge 
becomes larger in scale and moves up the ontological levels (knowledge spiral). 
Knowledge creation processes may spread to a group, organisation, and inter-
organisational level. 
Moran and Ghoshal (1996) developed a more simplified version of the concept of 
knowledge creation. Their theory envisages the two main processes of combination 
and exchange. Combination has two aspects: incremental and radical. Knowledge can 
be created through both incremental change of existing knowledge and radical 
change. Radical change can involve processes such as pragmatic change (Kuhn, 
1970), double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978), and generative learning 
(Senge, 1990). Second, the exchange process of knowledge creation takes place 
through social interaction between the parties who provide the knowledge. Therefore, 
through social interaction and negotiation, explicit knowledge can be transferred, and 
tacit knowledge can be learnt through shared experiences and understanding (Moran 
and Ghoshal, 1996). Compared to the knowledge creation theory proposed by Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (1995) and Moran and Ghoshal' s (1996) theoretical model of 
combination-exchanged, is more simplified and less detailed. 
Criticisms of the above-described theories arose from discussion of the process by 
which tacit knowledge is transformed into explicit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995), and Moran and Ghoshal's combination-exchanged model was accused of being 
too simplified (Tsoukas, 1996). These criticisms prompted scholars to develop more 
proactive representations of knowledge creation, including important aspects of sense 
making (Drazin et aI., 1999; Crossan et aI., 1999). In their view, the knowledge 
creation processes consists of intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and 
institutionalizing. These \vere used by other researchers as a new foundation for 
73 
discussing the concept of initiatives as knowledge creating entities within an 
organisation. 
2.4.1.2 Knowledge Creation in the Context of Strategic Initiatives 
The discussion of strategic initiatives as knowledge creating entities led Wielemaker 
(2003) to conceptualise three initiatives related knowledge creating phases: linking, 
interpreting, and integrating. Wie1emaker (2003) pointed out that initiatives do not 
necessarily have to proceed sequentially through these three phases. Moreover, an 
initiative may iterate backward and forward across these phases through iterative 
loops (Van de Ven, 1992; Wielemaker, 2003). Individuals and roles at different 
organisational levels become involved during the knowledge creating phases of an 
initiative. At the linking stage, an individual knowledge carrier interacts with other 
individuals and creates new knowledge as new ideas and possible new opportunities 
for a firm. At this stage other knowledge is collected for knowledge recombination by 
connecting with other knowledge carriers in order to create new knowledge (Clark 
and Fujimoto, 1991; Hedlung, 1994). Explicit and tacit knowledge are utilized to 
create new knowledge at this stage. However, explicit knowledge faces the critique to 
represent a way to create new ideas and find new opportunities. By comparison, tacit 
knowledge is personal, not codified (e.g. database, templates etc.) and implicit 
transferred between individuals (Nadler and Tushman, 1998). Therefore, the way to 
create new ideas is to contact other knowledge carriers and create new knowledge 
through personal interaction (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Hedlung, 1994). Moreover, 
the interaction with other individuals should be interdisciplinary and a prerequisite to 
simulating the creation of new ideas by regularly updating a firm's existing 
knowledge base (Nadler and Tushman, 1995). Wielemaker (2003) argues that 
knowledge itself is not enough to generate new ideas - intuition, as a integrated 
pattern of personal experience (Crossan et at., 1999), is also necessary. Intuition in 
combination with creativity and unexpected occurrences generates new ideas and 
opportunities which become sufficiently robust to initiate the first step in new 
knowledge creation (Drucker, 1985; Baden-Fuller and Volberda. 1997). The 
interpretation stage continues to shape the new ideas, which are still fragmented in the 
indiyiduals' minds. At this stage, indi\'iduals shape the new ideas by analysing and 
assembling bits and pIeces into a coherent whole: this is termed 'kaleidoscopic 
thinking' (Kanter, 1999). Metaphors, analogies, challenging the familiar and 
analysing the counter-intuitive are methods with which to produce that coherent 
whole (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Interactions among those methods and the 
validation of their results are necessary, and they fit well with the combinative process 
of strategic initiatives. In this regard, strategic initiatives - especially entrepreneurial 
ones - should be evaluated collectively according to their contribution to knowledge 
creation and to creating the coherent whole, instead of each individual initiative being 
assessed on its own (McGrath, 1996). Hence, the collective and interpretive sense 
making process is much richer and facilitates the interpretation of strategic initiatives 
in the context of knowledge creation. The last stage of knowledge creation in the 
context of strategic initiatives is the integration stage, which yields a detailed picture 
of the coherently developed concept. Individuals are brought together into teams to 
transform the emerged concepts from the previous stages into an explicit 
implementation plan. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), a team of 
individuals can proceed at this stage with the focus on integrating the knowledge and 
preventing actual transfers of knowledge from occurring. The initiative spreads the 
knowledge creating process from the group to the firm level, according to Nonaka and 
Takeuchi's (1995) concept of the knowledge spiral. This stage requires the 
formalization of rules and procedures to establish the routines of the workgroups and 
to conform with the rest of the organisation'S knowledge (Crossan et al., 1999). 
In summary, the knowledge creation process in general and in the context of strategic 
initiatives has been conceptualised and analysed by various knowledge-related 
studies. Nevertheless, limitations and gaps emerge, especially within the processes of 
knowledge creation (side-effects of knowledge creation). Strategic initiatives are 
conceptualised as knowledge creating entities which develop their own knowledge 
base over time. This knowledge base expand the overall knowledge repository of a 
firm with new knowledge - organisational knOWledge. The gaps and unwanted side-
effects - dysfunctional effects -that arise during the knowledge creation process are 
still unexplored in the literature reviewed here. Those gaps and side effects may 
funlish understanding as to why the transformation of competitive advantages is risky 
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and why successful companies may fail to sustain their competitive advantages over 
time. Furthermore, the reviewed literature leads to the assumption that a company is 
grounded on multiple knowledge bases and repositories which differ in their 
capacities to drive the transformation of a firm's idiosyncratic knowledge base. Those 
variations of knowledge bases are limited in their compatibility with other knowledge 
bases, which leads to the creation of unexpected and unplanned organisational 
knowledge ('negative knowledge'), classified as dysfunctional effects. According to 
Patriotta (2003), knowledge bases are one of the most important forms of storing 
organisational knowledge and facilitating the routinization of activities, often 
described as knowledge repositories. 
2.4.1.3 The Knowledge Base Concept of the Firm 
To keep up with the speed of changes and dynamic environments, managers 
frequently need to adapt their firm's knowledge base (Grant, 1996). Given the 
diffusion of knowledge inside and outside a firm and the uncertainty in the 
environment, the recombination of knowledge bases becomes a crucial element for a 
firm. Knowledge bases include the underlying logic that emerges from a community 
or organization sharing to some degree the same beliefs about reality. Furthermore, 
knowledge bases can be defined as stored information that is used to drive present 
decisions based on an organization's history (Day, 1994). In this context, knowledge 
bases are idiosyncratic and can be conceptualized as repositories of collective insights 
and beliefs, including capabilities, policies, procedures, routines, physical artefacts, 
and rules which can be used when needed (Moorman and Miner, 1997; Patriotta, 
2003). A firm can be conceptualized as a multi-form of different knowledge bases 
which utilizes them to achieve its targets and goals. During its utilization of different 
knowledge bases, a firm may adopt different mental models (Senge, 1990), working 
procedures (Hackbarth and Grover, 1999), history (Hall, 1984), organisational 
routines (eyert and March, 1963), and organisational culture (Walsh and Ungson, 
1991; Walsh, 1995), These varieties and the processes of combining different 
knowledge bases are less discussed in the literature. In this regard, still unclear is the 
conceptualization and understanding of possible side-effects - dysfunctional effects -
and a finn's limitations in combining and reconfiguring a multifaceted and 
idiosyncratic knowledge base. 
Some researchers have conceptualised the development of knowledge bases in terms 
of strategic initiatives (Wielemaker, 2003). They argue that strategic initiatives create 
their own knowledge base over the entire life cycle from the idea to the 
implementation. Furthermore, strategic initiatives are conceptualised as distinct 
knowledge bases, which are linked to a firm's knowledge base. In this context, the 
linkage varies between being loosely coupled to tightly coupled. Wielemaker (2003) 
describes these interconnections as the sources from which an initiative cultivates its 
own organizational form, administration, and roles. The initiative's knowledge base 
emerges from an opportunity often described as an idea (Pinchott, 1985; N onaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Birkenshaw, 1997). This may be the result of a problem-driven 
search caused by a crisis, unexpected occurrences or opportunistic and personal 
factors (Cyert and March, 1963; Aharoni, 1967). The starting points of emerging 
initiative related knowledge bases are often described as taking three different forms: 
radical and incremental strategic change initiatives of a firm to reshape its existing 
competitive advantage (Quinn, 1980; Henderson and Clark, 1990); autonomous and 
induced initiatives (Burgelman, 1988); or internal, local, or global market initiatives 
(Birkenshaw, 1997). 
In the context of this thesis, strategic initiatives are defined as firm-related and 
internal processes. These processes are closely related and integrated within a firm 
and its organisation in order to recombine the knowledge base to renew the firm's 
competitive advantages. The initiative shapes its own knowledge base which differs in 
its form and type of knowledge as an emerging part of the firm's wider idiosyncratic 
knowledge base. Furthermore, from the dynamic perspective of recombining a firm's 
resources and capabilities, initiative related knowledge bases may differ and collide 
with other initiatives or the firm-related knowledge base, and are limited in their 
compatibility with other emerging knowledge bases during the transformation 
process, which produces unexpected side-effects. The assumption is that thcse 
dysfunctional effects create ncw knowledge as new resource structures and 
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capabilities which conflict with the finn's defined strategies. In this relation, limited 
compatibilities of resources and capabilities may become relevant and relate to the 
heterogeneity of finn-related knowledge base. 
2.4.1.4 Heterogeneity of Idiosyncratic Knowledge Bases 
Scholars have maintained that initiative related knowledge bases transfonn over time 
and differ in their degree of broad and deep knowledge (McGrath et aI., 1 9 9 5 ~ ~
Wielemaker, 2003). Deep knowledge is specialized, functional and complex 
(Leonard-Barton, 1995; Demsetz, 1991; Hansen, 1999), whilst broad knowledge 
relates to a wide-ranging knowledge base created with the aim of exploring interfaces 
among different specialised areas, including characteristics of integrative and 
simplified knowledge bases (Hansen, 1999). Therefore, two important aspects of the 
heterogeneity of a finn's knowledge base emerge. Firstly, deep knowledge relates to 
the degree of expertise in specific finn-related knowledge fields. This type of 
knowledge is required to develop the competence of a specialist area of a company: 
for example, through a strategic initiative finns develop new knowledge fields of 
expertise. Secondly, the broad knowledge adjusts the range of knowledge. This 
concerns the ability of a finn to combine different knowledge bases and to exchange 
knowledge by understanding the interaction of individuals through a common 
language. Hence, the assumption is that broad knowledge is relevant to transforming, 
extending and recombining existing knowledge bases in order to renew and 
strengthen a firm's uniqueness and competitive advantage. The initiative related 
knowledge creation process addresses both dimensions. Broad knowledge is 
important for bringing different knowledge areas together and facilitating innovative 
ideas. Deeper knowledge refines a finn's specialist area. Therefore, to generate ideas, 
broad knowledge is initially required, whereas their detailing and implementation 
require deep knowledge. The combination of the two types needs to be addressed by 
an initiative in order to create new knowledge (Wielemaker, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
incompatibilities between combining and transfonning deeper knowledge fields 
through broad knowledge are still unresolved in the context of strategic initiatives. 
Initiatives facilitate sense making in their own way, based on their distinct knowledge 
base to combine and link deeper knO\v1cdge fields together. Hence, the assumption is 
that two or more ongoing initiatives face the challenge of creating new knowledge 
which is initiative-specific and must be recombined with the firm's knowledge base 
and other initiative related and emerging knowledge bases. This recombination 
creates overlaps and increases the capacity to create and store new knowledge. with 
the consequence of evolving dysfunctional effects due to heterogeneous knowledge 
bases. In this context, heterogeneity is defined as the variation of different 
idiosyncratic knowledge bases of a firm engaged in extending and recombining its 
knowledge base as a whole. The heterogeneity relates to the efficiency of 
recombinations and stimulates the creation of new knowledge (negative knowledge) 
which is unexpected and diametric to the aims of the initiative and the firm. 
2.4.2 Discussion of the KBV 
Knowledge based perspectives and theories extend the static view of the resource 
based theory by suggesting that the competitive advantage of a firm can be renewed 
through the creation, utilisation, and integration of new knowledge as a source of 
competitive advantage (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Weick, 1982; Demsetz, 1991; 
Hamel, 2000). The wide range of knowledge perspectives and the broad variation of 
empirical literature on strategic phenomena are linked and enriched with fundamental 
knowledge processes as alliances and acquisitions to strategic decision making and 
innovation. However, the KBV are still confronted with the criticism of not 
constituting a theory of strategy on its own. Knowledge based theories emerged and 
offered important insights to improve the understanding of many strategic processes. 
The process of strategy making is still unresolved in the context of the KEV, and 
particularly so are concepts on how existing knowledge bases can be reshaped and 
combined effectively using the concept of strategic initiatives. Moreover, the 
discussion on the recombination and related limitations of compatibilities between 
two emerging knowledge bases from different ongoing strategic initiatives is still 
unresolved. In this regard, conceptual explanations on emerging side effects 
(dysfunctional effects) during the knowledge creation process, especially in the 
context of strategic initiatives, are lacking. More clarification of this unresolved area 
would strengthen the assumption that knowledge can be the most important resource 
within a firm, as some scholars still maintain that it is crucial to consider the strategic 
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value of knowledge because not all knowledge is equally valuable (Eisenhardt and 
Galunic, 2000; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). Hence, knowledge sourcing, transfer, 
and even integration are not necessarily key sources of sustainable competiti\'e 
advantage unless the knowledge is strategically valuable. Therefore, the strategic 
initiative related strategy making perspective offers a new way to combine the KBV 
with the strategy making process to overcome the challenges of the current theoretical 
debates on knowledge and the criticism that the KBV is not yet a theory of strategy 
and organisation. Furthermore, this approach to conceptualising the strategic initiative 
related strategy making process may help develop more consistent knowledge 
taxonomies and measures, beyond the commonly accepted distinction between tacit 
and explicit knowledge. 
2.5 Derived Research Questions 
The foregoing review of the four main bodies of literature - strategic initiatives, 
resource based theory of the firm, dynamic capabilities and the knowledge based 
theory of the firm - comprises three interrelating aspects. Firstly, the different bodies 
of literature have been selected critically and based on the researcher's personal 
interest in order to enrich current debates and perspectives in the areas of 
investigation chosen. Secondly, based on the selected areas of investigations, the 
literature review has sought to identify major theoretical gaps that need to be filled. 
Furthermore, the theoretical gaps identified by the literature review and Berger and 
Lickmann's (1976) notion that reality is constructed through the social interaction of 
actors leads to the third aspect focused upon: formulating researchable questions that 
address the theoretical gaps identified and enable this research thesis to offer a 
contribution to the current knowledge. 
Figure 2: Identified theoretical gaps and research focus. 
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Figure 2 outlines the theoretical gap and research focus identified by this dissertation. 
The Figure highlights the connections among the concepts of strategic initiatives, 
resources, dynamic capabilities and knowledge which outline the foregoing 
discussions of the selected main bodies of literature. In this regard, the following 
research questions have been formulated. 
How do strategic initiatives affect the existing resources and knowledge base in the 
context of renewing a firm's competitive advantage? 
The challenges of strategic initiative implementation are still insufficiently observed 
and conceptualised, and especially the kind of challenges and effects that emerge 
during the strategic initiative related renewal process . In this regard, the research 
que tion comprises the following aspects: 
aJ How do trategic initiath es interact lvith the firm ' organisational context and 
other ongoing trategic initiatives? 
b) What challenges emerge from the interactions be{t1;'een different strategic 
initiatives and what are the drivers of such challenges? 
Strategic initiatives have been recognised as an important way to renew a finn's 
competitive advantage, because it is vital for finns to sustain their economic rents and 
above-average returns, especially in dynamic and competitive environments. 
Therefore, finding answers to the above research questions will increase theoretical 
understanding about a firm's strategy making and competitive advantage renewal 
processes in the context of strategic initiatives. Furthennore, it will provide the basis 
for enhancing the current concepts and theories in the field of strategic management. 
3 Research Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology developed to fulfil the 
proposed research objectives and finding answers to the research questions. 
Specifically, the research aims to discover which kind of challenges and effects 
emerge during the strategic initiative renewal process and what are the drivers of such 
challenges. 
To find answers to the derived research question a qualitative methodology approach 
was deemed appropriate. Motivated by personal experience and research interests, the 
researcher set up a qualitative case-study-based research project. Specifically, the 
research followed a case study-driven approach by collecting data from a company 
undergoing strategic renewal managed and implemented through strategic initiative 
implementation. Sun Microsystems, Inc. was the case company. 
The fieldwork started in October 2004 and finished in June 2007. Beginning with 
pilot interviews (refer to Appendix 2), the first aim was to select and verify the 
strategic initiatives for the in-depth case studies by collecting relevant background 
information on the company's strategic focus and business strategies at the same time. 
After the pilot interview schedule, the three in-depth case studies were conducted on 
the strategic initiatives selected: Sun Sigma initiative, CRM Convergence initiative 
and the Balanced Scorecard initiative. In this context strategic initiatives are defined 
as the unit of analysis of this dissertation. 
To increase the range of the data for triangulation purposes, the researcher collected 
and compared data from different sources, including internal company 
documentation, published company information, on-site observations and semi-
structured interviews addressing different stakeholder groups, in order to obtain the 
relevant varieties of data. In detail, fifty-one semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with different stakcholder groups and lasted between I and 3 hours. 
followed by various foHow-up mectings and phone-calls to clarify and rcview the 
aforemcntioned intcrvic\\' topics and results from the interviews. 
Furthermore, data analysis and interpretation was conducted to conceptualise the ne\\' 
theory of strategic initiative related dysfunctions. In this context, different types of 
coding methods, namely open coding, axial coding and selective coding. according to 
the principles of grounded theory, were used (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). Those coding methods were applied to reduce, organise and compare 
the data collected from the strategic initiative in-depth cases. 
In summary, all the elements described outline how the research was operationalised 
and helped to make the research approach transparent to other researchers. The 
following sections describe the major methodological elements and their relevance to 
the research design for this study. Moreover, the research methods used in this study 
are described in terms of their strengths and weaknesses and the rationale behind the 
choice of the specific method and approach. The last section explains how the 
research data collected were analysed to achieve the developed research objectives. 
3.1 Research Design 
The aim of the research design was to cover the defined objective represented by the 
following statement: "A research design is a logical plan for getting from here to 
there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and 
there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. " (Kuhn 1962, p. 
20). Through the research design, the researcher was able to develop a blueprint for 
the inquiry and to focus the research in a specific direction. Moreover, it helpedin 
defining the boundaries and addressing potential problems during the implementation 
of the inquiry. Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997) and Yin (2003) point out that several 
additional key aspects need to be taken into account when defining a research design. 
These aspects are the scope of the research, specific objectives of the research, nature 
of the research topic, the characteristics of the research areas, the availability of 
resources, the strengths and weaknesses of the researcher in terms of research skills, 
and specific time constraints which influence the choice and formulation of the 
research strategy. The following section discusses three fundamental Issues 
concerning the qualitative research approach, including the philosophical stance and 
the contrast between quantitative and qualitative research and the oyerall research 
orientation in terms of its being a theory building and or a theory testing approach. 
3.1.1 Qualitative Research Approach 
A principal concern of this thesis is to fill major theoretical gaps by investigating how 
strategic initiative implementation affects a firm's most valuable sources of 
competitive advantage. This thesis adopts the idea and perspective of social 
construction that meanings emerge through the verbal and social interaction of actors 
(Lattimer, 2003), which reflects as well the underlying assumption of the 
phenomenological perspective. More phenomenologically oriented and influenced 
theories regard social reality as being constructed and reconstructed by social actors 
who pre-interpret and interpret social meanings (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; 
Boeker, 1997; Lattimer, 2003). The main goal of the phenomenologist is to 
investigate 'the ways in which people create or discover meaning for them, tIT to 
make sense of the actions of others and together negotiate sensible social relations' 
(Harmon 1990, p. 11). 
This work is built on a phenomenological stance, and the research orientation are 
greatly influenced by several fundamental studies by phenomenologists, including 
those by Mead (1934), Berger and Luckmann (1967), Blumer (1967) and Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). Following the principle of social construction, and applying the 
phenomenological perspective, the researcher needs to be aware of the specifics to 
analyse and understand the meanings of the collected data. To understand and to 
interpret the different social actors, the choice of data collection needs to be taken into 
account during the formation of the research design. Therefore, the phenomenological 
paradigm is reflected in the underlying logic of the research design and influences the 
methodological considerations of the study. 
The perspective of this thesis on reality differentiates and influences the choice of 
research aims and methods. Such differences and influence are reflected in the naturc 
of research as either quantitativc or qualitativc. The research methods used within this 
approach are "an array of intcq)fctive techniques which seek to describe, translatc and 
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otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency of certain more or less 
naturally occurrmg phenomena in the social world" as the conceptualisation of 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions (Van Maanen, 1983, p.9). The 
phenomenological paradigm emerged as a result of criticisms of the positi\'istic 
paradigm, as illustrated in the following table. 
Table 5: Main criticisms of the positivist paradigm (Collis and Hussey, 2003, p.54) 
1 It is impossible to treat people as being separate from their social contexts and they cannot 
be understood without examining the perceptions they have of their own activities. 
2 A highly structured research design imposes certain constraints on the results and may 
ignore relevant and interesting findings. 
3 Researchers are not objective, but part of what they observe. They bring their own 
interests and values to the research. 
4 Capturing complex phenomena in a single measure is, at best, misleading. For example, is 
it possible to assign a numerical value to a person's intelligence? 
The criticisms help to explain the main differences between the two paradigms and 
the consequences the researcher had to deal with by selecting the phenomenological 
paradigm. In this context, the phenomenological paradigm tends to produce 
qualitatively rich and subjective data based on small samples (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). 
Phillips (1987) describes the quantitative researcher as someone who creates scientific 
knowledge through observing and measunng objective reality, based on the 
ontological assumption that social reality is independent of human minds. 
Quantitative research tries to achieve explanations and predictions that are general to 
other circumstances and settings. General results are built on rigid sampling 
strategies, combined with identifiable variables and measurable relationships from the 
data collection process (Luffman, 1996; Lynch, 1997). Methods such as surveys, 
experiments, inventories and demographic analysis are used during the data collection 
process to produce quantitative data on the basis of which correlations betwcen 
defined variables can be established. 
In comparison, qualitatiyc research, such as that conducted by this study. does not 
measure or predict the phenomena studied. It explores, investigates and understands 
of strategic initiative related dysfunctions which are socially constructed, complex 
and indivisible into discrete variables. This qualitative research observes the social 
actor's perception of the meanings embedded within social settings (Boeker, 1997) 
and focuses on the unfolding of the process. Qualitative research is more insightful 
and holistic than quantitative research (Vollmann, 1996) and it often uses case studies 
as the preferred method of this study, rather than the surveys and experiments of 
quantitative research (Greiner, 1972; Mayer-Wittman, 1989; Vollmann, 1996; 
Silverman, 1997). Drawing on the work of Halfpenny (1979), Table 6 lists seven key 
distinctions between quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
Table 6: Main distinctions between quantitative and qualitative research methods 
Quantitative research 
Hard 
Fixed 
Objective 
Value-free 
Survey 
Hypothesis-testing 
Abstract 
(Source: Silverman 1997, p. 13) 
Qualitative research 
Soft 
Flexible 
Subjective 
Political 
Case study 
Speculative 
Grounded 
As stated, this thesis does not seek to test or measure the relationship between the 
phenomena selected and does not offer any predictions. It aims to explore and 
understand strategic initiative related dysfunctions. Given the study's research 
objectives, the thesis is qualitative, rather than quantitative. It follows the principles of 
the social construction perspective (Lattimer, 2003). 
3.1.2 Theory building versus theory testing 
Differences in orientation between theory testing versus theory building reflect 
another important aspect of any research design. Academic debates address the 
question by arguing whether data or theory should come first. If research projects aim 
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to test, expand or modify an existing theory, then the theory must come before the 
data collection. In comparison, if research projects seek to create a theory from the 
collected data, the data must come before the theory. However, there are similarities: 
Snow and Thomas (1994) describe three different purposes of theory which can 
emerge in combination: description, explanation or prediction. The combination 
between theory building or testing and the purpose of theory (description, explanation 
or prediction) require various possible research methods. Table 7 shows six different 
scenarios linking the two basic orientations (theory- building and theory-testing) to 
three distinct purposes of theory: description, explanation or prediction. The six 
resulting combinations highlight the major differences between qualitative and 
quantitative research. 
Table 7: Theory building and theory testing 
Description Exploration Prediction 
lKey question is 'what'. Key questions are 'how' Key questions are 'who', 
Identify key constructs and 'why'. Establish 'where' and 'When'. Examine 
Theory and variables. Studies relationships among boundary conditions of a 
Building are usually based on constructs and provide theory. Result may be a 
observation and/or theoretical rationale for middle-range theory. Studies 
interviewing. observed relationships. use observation, 
Studies usually use questionnaire surveys and 
observation and/or i nterviewi ng. 
interviews. 
~ o c u s s is on developing Focus is on documenting Focus is on testing competing 
and validating measures relationships among theories of the same 
pf key constructs. variables through phenomenon through crucial 
Studies usually use hypothesis testing. Large experiments. Because of the 
Ruestionnaire, surveys samples are frequently dearth of this type of study, no 
Theory 
~ n d / o r r interviews. used with questionnaire pattern in field method usage 
Testing surveys or field can be discerned. 
simulations. Because 
causal links are examined 
or implied, researchers 
must be wary of common-
method bias. 
Source: Snow and Thomas (1994, p. 466) 
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Comparing Table 7 with the research project, the similarities are mostly in the section 
on theory building with the purpose to explain the phenomenon of strategic initiative 
related dysfunctions in the context of renewing a firm's sources of competiti\'e 
advantage. The classification of the research project within the area of theory building 
and explanation request specific methods accordingly. During the theory building 
process, the development of theoretically informed interpretations reflects one of the 
most powerful ways to bring reality to light. The development approach of the 
concept of strategic initiative related dysfunctions integrates the concept of grounded 
theory. The concept uses an inductive approach for theory building and represents . a 
qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an 
inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon' (Bogdan, 1975, p. 24). The 
process of theory development requires theoretical sensitivity which means the 
constant comparison of data and theory (Shortell and Zajac, 1990). 
Another difference between theory testing and theory building is linked to the 
methods used. Surveys, simulations and experiments for data collection are mainly 
used by theory testing (Christensen, 1997). In comparison, the case study oriented 
approach of this study is mainly used for building theories. In the context of the 
present analysis, attention has already been drawn to the lack of theories and 
empirical evidence capable of depicting the processes of strategic initiative related 
dysfunctions. Hence, for the purpose of this research, case studies have been utilised 
in an effort to generate a theory capable of filling the gap in the literature. 
3.1.3 Research Design: Case Study 
3.1.3.1 Introduction 
Within the social science, case study methods are used in different ways with various 
philosophical and methodological aspects (Platt, 1988) depending on the researchers' 
views. It could become problematic to link phenomenology (interpreti\'e) only to case 
studies and positivism to surveys (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Klein and Myers 
( 1999) illustrate some examples that are consistent with the eon\'Cntions of positi\-ism 
(Smith and Grimm, 1987; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois. 1988). Case studies represent 
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one of the most common frameworks or research designs to conduct qualitative 
research, but it is not limited only to qualitative research (Mayer-Wittman, 1989). 
Moreover, there are numerous examples which illustrate the deployment of case study 
designing for the purpose of quantitative research (Platt, 1988). 
3.1.3.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Case Studies 
The advantages of case studies can be described via several aspects. Case studies offer 
flexibility due to the adoption of multiple data collection methods and they generate 
insightful stories instead of statistical information. Generating more insightful stories 
drives better understanding of organisational complexity from an insider's 
perspective. Through the case study approach, the researcher is able to develop a 
holistic perspective of the studied phenomenon (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; 
Chwalowski, 1997) and in particular to explore a 'previously little-studied area' 
(Smith and Grimm, 1987). Case studies can be applied to various social settings 
(Lynch, 1997). Nevertheless, case studies are often criticised for such issues. Those 
critics include generalization representational and validity in the findings of the 
qualitative approach (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Gummesson, 1991; Luffman, 
1996). These issues are discussed in detail in the following sub sections. 
3.1.3.2.1 The Issue of Generalization 
Using the case study approach, the researcher is aware of the fact that developing rich 
contextual data will not be sufficient to generalise the chosen phenomena into a 
concrete set of laws for measurement and prediction ( Platt, 1988; Platt, 1988; Mayer-
Wittman, 1989; Fullan, 1991; Bruke and Litwin, 1992; Stake, 1995; Lynch, 1997). 
One argument is defined in the idiographic approach, which emphasises the 
understanding of social phenomena within a natural and individual case or event 
oriented environmental context. In opposition, an approach is nomothetic if it focuses 
on general statements that account for larger social patterns (Luthans and Davis, 
1982; Gay, 2002) that form the context of single events or individual behaviour and 
experience. A second argument can be described through the way this research 
develops the theory. The theory is based on observations of the real world rather than 
solely on abstract reasoning - more a grounded theory approach. The formulation of 
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grounded theory is more a process of discovery that begins with extensive observation 
from which theory emerges over time. The process uses inductive reasoning, \\'hich 
begins with observations and builds more general statements from them over time. 
Further research is recommended in the literature before a theory reaches a certain 
degree of maturity or generality. Furthermore, it is commonly agreed that case studies 
help to generate theories and provide theoretical platforms for quantitative testing. 
Quantitative testing can then be used in a second step to enable generalisation. 
3.1.3.2.2 Issues of Validity and Reliability 
There are four common types of validity, which are important for all social science 
research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Kidder 
and Judd, 1986). In general, validity can be defined as 'the accuracy and truthfulness 
of the findings' (Altheide, 1997, pA87). Construct validity and reliability become the 
major concerns during the data collection processes; internal validity is the key during 
the data analysis stage; external validity is crucial to the research design (Altheide and 
Johnson, 1997). Yin (2003) provides a guideline to explain the need for different 
types of validity at various stages of research. Table 8 provides a guideline for 
ensuring validity and reliability and enables the researcher to check its case study 
oriented research approach, according to the requirements of each research stage. 
Table 8: Case study tactics for four design tests (Yin, 2003). 
Tests Case Study Tactic Phase of research in 
I 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity - use multiple sources of evidence Data collection 
- establish chain of evidence Data collection 
- have case study report Composition 
Iinternall validity - do pattern-matching Data analysis 
- do explanation-building Data analysis 
Data analysis I - do time-series analysis I 
External validity - use replication logic in multiple case l Research design 
I studies 
Reliability - use case study protocol Data collection 
- develop case study data base Data collection 
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According to Yin (2003), during the preparation of data collection, a plan was shaped 
to address construct validity through the three recommended tactics. To address the 
issue of construct validity and to increase the spectrum of the data collection range, it 
was proposed to collect data from four different sources, which will be discussed 
later. 
3.1.3.2.3 The Issue of Triangulation 
To address the issue of triangulation multiple methods are combined to generate 
empirical materials. The rationale behind this is to overcome the weaknesses or 
intrinsic biases and the problems that come from single method and single theory 
study. Triangulation reflects a process and provides the opportunity to enhance the 
validity and reliability (Denzin, 1970; Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Denzin, 1988) of the 
case study by increasing the trustworthiness of the data and the validity of the 
explanation of social phenomena (Patton, 1990; Kochan and McKersie, 1992). In this 
context, the purpose of triangulation is to obtain confirmation of findings through 
convergence of different perspectives. From the literature, four basic types of 
triangulation can be derived (Denzin, 1988; Patton, 1990; Smith, 1975; Yin, 2003): 
data triangulation, theory triangulation, investigator triangulation and methodological 
triangulation. The concept of triangulation applies the following aspects: 
• Triangulation is a creative act and provides the opportunity to maximise the depth 
and breadth of data collection (Yin, 2003) 
• Triangulation strengthens confidence of research findings (Denzin, 1988) and 
drives comprehensive understanding of the studied phenomenon (Schein, 1987; 
Comer and Wilson-Barnett, 1992; Payne, 1997) 
However, triangulation does not resolve the contradictions created by different 
sources of data (Schein, 1987; Comer and Wilson-Barnett, 1992; Payne, 1997). 
However, some theorists argue that contradictory data often provide an additional 
source of creativity and can be used as a vital mechanism for expanding the 
researcher's thinking. Furthermore, some theorists (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Comer, 1991; Cowman, 1993; Powell, 1997; Kilmann and Herden. 1976; Kotter and 
Schlesinger, 1979; Hunsucker and Loos, 1989) argue that triangulation enables the 
researcher to reconcile the opposing positions held by qualitative and quantitatiye 
methodologies. 
3.2 Case Study: The Fieldwork Research Design 
The following section describes various processes through which the proposed 
research objectives can be achieved. In light of the current methodological literature, 
especially the works of Eisenhardt (1989), Miles and Huberman (1994), Stake (1995), 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Yin (1984), a number of issues require attention: 
devising the case study protocol, selecting cases, conducting the case studies, 
collecting data from the field and data analysis. These issues divide into two major 
phases of the field research design. 
Firstly, the preparation phase includes the rationale for the case company selected, 
outlining the criteria for its choice. This is followed by describing the details of the 
case study protocol, including the semi-structured questionnaire (see Appendix 1). 
Furthermore, the details of the single case study approach are described as the data 
collection approach, data collection procedures, data sources and data collection 
methods used. In addition the rationale for the selection of the three in-depth strategic 
initiative case studies and the reflexivity of the researcher are described. 
Secondly, the data collection phase illustrates how the researcher designed and 
formulated the semi-structured interviews, gained access to the case sites and selected 
the interviewees for the pilot interviews and the lessons learned from the pilot 
interview schedule as a starting point for the three in-depth case studies (see the 
questionnaires in Appendix 1). Furthermore, the data collection phase illustrates the 
on-site observations and how the documentation was organised during this phase. 
3.2.1 The Preparation Phase 
The researcher selected Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) as the case company, based on 
six unique characteristics of the case study company. Firstly, Sun needed to cope with 
an immense growth rate within a short period of time. which offered a unique 
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opportunity to study the development, evolution and complexities of existing 
company resource base impacts and resource re-configuration efforts. Secondly, the 
company had launched a large number of strategic initiatives to implement the firm's 
latest business strategies and directions. Therefore, Sun's environment provided an 
opportunity to study strategy making and related challenges in the context of strategic 
initiatives. Thirdly, the strategic initiatives launched by Sun covered a wide range of 
strategic objectives and strongly interrelated with each other in some areas. Fourthly, 
the strategic initiatives launched aimed to transform some of the company's core 
competencies, which were responsible for some of Sun's past successes. In this 
context, the company's strategic initiatives sought to impact on existing resources, 
capabilities, and the knowledge base of the company in different ways to implement 
the new strategies. Fifthly, Sun's strategic initiative portfolio included different types 
of initiatives due to their scale, area of implementation, change power, 
implementation time and starting point. This uniqueness of ongoing strategic initiative 
diversities provided an opportunity to study different types of ongoing strategic 
initiatives in the same organisational context. The six and final criterion was based on 
the researcher's previous employment with Sun and his personal company network 
which helped him access the necessary case study data. The researcher was able to 
access especially sensitive data and insider information on the company's actual 
strategy and strategic initiative implementation details. 
3.2.1.1 Shaping the Case Study Protocol 
The case study protocol is the basic element in planning and conducting the strategic 
initiative related case study and it is used in this research project as a tool to manage 
the rules and procedures of a case study to enhance the reliability of the research 
(Lynch, 1997). Based on the nature of the case study approach that requires multiple 
data methods, the case study protocol helped the researcher select appropriate 
methods from the wide range of different methods available. The protocol describes 
and expresses why different sources of data are collected (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). 
In the context of this study the protocol contained the sections: 
IntroductionlPrerequisites, Data Collection Approach, Data Collection Procedures, 
Case Study Questions, Outline Case Study Report in accordance with the 
recommendations of various scholars (Yin 2003), described in the following. 
The introduction and prerequisites of the case study protocol consisted of a short 
introduction to the research project presented by the researcher to the interviewees 
and related discussion partners. The researcher prepared three slides to illustrate the 
research objective and purpose of the discussion. The introductory material was 
mainly used by the researcher at the beginning of every scheduled interview. 
Furthermore, every interview and on-site observation was prepared with a case study 
check list. Details on the introduction (purpose of the discussion) and prerequisites 
(case study preparation check list) are listed in Appendix 1, as those elements were 
mainly used in the context of the case study questionnaire. 
To collect the data necessary for this research project, the researcher opted for the 
data collection approach, conducting the case study in two major steps, as outlined in 
Table 9. The first step collected first experiences with a pilot interview schedule, 
including observation of the company's strategic focus and latest business strategies 
in the context of the ongoing and planned strategic initiative implementation 
processes. The first step helped the researcher increase his understanding of strategic 
initiatives as the unit of analysis defined at an early stage and select the appropriate 
strategic initiatives for the planned in-depth case studies. The second step comprised 
the in-depth case studies of the three selected strategic initiatives: Sun Sigma 
initiative, CRM Convergence initiative and the Balanced Scorecard initiative. 
One of the data collection procedures was carried out through a case study interview 
schedule, including the name of the interviewee, the company background and title, 
the interview group and the individual role and responsibilities of the interviewee. 
Furthermore the data collection procedures included the geographical location, email 
and telephone number, illustrated in Appendix 2 and briefly outlined in Table 9 in the 
section of data sources (Interview Groups and Roles/Responsibilities). The researcher 
also used a computer-based calendar (Outlook) to schedule on-site visits and 
interviews, including the invitation, confirmation and feedback on data collection 
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activities. For data privacy reasons the researcher excluded the interview schedule in 
Appendix 2, in particular the names of the interviewees, the email details. telephone 
number and the geographical location of the interviewee. 
The interview questions were developed before the first interviews were scheduled 
and conducted (detail questionnaire in Appendix 1). The questionnaire was enriched 
over time and was refined according to the progress of the interviews conducted, and 
especially to the lessons learned by the researcher and follow-up feedback from the 
interviewees and discussion partner. 
A case study report was developed and updated regularly for various purposes: firstly, 
to maintain the progress of the field work systematically and manage the preliminary 
findings of the research project; secondly, to establish a baseline for regular 
supervisions and research project milestones; thirdly, to manage relevant 
documentations and documented interview scripts which illustrated the used data 
format; and, finally, it was the protocol that included a log history, documenting the 
case study interview schedule and related progress as links of memos which 
illustrated the researcher's thoughts on the collected data and links to the papers of the 
preliminary and final findings. In summary, important details of the case study 
protocol are listed in Appendices 1-3 and in Table 9. 
Table 9: Single Case Study Design Overview of Sun Microsystems, line. 
Data CoHection Approach 
Two Step Approach: 
Step 1: General Company Case Study: 
• 
• 
• 
Pilot-interview schedule: collect first experiences with the research approach and 
case study questions 
Observe the company's strategic focus and business strategies. 
Identify and select strategic initiatives for in-depth case studies. 
Step 2: Three Strateqic Initiative In-Depth Case Studies: 
• Start with in-depth case study of the Sun Sigma initiative. 
• Followed by two additional in-depth case studies, of the CRM Convergence 
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initiative and the Balanced Scorecard initiative, for cross-in-depth case study 
comparisons. 
In this context, the strategic initiative reflects the unit of analysis for the single case study of 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
Data Sources 
To increase the spectrum and data collection range and for triangulation purposes, the 
researcher identified the following important data sources. The researcher created an 
archive and index-list of the collected data, classified by data sources. 
---------------------------------------
--- - -------- ----- --- -- --- -- -- --- ---- --- ------- -- - - - ------- -- - - - - - ---
Documentation: collection of various public and non-public company presentations and 
docu mentations. 
Internal: Non-public company documentation: 
• Internal presentations 
• Internal documentation on the intranet 
• Internal studies 
External: Public company documentation: 
• I nvestor relations 
• Various published articles/newspapers 
Research reports, mainly Gartner Group, Forrester Research and IDC 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On-site Observations: On-site observations included speCific company meetings and 
events to increase the data collection spectrum. The researcher attended Sun Tone-Hall 
Meetings (Internal Company Announcements and Employee Updates), On-Side company 
presentations and selected meetings, round tables (including Business Aperos) and 
customer events. 
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interviews: All the interviews conducted were recorded via voice-recorder and transferred to 
a written interview protocol. The protocol included the date of the interview; interviewee, 
intervieW-duration, history-table in case of interview iterations and the detailed interview text 
(refer to Appendix 2). 
Interview Groups (Context): 
• General Source: Key employee - involved in key programmes/initiatives 
• Sun Sigma initiative: strong involvement in the initiative 
• CRM Convergence initiative: strong involvement in the initiative 
• Balanced Scorecard initiative: strong involvement in the initiative 
Roles/Responsibilities (Case Study Perspectives): 
• 
• 
Line-of Business, Management / Decision Maker 
Initiative "customer" / representative 
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• Project I competence centre team - strategic initiative team 
Data Collection Methods Used 
Interviews: Semi-structured interviews (refer to questionnaire section in Appendix 1). 
- O ~ - - - ~ i t ~ ~ O b ~ ~ - ~ ~ t i - ~ ~ ~ : : A t t ~ ~ d - i ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ t i - ~ ~ ; ; ~ ~ d - ~ ~ ~ - ~ t ~ ~ ~ ---- ----- -- -- ----- --------------
Internal/External Documentation: Analysis, review of the classified documentation, including 
the use of mind-maps and cause-effect diagrams for the review of the documentation. 
- - - -- -- - - - -- --- -- ---- -- --- -- -- ----
----- -------------------------
-------------------------------------- - --
In summary, the data sources and related methods outlined in this research protocol 
are, firstly, interviewing (Calder and Sheridan, 1984; Holstein and Gubrium, 1997) 
using semi-structured interviews; secondly, on-site observations conducted on 
selected company meetings and events (e.g. Sun Tone-Hall meetings), company 
presentations, discussion round tables, and customer events (Robson, 1993; 
Silverman, 1997; Yin, 2003); and, thirdly, documentation including public and non-
public company information to enhance the richness of the data and increase the 
validity through triangulation (Burgess, 1982; Luffman, 1996; Dingwall, 1997). 
3.2.1.2 Selection of the In-depth Strategic Initiative Case Studies 
To collect the data necessary for this research project, the data collection approach 
was organised in two major steps. As described in the previous sections and in Table 
9, the first step collected experiences of the case study company, particularly relevant 
background information on the company's strategic focus and latest business 
strategies. Furthermore, the first step was necessary to identify and select the best 
candidate for the planned in-depth case studies, illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows 
the key initiatives of the company in implementing the latest business strategies and 
directions. In this regard, the selection of the strategic initiatives for an in-depth case 
study was based on two major steps. 
Firstly, the strategic initiatives were classified into three different groups, according to 
the company's strategic business agenda. The first group of key programmes aimed at 
increasing Sun's top-line revenues and market shares. The best candidate for an in-
depth study was the CRM Convergence initiative. This strategic programme aimed at 
transforming a wide range of different company areas in the firm's existing sales 
capabilities and customer operations. The second group of key programme wa 
classified according to the company's strategic efficiency objecti es - especially the 
improvement of current business processes and related quality standards. In thi 
regard, the Sun Sigma was the best candidate for an in-depth case study. Sun Sigma 
was the largest initiative with many types of interrelations and dependencies to other 
ongoing strategic initiatives and Sun 's organization. This context offered a broad 
spectrum to study the strategic initiative related tensions during the implementation 
process. The third group of key programmes related to Sun's objectives in improving 
its strategy execution process, especially the firm 's current strategy management 
approach and capabilities. Within this group of strategic initiatives the Balanced 
Scorecard provided the best opportunity for an in-depth case study based on the 
objectives of implementing the firm 's new business strategies and aligning the current 
ongoing activities and programmes with the new company directions . 
Figure 3: Selected strategic initiative candidates for in-depth case study. 
From Growth to Transaction Sales to From De-Central Planning 
Process and Solution Sales to Centralized Business 
Operational Excellence Capabilities Planning and Monitoring 
Transformation of Transformation of Transformation of 
existing product and eXisting Sales and existing strategy 
service qualities and Customer Operations implementation 
standards management capabilities 
CRM Convergence Balanced Scorecard Sun Sig ma Imllative Initiative I m t l a ~ v e e
lJ lJ lJ 
Sun Centre Operations Global Field Development ) Partner Operations 
Initiative Initiative Inltiabve 
Customer Advocacy Global Client Engagement C o m p e n s a ~ o n n Model 
Initiative Initiative I n l t i a ~ v e e ) Forecast Alignment Solution Selling Passport I n I ~ a b v e eInitiative I m ~ ~ t i v e e
Sales Readiness - SSA ) Partner Relationship Global Deal Mgmt. Process Initiative Initiative Inlliabve 
Secondly, the be t trategic initiative candidates were evaluated according to IX 
different key characteri tic trat gic profile and rele ance of th initiati e, 
interrelation with the firm' organizational context, interrelation ith ther ongoing 
tra tegi initiati e, trong t cu on trategy ecution, ope to tran ~ ~ rm m f 
tl1 ompan citing ore apabilitie, and p . ibl data ace " - in particular 
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confidential information. In this regard, the Sun Sigma initiatives aimed at improving 
and transforming Sun's current business operations to establish process excellence 
standards across the entire company. The initiative affected and impacted nearly every 
ongoing project and programme within the organisation. The CRM Convergence 
initiative sought primarily to change the way in which Sun approached its customers, 
and it affected nearly every ongoing programme and activity related to the firm's 
customer and market operations. The Balanced Scorecard initiative aimed at 
implementing the company's new business strategies and changing the way Sun was 
managing its business strategies. The initiative affected every major programme and 
strategy implementation process of the company. Based on the two selection steps and 
the validation criteria, the researcher selected the Sun Sigma initiative, the CRM 
Convergence initiative and the Balanced Scorecard initiative as the best candidates for 
the planned in-depth case studies. Two steps helped to enrich the overall study 
through the notion of 'controlled opportunism'. According to Eisenhardt (1989), 
controlled opportunism is the way in which 'researchers take advantage of the 
uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of new themes to improve resultant 
theory' (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 539). 
3.2.1.3 Reflexivity of the Researcher 
It should be mentioned that the researcher had worked as an employee for the case 
study company. From 2001 until 2004, the researcher worked for the case study 
company as an Industry Business Manager and Strategy Implementation Manager 
EMEA (Europe, Middle-East and South Africa) for the business development and 
corporate development departments in Zurich, Geneva, and the Headquarters in Palo 
Alto, US. 
The researcher left the company at the beginning of 2004, before the data collection 
and data analysis for this research project started. The researcher's previous history 
and relationships with the company offered unique advantages for the research 
project. Firstly, the researcher was able to access confidential and non-pUblic data on 
strategic initiatives. Furthermore, the researcher was able to access key employees to 
collect relevant and critical data, especially for the in-depth case studies, and interpret 
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company specific phrases and jargons. However, the researcher was aware of his 
previous relationship with the company and defined different strategies to avoid 
potential bias. 
Firstly, following the recommendations of Yin (2003), the researcher continuously 
tested the degree of being open to contrary findings. During the data collection period, 
the researcher selected critical colleagues inside and outside the case study company 
to report and continuously discuss the meaning of the collected data and his 
preliminary findings during the analysis stage. Ex-colleagues and interviewees offered 
alternative explanations and suggestions for the data collection and searched for 
contrary findings which sometimes produced documentable rebuttals and guided the 
researcher in his next data collection plans. Furthermore, the strategy of critically 
reviewing the preliminary findings was strengthened by regular supervisor meetings 
during the data collection period. Secondly, the tolerance of the researcher towards 
contrary findings was regularly tested and the researcher sought alternative and 
contrary explanations to his preliminary findings and documented them through 
memos. After discussing the findings with selected colleagues, the researcher 
compared his memos with the outcomes of the critical review sessions to understand 
if the likelihood of potential bias had been reduced. Thirdly, the researcher selected 
different data sources for identical or similar topics during the data collection period 
to compare them and derive possible explanations contrary to his own memos and 
critical review discussions with selected colleagues regarding the data meanings and 
his preliminary findings. Fourthly, the researcher used the on-site observation 
technique, since one of the major problems occurring with this technique is potential 
bias. In this context, the researcher used the rule of 70% minimum listening and 
maximum 30% asking questions with the group or individual. 
3.2.2 The Data Collection Phase 
The main purpose of this section is to describe how the research site was accessed and 
how the data access was established and different data collection methods, especially 
interviewing, on-site observations and documentation were employed, to implement 
the research design and obtain the answers needed to fulfil the research objectives. 
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The integration of the data collection methods and the problem of ensuring the 
validity of multiple sources of data will be discussed in the following sections. 
3.2.2.1 Designing the Interviews 
The following section describes how the researcher designed the interviews. At this 
stage, the researcher had already accessed company data for the interview design 
process described below. Furthermore, the interview design was a continuous process 
within this research project, and it was reviewed periodically by the researcher based 
on the feedback and lessons learnt during the data collection period. There exists a 
wide range of interview types based on the degree of interview structure and the 
nature of the interview questions (Jones, 1985). It ranges from predetermined 
questions and standardized schedules, commonly known as structured interviews, to 
unstructured interviews in which the interviewers have a general area of interest. The 
interview process is characterized by the flow of conversation (Powney and Watts, 
1987). Integrating aspects from structured and unstructured interviews gives rise to 
semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews include a clearly defined 
purpose with some degree of flexibility in the wording and ordering of questions 
(Robson, 1993). Furthermore, all types of interviews can be classified into two 
different groups according to the type of questions (Jones, 1985). Interview questions 
can be categorised as open-ended or closed (Robson, 1993). Interviews can be in-
depth interviews or survey. In-depth interviews are used to collect detailed insights 
from individual interviewees and survey interviews aim to achieve a broad coverage 
of the population (Jones, 1985; Powney and Watts, 1987). 
According to the research purpose of understanding how Sun employees (social 
actors) constructed, categorised and interpreted events in their world, the researcher 
designed semi-structured and in-depth interviews (Jones, 1985; Powney and Watts, 
1987). Furthermore, integrating the suggestions of Corbin and Strauss (1999), the 
researcher included four different types of question (data-oriented, process-concept 
oriented, practical-theory-structural oriented, and guiding questions) to cover 
contextual aspects of the theory building process. This approach has the important 
~ H . h a n t a g e e of pnwiding the flexibility which is needed in the field of theory building 
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and modification. Furthermore, for the interview preparation, the researcher collected 
information on the company's current business strategies, current strategic initiatives, 
latest information from archival records, and public/confidential documentation in 
order to be aware of Sun's current issues and enhance the formulation of appropriate 
interview questions. 
To select the strategic initiatives for the planned in-depth case studies and for a better 
understanding of Sun's current business strategies, the researcher decided to start with 
pilot interviews. The selection of the interviewees was based on the need for the 
responses to be able to reflect the reality constructed by the whole (Smith, 1975; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The researcher's personal experience with the company was useful 
within the preparation stage of the different interviews. The researcher received from 
his personal network information on new strategic initiatives activities and results, 
relevance of new key-employees and general updates on the company's existing 
business strategies and their implementation process. In this context, pilot interviews 
were planned to enhance the validity and appropriateness of the collected data (Yin, 
2003). 
Six pilot interviewees from the four different interview groups were selected: three 
key employees, who were strongly involved in several strategic company programmes 
and initiatives and one employee from each potential in-depth case study initiative 
(Sun Sigma initiative, CRM Convergence initiative and the Balanced Scorecard 
initiative). Moreover, the interviewees were selected according to their experience 
with Sun's strategy implementation processes, strategic initiative involvement within 
the company and their willingness to participate in the research (refer to the pilot 
interview schedule in Appendix 2). The pilot interviews helped to articulate critical 
issues for inquiry and to enhance the formulation of appropriate interview questions 
for further planned interviews. 
3.2.2.2 Enabling the Data Access 
To collect relevant data, the researcher approached different sites in Switzerland. 
Germany, Spain, France. the United Kingdom, and the USA to conduct interviews 
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with the interviewees identified, who were classified into four major groups, 
according to the case study design. Furthermore, for the case site, the researcher 
approached Sun Microsystems Inc., sharing the researcher's prior working experience 
within the company and based on the unique research environment to explore the 
chosen research topic (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The process of gaining access 
began in October 2004 and ended in June 2007. During the data collection period, the 
researcher attended company related meetings, accessed different sources of 
documentation and arranged several meetings with the three different groups of 
interviewees (Line-of Business, Management / Decision Maker, Initiative "customer" 
/ representative, Project / competence centre team - strategic initiative team) through 
several direct telephone calls, followed by additional telephone and face-to-face 
interviews. After the pilot interview schedule, the researcher extended the case study 
interview list (refer to Appendix 2) and arranged participation in specific company 
events like the firm's tone hall meetings, customer events and company meetings for 
planned on-site observations. 
3.2.2.3 Lessons Learned from the Pilot Interviews 
The lessons learnt from the pilot interviews can be summarised in four aspects. 
Firstly, the pilot interview round gave the researcher confidence that the strategic 
initiative was appropriate as the unit of analysis. Secondly, the pre-selected strategic 
initiatives (Sun Sigma initiative, CRM Convergence initiative and the Balanced 
Scorecard initiative) could be confirmed for the planned in-depth case studies. 
Thirdly, the pilot interview schedule helped the researcher to test and reshape the 
interview questions in order to avoid using theoretical terms, such as resource 
prioritisation, causal ambiguity etc., with which most of the interviewees were 
unfamiliar. The researcher changed the questions into more open and business related 
oncs to increase the understanding of specifics and provide the opportunity to include 
the individual perspectives of the interviewees in the interview process (Jones, 1985). 
Fourthly. the pilot interview schedule was useful in identifying additional candidates 
for further intervic\'.'s, events for on-site observations and indications of additional 
company documentations, based on the feedback from the intervie\\'ees. In addition, 
the on-site observations and the case study inten'jc\\' schedule required flexihility 
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from the researcher according to the time schedule and the place where the interview 
should be conducted. Furthermore, often, non-public documentations were handed 
over to the researcher personally, which required additional visits from the researcher 
to the case study company. 
In summary, the pilot interviews and latest information from archival records and 
documentation provided helpful input to understanding the current situation and 
preparing the interview questions and conducting the interviews for the in-depth case 
studies. Furthermore, the piloting interview questions enhanced the validity and 
appropriateness of the data collected in later interviews by enhancing the interview 
questions, according to the received pilot interview feedback (Glesne and Peshkin, 
1999). 
1.2.2.4 Conducting the Interviews 
The researcher conducted interviews with the key-employees from each group (Line-
of Business, Management / Decision Maker, Initiative "customer" / representative, 
and Project / competence centre team - strategic initiative team), especially in the 
context of the in-depth strategic initiative case studies. Based on the pilot interviews 
and the lessons learnt, the researcher formed the three interview groups, as outlined in 
Table 10. 
Table 10: Overview of the three interviewee groups approached. 
Interviewee Group Description 
I Line-of Business, Management I This group mainly included the executive management 
and Decision Maker team members who played an important role in initiating, 
configuring, energising, deciding and terminating strategic 
initiatives to allocate and re-allocate company resources. 
Interviews were conducted with different company 
I executives from different lines of business like the Global 
I 
Sales Organisation, Global Support Organisation and the 
Professional Services Organisation. Moreover, former 
executives were interviewed to increase the evidence of 
data sources. The executive team members helped to 
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, 
'[ 
describe and analyse the data from a company's 
management perspective. 
Initiative "customer" and 
I This group of interviewees related to strategic initiative 
Customer Representative: execution and key program management. The various 
strategic program managers and key team members 
provided insights into how Sun as a company implemented 
its strategies by executing various strategic key initiatives. 
The program execution teams enriched the data from a 
company transition management pOint of view. Additional 
I details on the strategic initiative implementation and 
transformation process and upcoming challenges were 
collected. 
Competence Center Team - The third source represented a number of communities 
Strategic Initiative Team: which may have been affected or impacted by various 
strategic company resource transition efforts. 
I 
Representatives from various business lines were ablle to I 
provide additional insights on how different strategic I 
I change initiatives were recognised by the wider 
organisation. The group could increase, for example, 
understanding on the general perception, acceptance, 
, 
resistance, challenges etc. of different company 
programmes and activities. 
The sequence of the individual interviews rotated between the three different 
interview groups to identify relevant effects, focal points and patterns across the 
different groups. The interview rotations between the three different groups provided 
an opportunity to include the lessons learnt from the previous interview schedules for 
each group. 
Each individual interview was scheduled for 2 hours and lasted between 1 and 3 
hours. After interviewing each individual, the researcher used the snowball technique, 
asking the interviewee to recommend additional individuals and documents for 
additional interviews and reviews. Moreover. the researcher asked each indi\'idual 
interviewee why he or she recommended the additional indi\'idual to increase the 
understanding of individual relations. 
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Overall, it was agreed that each interviewee would receIve a written interview 
transcription to invite their feedback on the content and make additional comments. 
Interviewees received their transcripts via email and were asked to go through the 
content memos drafted with the researcher in a second step. Additionally, the 
researcher drafted memos after some key feedback cycle with the interviewee. Memos 
reflected the researcher's thoughts, interpretations, questions, and directions for 
further data collection and provided assurance that the researcher was on the right 
track. 
3.2.2.5 On-site Observations 
On-site observations are a helpful approach for the researcher to understand and 
interpret the social actor's world. Social settings of the phenomenon researched playa 
vital role in understanding the researched topic (Robson 1993; Altheide and Johnson 
1997; Hunt and Benford 1997; Silverman 1997; Yin 2003). Social settings can be 
linked to the specific epistemological assumptions of the researcher. Ontological and 
epistemological assumptions determine how the nature of reality is perceived and how 
knowledge of the reality can be obtained. On-side observations were used to observe 
how different groups of people discussed and represented achievements of strategic 
initiative implementation. In this context, the researcher attended the company's 
specific Tone-Hall Meetings in Zurich and London. Tone-Hall Meetings are 
organised by the company on a regular basis to communicate and discuss the latest 
news about and achievements of the company. During the researchers data collection 
period different topics on the Sun Sigma initiative, CRM Convergence initiative and 
the Balanced Scorecard initiative were communicated and discussed: in particular. 
achievements, changes, challenge and future plans of the specific initiative. 
Furthermore, on-site observations were conducted in the corporate office at Paulo 
Alto/Santa Clara - California (USA). The researcher participated in selected round 
tables \vhere Sun's strategic direction \vere presented and discussed. In this context. 
the researcher \vas able to listen to different employees on Sun's strategy 
implementation, review internal documentations and clarify understanding on 
ditTerent written and verbal meanings. Notes \ n ~ r e e taken during each individual 
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observation and further reflections were written up soon after the researcher had left 
interactions with the observed organisation. Informal discussions with some of the 
organisational members during coffee- and lunch-breaks proved to be especially 
valuable because individual employees were often more willing to express their 
personal viewpoints at these times rather than during the formal meetings and 
company presentations. The researcher's working experience and personal trusted 
network were helpful in collecting additional important and sensitive data. This 
enabled the researcher to recognise the differences between the stories told by the 
same interviewees on different occasions. 
3.2.2.6 Documentation 
The researcher collected various public and non-public company presentations and 
documentation, such as published articles and unpublished management presentations, 
commentaries on the company, and different company investor relations materials. 
Those materials were necessary to increase the researcher's company understanding 
and support the researcher's case study interviews and analysis. 
Documentation includes letters, written reports, administrative documents, 
newspapers and other relevant studies (Hunt and Robert, 1995; Miller et aI., 1997a), 
and it is used to address the data triangulation because it can corroborate and augment 
evidence from other sources. A systematic search of documents is vital ( Katz, 1983; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Therefore, documentation was collected from various 
company sources guided by the recommendations and suggestions of the 
interviewees. The indications of different interviewees helped the researcher to collect 
the documentation from various company sources and put them together in the right 
context (Stake, 1995). To manage the wide range of documents the researcher created 
a documentation database for each case. The database contained documents from 
different periods, which were classified, compared and commented by the 
resc3rcher's individual thoughts. 
, 1\ 
3.3 The Data Analysis and Interpretation Phase 
The following section describes the processes through which data analysis and 
interpretation led to the generation of the new concept of strategic initiative related 
dysfunctions. Firstly, it illustrates the different types of coding methods used, namely 
open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990; Stake, 1995). The coding methods were applied to reduce, organise and 
compare the data collected mainly from the three strategic initiative in-depth case 
studies. Secondly, it illustrates how a theory of dysfunctional effects in the context of 
strategic initiative implementations was generated from the data analysis, cross-case 
study comparison and interpretation results. Finally, this section also discusses the 
issues of literature comparison, validation and thesis writing. 
3.3.1 The Coding Processes 
The large amount of data collected through interviewing, on-site observations and 
documentation led to the danger of 'drowning in data' (Boeker, 1989). To avoid this 
danger, the researcher followed Strauss and Corbin's (1998) recommendations to 
break the coding process down into a series of activities. According to Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), the researcher approaches the series of coding activities through three 
sequential stages: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. The researcher 
expected to apply the grounded theory to the strategic initiative case study analysis to 
include fluid, ambiguous and context dependent meanings emerging from the 
interaction of the social actors (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Locke 2001). 
3.3.1.1 Open Coding 
The researcher started by usmg open coding to identify the concepts and their 
properties and dimensions based on the collected data. Concepts are central ideas of 
the phenomenon represented through the data and are the building blocks of a theory. 
Concepts are labelled 'phenomena' and can be classified into different categories. 
Each category can have specific characteristics, called properties. which are relevant 
to defining the meaning of a category. Firstly, the researcher documented each 
individual intcryicw and on-site observation on a script. In detail, a script comprised 
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documented interview scripts, memos, notes and mind-maps from on-site 
observations and follow-up interview feedback and collected the documentation about 
the case company. Secondly, the researcher went through the scripts in a line by line 
analysis to identify relevant concepts. Useful examples of the line by line analysis are 
illustrated in Appendix 19.1. (the open coding examples). The examples in section 
AI, A2, A3 and A4 of Appendix 19.1 outline the researchers' line by line analysis 
(the blue comments within brackets in the interview scripts) of the documented 
scripts, which reflect the identification of the relevant concepts and their properties. 
After conducting the line by line analysis, the researcher summarised the identified 
concepts and properties into logical groups, as illustrated in Appendix 19.1 section B 1 
and B2. Thirdly, the researcher indexed the concepts to establish a link between the 
findings and the different data sources (e.g. interviews, memos from on-site 
participation and documentation) to verify the connection between the data source of 
every concept emerging at any time of the analysis stage, illustrated in Appendix 19.1 
section B 1. The researcher identified over 331 different concepts which evolved 
iteratively, based on the line by line analysis of the different scripts emerging during 
the data collection process. Fourthly, the researcher compared and merged similar 
concepts to a group of 141 different concepts, illustrated in Appendix 19.1 section B3. 
In this context, the abstraction of the data sources into concepts enabled the researcher 
to apply a comparative analysis of the different concepts through the identification of 
common characteristics across the concepts and define groups to enrich the open 
coding process. Furthermore, conceptualising, including grouping and abstraction of 
the data, was helpful in reducing the large amount of data to smaller, more 
manageable pieces. Fifthly, after grouping the identified concepts into smaller and 
more manageable pieces, the researcher abstracted the data into common patterns, 
processes and structures (Anderson et a1., 1995). The abstraction of common patterns, 
processes and structures, including the classification of events, objects, or 
actionslinteractions, was the first step in building the new theory of strategic initiative 
related dysfunctions. A classification of actionslinteractions of Sun Sigma 
implementation related dysfunctions is illustrated in Appendix 19.1 section 82. 
Finally, the researcher analysed how the identified concepts (categories) varied 
dimensionally along those properties and identified pattems. such as patterns of 
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strategic initiative interactions, how strategic initiatives interacted with the 
organisational context, and how strategic initiatives interacted with other ongoing 
strategic initiatives or challenging effects of strategic initiative implementation. The 
step of identifying patterns as illustrated in Appendix 19.1 section B2 (dysfunctional 
effects of Sun Sigma implementations) was the foundation and beginning of the 
theory building process of this study. In summary, open coding technique was used 
for content analysis and helped generate categories suggested by the data rather than 
imposed by other theories (Agar, 1980). 
3.3.1.2 Axial Coding 
The second stage of the interpretation and analysis was based on the concept of axial 
coding. After all the data had been examined and categorised by the researcher, the 
axial coding was applied to relate categories to their subcategories. In this context the 
term "axial" is used because coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking the 
categories at the level of properties and dimensions (Strauss and Corbin, 1 9 9 0 ~ ~ Stake, 
1995). Additionally, axial coding includes the identification of structures and 
processes. A structure is the conditional context in which a category (phenomenon) is 
situated. In comparison, a process describes the sequences of action/interaction 
pertaining to a phenomenon as they evolve over time. To arrange various categories 
and sub-categories, the researcher focused the axial coding on the connections 
between categories to cover as much of the data as possible in order to produce a 
comprehensive scheme. Appendix 19.2 illustrates how the researcher started to 
conceptualize the connections between the categories to shape the main concept, 
illustrating the examples strategic initiative implementation (section C 1) and 
challenging initiative implementation effects (section C3). This iterative approach 
generated a new set of interconnected categories with related concepts that 
highlighted various activities of strategic initiative implementation in the context of 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions, influencing factors and relevant processes of a 
company. Finally, the researcher developed the structure between the categories to 
shape the main category. This fulfilled the requirements of multi-level analysis in 
studying the dynamic relations between processes and structures (Pettigrew, 1990). 
To structure the categories and link related subcategories to the category, the 
1 11 
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researcher used tree-root-structures, illustrated in Appendix 19.2, through the hvo 
main concept examples of strategic initiative implementation (section C2) and 
challenging initiative implementation effects (C4). During the axial coding process, 
the researcher pursued the goal of systematically developing and relating categories. 
Finally, the researcher identified 17 main categories, as outlined in Appendix 19.3. 
This was the next step in building the theory within this study. At this stage, the 
researcher started to apply the paradigm model to look for answers to different 
questions, such as why, where, when, how, and with what results, and in so doing he 
was able to uncover the relationships among categories. The paradigm model is 
nothing more than a perspective taken towards the data, an additional analytical 
stance that helps the researcher systematically to gather and order the data in such a 
way that the structured processes are integrated (Turner, 1983). 
3.3.1.3 Selective Coding 
Selective coding reflected the process of developing and refining the theory of 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions by integrating the different categories. The 
first step was the choice between a central or core category. The central category 
evolves from the research and was selected by the researcher according to the 
following criteria. 
Table 11: Criteria's for choosing the central category (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 147) 
1 It must be central; that is, all other major categories can be related to it. 
2 
It must appear frequently in the data. This means that within all or almost all cases, there are 
indicators pointing to that concept. 
3 The explanation that evolves by relating the categories is logical and consistent. 
The name or phrase used to describe the central category should be sufficiently abstract that it 
4 can be used to do research in other substantive areas, leading to the development of a more 
general theory. 
5 
As the concept is refined analytically through integration with other concepts, the theory grows 
in depth and explanatory power. 
The concept is able to explain variation as well as the main point made by the data; that is, 
when conditions vary, the explanation still holds, although the way in which a phenomenon is 
6 
expressed might look somewhat different. One also should be able to explain contradictory or 
alternative cases in terms of that centrallidea. 
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Appendix 19 outlines the final stage of the iteratively evolved paradigm model 
according to the case studies conducted. Based on the data collected, the commitment 
to the central strategic initiative related dysfunctions was made and all major 
categories were related to it through explanatory statements of relationships. The 
researcher used the technique of writing a storyline based on the evolved and final 
paradigm model, outlined in Appendix 19.3. Additional diagrams. like those 
illustrated in Appendix 19.1 and 19.2, were useful to the researcher in facilitating the 
integration process. The researcher brought the iterative analysis to an end after 
reaching the point in the category development at which no new properties, 
dimensions, or relationships emerged during the analysis, defined as 'theoretical 
saturation' (Turner, 1983; Martin and Turner, 1986). Theoretical saturation was used 
to bring the iterative analysis between the data and concepts to an end. According to 
Strauss and Corbin (1990), this is the stage where no new data seem to emerge in 
relation to a category, the category is fully developed and the relationships between 
the main categories of strategic initiative related dysfunctions are well ,established and 
validated. However, even within patterns and categories, there is variability between 
different people, organisations, and groups falling at different dimensional points 
along some properties. In writing about the new theory, the researcher used the 
concept of variability to bring out the variations both within and between categories. 
Nevertheless, even the theoretical achievement of saturation does not mean that the 
data analysis and interpretation processes have been completed. The following section 
highlights the importance of comparing the current literature with the emerging 
theory, used in this study. 
3.3.2 Case Study Analysis Approach 
The analysis of this thesis was not separated from the data collection and coding 
process as the main feature of building the new theory of strategic initiative related 
dysfunctions from the case studies, based on frequent overlaps of data analysis with 
data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989). During the data collection process, the researcher 
was simultaneously analysing the preliminary findings as emerging concepts and 
categories outlined in Appendix 19.1 section B 1. thus mixing collection with analysis. 
'-
Through the coding process, the researcher was able to reduce the huge amount of 
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data by analysing the three strategic initiative case studies in two different steps, 
according to the suggestions of Eisenhardt (1989) and Turner (1983). 
Firstly, the researcher analysed each single initiative. Initially, the analysis focused on 
understanding each strategic initiative separately. The reason for this was to reduce 
the amount of data to that concerning a single strategic initiative, described by 
Eisenhardt as a "within-case analysis". The primary aim was to increase the 
understanding of the patterns and findings of a single case, before looking at patterns 
across the different strategic initiative case studies. The scripts and documentation 
relating to the single strategic initiative were reviewed several times and coded into 
different interconnected concepts before the researcher discussed the findings with 
key people of the strategic initiative to verify that the case description and findings 
were a fair representation. 
Secondly, the researcher compared the three strategic initiative in-depth case studies 
to detect general patterns, described by Eisenhardt (1989) as a cross-case search for 
patterns. Initially, the strategic initiatives were analysed by comparing the different 
single initiative results and summaries of the separate initiatives and grouping them 
together into similar categories as types of strategic initiative related dysfunctions, 
illustrated in Appendix 19.2 section C4. Every major concept from each strategic 
initiative was cross-compared and summarised. Following that, the researcher 
reviewed the scripts of each strategic initiative again to check and compare the 
summarised categories with the different transcripts and selected documentation and 
to determine whether any important information had been overlooked. Furthermore, 
this was discussed with key persons from the case company in separate sessions. 
Finally, two aspects are illustrated in the following sub-sections which reflect 
important aspects of the analysis phase of this study: the literature comparison and 
lessons learnt from applying the grounded theory to this study. 
3.3.2.1 Literature Comparison and Issues of Validation 
After open, axial and selective coding in an advanced stage, the researcher started 
with the literature comparison. As a logical follow-on from finalising the selective 
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coding, a broad range of literature was intensively compared with the new theory of 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions. The purpose of this comparison was to ensure 
that the new theory would have a 'stronger internal validity, wider generalisability 
and higher conceptual level' (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 544). The literature comparison 
helped to identify conflicting literature to increase confidence in the findings and to 
exploit more alternatives in analysing and interpreting the data (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Stake, 1995). 
In summary, the researcher sought to increase the validity and reliability of the theory 
generated by applying well-constructed procedures of data collection and analysis to 
the study. The purpose was that the new theory of strategic initiative related 
dysfunctions would reflect the uniqueness of the case and generalise patterns from the 
analysis of the three strategic initiative case studies (Anderson et al., 1995). 
3.3.2.2 Lessons learnt from applying the Grounded Theory 
Applying the grounded theory to a theoretically underdeveloped area as strategic 
initiative related dysfunctions raised different challenges for the research project. 
Firstly, the research project might fail to address the methodological adequacy, 
limitation and contribution of using such an approach for the chosen research area. 
Secondly, this study iterated between data and emerging theory. The challenge of 
such an approach is that it may fail to recognise the need to incorporate data analysis 
techniques into the iteration process (Orlikowski, 1993; Locke 200 I). In other words, 
conceptual reliability and theoretical validity are enhanced not only through 
continuous questioning and comparing the data and findings (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990); more importantly, there is a need for continuous iteration and evaluation 
between the data, findings and analysis techniques. Thirdly, the grounded theory 
approach comprises the challenge of ambiguity and lack of clarity in terms of how the 
data collected are transformed into thc theory. 
Thc researcher addressed the challenges of the grounded theory in diffcrent ways. The 
first was to dcvelop and outlinc thc lcssons learnt from applying the grounded theory 
within the contcxt of this study. The data were collected mainly through interviews. 
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on-site observations and documentation, which were analysed systematically 
regarding the concepts of open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). The iteration between the data and the concepts helped the researcher 
not only to generate categories and sub-categories, but also to identify the potential 
links between categories, as illustrated in Appendices 19.1 and 19.2. The huge 
number of different links could be managed in this study through tree-root-structures, 
grouping and mind-maps; examples as strategic initiative related dysfunctions are 
illustrated in 19.2 section C4. Computer-based mind-maps include the functionalities 
of versioning which allow the capture of the history of iteration between the data and 
emerging theory to illustrate the changes as a baseline for continuous evaluation 
between the data, findings and analysis techniques. Moreover, the researcher iterated 
the data, emerging themes and theory with the data analysis techniques to ensure that 
the taken-for-granted rules and assumptions were minimised. In this context, the 
researcher used different data analysis techniques in different stages to avoid 
establishing the taken-for-granted rules and assumptions. As already mentioned in 
previous chapters, the researcher raised questions like the following: Who? When? 
Why? Where? What? How? How much? With what results? Those questions were 
useful for the researcher when the analysis stagnated and nothing could be assumed as 
the standard way to explain the phenomena. During the line-by-line analysis 
(examples are outlined in Appendix 19.1), the researcher scanned the script, or at least 
a couple of pages of it, and then returned to focus on a word or phrase that struck him 
as significant and analytically interesting. This technique was useful to raise questions 
about possible meanings instead of those assumed by the researcher. Furthermore, the 
researcher used the technique of comparison. This involved comparing categories of 
individual strategic initiative case studies to similar or different concepts to bring out 
possible properties and dimensions when these were not evident to the researcher. The 
comparative technique was especially useful for developing the new theory. In his 
follow-up interviews with the interviewees or discussion partners, the researcher used 
opposites or extremes of the topics discussed. For example, during the interviews. the 
CRM Convergence achievements were discussed and mentioned by the interviewees 
several times. Those achievements were challenged by the researcher. The researcher 
claimed in the follow-up discussion that the achievements were not \'isible because 
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the company was still in a challenging market situation. This approach helped the 
researcher to bring out significant properties relating to CRM Convergence initiative 
implementation challenges. Additionally, the researcher compared the data analysis 
and interpretation with the current literature. The purpose of this activity was not only 
to compare the emergent theory with similar theories, but also to contrast the 
emergent theory with conflicting literature in order to ensure internal validity (Yin, 
2003). Additionally, the literature comparison constantly served as a vital source of 
theoretical creativity. The final point to be mentioned is that the researcher validated 
at an early stage a computer-based programme for the qualitative analysis (ATLAS 
for Windows). The researcher decided that he would still use papers, pencils, scissors, 
glue, bundles of memos and index cards, and posted walls with coloured flip charts 
alongside his computer-based programmes to inspire creativity. 
3.4 Thesis Writing 
The first stage of the writing process started with the stage of open coding, focusing 
on producing a detailed descriptive account of the case study. During the writing 
process of open coding, axial coding and selective coding, the researcher produced 
different content. To document, validate and discuss that different content, several 
case study reports were sent via email (approximately every 8-12 weeks) to different 
key people in the case company. The feedback was included in further versions of 
different working documents to improve the quality of the content and track the 
changes in writing and thinking. 
Alongside the writings, the researcher decided to use a brainstorming approach, 
according to Phillips and Pugh's (1994) recommendations. Brainstorming is helpful 
for putting down all the main points and ideas that come into the researcher's mind. 
The brainstorming approach can be useful to extend creativity during the axial coding 
process, from Strauss and Corbin (1990). Additionally, a brainstorming folder was 
created to write down all necessary ideas which might be included in a final document 
but which docs not specify the order in which they might be presented. Secondly, the 
researcher used \'isual maps. Visual maps become very helpful once the researcher 
had constructed a mind map in the most appropriate structure (Van Maanen, 1983: 
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Phillips, 1987). Then the next step was to proceed to construct the points into 
grammatical paragraphs made up of well balanced sentences. The researcher did this a 
chapter at a time, followed by organising the points into each of the sections in the 
chapter, and then concentrated on writing the paragraphs. To write up the complete 
thesis, the following timetable illustrates the main chapters and tasks of the 
researcher's plans. 
Table 12: Required time to write up the final Ph.D. thesis 
Chapter or task Number of weeks 
Introduction 5 
Literature review 9 
Methodology 6 
Results 5 
Analysis and Discussion 7 
Conclusions 5 
Tables, figures, references, appendices etc. 2 
Conclusion with supervisors and/or others and revisions 5 
Editing, proof reading and binding 4 
The table above illustrates a breakdown and implies that some preliminary work has 
been done; for example, most of the references were known and listed, and some of 
the diagrams were drawn up and were ready to be incorporated, including the 
finalisation of the analysis and results. 
3.5 Conclusion and Limitations 
This section discusses various methodological issues and specifics which relate to this 
study. The study was built on a phenomenological paradigm. This phenomenological 
oriented study stresses the subjective aspects of human activity by focusing on the 
meaning, rather than the measurement, of social phenomena. There is no reality 
independent of the researcher's mind. Hence, what is researched cannot be unaffected 
by the process of the research. 
The aim of the paradigm is to deal with the process of generating theories. From the 
start, generating a grounded theory was the aim of this research work and increased its 
capacity to explain strategic initiative related dysfunctions in the context of strategy 
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making. In comparison, the phenomenological approach generalises from one setting 
to another and does not generalise from sample to population. Hence, further research 
will be required to increase the reliability of the research findings. Under the 
phenomenological paradigm, the criterion of reliability may be given less status, or it 
may be interpreted in a different way. It is unimportant whether the qualitative 
measures are reliable according to positivist rules, but rather whether similar 
observations and interpretations can be made on different occasions and by different 
observers. 
To ensure the internal consistency of the thesis, the seminal works of Glaser and 
Strauss (1967), Yin (1984), Miles and Huberman (1984), and Eisenhardt (1989) were 
used as guiding principles to shape the research design and use case studies for theory 
building. A case study is an extensive examination of a single instance of a 
phenomenon of interest and a core element of this phenomenological methodology. 
Generative accounts of using case studies for theory building provided a useful 
guideline for shaping the research design (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The choice of 
the case study method provided not only flexibility in adopting multiple data 
collection methods, but also the ability to articulate insightful stories embedded within 
the organisational context. In this context, the researcher addressed the challenges by 
setting boundaries on the case study through the construction of the case study 
protocol clarifying necessary boundaries, relevant procedures, and by enhancing the 
reliability of the chosen case study (Lynch, 1997). 
4 Fieldwork: Case Study Company Overview 
This chapter illustrates the fieldwork, starting with relevant company background 
information regarding the fieldwork conducted and followed by the three selected 
initiative in-depth case studies; the Sun Sigma initiative, the CRM Convergence 
initiative and the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) initiative. The preparation and planning 
of the case study fieldwork started in October 2004 and finished in June 2007. The 
selected initiatives were based on established managerial practices and represented a 
strategic key profile of Sun's strategy execution efforts. All of them provided 
supportive criteria to investigate how strategic initiatives interrelated with Sun 's 
sources of competitive advantage, especially for observation of which kind of effects 
emerged during the transformation of Sun's actual resource and capabilities. Figure 4 
outlines the organisation and structure of the case study fieldwork. 
Figure 4: Case Study Organisation (Structure). 
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(1) illustrates the firm context and why Sun Microsystems, Inc. started to renew its 
existing resources and capabilities to sustain competitive advantage. The second part 
(2) relates to "Sun's Strategic Agenda and New Business Strategies", in the context of 
strategic initiatives. Sun Microsystems, Inc. mainly tried to implement its defined 
strategic directions and changes by defining and launching different strategic actions. 
Those strategic actions gave rise to different strategic initiatives, which were 
conceptualised and launched to implement Sun's strategic agenda and business 
strategies outlined in part (3). Part (3) is focused on "Strategic Initiatives" and 
provides general information on Sun's different strategic initiatives, outlining the 
characteristics of them. In particular, the organisational context of the strategic 
initiatives and the structure and approach of Sun to launch and manage the different 
planned and ongoing initiatives to execute the defined strategies are illustrated in the 
last sub-section of the case study: company introduction. Moreover, part (3) outlines 
the main parts of the fieldwork - the three in-depth initiative case studies, including 
the interaction with Sun's organisational context and interaction with other ongoing 
strategic initiatives organised in part (4). Parts (3) and (4) reflect the detailed scope of 
the case study fieldwork to observe how Sun's strategic initiatives interacted with 
Sun's organisational context and with other initiatives. These interactions were 
relevant for the research work to identify and discuss which kind of effects emerge 
from strategic initiative implementation. 
In summary, parts (3) and (4) contain the three in-depth strategic initiative case 
studies described in individual chapters of this dissertation. Those strategic initiative 
case study chapters provide the baseline for the case study analysis. Therefore, part 
(5) comprises the interpretations, comparisons and conclusions of the in-depth 
strategic initiative case studies which led to the conceptualisation and design of the 
new theory of strategic initiative related dysfunctions, illustrated and discussed in the 
analysis and conclusions chapter of this dissertation. 
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4.1 Introduction to the Case Study Company 
Sun was founded by four people in February 1982 in the United States with its head 
office in Santa Clara, California. The founders had different views on computing 
technologies and since 1986 the company has embraced a singular vision: "The 
network is the computer [tm]" - this vision has propelled Sun Microsystems, Inc. to 
its position as a leading provider for industrial-strength hardware, software and 
services that make the Net work (Nasdaq: SUNW). In 2004, Sun was operating in 
more than 100 countries and on the World Wide Web at http://www.sun.com. 
Furthermore, the information technology (IT) company is today known as a leader in 
IT innovations with a global workforce of over 31,000 employees world-wide. Two of 
the three production locations are in the US; the third is in Europe. Sun conducts its 
research and development activities in six different countries. The company claims to 
be among the top five on the cutting edge of information technology. The chip 
technologies and software (e.g. Java) track record of the firm provides a twenty-year 
history of "First" Innovation. These achievements and success stories of the company 
have always been strongly related to its vision. 
4.1.1 Sun's Vision 
The central interest of the company in developing new products and servIces IS 
information technologies networks. Sun believes that the network will soon consist of 
billions of devices interacting with millions of services over the network, doing so 
predictably, securely and globally. Sun's vision of network computing starts with the 
challenge of digital network growth: Billions of Devices Interacting with Millions of 
Services, P r e d i c t a b ~ l ' , , Securely, G l o b a / ~ l · . . Figure 5 illustrates Sun's vision of network 
explosion. 
Figure 5: Sun's vision of network computing (Papadopoulos and Yen , 2004). 
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Thus Sun views the network as huge and highly diversified, and this has induced Sun 
to undertake high R&D investments in network computing in comparison to other 
innovative high-tech competitors (refer to Appendix 4). 
Based on the vision of the connecting network, in 1986 Sun's founder team coined the 
phrase "The Network Is the Computer". Customers initially did not understand the 
slogan, but the executive management team insisted that it was the right conclusion. 
Since 1986 the management team has related to that vision, and it has shaped Sun's 
values and beliefs. 
4.1.1.1 Company Values and Beliefs 
Sun 's values describe both what it is as a company and what it aspires to be. The 
management team believes that those values have shaped the company since the 
begilming, and that they still express today what the company needs to emphasize to 
ucceed in the long tenn (Source: intemal company material). These alues should 
guid thc decision-making of e ery employee. In thi regard Sun ' alue are di ided 
into fivc different key thcme . 
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Table 13: Sun's Value and Beliefs (Source: internal company material) 
Values Description 
Integrity and courage Integrity and courage should demonstrate the determination to do 
what is right, champion good ideas and make tough decisions. 
Employees should be open, honest, learn from their mistakes and 
be straightforward in all of their dealings with customers, partners, 
shareholders and each other. 
Innovation Innovation reflects the company's determination always to challenge 
conventional thinking. 
Customer focus Customer focus ensures that the company will understand and meet 
its customers' business needs. 
Teamwork Teamwork is important for the company to value the diverse 
perspectives of their global workforce, partners and customers. 
Delivering results This manifests Sun's belief that it is in business to create value. The 
company wants to achieve long-term results through disciplined 
planning and execution. 
The values and beliefs illustrate that Sun was built and influenced by engineers and 
scientists from Silicon Valley. Those engineers believed to develop innovative 
products for other companies and institutions. Innovation, especially, is strongly 
claimed by the company to be one of its core capabilities, as reflected in its mission to 
make the vision reality. 
4.1.1.2 Sun's Mission 
With its drive to build the service driven network Sun has focused its efforts on a 
singular mission: 
'To solve complex network computing problems for 
governments, enterprises and service providers.' 
(Scott McNeally, 2004) 
In this context the company addresses complexity through specific product design. 
The first clement is \irtualisation and automation. Sun seeks to deli\cr its products 
with features which can be used by its customers to plug and hide their existing 
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computing environments (e.g. data centres) under a virtualisation layer. Virtualisation 
can be described as an additional software or technology layer provided by Sun to 
hide the heterogeneity of different customer technology systems and platforms. 
Different hardware and software resources are virtualised and their complexity 
reduced. Companies will be able to focus on computing services, rather than on 
different hardware standards, updates and releases. Other elements in the company's 
mission are Sun's open standard policies and platform-independent Java technologies. 
All company products are integrated and able to work together. Through open 
standards and platform interfaces with other, even competing, company products, 
Sun's products can be integrated to provide customer solutions. In this context, Sun 
has established a holistic approach (Sun Microsystems, 2004b) to network computing 
in which new systems, software and services (integrated and pre-tested) are all 
released on a regular, quarterly basis. The purpose behind this approach is to reduce 
the computing complexities for customers and to increase the compatibilities among 
different computing products (including Sun competitor products). The company's 
market success suggests that the company adopted the right vision and pursued the 
right mission. 
4.1.2 The Company's Market Presence 
In 2005, Sun was a global company with more than half of its FY2004 S 11.36 billion 
revenue (McGowan, 2004) deriving from international sales. Sun had a sales presence 
in 100 countries with a global workforce of 31,000 employees worldwide. Sun had set 
up a worldwide network of iForce Centers around the globe; these were partner 
facilities that helped clients to design, develop, test and implement industry business 
solutions. They exemplify Sun's close relationships with its partners. The company 
knows business systems and is committed to delivering the highest possible return on 
its client's information assets, serving as a trusted partner to the Global Fortune 1000. 
Sun powered over half of the 25 largest Fortune 100 companies and ran the IT 
infrastructure for most companies doing business with and on the Internet. However. 
in fiscal year 2004 the company was forced to save over 250 million USD while 
operating in the still challenging information technology industry. Those challenges 
arose after 2000 because of the glohal IT market downturn. 
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4.1.3 Dynamic Market Transformations and the Challenges for Sun 
After 2000, Sun's global business environment changed dramatically. The global IT 
boom was definitively over, and customer behaviour and market conditions started to 
change and transform the business landscape. The pressure on Sun increased in two 
dimensions. Firstly, Sun was forced to improve its overall efficiencies and to reduce 
costs. Secondly, Sun was forced to develop new areas of growth. The following 
statement reflects the market pressure and changes that Sun was facing. 
'Maybe five / six years ago the case was completely 
different. This was actually a seller's market in the 
sense that customers just embraced the value of the 
solutions that were available in the market place. There 
was a hype caused by the Internet and everyone 
appeared to see that there was a huge paradigm shtft 
going on in the market. Now we all know that the so 
called Internet Bubble burst plus minus in April of 2000 
- all of a sudden the majority of customers, especially 
large customers - just put on the brakes stopping all 
sorts of internet based projects. There was a sense that 
previous investments made in IT were not generating 
the promised returns. A focus on tactical cost cutting 
was introduced. The IT industrv as a whole felt the 
implications of customers holding back, seeing 
reductions in revenue streams and profits leading to 
l1'ide scale lay-offs - something never seen before.' 
(Senior Sales Manager & Customer Representative, 
2004, [1]) 
The statement reflects that the market strengths and revenue drivers that the company 
had enjoyed in the past were not continuing to create impact on revenues and growth 
in the present and might not be valuable in the future. 
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'The market conditions definitely changed and Sun was 
not geared or used to a sudden drop in a shrinking 
market.' (Senior Sales Manager & Customer 
Representative, 2004, [I]) 
The company's resources as the large customer base, global partner-network and 
product-based sales capabilities did not help to secure Sun's stake in the shrinking 
markets. Customers' needs changed, and they required Sun to provide real business 
solutions to solve their business problems, instead of fancy and cool technologies. 
New capabilities became more and more important for the entire company and 
heightened demand for new business directions and strategies. 
4.2 Sun's Strategic Agenda and New Business Strategies 
To respond to the changing environment and to achieve its growth goals, in 2004 Sun 
identified three strategic directions at the core of the value which it offered to its 
customers, partners and the industry (Sun Microsystems, 2004a). The first strategy 
was to "attack cost and complexity" of their customers. Internal company studies 
found that a system administrator could manage between 15 and 30 systems. 
However, to fulfil all relevant business requirements companies would need to 
manage over 500 systems. Furthermore, system utilization was around 15 percent but 
should be 80 percent. For example, a company needed weeks to deploy a new 
network service; it should instead take days or even hours. This strategy was focused 
on simplifying systems which cut costs for customers and helped them be more 
productive (Example: Sun Nl software product roadmap). 
The second strategy was "accelerating network service deployment ". This strategy 
recognised that time was money for Sun's customers, particularly time to market new 
products and services. Sun's customers needed to be able to quickly build and manage 
Web services delivering information reliably at minimal risk (Example: Sun Java and 
XML technologies and service delivery platform). 
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The third strategy was to help Sun's customers "deliver data seamless!} and robust 
security JJ wherever their customers happened to be, whenever they needed their data 
on whatever kind of devices they were using. Sun 's products should allow their 
customers to drive network computing to every device. This direction was based on 
the firm's vision that "everything and everybody would be connected to the network" . 
Mobility meant more than being wireless. It was more than desktop computing for 
Sun. It was about providing secure information to consumers, inventory managers , 
executives, teachers, financial advisors, and emergency medical technicians -
practically anyone, no matter where they were. It was about making valuable 
information as mobile as the person who used it. 
Nevertheless, Sun's customers began increasingly to judge the different service IT 
vendor offerings on the basis of on their proposed business values. In this context, 
Sun was not fully able to deal with the shift in customer demand: the company had 
not developed the necessary solution sales capabilities in the past. Furthermore, the 
growing market pressures and price reductions challenged companies like Sun to be 
more efficient in their operations and to lower their cost base. 
Figure 6: Sun's Strategic Agenda (Sun Strategic Playbook 04/05). 
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The company's top management teams identified various operational inefficiencies, 
cost pressures, and strategic capability gaps within the global sales force, such as 
Sun's partner business operations, the need for new solution offerings, and strategic 
customer relationship management issues. The company's top management team 
identified some of those challenges at the very beginning and some of the challenges 
at a later stage. Nevertheless, the company launched more and more strategic 
initiatives to address these issues and gaps by renewing the firm's capabilities and 
establishing competitive advantage. Figure 6 summarises Sun's strategic agenda of 
2004. 
In this regard, the management team decided to improve two mam areas of the 
company. Firstly, the revenue perspective reflected the improvements in Sun's 
existing service offerings and customer engagement approaches. To implement Sun's 
new business strategies, the company sought to provide complete customer solutions 
instead of single product offerings. Furthermore, the new offerings would provide Sun 
with entry to new markets and revenue streams. Secondly, the cost perspective 
implied that Sun would be more efficient in the future as overall industry margins 
would decrease and the company would compete more and more with decreasing 
prices for new IT products and solutions. Both perspectives were essential for Sun's 
future and started to be implemented through different strategic initiatives. These 
initiatives were organised within the strategic business architecture programme 
(SBAP). SBAP was created to implement Sun's new business strategies through 
various strategic initiatives. 
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4.3 Strategic Initiatives 
Sun's strategic initiatives became the mam means to implement the new business 
strategies and to transform Sun's existing environment into efficient and effecti e 
business operations. The company launched a large number of global key programs 
(Source: internal company documentation), managed by different programme 
managers and change teams from the SBAP department, as listed in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Strategic Initiative in relation to Sun 's Strategic Objectives. 
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17 Global Strategic Change Initiatives in FY 2003 
Managed by the EMEA SBAP Team (Scope only EMEA) 
Figw·e 7 illustrates the portfolio of 17 key programs with strategic profiles launched 
within the EMEA (Europe, Middle-East and South Africa) time zone to implement 
Sun's strategic agenda and new business directions. Nevertheless, the company was 
running far more projects at different operational levels. In this context, the new 
SBAP team did not seek to cover all company projects; furthermore SBAP wa only 
re pon ible for executing Sun' trategic initiative . 
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4.3.1 Organisational Environment of Sun's Strategic Initiatives 
The SBAP group was organisationally embedded within the global sales organisation 
(GSO) and influenced by different GSO executives, because in the mid-1990s Sun 
was still divided into three main organisational units (Source: internal company 
documentation): 
• Sun Support Organisation (SSO) 
• Global Sales Organisation (GSO) 
• Sun Professional Services (PS) 
Each individual organisation had its own reporting line, management structure, goals 
and budgets. However, the GSO organisation was the strongest organisation in terms 
of decision power, responsibilities, budgets and business impact. Moreover GSO 
primarily financed and managed the SBAP group; therefore all initiatives within the 
SBAP team were more under the GSO influence than were the PS and SSO. This 
influence opportunity was utilized by different GSO executives to support initiatives 
which would be in line with GSO interests and expectations within a de-centralized 
Sun organisation. Furthermore, there was no doubt that the executive management 
team, including Scott McN eally, had a strong GSO orientation and supported the 
promotion of GSO managers to SBAP management positions. 
The SBAP group was led by a headquarters' director with more than twelve years of 
experience at Sun. He had previously worked for HP and other IT companies in 
similar positions. SBAP was related to the executive management teams as a 
corporate centre with no operational business responsibilities. Nevertheless, between 
2000 and 2004, SBAP was represented by a group of between 12 and 16 people. Most 
of them had worked before in different GSO positions and were experienced 
programme managers with specific knowledge and skills in the areas of Customer 
Relationship Management, Six Sigma, Balanced Scorecard, Process Re-Engineering, 
Organisational Analysis, Change and Programme Managemcnt. In 2002, thc tcam 
consistcd of 12 pcople. Seycn of them, including the team lcadcr \\Tre located in thc 
UK, two in Gcnnany, one in S\\'itzcrland and one in Francc. Updates on the diffcrent 
UI 
programmes were given at a weekly team meeting through telephone conferencing 
and individual personal calls. Every second month the team met at a different EMEA 
Sun office (France, the UK, Germany, etc.) for a one-day update and review meeting 
on progress of the ongoing initiatives. 
4.3.2 Structure and Approach of Sun's Strategic Initiatives 
The SBAP team sought to standardize all strategic initiatives as much as possible and 
used Prince 2 (international standardised project and programme management 
methodology and framework) as the standard programme management methodology. 
At the same time, one of the company's decisions was to roll out Prince 2 alongside 
ongoing initiatives across the company. The idea was mainly GSO-driven, the 
purpose being to make Sun more project work oriented with the expectation of 
managing internal and external (client) key projects more professionally, in time, and 
on budget, and to minimize delivery risks, as outlined by the following statement. 
'In the past our customers recognized Sun as a place 
where they could get skilled people with specific 
knowledge and capabilities like a Java Expert. In the 
future our customers should think about Sun that they 
can deliver risky projects to solve our [customer} 
complex business problems. ' (Senior Manager UK 2003 
& Sun Sigma Project Manager, [16]) 
In this context, the roll-out for Prince 2 became another of Sun's strategic initiatives. 
Furthermore, this example illustrates how GSO executives influenced the portfolio of 
Sun's strategic initiatives by adding the Prince 2 roll-out to the existing portfolio of 
key programmes. 
Every strategic initiative was managed through the organisation illustrated in Figure 
7. All programmes were led by an internal SBAP programme manager with a 
dedicated project support officc and a virtual team. The \'irtual teams compriscd 
reprcscntati\,cs from the different lines of business like country managers. finance 
managers, marketing representatives, HR representatives, depending on indi idual 
programme requirements and roles. Virtual team members covered two key aspect 
for all strategic initiatives. Firstly, they were necessary to include relevant aspect on 
the business side and to facilitate early pilot implementations. Secondly they were the 
key to initiating and driving changes. Moreover, each programme had its own intranet 
homepage and communication team to keep the different stakeholders on track, ba ed 
on the individual programme deliverables. 
Figure 8: Strategic Initiative Organisation (Source: Internal SBAP Documentation). 
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All strategic initiatives were rolled out in two steps. In step 1, the initiative was 
launched within the EMEA time zone. After the EMEA time zone roll-outs had been 
completed, the initiative was extended globally (step 2). The SBAP team 's 
expectation in step 1 was to minimize risks and apply the lessons learnt apply the 
new deliverables (a new proce se , concepts applications etc), and cr ate kno -how 
for u e in the second step where the aim wa to impro the initiati e 0 raIl 
quality and re ult . In thi context, all trategic initiati e were tructur d a global 
progranune trongly upported by Sun ' top management. 
5 The Sun Sigma Initiative Case Study 
5.1 Introduction 
In the late 1990s, improving the quality and process efficiencies of Sun's products and 
services became one of the strategic focal points of the existing management team. 
The company decided to launch a global process excellence and improvement 
programme - the Sun Sigma initiative. Customers expected constantly improved 
quality for a better price. At the same time, the IT industry started to intensify its 
quality path, stimulating IT -companies like Sun to enhance their qualities in response 
to challenges from unexpected sources like Bangalore. Indian software and services 
firms started to provide a level of quality at prices that made it difficult for companies 
like Sun and their partners to justify carrying out software development, application 
management, and other activities in the higher-priced United States or Western 
European regions. Indian companies competed with many Western companies on 
pricing and established a new value proposition on quality that was equal to or better 
than that of their Western counterparts. Those challenges and trends highlight how 
crucially important the Sun Sigma initiative became for Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
The Sun Sigma initiative arose from General Electric's (GE) well-known Six Sigma 
quality improvement programme. Jack Welch (Former GE CEO), a very good friend 
of Scott McNeally, was one of the key drivers of GE's Six Sigma development and 
experience. Through Scott McNeally's close relationship with Jack Welch (both had 
an interest in golf), GE's Sigma became an increasingly feasible solution for Sun's 
executive board to solve the firm's quality and performance issues. 
The Six Sigma programme had been implemented to improve quality at major 
corporations worldwide, including GE, Allied Signal/Honeywell, Toshiba, and many 
others. Sun's executives realised that Six Sigma was a way to measure processes (for 
example, statistically, Six Sigma processes, products, and services met defined 
customer requirements 99.9997 percent of the time; a near-perfect r e s u l t ) ~ ~ and a way 
to cham!c the culturc of an oruanization marked by six important themes, adaptations 
~ ~ ~ ~
of which were embraced by Sun Sigma. Finally, the Sun Sigma initiative was defined 
as a broad and comprehensive concept for building and sustaining business 
performance, success, and leadership across the company. 
The following in-depth case study discusses how the Sun Sigma initiative differently 
interacted with Sun's environment, and especially its organisational context and other 
strategic change initiatives. The case study is divided into three major sections. The 
first section illustrates the rationale for the Sun Sigma initiative, including the 
definition and vision of the Sun Sigma initiative and the main objectives specified by 
Sun's management team. The second section discusses the implementation of the Sun 
Sigma initiative and which kinds of challenges and effects emerged during the 
implementation from interactions between the Sun Sigma initiative and Sun's 
organizational context and from interactions between the Sun Sigma initiative and 
ongoing strategic initiatives. The last section illustrates the overall findings of the Sun 
Sigma initiative case study. 
5.2 Rationale of the Sun Sigma Initiative 
In 2000, Sun Sigma became a programme spanning the entire organisation in order to 
improve the company's process efficiency and cost performance. Officially, the Sun 
Sigma initiative was a response to challenging market conditions intended to make the 
firm more competitive. Sun's overall operating costs were too high in comparison to 
those of its competitors, and the company was obliged to lower its operating costs and 
increase product qualities at the same time. Moreover, quality issues grew 
increasingly pressing and constituted a real threat for the company. Customers started 
to compare Sun's high price products with their competitors and to change vendors, 
especially during the market downturn after 2000. This threat stimulated the 
management team to launch a strategic improvement initiative - Sun Sigma. 
'At the Spring Leadership Conference 2000 Sun 
committed to implementing 'Six Sigrna'. It is the core 
methodolog\' Sun is lIsing to achiel'(' industry-leading 
(7l'ailabilitr and quality. by dri\'ing key processes with 
data about critical customer requirements. "Sigma" is 
the term used in statistical analysis for variation from 
perfection. By using data to define and control process, 
then measuring defects across a project (or across 
Sun), a common measurement of quality for any type of 
process can be attained.' (Source: internal company 
documentation) 
Initially, the management discussed the establishment of a Six Sigma platform for 
various quality improvements and projects. The aim of these key projects was to 
improve Sun's product qualities, business efficiencies, and to reduce customer 
complaints by enhancing the fulfilment of critical customer requirements. 
'We [Sun] received more and more customer 
complaints. Hence, we had to decide how the quality of 
our products and services could be increased. At the 
same time Jack Welsh, a very good friend of Scott 
McNeally, told him how Sigma became the household 
at GE. ' (Senior Project Member & Strategic Sun Sigma 
Projects, 2004, [2]) 
Finally, Sun decided to buy the rights from GE in order to use and adapt GE's Sigma 
as a platform for future efficiency standards at Sun Microsystems, Inc. In this context, 
the intention of the first Sun Sigma activities was to achieve success stories and thus 
build confidence, so that company resources would continue to be invested in new 
Sun Sigma projects. 
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'We started the first Sun Sigma improvement projects 
... we were impatient to create the first Sun Sigma 
success stories. In the beginning we required success 
stories to build confidence and prove to our 
stakeholders that we are moving into the right direction 
... '(EMEA Sales Operations & Sun Sigma Projects, 
2006, [46]) 
In this context, the executive board decided to group and manage all ongoing and 
planned Sun Sigma activities into one strategic initiative which would follow and 
establish Sun's vision of Sun Sigma. 
5.2.1 Definition and Vision of the Initiative 
The Sun Sigma initiative was launched by Sun's management team as a broad and 
comprehensive concept for building and sustaining business performance, success, 
and leadership. The programme was designed to integrate the Sun Sigma vision into 
Sun's back-office operations, according to GE's Six Sigma. In many organisations, 
Six Sigma simply means a measure of quality that strives for near perfection. As 
expressed by GE, the central idea behind Six Sigma was that, if companies can 
measure the number of 'defects' in a specific process, they can systematically figure 
out how to eliminate them and get as close to zero defects as possible (Sigma is a 
letter of the Greek alphabet and is used in statistics as a measure of variation). Sun 
defined Sun Sigma as an aU-out assault on defects occurring in processes that 
produced products, services, or transactions. The initiative represented Sun's core 
methodology to achieve industry-leading availability and quality. A new Sun 
Customer Advocacy Organisation (CAO) was to be established by the initiative to 
playa key role in the future, driving Sun Sigma practices across the company to 
achieve high customer satisfaction. Nevertheless, the initiative was influenced from 
the outset by the firm's increasing customer orientation driven by the CRM 
Convergence initiative (CRM = Customer Relationship Management). At an early 
stage, thc Sun Sigma initiative drifted from implementing its visionary Sun Sigma 
framework to driving additional customer centred activities. Expectations about the 
137 
Sun Sigma initiative shifted to troubleshooting and solving customer problems areas 
like reducing customer complaints and increasing overall customer satisfaction rates. 
Furthermore, some executives expected Sun Sigma to be induced by customer 
feedback to increase overall service and product quality and to develop capabilities 
that made Sun more proactive to its customers. 
'The project should develop the capabilities to be more 
proactive to our customers. For example, if problems 
occur and we have no solution, we would need a 
structured process to deal with this specific issue 
because we try to keep customers and avoid bad press. 
The information could be easily used by our 
competitors to attack our brand and image. On the 
other side, we had to deal with those kind of issues and 
establish a learning processes by providing solutions to 
similar problems to other customers and not to create 
the same problems again and again. ' (Senior Project 
Manager & Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, [2]) 
Those expectations increased the scope of the Sun Sigma initiative and manifested the 
management's expectation that the Sun Sigma initiative would solve a wide range of 
Sun's strategic problem areas and become a strategic enabler for the entire company. 
This overall expectation was derived from two different key opinions within the 
organisation. Firstly, Sun Sigma would provide effective tools with which to combat 
declining service and product quality, an increasing cost base, and growing brand and 
image damage. Secondly, Sun Sigma would help establish a learning process to 
increase Sun's operational efficiency and create a future platform for knowledge 
sharing. The organization should not produce and solve the same problems again and 
again. In this context, Sun's executives defined the Sun Sigma vision for the entire 
company. 
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Figure 9: Sun Sigma - A Visionary and Company-wide Framework. 
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The vision reflected and communicated the first step in Sun's strategic Sun Sigma 
transformations, which should be realised through the Sun Sigma initiative. Inspired 
by the CRM Convergence initiative, Sun changed Six Sigma into Sun Sigma and 
developed the vision of establishing a 'Customer-First Company' . Figure 9 illustrates 
the core elements of the Sun Sigma vision. A vision which intents to establish greater 
customer orientation of the company and at the same time drive cost-efficient 
operations, Sun Sigma was positioned to improve the firm's core processes and 
operations. Overall, the Sun Sigma Framework was defined to enhance the company's 
management system by bridging its enabling layers (refer to Figure 9: Leadership, 
COlnmunication, Rewards & Recognition, Training & Development, Performance 
Measurement & Systems) with continuous improvements of the Sun' s core business 
processcs as the portfolio management process which represented the management of 
thc company 's product and market offerings, closely interconnected with the product 
li£ -cycle proce s. That process should be improved through Sun Sigma to manage 
quality i ue and product ri ks more proactively for their customer. Furthermore 
the su pect-to-order proce refl cted the entire ales and engagement proce of un, 
\ hich hould be enhanced by un Sigma conc pt to increa c th finn ' 0\ cra ll 
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success rates and stimulate growth. The order-to-collect process covered Sun's billing 
and product/project delivery process supported by the fifth key process of the 
company - the customer service process. Customer service processes targeted to 
leverage Sun's internal customer knowledge, create robust solutions for their 
customers and protect Sun's existing customer base from their competitors. All those 
processes should be enhanced and continuously improved by Sun Sigma to establish 
fast and valuable solutions for their customers from the beginning without creating 
critical response times. Those occasions created major threats for Sun as customers 
became unsatisfied and started to switch to products and solutions from Sun's 
competition. Moreover, the Sun Sigma vision demanded substantial changes within 
the company's existing business operations and core processes to reshape Sun for the 
future. In this context, the management team defined four different key objectives for 
the initiative. 
5.2.2 Strategic Objectives of Sun Sigma Initiative in 2001 
Finally, four different delivery elements formed the core of the Sun Sigma initiative 
objectives to implement and roll-out Sun's vision of Sun Sigma across the firm. 
Firstly, an initiative was launched to establish a company-wide CAO which would be 
linked to all organisational units. CAO's (Sun Sigma within the organisation) highest 
goal should be to defend customers' quality rights and expectations. Moreover, CAO 
would furnish future Sun Sigma experts and attach them to various departments, 
where they would initiate projects to solve individual problems and challenges across 
the firm. In this context, CAO should perform a key role in the future to drive Sun 
Sigma practices across the company. Secondly, Sun Sigma was intended to launch a 
company-wide education and certification programme. This programme should have 
increased Sun Sigma knowledge and shared it across the organisation. The following 
certification concept was adopted to roll-out and establish a standardised training and 
certification programme across the company, sorted by experience and professional 
degree. Starting with a basic Green Belt certification level up to the highest possible 
certification degree of a Sun Sigma Master Black Belt (MBB): 
\ .. +0 
• 
• 
• 
Green Belt: Green belts would lead smaller Sun Sigma projects, de\'oting 
between 20%-50% of their daily work to Sun Sigma Projects. 
Black Belt: Black belts would manage larger Sun Sigma projects with the 
strong involvement of statistical tools and methods. Often, these people were 
1000/0 involved in Sun Sigma projects. 
Master Black Belt: master black belts would manage project portfolios, coach 
employees and deliver training. 
• Sun Sigma Champion: Organisational leader of the MBBs and MBs. Marissa 
Peterson took over this role at Sun. 
Sun created four different roles of Sun Sigma experts. The titles were selected from 
martial arts disciplines like Karate or Judo in order to reflect and underpin the 
professionalism and precision of the training and certification programme. Thirdly, 
the initiative began to develop an enterprise-wide portal providing news, tools, 
training, registration, and information for all relevant Sun Sigma areas. The Sun 
Sigma portal should provide a central interface to all Sun employees worldwide where 
people could download tools, apply for training and certification programmes, and 
learn more about the latest Sun Sigma activities within the company. Moreover, 
employees should be able to exchange experience and/or find answers in one of the 
online discussion forums. Sun believed that the use of information technologies would 
help people to be more efficient in their daily work. In this context, the Sun Sigma 
portal should become a part of Sun's comprehensive intranet network. The firm 
believed in the advantages of new concepts, such as e-Learning or virtual team 
meetings, which should enhance current collaboration among the firm's employees. 
Fourthly, Sun Sigma was put in charge of conceptualising and driving Sun's process 
excellence standards. In this regard, the Sun Sigma initiative should strengthen 
existing projects with Sun Sigma knowledge and establish company-wide process 
excellence projects to improve Sun's core business processes and goals (see Appendix 
10). Those process excellence projects could emerge from aligning existing projects 
with the goal of improving Sun's business operations or launch new Sun Sigma 
projects. Sun Sigma projects should follow the Sun Sigma project methodologies: 
provide a clear business case on ROSS (Return on Investment, especially Return Ql1 
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Sun Sigma investments) and decisions should be data- and fact-driven. Table 1.+ 
summarises the four key objectives of the Sun Sigma initiative in 2001. 
Table 14: Overview of the key objectives of the Sun Sigma initiative 
Key Objective Description 
• Establish a new Customer • Protect the quality rights of Sun customers 
Advocacy Organisation - • Develop Sun Sigma knowledge within the organisation 
CAO • Develop organisational routines for Sun Sigma expertise 
• Provide support to all Sun Sigma projects/activities 
• Establish a global • Develop Sun Sigma expertise across the company 
education and certification • Enhance the current knowledge with Sun Sigma across the 
programme company - new career opportunities 
• Establish a Sun Sigma 
Portal 
• Establish Process 
Excellence Standards 
------------------- ------
• Enhance the work of Sun employees with e-Support 
• Increase business collaborations across departments 
• Apply Sun Sigma knowledge to existing projects 
• Align existing key projects 
• Launch new process improvement projects 
These four key objectives reflect the strategic goals of the Sun Sigma initiative in 
2001. The team and the company enthusiastically set about solving Sun's complex 
business problems and making the company more efficient. 
1.+2 
5.3 Implementation of the Sun Sigma Initiative 
The Sun Sigma initiative was launched and strongly supported by Sun's global 
executive board. The initiative rapidly became a global initiative and receiycd 
worldwide attention within the Sun organisation. In this context, Sun's executive 
board initiated two key activities. Firstly, the management team appointed a global 
executive board member as the 'First Customer Advocate' to create and devclop a 
global CAO, embedded within the existing Sun organisation. 
' ... Marissa Patterson ... started the Sigma thing as first 
Customer Advocate. She supported it in a massive war. 
She worked really hard and did flaming speeches via 
email and webcasts and so on. She developed a new 
organization with programme managers ... ' (Senior 
Program Member & Sun Sigma Black Belt, 2005, [21]) 
Secondly, the management team launched the Sun Sigma initiative, and the 'First 
Customer Advocate' appointed a Master Black Belt (MBB) as the responsible 
programme manager for it. In the beginning, CAO was strongly supported by the Sun 
Sigma initiative managed by the responsible MBB, in various ways. For example, the 
initiative team member developed training and certification programmes for CAO 
which would be fully managed by CAO at a later stage. Furthermore, teams of the 
initiative defined and recruited a new portal solution development team which started 
to create the global Sun Sigma portal. At the beginning, the Sun Sigma initiative 
teams managed the conceptualisation and development of the portal, which would 
also be fully managed by CAO at a later stage. Those activities would promote 
acceptance of Sun Sigma within the wider organisation by providing Sun Sigma 
cxpertise to ongoing projects. 
Driving process cxcellence standards by enhancing current projects with Sun Sigma 
expertise and launching new Sun Sigma projects became one of thc focal points of the 
Sun Sigma i n i t i a t i \ l ~ . . Moreoycr, the Sun Sigma programmc manager took oyer the 
I·B 
task from management of rolling out the first Sun Sigma 'waves' within the EMEA 
(Europe, Middle-East and South Africa) region, which initially comprised 13 projects. 
The first 'wave' of Sun Sigma projects focused on various quality problems. as 
described by one of the first key project leaders. 
'The scope of my project was to design or improve a 
process, to alert customers of known problems for 
which we did not have fixes but workarounds. The 
project should create impact on customer satisfaction 
and the way that the company approaches and deals 
with critical customer situations.' (Senior Project 
Manager & Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, [2]) 
One of the first Sun Sigma projects sought to impact overall customer satisfaction and 
product quality and aimed to solve service delivery problems. All those first 13 
projects were coordinated by a Sun Sigma expert, or their champions were coached by 
Sun Sigma experts to enhance and build up the desired Sun Sigma knowledge as 
rapidly as possible. Furthermore, to influence and strengthen current project activities 
within the Sun organisation with Sun Sigma expertise, the initiative launched various 
meetings and steering boards within the organisation. The aim of these meetings was 
to get all decision makers closer to Sun Sigma, to coach individual executives, to 
prepare decisions on changing existing projects, and to launch new Sun Sigma 
projects. 
Alongside those project activities, Sun Sigma became increasingly organisationally 
embedded through CAO. This was not only because every selling unit, region, and 
department was asked to allocate a specific amount of their resources and budgets to 
the Sun Sigma initiative and CAO, but also because every major activity and project 
in the various regions became increasingly challenged to involve Sun Sigma experts 
and to adopt Sun Sigma methodologies and frameworks. Moreover, C AO started to 
grow alongside the Sun Sigma initiative through the recruitment of more and more 
people from the wider Sun organization and external sources. Figure 10 illustrates the 
1.f.f 
overall Sun Sigma initiative implementation structure and the organization of six ke 
sub-project implementation activities. 
Figure 10: Implementation of the Sun Sigma initiative (EMEA scope) 
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The Figure illustrates how Sun rolled out and implemented the Sun Sigma initiative 
alongside the development and integration of CAO into the existing Sun Organisation. 
As already mentioned, the first focal point (1) was to roll out a series of 13 Sun Sigma 
projects to improve existing customer support processes and enhance overall product 
and service qualities. The second team focused their energy and activities (2) on 
preparing and launching global Sun Sigma training and certification programs to build 
up Sun Sigma knowledge within Sun. These activities were supported by the new Sun 
Sigma portal development team. The portal team (3 ) sought to enhance the diffusion 
of Sun Sigma knowledge by developing a central intranet Sun Sigma portal. The 
fourth focal point (4) was to get the Sun decision makers closer to Sun Sigma and 
in pire Sun ' exi ting leadership with the advantage of a Sun Sigma dri n 
leader hip tyle. In this conte t, the Sun Sigma initiati e team tabli hed a global 
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Sun executives and senior managers. Each Sun executive was assigned a personal Sun 
Sigma coach on the level of a MBB or black belt. 
During the implementation and transformation of the Sun Sigma initiative, different 
effects emerged. These effects can be classified into (a) effects between the 
organisation and the initiative and (b) various types of effects between the Sun Sigma 
initiative and other strategic initiatives. 
5.3.1 Interactions between the Sun Sigma initiative and the firm's Organisational 
Context 
The Sun Sigma initiative affected the organisation and was affected by the 
organisation in its tum. These interactions emerged during a period where Sun was 
building up Sun Sigma. The initiative started to implement the planned Sun Sigma 
objectives, and various interactions between the organisation and the initiative 
stimulated challenges in the form of organisational misunderstandings of Sun Sigma 
and organisational resistance against Sun Sigma. In this regard, three initiative-
oriented' drivers' could be observed which facilitated initiative related challenges and 
triggered the various interactions between Sun's organisational context and the 
initiative. Firstly, the initiative's team member received strong management support 
and the authority to implement the Sun Sigma objectives. Secondly, through the close 
relation of the Sun Sigma team with CAO and Sun's executive board member as first 
'Customer Advocate's', the Sun Sigma executive steering boards and the executive 
coaching panel, the initiative's team members gained a strong decision support from 
the management teams. Furthermore, the initiative team was increasingly able to 
influence the management teams in accordance with the Sun Sigma objectives. 
Thirdly, the initiative's experts provided new methodologies, templates, and skills 
which created respect and acceptance within the wider Sun organisation. These 
drivers facilitated various challenges and stimulated different effects, as illustrated by 
Figurc 11. 
Figure 11: Context of interactions between the initiative and the organisation . 
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The figure illustrates the organisational context (A) of the Sun Sigma initiative, 
including CAO. The initiative was managed by a Sun Sigma expert (MBB) appointed 
by CAO and employed by the SBAP team (Strategic Business Architecture 
Programme). As described in previous sections, the SBAP team was located within 
the GSO and had close relations with the sales organisation. In this new constellation 
(B), the initiative implemented the objective defined across Sun's various lines of 
business (LOB) which gave rise to different challenges and created different effects 
between the organisation and the initiative, especially within the areas of the firm's 
routines and processes, actual roles and responsibilities, existing skills and 
competencies, and organisational structures. The following sections describe those 
challenges and the related effects in detail. 
5.3.1.1 Organisational Misinterpretations of Sun Sigma 
Variou effects emerged from the organisational mi int rpretation of Sun Sigma 
uch a the growing complc itie and decrea ing progre p cially ith regard to 
lution-findjng effort . The C lnj interpretation induc d Sun Sigma to ad pt a 
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mInImIzmg approach rather than pursue a new quality and process excellence 
standard. Moreover, based on the CRM Convergence initiative activities, Sun 
managers started to expect Sun Sigma to recover their decreasing reycnues and 
margins. The sales organisation were faced with decreasing margins, growing 
competition, and increasing numbers of dissatisfied customers, who left Sun for 
competitors like IBM, HP or Dell. 
' ... GSa decided to be the first business unit to 
implement Sun Sigma. They didn't really know what 
Sun Sigma was all about and how to use it to recover 
our revenues and margins. ' (EMEA Sales Operations, 
2006, [31]) 
GSO expected Sun Sigma to increase its sales opportunities and customer-win 
probabilities, to recover Sun's margins and revenues, and to make the sales operations 
more efficient. Influenced by GSO, Sun managers started to focus their attention on 
the "Return of Sun Sigma" (ROSS) instead of applying the Sun Sigma tools to their 
actual problems. ROSS was defined as a Sigma-specific return on investment 
calculation and reflected the potential financial benefit of every project in quantitative 
terms like cost savings. 
The misinterpretation of Sun Sigma advantages caused a drift from the long-term Sun 
Sigma objectives to short-term cost reduction activities. The misinterpretations were 
supported by the firm's technocratic mind-set and its culture that a solution could be 
found for every problem and easily duplicated. ROSS became the solution for a wide 
range of different problems and inspired various departments to start adopting Sun 
Sigma tools, methods, and templates in their planning process. These activities shifted 
the focus of Sun and its managers away from the original objectives and the vision to 
implement new Sigma-driven processes, routines, roles and responsibilities. 
'/ think H'C did not sell it right, We [Sun} are 
prcdestined to use Sigma in the wrong 1 va)'. We [Sun} 
are a technology company. We are technocrats. We 
came and sold the Sigma approach and tools instead of 
selling results. We said it is great, it is Sigma, and it 
has phases and has to have a financial return. The 
famous ROSS (operational benefit) and what the 
difference is and how it is going to be entered. And you 
need a Black Belt with an education. We talked about 
the method ... We described the method and tried to sell 
it instead of not talking about the method and selling 
the results.' (Senior Program Member & Sun Sigma 
Black Belt, 2005, [21]) 
The Sun organisation came increasingly to believe that following the Sun Sigma 
guidelines was the solution, instead of using them as a vehicle to achieve better 
results. 
' ... and people then used Sigma '" they used it to be 
Sigma compliant, Instead of just using it for achieving 
their goals. ' (Head of SBAP/GDA, 2005, [15]) 
' ... Because Sigma became synonymous with solving all 
problems ... ' (Senior Project Member & Strategic Sun 
Sigma Projects, 2004, [2]) 
The growing euphoria about ROSS, on the one hand, and the misinterpretation of Sun 
Sigma by the Sun organisation on the other, induced the Sun Sigma initiative 
increasingly to identify ROSS potentials across the company and launch an increasing 
number of Sun Sigma projects, rather than enhancing the current company processes, 
tools, methods, and establishing the Sun Sigma framework. The managers were 
concen1ed about the decreasing revenues and increasing costs, and tried to find 
solutions to these challenges by identifying new ROSS potentials in their departments 
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and regions. Various effects ensued from these organisational misinterpretations of 
the initiative, and they had different implications in different groups. 
Table 15: The effects and their implications. 
Initiative Activities Effects Implications 
(1) • Growing • Shifting firm focus from solving critical quality customer issues to 
company-internal Sun Sigma activities • Applying Sun complexities 
Sigma concepts 
to Sun business 
operations 
(2) 
• Emphasise the 
value of Sun 
Sigma through the 
ROSS concept 
decreased process • Absorption of scarce resources with additional Sun Sigma 
efficiency policies and procedures 
=> Focus shift and additional policies increased the challenge to 
priorities critical firm activities 
• Growing • Shift from long-term achievements to short-term returns on 
expectations investment activities (ROSS) 
decreased planned • ROSS was recognised as a cost reduction approach and started 
progress of 
initiative activities 
to decrease long-term process excellence achievement efforts 
=> Conflicts between short term activities versus long-term 
investments/efforts 
(3) • Growing Sun • Reduction of unconventional solution-finding efforts, people 
• Adopting Sun Sigma orientation started to follow standardised procedures and processes 
Sigma concept decreased • Shift from result-driven activities to Sigma template-oriented 
from the wider solution-finding activities 
Sun organisation efforts and result => Decreasing utilization of problem-solving skills and result-driven 
orientation working behaviours 
5.3.1.2 Organisational Resistance against Sun Sigma 
The Sun Sigma initiative facilitated changes within the company's existing 
organisational structure and created controversial reactions and resistance against the 
Sun Sigma initiative. In this context, CAO became more and more the organisational 
'Advocate' for Sun's existing and future customers. However, the change in the 
existing organisational structures created new roles and responsibilities, and changes 
in various existing processes, as will be illustrated in detail by the following 
examples. 
Firstly, the existing project teams became increasingly fearful of losing their 
competencies and jobs. The existing employees imagined that they would be replaced 
by certified Sun Sigma experts. Those people solved various problems for the 
company without using Sun Sigma methods and concepts. 
I ~ ( ) )
'We did not really like Sun Sigma. Before Sun Sigma 
our people and engineers had the freedom to select their 
own tools and methods for problem solving. Sun Sigma 
provided the impression within our people that the)' 
were not good enough anymore. They were afraid to be 
replaced by certified Sun Sigma experts. The resistance 
against Sun Sigma increased. ' (Head of Service 
Delivery Organisation [Sun Sigma], 2005, [8]) 
On the other hand, the organisation and Sun's top management supported Sun Sigma 
strongly. New hired Sun Sigma experts received top management attention and 
support without proving their value to the company. This Sun Sigma euphoria and 
support caused jealousy within the existing teams. 
The second example outlines how the new Sun Sigma concepts and methods reduced 
the performance of delivering results within the existing project teams, with the 
consequence of decreasing the management's attention. The managers started to 
expect an increasing number of improvements from Sun Sigma implementation. 
However, Sun Sigma implementation increased the complexities within the existing 
project teams. The teams became stretched to manage learn and adopt Sun Sigma 
alongside their daily project work. Furthermore, the same people were forced to 
deliver the expected results from their ongoing projects. The additional Sun Sigma 
project tasks and workload increased the resistance of various team members to attend 
Sun Sigma training and apply Sun Sigma to their daily work. 
'1 remember, 1 travelled about three times to California 
because we had three weekly sessions where 
experienced consultants taught us the methodology 
parallel to our project execution acti"\'ities. Butl\'e spent 
a lot of time 011 describing the fil'e phases [Sun Sigma 
Process Stages}. l\'hich are define, measure, a n a ~ r s e , ,
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implement, improve and control, and b a s i c a l ~ v v because 
we were all learning at the same time we just got stuck 
m various places. That was the reason whv 
management attention decreased over time. First, we 
became lost in the administrative and bureaucratic 
methodology approach and second we had no 
experience with the methodology. We developed Sun 
Sigma skills but the company's problems still existed -
we couldn't sell and maintain the top management's 
euphoria at the beginning. , (Senior Project Member & 
Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, [2]) 
The statement illustrates how the organisation tried to adopt changes in the existing 
processes by following and integrating the new Sun Sigma processes into the firm's 
everyday work. Those changes increased the resistance, as the overall project 
performance decreased and Sun Sigma related workloads increased. 
'Our people developed their own ways of problem 
solving; this was always one of our strength in the past. 
People could be mobilised and motivated quickly, now 
the same people must follow standardised procedures of 
project proposals, approvals and pre-defined stages. 
This is controversial to our mentality and created a lot 
of trouble and resistance against Sigma.' (Senior 
Project Member & Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, 
[2]) 
In this context, CAO missed the opportunity to enhance Sun's field work teams. C AO 
was initiated to enhance and support the ongoing project teams with Sun Sigma 
cxpertise. Hmvcycr, oyer time, CAO became increasingly the 'Sun Sigma 
organisation' within the 'Sun organisation'. Instead of increasing Sun Sigma 
knm\'kdgc within the different lines of b u ~ i n e s s , , C AO absorbed an incrcasing numbcr 
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of people with various project work, teaching and coaching, and 'internal' Sun Sigma 
oriented meetings. The Sun Sigma initiative and CAO created a community of . Sun 
Sigma' experts which debated new methods, frameworks, and trends instead of 
facilitating Sun's problem-solving processes. The effect on Sun's organisations and 
departments of the Sun Sigma initiative was an increase in the Sun Sigma project 
costs, and in business complexity. This leads to the third example of how 
organisational resistance emerged against Sun Sigma. 
The third example describes how different managers and decision makers facilitated 
organisational resistance against Sun Sigma. Sun managers started to recognize 
various feedback from their teams and began to pay more attention to the values that 
Sun Sigma was creating for their departments and business units. A growing number 
of executives realised that, although more people were adopting Sun Sigma processes 
and methodologies, the results remained the same. Moreover, the costs spiralled, as 
every division and department was challenged to invest in CAO, with no clear returns 
on ROSS, only promises. Hence, the executives started to challenge ROSS and 
resistance against Sun Sigma continued to increase, impeding the Sun Sigma initiative 
from achieving its objectives. 
' ... you felt a passive resistance to or no interest in the 
theme... Behavioural optimism that gets me 
p e r s o n a l ~ v v angry because if you talk to them 
[Management} in a meeting everything will be fine at 
that time. {[you ask for a Black Belt person to make the 
biggest effects in starting a Sigma project there will be 
nothing more than silence. ' (Senior Program Manager 
& Sun Sigma Black Belt, 2005, [21]) 
The management teams started to reduce their support for integrating Sun Sigma into 
the company's core business operations. The pressure on Sun's managers and 
decision makers to achie\'c thcir personal goals were still immense in those 
challenging times. In this context. Sun Sigma was not producing the expected results 
153 
and improvements. Furthermore, vanous decision makers and Sun employees 
involved in different Sun Sigma activities and improvement projects started to regard 
Sun Sigma as an obstacle to their everyday work and started to develop resistance 
against it and CAO. 
' ... I pushed Sun Sigma as much as possible, we started 
different improvement projects in my department and 
our people attended mandatory Sun Sigma training. We 
didn't get the expected results and I decided to reduce 
our Sun Sigma efforts .. , ' (Senior Practice Manager & 
Sun Sigma Green Belt, 2004, [10]) 
'CAD couldn't deliver the expected Sun Sigma 
promises and I was forced to make a decision ... in our 
teams - we reduced the Sun Sigma engagements and 
went back to our daily businesses ... '(Sales Manager 
Switzerland & Sun Sigma Green Belt, 2006, [27]) 
Sun managers were not committed to supporting CAO and investing their scarce 
resources in Sun Sigma training and projects, as the actual improvement results from 
the ongoing Sun Sigma projects were unconvincing. From the perspective of various 
Sun managers, CAO emerged increasingly as an administrative overhead, instead of 
providing effective support to various business units and departments. 
' ... through Sun Sigma we increased our overhead costs 
and methodology folders, but our customer challenges 
H'e,.c still the same ... I don't see the value how Sun 
Sigma increased our customer operations and 
revenues. We should seriously increase our customer 
focus and im'csfme17/S . (Senior Key Account 
ivlanagcr, ~ 0 0 5 , , [12]) 
15.+ 
Within customer oriented teams especially, Sun Sigma was losing credibility as an 
enabler to improve existing customer operations and increase the overall possibilities 
to reach the desired customer targets and sales goals. 
Table 16: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities Effects 
(4) • Increasing Sun 
• Replace existing Sigma project 
project orientation 
methodologies reduced overall 
with Sun Sigma project 
methods acceptance 
(5) • Increasing 
• Establish managerial 
commitment of resistance 
Sun managers to against Sun 
Sun Sigma and Sigma reduced 
CAO investments Sun Sigma's 
position as a 
valuable solution 
partner for Sun 
Implications 
• Introduction of Sun Sigma concepts into actual projects increased 
overall project complexities 
• Formalism of Sun Sigma projects increased with the consequences 
of additional delays 
• The obligation to adopt Sun Sigma in their everyday project work 
increased resistance against Sun Sigma and slowed down overall 
project performance/progress 
=> People realised that Sun Sigma would not de facto solve actual 
business issues 
• Managers from different departments increased their resistance 
against financing CAO - especially in the challenging market 
situation 
• Managers started to challenge Sun Sigma activities and rejected 
improvement projects which required their attention and 
commitment 
• Resistance by various managers against Sun Sigma increased, 
with internal cost-saving activities 
• Various departments started their own improvement projects and 
ignored Sun Sigma concepts 
=> Resistance by various managers against Sun Sigma challenged 
the position of CAO and Sun Sigma as valuable business 
partners for their departments 
~ - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(6) 
• Mobilise certified 
Sun employees 
and project 
members to 
promote Sun 
Sigma 
• Decreasing • People started to follow their local departmental managers and re-
commitment by focus their attention away from Sun Sigma projects 
project members • People reduced their project commitments and Sun Sigma projects 
reduced results of started not to deliver the results expected 
Sun Sigma => Sun Sigma project members (green and black belts) followed 
projects their managers and their reduced commitment to Sun Sigma 
engagements 
5.3.2 Interaction between Strategic Initiatives 
The Sun Sigma initiative affected other initiatives and was affected by them in tum. 
These effects emerged during a period of various ongoing strategic (change) 
initiatives which were part of Sun's overall strategic change and improvement 
programme as described in the company introduction section. The implementation of 
the Sun Sigma initiative gave rise to various effects due to different challenges: 
compliance issues between initiatives, challenging dependencies between initiative 
goals and objectives, and facilitation of initiative challenges through project 
proliferations. Identifiable in this context were three initiative-oriented drivers which 
produced different effects between the Sun Sigma initiative and other initiatives. 
These drivers were very similar to those observed between the effects of the Sun 
Sigma initiative and Sun's organisational context. They are illustrated in Figure 12, 
which shows the Sun Sigma initiative-oriented main driver, which created different 
challenges with emerging effects between the Sun Sigma initiative and other 
initiatives. 
Firstly, the Sun Sigma initiative and related Sun Sigma projects affected other 
ongoing initiatives through the ability of the Sun Sigma initiative to change the actual 
project priorities ("Authority to reach strategic goals") and tactical efficiency goals, 
which created various resource re-allocation and re-prioritisation effects within other 
initiatives. Secondly, because of the close relationship between CAO and the Sun 
Sigma knowledge, the initiative team members were able to increase and reduce the 
Sun Sigma relevant expertise and priorities in other ongoing and planned initiative 
through the allocation and re-allocation of mandatory Sun Sigma expertise (new 
project policies; mandatory engagement of an Sun Sigma expert) and project 
representatives - "Sun Sigma Knowledge and skills". Moreover, other initiatives were 
forced to adopt new Sun Sigma approval processes (e.g. Gate-Concept). Those 
approvals were managed by the Sun Sigma experts from CAO, who decided whether 
the projects were able to progress to the next stage, or whether the milcstones \\ere 
insufficiently fulfilled or the programme goals should be changed. 
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Figure 12: Context of interactions between the Sun Sigma initiative and other initiatives. 
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Thirdly, the strong influence of the Sun Sigma initiative on CAO and Sun's executive 
steering boards and the executive coaching panel enabled the Sun Sigma initiative to 
drive decisions ("Decision support/Mgmt. support Driver") across executive levels 
when a choice had to be made between the Sun Sigma initiative and other initiatives . 
In sum, these drivers were identified as sources of the observed challenges in the 
context of the initiative from which the effects between the Sun Sigma initiative and 
other ongoing initiatives emerged. 
5.3.2.1 Compliance Challenges between Strategic Initiatives 
The Sun Sigma initiative managers were forced to apply the application of Sun Sigma 
to other key initiatives to enhance other initiatives within the Sun Sigma concept. In 
this context, the initiative created additional Sun Sigma compliance issues between 
trategic initiatives with different implications. Before the Sun Sigma initiati e wa 
lawlched, Sun employees had struggled with the wide range of n w too l 
frameworks, and method e tab Ii hed through different initiati uch a the ne 
RM tool , new ale planning and fo reca t tool and proc e , ney partner 
manag m nt oncept , ne deal management concept, etc . AIm t every trategic 
15 
initiative used and established its own tools, frameworks, and methods, and this 
'overloaded' Sun's employees. Moreover, every strategic initiative had its own 
definitions and acronyms, which produced more complexities, misinterpretations, and 
confusion among the various project teams and lines of business. 
'J think get organized and slow down tools and 
methodologies, we have too many initiatives, too man)' 
acronyms too many ... we really need to be more 
delivery oriented. (Senior Project Manager & Strategic 
Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, [2]) 
The aim of the Sun Sigma initiative was to consolidate the vanous tools and 
frameworks used by the other strategic initiatives and replace them with standardised 
and approved Sun Sigma tools, frameworks, and methods. The Sun Sigma initiative 
started to use its close relations with CAO and Sun's management decision layer to 
consolidate and standardise the top-downwards existing methodologies and concepts 
within the different initiatives. 
' ... They did something big to develop the 'Top Down' 
which was not a bad idea. The goal was to get every VP 
(Vice President) trained on Sigma and to get them to 
understand the method and to understand how to 
receive a financial benefit in the end. The first wave 
was done for VPs, the highest management layer, the 
second wave included directors ... ' (Senior Program 
Manager & Sigma Black Belt, 2005, [21]) 
The consolidation processes exerted by the Sun Sigma initiative on other initiatives 
were conducted in two steps. Firstly, the decision makers from other initiatives were 
invited to learn more about Sun Sigma and how the new tools and methods could be 
applied to their strategic initiatives. Training and coaching sessions \vere organised in 
regular management cycles and steering boards. VPs and management teams from all 
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initiatives were organised in d l ' f ~ e r e n t t boards 1 1 11 to meet regu ar y and discuss their 
progress in applying Sun Sigma. Secondly, Sun Sigma experts (MBB 's) were 
appointed to coach different VPs as the VP at that time responsible for the CRM 
Convergence initiative. 
'I was appointed to coach our VP; he was responsible 
for a few strategic initiatives within the EMEA time 
zone, including the CRM Convergence initiative ... 1 
tried to convince him to become a Sun Sigma advocate. 
It was difficult; it was really difficult ... his attention 
and energy was focused on fulfilling his quarterly goals 
and figures. On the other hand, he was quite supportive 
for pushing Sun Sigma because this was the direction 
defined by the top management' (Sun Sigma Master 
Black Belt (MBB), 2005, [38]) 
However, coaching and promoting Sun Sigma within the management teams to 
standardise and align ongoing strategic initiatives like CRM Convergence to Sun 
Sigma created different challenges and complexities. Firstly, the CRM Convergence 
teams were 'invited' to attend Sun Sigma training sessions to apply Sun Sigma 
methods and frameworks in their ongoing projects. In this context, the management 
steering board decided that every project must have a Sun Sigma expert (champion) in 
the project team. 
, ., . Every project had to have a champion - VP level, 
later at least director level ... ' (Senior Program 
Manager & Sigma Black Belt, 2005, [21]) 
The aIm was to enhance the current initiative work with Sun Sigma knowledge. 
Nevertheless, Sun Sigma hampered progress within other initiatives, whose team 
members \vere taken up with new Sun Sigma concepts, methodologies, templates and 
definitions. The result was that the initiatives, other than CRM Convergence, 
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increased their Sun Sigma knowledge, and, at the same time, this additional Sun 
Sigma knowledge created confusion, misinterpretations, and complexity, as well as 
slowing down progress. The project teams lost their focus on the initiative's original 
measures and targets. 
' ... We were forced to apply the Sigma methodology and 
tools to our problem solving activities. At the end you 
don't need a fancy methodology to figure out how to get 
from problem definition to solving ... People felt 
themselves become slower and slower by using the new 
methodologies and tools' (Senior Project Manager & 
Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, [2]) 
Secondly, instead of enhancing the initiative, they became Sun Sigma advocates who 
sought to convert the existing results into the new Sun Sigma language. Overall, the 
initiative became static because it followed the new Sun Sigma methods absolutely. 
People felt they had lost their creativity and ability to think outside the box. 
' ... We stopped thinking outside the box. For example 
Sun created a two-day workshop template, so called 
Sun Shot; it was used to solve different kinds of 
problems and speed up solution finding. You collect 
some data in advance, then you come together, discuss 
the data and decide on the solution and its 
implementation. However, our problems were too 
complex to solve in a two-day Sun Sigma Shot' (Senior 
Project Manager & Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, 
[2]) 
.... we dissipate ow' project time H'ith these Sigma tools 
and methodologies rather than focus on solution 
IhO 
finding and problem solving ... ' (Senior Project 
Manager & Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, [2]) 
In the past, Sun employees had had the freedom to select their own methods and tools 
to solve existing problems. This ability started to be replaced by Sun Sigma. Overall, 
the Sun Sigma initiative aimed to improve several aspects within other initiatives 
through various actions, and this had different effects. 
Table 17: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities 
(7) 
• Apply Sun Sigma 
to other initiative 
teams and project 
members to 
increase Sun 
Sigma 
programme 
knowledge 
(8) 
• Consolidate 
various tools, 
methodologies, 
and project 
approaches 
Effects 
• Increase of Sun 
Sigma knowledge 
within other 
initiatives 
increased 
complexities and 
slowed down 
progress 
• Adopting Sun 
Sigma processes 
and guidelines 
reduced people's 
commitment and 
creativity and 
Implications 
• Programme teams started to attend regular training sessions and 
Sun Sigma meetings and reduced their everyday project work 
• Additional templates, methods, and concepts increased the 
complexities of 'translating' existing results and methods into Sun 
Sigma concepts and processes 
• New Sun Sigma methods created confusion and misinterpretations 
between initiatives on definitions and reduced project results 
=> Additional Sun Sigma knowledge within other initiatives reduced 
project work and increased coordination and alignment of Sun 
Sigma between initiatives 
• Mandatory Sun Sigma experts in each projects increased project 
costs, alignment times between team members, and the motivation 
of other team members to facilitate progress in project work 
• People reduced their performance and replaced problem solving 
activities with the fulfilment of Sun Sigma 'checklists', with the 
result of increased delays in delivering results 
increased project • People did not accept all Sun Sigma methods as effective problem 
costs, solving methods and tools, so that inefficient work between team 
inefficiencies and members increased 
timelines • People lost their freedom to solve business issues and their 
commitment to applying Sun Sigma concepts decreased - people 
started to reduce their project involvements 
=> The consolidation of existing initiative approaches, templates, 
processes, and methods increased confusion and reduced 
commitment to follow Sun Sigma guidelines 
5.3.2.2 Challenging Interdependencies between Initiative Goals and Objectives 
Challenging interdependencies between initiative goals and objectives in the context 
of the Sun Sigma initiative produced different effects, which can be described m 
detail using the following three examples. 
The first example concerns the alignment efforts between the Sun Sigma initiati\'c and 
the CRM Convergence initiative. CRM Convergence impacted on Sun Sigma's 
objectives and goals to generate various effects. According to the CRM Convergence 
initiative and overall customer orientation, an increasing number of executives 
requested that every initiative, including Sun Sigma, should drive and utilise customer 
values. Sun Sigma should determine the goal and level of the improvements required 
primarily (if not exclusively) by Sun's customer input. Hence, Sun Sigma was 
increasingly required to create and demonstrate customer values. The further 
objective of the Sun Sigma initiative was to "completely satisfy customer 
requirements and profitability" together with existing process excellence objectives. 
The new objective was stimulated by various customer-oriented initiatives, such as 
CRM Convergence, Global Field Development (GFD), and Partner Operations. Sun 
acknowledged, however, that not all of its customers required customer services at the 
Six Sigma level. Thus, the company wanted to understand the customer requirements 
thoroughly and set appropriate Sigma levels for each customer, service, product, and 
process. In this example, the Sun Sigma initiative team was forced to align the 
existing objectives and goals with the additional customer oriented improvement 
objectives already covered by the CRM Convergence initiative. Those alignments 
between the two initiatives produced resource inefficiencies because additional 
initiative costs were required for more Sun Sigma project resources. Hence, the Sun 
Sigma initiative started to address customer improvement issues overlapping with the 
CRM Convergence initiative, with the consequence that existing Sun Sigma activities 
slowed down and inefficiencies across initiatives increased . 
•.. .I couldn't understand It'hy we i n c r e a s i n g ~ v v started to 
j()ClIS on customer issues the CR"\f initiatiH' alrealzr 
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covered most of the identified customer gaps. Our Sun 
Sigma activities started to cover those issues ... and our 
original plans to establish operational efficiencies 
slowed down.' (EMEA Sales Operations & Sun Sigma 
Projects, 2006, [46]) 
The second example illustrates how the GFD initiative failed to fulfil some of its 
objectives and created inefficient overlaps between initiatives by increasing the scope 
of Sun Sigma. The aim of the GFD initiative was to develop competitive service 
offerings and train sales forces to sell them in the market. Managed Services was one 
of Sun's new service offerings, and it can be described as a special type of outsourced 
service. Sun customers could operate their data centre infrastructure (computing 
systems etc.) with Sun experts without selling their organisation and infrastructure to 
Sun (outsourcing contracts). The client was still the owner of its computing 
infrastructure and IT -departments. Sun simply provided additional operating 
knowledge and skills through on-site teams for their customers. These teams took care 
of the existing client environment and helped the clients to optimise their IT-
operations and IT -costs. The GFD initiative was tasked with developing an overall 
quality level for their managed services. The initiative team was behind the milestone 
plans and timelines, while the core team 'used' Sun Sigma to compensate for their 
necessary programme workloads. 
'The GFD team was lagging behind their plans. They 
started to use Sun Sigma to meet their resource needs 
and to reduce their program scopes. Everything which 
could be done by Sun Sigma was requested by the GFD 
team to be done by the Sun Sigma initiative as the new 
SLA concept for the new service offering managed 
services.' (Senior Project Manager & Deal Manager 
(CH), 2006, [39]) 
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The GFD programme core team mobilised the initiative sponsors and asked the 
executive level for additional programming resources to develop Sun Sigma oriented 
quality levels. The decision board decided that Sun Sigma should take care of this 
important GFD initiative objective and increased the scope of Sun Sigma. Hence. the 
effects of the inefficient overlaps between the initiatives emerged because both spent 
resources and time on fulfilling this objective. 
The third example describes how Sun Sigma increased the barriers against the BSC 
initiative's (BSC = Balanced Scorecard) ability to fulfil the defined BSC objectives. 
Those barriers reduced the BSC's progress and led to a request for more time and 
resources which increased the BSC initiative's overall costs. The aim of the BSC was 
to break down Sun's strategy and strategic objectives into their various organisational 
layers and make the strategy more measurable. The BSC initiative consequently tried 
to collect and consolidate all used and operationalised KPIs (KPI = Key Performance 
Indicator) and dashboards. Moreover, the wide range of individual Sun Sigma 
projects that had already begun continued to develop further KPIs and dashboards for 
specific business problems and project cases. This flood of KPIs and dashboards 
comprised inconsistencies and KPIs contrary to Sun's overall strategic direction. The 
BSC team discovered that a large number of KPIs were useless for measuring Sun's 
strategic performance. Moreover, these KPIs were sometimes at odds with Sun's 
strategy. However, different department and teams relied in their daily business 
activities on these controversial KPIs and dashboards. 
'We had a wide range of different and controversial 
KPls - as for example the Partner Operations initiative 
used KPls to measure how many deals were executed 
by our partners as revenue multipliers. Our partners 
were measured by the number of complex deals they 
delivered They l\ 'ere pushed b.v us to execute as man.v 
projects as possible. At thc same time It'e (Sun) tried to 
establish a project-oriented Professional Sen'ices (PS) 
organisation H'here H'C tried to take the lead in selling 
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up and executing complex client projects. PS had 
controversial KPIs in comparison to our partner 
business operations,' they were also pushed to deliver 
as many deals as possible, and ours sales people were 
measured and controlled on how many products they 
sold and not on service deals.' (EMEA Operations 
Manager & BSC Core Team Member, 2006, [29]) 
'Sun Sigma tries to measure everything. We had far too 
many dashboards and measures which didn't relate to 
each other. Every new Sun Sigma project came up with 
new measures and dashboards.' (EMEA Operations 
Manager & BSC Core Team Member, 2006, [29]) 
These misalignments created barriers and increased the BSC project's obstacles 
against fulfilling the BSC objectives of providing a set of strategic and integrated 
measures to monitor Sun's strategy performance. The initiative required more time 
and resources to analyse and consolidate the company's existing KPI and dashboard 
landscape, and it encountered resistance from various departments and regional 
offices operationalising the dashboards and measures established by different Sun 
Sigma improvement projects. Those dashboards and measures did not provide an 
integrated and consolidated perspective of Sun's performance because they were 
established by various Sun Sigma projects to solve and improve specific business 
issues. Furthermore, the management teams realised that not all Sun Sigma activities 
could be linked to Sun's overall strategic objectives. In this context, the executives 
realised that a wide range of Sun Sigma projects was misaligned with the overall 
company goals. 
· ... Senior VPs like Ellie Simon said "Sun Sigma is a 
fax I hal'c fo pay for "00. ' (Senior Project Manager & 
Strategic Sun Sigma Projects. 2004, [2]) 
Executives lost their commitment to Sun Sigma and felt that they were being forced 
by headquarters to finance various Sun Sigma activities and CAO without a clear 
understanding of how those projects would help to increase the overall company 
performance and results. 
Table 18: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities Effects Implications 
(9) 
• CRM 
Convergence 
initiative 
increased 
executives' 
attention and 
commitment to 
initiative goals 
and objectives 
(10) 
• GFD was unable 
to achieve its 
desired goals and 
objectives on time 
(11 ) 
• The Sun Sigma 
initiative created 
various 
measurements 
and dashboards 
to drive fact-
based decision 
making 
• CRM 
Convergence 
initiative reduced 
Sun Sigma's 
performance and 
increased 
inefficiencies 
between the two 
initiatives 
• CRM Convergence produced the overall opinion that Sun Sigma 
should create customer value 
• Sun Sigma reprioritised initiative-process excellence improvement 
activities to customer improvement activities with the consequence 
of overlaps between the initiatives and requests for more project 
resources and skills 
• The change of different Sun Sigma process excellence activities 
reduced achievement of the expected results and increased overall 
costs 
=> Alignment efforts between CRM Convergence and Sun Sigma 
created challenges on initiative performance and costs 
• GFD delays and • The GFD initiative defined some of its goals and objectives as Sun 
missing results Sigma goals 
created inefficient • The transfer of GFD tasks to Sun Sigma created additional 
overlaps between workloads within the Sun Sigma initiative 
Sun Sigma and • The transfer of GFD tasks created inefficient overlaps between 
GFD 
• The Sun Sigma 
initiative 
increased the 
SSC initiative 
timelines, 
resource needs, 
and efforts to fulfil 
the SSC goals 
and objectives 
GFD and Sun Sigma activities 
=> GFO delays impacted on Sun Sigma and created additional 
workloads and resource overlapping 
• Sun Sigma dashboards were detached from overall strategic 
objectives and goals 
• Sun Sigma dashboards were operationally embedded and various 
lines of business rely on those measurement and figures 
• Not all Sun Sigma measures were in line with Sun's key 
performance indicators and created challenges 
• Not all Sun Sigma projects supported Sun's key performance 
indicators and generated only additional costs 
=> Sun Sigma created barriers against the BSC initiative and 
increased the BSC's resource needs and timelines 
5.3.2.3 Emerging Initiative Challenges from Uncontrolled Project Proliferation 
The management of emerging key projects by the initiative was only the beginning of 
a series of new Sun Sigma projects across the entire Sun organisation, with different 
consequences (effects) for the business. 
'If we look into our global Sun Sigma project 
registration tool, over the last 18 months we could find 
over 3000 registered projects around the globe.' 
(Senior Program Manager & Sun Sigma Black Belt, 
2005, [21]) 
The initiative started to create an uncontrolled process of project proliferation from 
the original less than 20 key projects to over 3000 projects across the organisation. 
This project proliferation arose unexpectedly from the various key activities of the 
initiative. 
The first source of uncontrolled project proliferation was the Sun Sigma training and 
certification programme managed by the initiative and strongly supported by CAO. 
People were mobilised to participate in mandatory and standardised training schemes 
(according to the Sun Sigma objectives) to become green and black belts. The 
growing audience across the company showed that Sun Sigma skills were developing. 
However, besides new skills, the Sun Sigma training and certification programme 
'encouraged' more and more Sun employees to attend the Sun Sigma training sessions 
and qualify for a green belt. 
'Through Sun Sigma H'e had an inflation of black belts. 
E\'(!IY business line started to train people to become 
green and black belts. These belts had to have a project 
so the numbers qlprojects increased and of course the 
c o m p l e x i ~ l ' ' (?l each individual project. For example, in 
some (?l our projects lH' worked three months o n ~ \ ' ' 011 
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the charter to fulfil the Sun Sigma criteria' (Senior 
Project Manager & Strategic Sun Sigma Projects, 2004, 
[2]) 
The Sun Sigma training community within Sun started to grow, and this stimulated a 
demand for new Sun Sigma projects. This triggered the process of uncontrolled 
project proliferation and demand for scarce firm resources within the organisation. 
'Still today, for a black belt to be certified you have to 
lead two projects and we have about six or seven black 
belts in our team. Only one is certified, and as for the 
other ones - they are still looking for projects. I mean 
that is where we ended up.' (Sun Sigma Expert & 
Special Projects, 2005, [30]) 
This proliferation of projects had the unexpected effect that key people grew 
increasingly 'absorbed' with their Sun Sigma certifications and projects. 
Consequently, widening workforce gaps emerged within different areas of Sun's daily 
business operations. 
'Each department was pushed to train and certify a 
percentage of its staff to become Sigma green and black 
belts. It was split in X percentage of green and X 
percentage of black belts. Moreover, X percentages of 
green belts had to be directors. Then the organisation 
started to fudge project stories and declared projects to 
be Sigma projects, which we normally wouldn't do. I 
think H'e increased the complexity s i g n [ f i c a n t ~ 1 ' . ' '
(Senior Program Manager & Sigma Black Belt, 2005. 
[21 ]) 
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Over time, the Sun organisation ran out of resources and did not have enough 
qualified people to manage its daily business operations. An increasing number of 
people were required. These employees again started to look for new Sun Sigma 
projects for their certification, which started to drive the project proliferation through 
a 'snowball' effect. 
The second key source of uncontrolled project proliferation was the Sun Sigma 
executive steering boards. In this combination, Sun's coaching of managers and 
executives increased the overall Sun Sigma knowledge and visibility at the executive 
level and created an increasing number of Sun Sigma oriented projects. The managers 
and executives discussed on a regular basis how their business could be improved and 
decided increasingly to launch Sun Sigma projects to improve the identified gaps. 
Those steering boards and discussion boards were organised and moderated by Sun 
Sigma experts who influenced the Sun executives to become more Sun Sigma 
oriented. In summary, the decisions to launch Sun Sigma projects were stimulated 
through the following aspects. Firstly, the misinterpretations of ROSS (see above) 
increased the expectations of vanous managers that Sun Sigma projects could 
strongly help them to achieve their management goals as the cost reduction and 
saving measures became clearly outlined through ROSS. At this time, Sun was in a 
challenging financial situation, with increasing pressure on various executives and 
managers. These decision makers started to back up their business issues with Sun 
Sigma improvement projects. 
Secondly, the Sun Sigma steering boards did not cover all of the needs of different 
regions of the company. In this context, the decision power and competencies for 
launching new Sun Sigma projects were decentralised and delegated to the various 
time zones. 
. .. We talked elegantl), about a decentralized model ... 
This actualh' means that e\'('l,\, time ::one did H'hate\'cr 
it It'w1ted - this r e a l ~ l ' ' happened.' (Senior Program 
Manager & Sigma Black Belt, 2005. [21]) 
The decentralisation of the new Sun Sigma projects facilitated the initiation of new 
projects. Every office started to launch independently new Sun Sigma projects to 
address their local business issues. 
The third aspect to stimulate new Sun Sigma projects were closely related to the 
second aspect - individual departments and time zones cross-financed CAO and new 
Sun Sigma projects. The executives reclaimed those budgets by requesting and 
launching individual Sun Sigma projects to receive at least some kind of return on 
their internal Sun Sigma payments. These activities increased the overall demand for 
new projects, with the consequence of growing project activities. 
The fourth and last aspect relates to the MBO of Sun's executives. The Sun Sigma 
initiative, in correlation with CAO, developed additional goals and objectives for 
Sun's management teams. Those objectives included, besides mandatory training, the 
participation in at least one Sun Sigma project and the development of one proposal, 
which outlined three potential areas of improvement through Sun Sigma. Those 
proposals became the baseline for new improvement projects. Accordingly to Sun's 
management community of between 3000 - 5000 managers (between 10 - 15% of the 
staff), nearly every third proposal was implemented through a Sun Sigma project. 
With regard to project proliferation, based on the stimulation from the global Sun 
Sigma training programmes and the Sun Sigma steering committees, the Sun Sigma 
initiatives increased their activities progressively. The Sun Sigma initiative can be 
defined in terms of the total number of ongoing projects within Sun - which 
amounted to between 3000 and 4000 projects around the globe. Those Sun Sigma 
projects were part of the Sun Sigma initiative and acted as additional multipliers of 
the described effects of the various challenges. Figure 13 illustrates how the Sun 
Sigma initiative increased its project dynamics by launching additional Sun Sigma 
projects, and how those projects increased the possibilities of different challenges and 
different effects. 
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Figure 13: Sun Sigma project multiplier effect on other initiatives 
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Figure 13 describes the Sun Sigma initiative range that was built on the growmg 
dynamics of new Sun Sigma projects. It illustrates various additional possibilities for 
effects between other initiatives and the Sun Sigma initiative stimulated by new Sun 
Sigma projects (project proliferations). These initiatives relate to the Sun Sigma 
initiative and increased massively over time, as illustrated in Figure 13. Furthermore, 
both activities, the global Sun Sigma training programmes and the Sun Sigma steering 
committees, were supported and facilitated through the new Sun Sigma company 
portal, where the employees were able to obtain Sun Sigma related information, share 
their experiences, and collaborate with other Sun Sigma experts within the wider 
organisation. In this context, CAO increasingly became the central organisational unit 
for Sun Sigma activities and decisions. 
Table 19: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities Effects Implications 
(12) • Increase in Sun • Training and certification programs absorbed people from their 
• Increase Sun Sigma knowledge daily work and business operations 
Sigma know-how reduced workforce • People were forced to attend Sun Sigma trainings and project 
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across the 
organisation 
(13) 
• Defining and 
launching various 
Sun Sigma 
improvement 
projects to 
improve Sun's 
business 
operations 
power and resource meetings 
gaps emerged • Training and certification programme increased the number of 
during everyday certifications and experts (green and black belts) and increased 
business 
operations 
• Increase in Sun 
Sigma projects 
reduced overall 
efficiencies as 
CAD focus 
changed from an 
support 
organisation to an 
internal project 
demand for new Sun Sigma projects to fulfil the certification criteria 
=> Sun Sigma improvement projects became 'cerlification '- driven 
instead of business issue-Iresult-driven and stimulated the Sun 
Sigma project proliferation 
• Claiming ROSS and expecting measurable results stimUlated 
various managers to start new Sun Sigma improvement projects 
• Uncontrolled proliferation of Sun Sigma projects increased the 
demand for scarce firm resources and increased overall project 
costs 
• Managers expected from their cross-financing activities to CAD 
measurable paybacks in form of new Sun Sigma projects within 
their departments and supportive Sun Sigma expertise 
• Uncontrolled proliferation of Sun Sigma projects increased the 
coordination and demand for support activities within CAD - CAD focus drifted from 
administration unit enhancing Sun's line of business with Sun Sigma knowledge to 
internal project coordination and administration activities 
=> Uncontrolled proliferation of Sun Sigma projects stretched Sun's 
scarce resources and increased overheads within Sun's 
organisation 
(14) • Increase in Sun • Decentralized organisational structures and decision boards on 
new Sun Sigma stimulated new Sun Sigma projects in various local 
regions and business units 
• Supporting Sigma projects 
decisions to reduced process 
launch Sun Sigma excellence 
projects to fulfil achievements 
the Sun Sigma 
process 
excellence goals 
(15) 
• Multiplying and 
enhancing Sun's 
current process 
excellence 
improvement 
efforts with 
specific Sun 
Sigma projects 
• Multiplication of 
challenges 
between the Sun 
Sigma initiative and 
other strategic 
initiatives through 
additional Sun 
Sigma projects 
• New Sun Sigma projects were launched in increasingly 
decentralised manner by local departments and executives with 
the consequence of growing overlaps and inefficiencies 
• Similar New Sun Sigma projects were launched independently and 
were misaligned with each other 
=> The 'snowball' effect of uncontrolled project proliferation reduced 
control over Sun Sigma projects and reduced the focus on 
consolidated process excellence areas 
• New Sun Sigma projects were launched through the Sun Sigma 
initiative with the support of CAD 
• New Sun Sigma projects addressed specific gaps to 
increase/utilise ROSS 
• Sun Sigma projects were structured and managed according to 
Sun Sigma project phases, methodologies and templates 
=> Growing number of de-centralised Sun Sigma projects, as parl 
of the overall Sun Sigma initiative, generated effects between 
Sun Sigma and other initiatives 
5.4 Summary 
The intention in undertaking a case study of Sun Sigma was to investigate which kind 
of challenge emerged during the transformation of Sun's existing business operations 
according to the strategic initiative objectives and goals . In detail, the aim of the Sun 
Sigma initiative case study was to investigate which challenging effects emerged from 
the interactions with Sun's organisation and between other strategic initiatives. In the 
context of the Sun Sigma initiative, those interactions created different challenges 
from which various effects between the initiative and Sun's organizational context 
and between the initiative and other initiatives emerged. 
The challenges observed reflect a group of effects which evolved from an interaction 
between the Sun Sigma initiative and Sun's organizational context or from an 
interaction with other strategic initiatives. In relation to the Sun Sigma initiative, three 
firm specific capabilities could be identified as the key drivers in stimulating the 
creation of the five classified challenges and related effects, as summarised in the 
following figure. 
Figure 14: Related key driver and observed challenges within the Sun Sigma initiative. 
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The figure illustrates the mam drivers identified as stimulating the five different 
challenges, classified into the two types of interaction. The first driver relates to the 
capability of Sun's decision support and management support capabilities, which 
includes the firm-specific decision support and management support processes with 
reference to the Sun Sigma initiative. Sun Sigma received strong management support 
to implement the Sun Sigma objectives across the company. In this regard, the Sun 
Sigma initiative utilized their ability to influence the management teams in 
accordance with the Sun Sigma objectives to align other strategic initiatives with Sun 
Sigma related aspects. The second driver relates to Sun's capabilities to apply new 
knowledge and skills to the organization and other strategic initiatives to renew and 
facilitate the fulfilment of the defined strategic objectives and goals. The third driver 
is summarized as Sun's capability to manage, especially to exert the authority to 
reach the strategic goals o/the Sun Sigma initiative to drive the implementation of the 
different ongoing strategic initiatives, including the Sun Sigma initiative. The driver 
implies the capability of prioritization and includes the ability of the company to 
define the necessary authorities for the Sun Sigma initiative to achieve its strategic 
goals and objectives. In particular, the close relation to CAO and the objective to 
distribute and establish Sun Sigma knowledge across the organization and other 
initiatives' challenge Sun to increase and reduce the Sun Sigma relevant expertise and 
priorities on other ongoing and planned initiatives through the allocation and re-
allocation of mandatory Sun Sigma expertise (new project policies; mandatory 
engagement of a Sun Sigma expert) and scarce Sun Sigma project experts. These 
drivers led to the challenges observed during the strategic initiative implementation 
period, which included the appearance of the observed challenging effects. 
Table 20: Summary of Sun Sigma initiative related challenges and effects. 
Observed Challenges Emerged Effects (Observed Examples) 
Organisational (1) Focus Shift of the Sun Sigma initiative with emerging conflicts and complexities 
Misinterpretation of Sun within the Sun Sigma initiative. 
Sigma: This situation is defined (2) Different org. perspectives reduced expected Sun Sigma initiative progress on 
through different interpretations, the defined objectives and goals. 
expectations and different 
supporting activities/decisions 
of various involved actors. 
(3) Sun Sigma Initiative facilitated the decrease in applying and utilizing existing firm 
capabilities. 
----------------- ------- -------- - --_._-
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Organisational resistance 
against Sun Sigma: This 
(4) Sun Sigma orientation/concentration decreased acceptance of Sun Sigma 
related initiative activities 
situation reflects how resistance 
by involved actors increased (5) Increasing managerial resistance against Sun Sigma reduced Sun Sigma 
initiative support 
the barriers and challenges 
tagainst progress with the Sun 
Sigma initiative. 
Compliance challenges 
between strategic initiatives: 
This situation is characterised 
through the Sun Sigma efforts 
to apply Sun Sigma to other 
strategic initiatives. 
Challenging dependencies 
between initiative goals and 
objectives: this situation 
defines the situation where two 
strategic initiatives engaged in 
(6) Decreasing commitments of Sun Sigma project members reduced Sun Sigma 
initiative progress 
(7) Increase of Sigma knowledge within other initiatives increased complexities and 
reduced progress by other initiatives 
(8) Sun Sigma standardisation increased complexities and confusion between 
initiatives and project team members 
(9) Sun Sigma related alignment efforts created challenges and issues between 
different initiatives 
(10) Sun Sigma orientation increased delays and inefficient resource allocation 
overlapping between initiatives 
dependencies between initiative (11) Sun Sigma initiative created barriers for other initiatives and increased scope for 
individual goals and objectives 
with the consequence of 
evolving challenges. 
other initiatives 
Emerging initiative (12) Increase of Sun Sigma knowledge created additional resource needs and 
challenges from uncontrolled workforce gaps 
project proliferations: this 
situation illustrates how 
uncontrolled proliferation of new 
(13) Growing number of Sun Sigma project increased overheads within Sun's 
organization, operations, and reduced resource allocation efficiencies 
Sun Sigma projects increased (14) Growing number of Sun Sigma projects stimulated misalignments between 
the observed effects and project goals and decreased results of other projects (decrease of consolidated 
created multiplier effects across process excellence results) 
Sun. (15) Multiplication of Sun Sigma projects as part of the Sun Sigma initiative reduced 
Sun's project resource allocation control and stimulated additional effects with other 
initiatives and the organization. 
~ - - - - ~ - - ----------------------------------
In 2007, the Sun organisation officially finalised its global Sun Sigma initiative and 
the management team claimed that "Sun Sigma is now in the DNA" of Sun 
Microsystems, Inc. based on the improved financial performance and positive 
quarterly results. "Voices" in the company claimed that Sun Sigma was essential for 
the evolution of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and that the initiative was a strategic step that 
would be noted by its customers, partners, and competitors. However, other "Voices" 
from different departments still claimed that, after 2007, Sun Sigma was too 
cxpcnsi\c, difficult to measurc and led nowherc, with thc conscquencc that Sun's 
management team decided to reduce its Sun Sigma investments unofficially. In this 
regard, the case study conducted may provide answers regarding why Sun Sigma was 
recognized as difficult, expensive and sometimes challenging for Sun, according to 
the effects which emerged from the different initiative related challenges. All of the 
challenges and effects in the table refer to the Sun Sigma initiative and related 
interactions between Sun's organizational context and other strategic initiatives. 
Overall, the Sun Sigma case study illustrates how various effects evolved with 
sometimes challenging consequences and difficulties for Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
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6 The CRM Convergence Initiative Case Study 
6.1 Introduction 
Stagnating IT product markets induced Sun to focus on its customer relations and to 
launch the CRM Convergence initiative to transform their existing well-established 
transaction- and product-based sales approach into a more customer-centric and 
collaborative sales one. Furthermore, Sun had little customer knowledge and no deep 
client relationships in its global key customer base, and customers demanded more 
integrated business solutions instead of single hardware and software products. 
Sun's management team held close discussions with the Siebel management team to 
examine the benefits of different CRM projects around the globe. At that time, Siebel 
transformed and implemented global CRM initiatives at Sun's competitors, such as 
IBM and HP. Both companies claimed that their CRM initiatives strengthened the 
effectiveness of the company's sales force and increased their overall competitive 
advantage. 
On the basis of the paradigm shifts in the markets and the growing intensity of the 
assault by Sun's competitors on Sun's customer base, the management team defined 
the CRM Convergence initiative as a strategic enabler to facilitate two strategic firm 
directions: firstly, the protection of Sun's current customer base through the 
improvement of existing customer satisfaction and loyalty rates; and, secondly, the 
ability to enter new markets and customer segments by providing valuable and 
integrated customer solutions based on comprehensive customer knowledge and 
collaborative engagement skills. Both directions required changes to the existing 
company structures and capabilities. In this regard, the CRM Convergence initiative 
rolled out various change enhancements to Sun's current resource base, including new 
customer-centric organisations, processes. routines and tools. Moreover. the CRM 
Convergence initiative became part of Sun's strategic endeavour to put future 
business strategies in place and operate more effectively with their customers and 
markets. O\'erall, the management manifested a concern to put the customer at the 
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centre of all business operations, thus enabling the firm to strengthen its 
competitiveness, increase its sales activities, and dissuade customers from defecting to 
Sun's competitors. 
The following in-depth case study discusses how the CRM Convergence initiative 
interacted with Sun's environment, and especially with its organisational context and 
other strategic change initiatives. These interactions generated different situations and 
had various challenging effects on the CRM Convergence initiative, other initiatives 
and Sun's organisational context. The first section describes the CRM Convergence 
initiative, especially why it was launched (the rationale) and the objectives and goals 
that Sun defined for it. The next section illustrates how the initiative was 
implemented, by outlining how the CRM Convergence initiative interacted with the 
company's organisational context and other strategic initiatives, and the challenging 
effects that arose from those interactions. The last section illustrates and summarises 
the overall findings of the CRM Convergence initiative case study. 
6.2 Rationale of the CRM Convergence Initiative 
In 2000, after a successful period of growth in terms of revenue and margins, the 
management team of Sun Microsystems launched the CRM Convergence initiative. 
The aim was to create a more customer-oriented organisation by placing Sun's 
customers at the centre of all business operations, and to address the paradigm shifts 
ongoing in the market. The market conditions and customer behaviour had changed, 
with customers starting to demand more integrated business solutions instead of 
single hardware and software products. 
' ... and e 1 ' e ' ~ 1 ' O n e e appeared to see that there was a huge 
paradigm shift going on in the market .. , ' (Senior Sales 
Manager & Customer Representative, 2004, [1]) 
.... We han' simpzl' failed to lin) up to the e.\pectations 
( ~ l l our cllstomers ... I also beliel'e that In.' could he 
doing far more to ensure that customer s1'slems are 
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configured for availability and that we escalate and 
manage problems in a more pro-active way. .. ' (EMEA 
Vice President, 2004, [40]) 
This was because it was simply impossible for enterprises (customers) to meet the 
return-on-investment targets unless the hardware was accompanied by substantial 
value added by the business-process-oriented services. As a consequence, IBM shifted 
its emphasis to the services and announced in 2001 that 60 percent of the company's 
revenues and 75 percent of its profits were derived from software and services. 
Vendors like Hewlett-Packard, Compaq and Novell took note of IBM's results and 
they too began to emphasize services. This should have benefited those vendors who 
acted quickly and followed IBM's example by making services the core of their 
offerings, not just a secondary channel for selling hardware. This was what the IT 
buyers needed after 2000, and increasingly what they started to demand. In this 
context, by making services the core of its offering, Sun started to discuss changes in 
the firm's existing business mix. 
' ... our customer relations were certainly transaction 
orientated. It was slightly remote. Computers were 
bought and Sun did not really care what business issues 
or problems were solved. It can g e n e r a l ~ v v be stated that 
computer systems and software were bought because of 
technology's sake. There was a perceived view in the 
market place that increased investments in Information 
Technology would make companies somewhat more 
productive.' (Senior Sales Manager & Customer 
Representative, 2004, [1]) 
However, in the past, transaction-oriented product selling had been one of the reasons 
for Sun's strong business growth and stable margins. The company successfully' 
developed these sales capabilities to handle sales transactions and, at the same time. 
cover a wide range of geographical regions with their existing sales teams. In 200 I. 
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Sun claimed a 55% worldwide market share of business servers (UNIX shipments), 
which was more than that of IBM, HP and Compaq combined. I Sun led the field in 
terms of revenue - outpacing HP by approximately 10% and IBM by approximately 
170/0. In the US, Sun grew in the sphere of server products (UNIX market share - both 
shipments and revenue), while IBM's and HP's shares declined. 2 The server product 
(Sun Fire line) grew by 39% in terms of shipments (significantly outpacing IBM's 
pSeries) and by 220/0 in revenue, compared to previous quarters. In 2001, for the first 
time, Sun was ranked first in terms of revenue in the High Performance 
Computing/Tech server market, followed by Compaq, HP and IBM.3 These successes 
were built on Sun's transaction-oriented sales capabilities, which became irrelevant as 
market conditions and customer behaviour changed. The customers reduced their IT 
expenditure and requested more business value and solutions from Sun, which 
conflicted with Sun's existing sales capabilities. Decreasing IT budgets heightened 
the competition between Sun and companies like HP, IBM, Microsoft, Dell, etc. 
which exploited the shift in customer behaviour as an opportunity to sustain their 
market share within decreasing the IT budgets and offered an increasing number of 
business solutions. Nevertheless, like many players in the industry, Sun Microsystems 
recorded a significant drop in revenue after 2001. In this context, Sun realised that 
substantial changes were necessary. 
'Corporate [Sun Executive Board] realized more and 
more to change direction and drive solution selling. We 
[Sun] need to change our current company capabilities 
and assets to be profitable in the future' (CFO Sun 
CentrallNorthem EU & CRM Core Team, 2005, [7]) 
Sun started to sustain and extend its customer base by transforming the company's 
current capabilities into more customer-centric business operations, including 
competitive solution offerings. Therefore, the CRM Convergence initiative became of 
I Sl111fCC: DataQuest \\\\ Server Marketview Statistics. 3QCYOI. 11/1501 
2 Source: DataQuest l'S Marht\iew. 2QC'1'OI. 11/09/01 
1 Sllun:e: IDC HPC Tcdl server market, I He'lll! 11 01 
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major importance for the company III sustaining its existing customer base by 
enhancing its existing capabilities. 
6.2.1 Definition and Vision of the Initiative 
Sun's management team described and defined the CRM Convergence initiative in 
three key respects. Firstly, because the company's product-oriented sales capabilities 
were focused only on sales transactions, these were insufficient to enable the 
company to continue its operations. After 2001, Sun had little customer information 
and no deep client relationships in their global key customer base. Competitors like 
IBM and HP sought to persuade Sun's customers to convert to their platforms and 
technologies. In this context, Sun lacked the strong relationships through which to 
instil confidence in their existing customers. 
' ... The market conditions definitely changed ... we now 
have the situation where we have to actually sell and 
position our various solutions we have in our portfolio. ' 
(Senior Sales Manager & Customer Rep., 2004, [1]) 
Secondly, the global sales force was too absorbed in internal processes, procedures, 
approvals, administration, and challenging sales tools. The customer-facing 
employees, like the salespeople, IT -consultants, supporters, and alliance managers, 
could not respond rapidly and reliably to customer requests as "one voice". The 
company's organisational structures, processes, and tools were not effectively client-
oriented. Thirdly, in order to convince the existing and new customers that Sun was a 
reliable partner and a trusted IT-advisor, the company was forced to provide business 
understanding, collaborative problem-solving skills and solution-oriented industry 
offerings. Their existing sales skills and offerings grew increasingly irrelevant. To 
address these aspects, Sun adopted a region-by-region approach under a global master 
plan covering all of the necessary topics and activities. These three key aspects led to 
the definition of the CRM Convergence initiative. Based especially on the first of 
them, that of transforming the existing sales capabilities, Sun created its vision 
regarding the sales capabilities necessary in the future. 
1 X 1 
Table 21: Sun 's vision of the new sales capabilities required (Source: Interviewees) 
Sales Capabilities Before 2001 
Focus on acquiring new customers 
Partner-Management, growing the 
distribution partner network for Sun 
products 
Strong transaction-oriented sales 
force 
Strong sales relations with 
customers ' IT departments and 
CIOs (Chief Information Officer) 
Less customer industry and 
business knowledge required 
Sun services are add-ons to 
assure product quality for Sun 
products 
Reactive and passive sales 
processes; customers and partners 
are ordering Sun products/services 
Sales Capabilities Required After 2001 
Focus on protecting current 
customer base 
Project Management business 
required a network of solution 
providers and business advisors to 
enhance Sun's business capabilities 
Focus on customer relationship 
management 
Solution sell ing approach and value 
proposition required to solve 
customer business issues (Sun's 
AIM Framework) 
Sales advisory capabilities required 
to solve business issues and shape 
customer solutions 
Being proactive in leading sales 
process and partner business 
This was the vision created by Sun's prospects in the future IT market, as software 
and services became the key elements for solution-oriented offerings in this industry 
sector. Therefore, the CRM Convergence initiative played a key role in transforming 
the company's well-established and traditional transaction-based and product-oriented 
sales approach into a more customer-oriented and collaborative sales one. 
Furthermore, the initiative sought to strengthen Sun while also protecting the 
company's global customer base by increasing Sun's effectiveness in approaching 
future customer segments. In this context, Sun announced, during the initialization of 
the CRM Convergence initiative, that it would approach five new industries, so that 
the firm would be less reliant on the traditional industry segments (government, 
telecommunications, and banking). Sun realized that of key importance for those new 
industry segments were the collaborative and solution-oriented sales approaches 
implem nted by the CRM Convergence initiative. 
6.2.2 Strategic Objectives of the CRM Convergence Initiative 
Three different deliv ry element formed the core of the CRM on ergence initiative 
undertak n to fulfil un' trategi initiati e goal . The fir t \ a to m rca. th 
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effectiveness of the current sales force and customer-facing teams: the programme 
management team sought to integrate new CRM applications, processes, and to re-
design existing business processes and skills to enhance the current sales forces 
capabilities to operate more effectively with their customers and markets. The second 
was to increase their knowledge of existing and future customers. Sun started to 
enable the new CRM applications, which required integration into the Sun business 
environment and various migrations of current (ineffective) Sun applications and 
systems. After 2000, the company's existing tools, the related marketing, sales, 
customer service processes, and organisational structures were too complex and too 
cost intensive. Moreover, the company's current customer operating model became 
increasingly difficult to operate. To overcome these difficulties, the initiative 
endeavoured to implement a customer perspective by establishing a central CRM 
platform and customer database. This objective required a supportive organisation. 
Thirdly, in order that Sun could become a customer-centric organisation, it decided to 
align its current organisations to become more customer-oriented and support the new 
sales approaches. 
'Our customers started to request more and more 
business solutions. If we offer these kinds of solutions, 
we need to know our customers' business processes. 
Today, Sun has no clue about our customers 
businesses ... ' (Senior Engagement & Project Manager, 
2005, [18]) 
The above statement reflects the importance of the CRM Convergence initiative for 
the entire company's operation in future markets. Nevertheless, the company, and 
especially the executives and programme team members involved, were enthusiastic 
and started to implement the CRM Convergence initiative objectives in 2001, as 
summarised in Table 22. 
Table 22: Overview of the key objectives of the CRM Convergence initiative 
Key Objective Description 
• Increase the effectiveness • Establish new CRM tools to enhance support for sales teams 
of the current sales forces • Conceptualise and integrate new sales-oriented business 
and customer-facing teams processes and the necessary roles and responsibilities 
• Increase knowledge on 
Sun's existing and future 
customers 
• Align existing 
organisations to support 
new sales approaches 
• Organize training and coaching sessions to enhance existing 
sales capabilities 
• Implement the new CRM platform (Siebel) 
• Migrate existing customer applications and existing 
databases to the new CRM platform 
• Establish one central customer database and implement the 
central customer database within the new CRM platform 
• Align and transform current Sun organisations (PS, SSO, 
and GSO) to become more customer oriented 
• Reduce complexities in existing organisational structures so 
as to increase the efficiency of sales support 
6.3 Implementation of the CRM Convergence Initiative 
The CRM Convergence initiative was launched by Sun's global executive board to 
prepare and transform Sun's global sales force and customer-facing teams to suit the 
future customer and market needs. At that time, Sun was (and remains) a company 
with a strong "engineering mind-set", so that the roll-out plans for the strategic CRM 
Convergence initiative resembled a new product or software system roll-out. At the 
beginning, the management teams somewhat underestimated the fundamental changes 
that were occurring as a result of changing the company's current sales capabilities 
and market offerings. Some criticisms were voiced by initiative team members, who 
pointed out that the initiative did not include sufficient change activities and 
transformation time. The CRM Convergence initiative included only one of Sun's 
change acceptance processes, that focused on the assessment of the business process 
re-design and organisational re-design work. The team members commented that 
those efforts might prove insufficient to initiate fundamental changes. 
'I guess Sun underestimated the challenges to 
transform the product sales people into solution sellers. 
CRM is more than a system or concept; it is a new 
customer strategy which requires new skills and 
competencies. '(CFO CNE Region, 2006, [41]) 
Moreover, the change acceptance process was mainly focused on Iberia (a 
geographical region for Sun which includes Spain and Portugal), as the management 
sponsor was located in Madrid and primarily focused on his "home region". It would 
be insufficient to generalise from Iberian activities to the following roll-out waves. 
However, the executives and teams were motivated, and they communicated their 
confidence in the CRM Convergence plan (see Appendix 11). In this context, the 
CRM Convergence initiative was structured as a global programme based on Sun's 
Prince 2 and Sun Sigma methodologies and guidelines. The uppermost decision and 
steering leyel consisted of an executive steering committee comprising members of 
the global executi\'e management board and various EMEA executives. The 
IR5 
committee had wide-ranging decI·sI·on and powers, management competencies, 
budgetary responsibilities. The SBAP (Strategic Business Architecture Team) 
programme manager regularly reported on the initiative's progress to the executive 
steering committee. The SBAP programme manager's role was supported by the 
coordination and administration office (project office) and communication team. 
The initiative implemented the strategic objectives in two steps (like many other 
initiatives), firstly within the EMEA time zone and then worldwide, drawing on the 
experience and lessons learnt during step one. In detail, step 1 (EMEA time zone) was 
organised in three phases. 
Phase 1 - piloting included a change acceptance process which was to be the starting 
point for mobilising the parties involved and increasing the awareness of the 
initiative. In parallel, a data clean-up procedure was launched to prepare for the 
migration of the current tools and application infrastructures. In addition, phase 1 
included a scoping and review activity related to the current organisations and 
business processes, which was undertaken in order to increase the understanding of 
potential areas for improvement. Furthermore, the programme team selected Iberia as 
the pilot region for phase 1. Iberia (the pilot region) was chosen because the EMEA 
sales operations executive responsible for the initiative was from Spain and had 
previously been the managing director for Iberia. His ambition was to achieve the 
company's first success story with the CRM Convergence initiative in Iberia. The 
Iberia pilot was used to find the best deployment mode of the CRM Siebel system 
through a proof of concept approach for the next phases. 
Thc second phase sought to utilize the lessons learnt from the Iberia pilot and to roll 
out the CRM Convergence through three sequential single-country waves, starting 
with Germany, followed by France and then the United Kingdom. 
For the third phase, the SBAP team decided to define the last two wavcs (-+ & 5) as 
multi-country waves covering more than one country per wave. The programme 
management team was convinced that it could accumulate sufficient expcrience and 
IR6 
knowledge to increase the complexities step by step from a pilot region (Phase I to a 
single country region (Phase 2) to a multi country region (phase 3). The third phase of 
multi-country region waves should also be used to acquire experience of roll-outs in 
more than one country simultaneously and to prepare for step 2, which included two 
additional and larger regions; North America/Canada/Latin America and Asia Pacific. 
For both of these regions, the CRM convergence team had to be ready to roll out the 
initiative in different countries simultaneously, on the basis of the experience curve 
from previous waves. Figure 15 illustrates the overall CRM Convergence programme 
structure. 
Figure 15: CRM Convergence Initiative Implementation Structure (Step 1; EMEA time zone) 
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Apart from the different waves, the CRM Convergence initiative supported the three 
implementation phases with a Siebel CRM Integration and Training team. This team 
provided integration and support workforces for all regional waves, including th 
piloting. The team was staffed by external Siebel consultants, Accenture con ultant , 
Sun employees, and trainers . All of these various teams supported the different ub-
projects within the three phase in order to ensure the deli ery of the trategic 
clement of the initiative. In thi context, during the CRM Convergence initiative' 
tran formation a ti itie , two type of interaction aro e, that gave ri e to different 
outcomes; firstly, the interactions between the organisation and the initiative, and, 
secondly, the interactions between the CRM Convergence programme and other 
strategic initiatives. These interactions produced various effects with different 
characteristics and outcomes. 
6.3.1 Interactions between the CRM Convergence Initiative and the Firm's 
Organisational Context 
The CRM Convergence initiative interacted with Sun's organisational context. These 
interactions gave rise to different challenges from which different effects emerged. In 
the context of the Sun Sigma initiative, three different challenges produced different 
effects: organisational silos and misaligned business operations, barriers from 
existing sales capabilities, and retroactions from organisational transformations. In 
detail, those challenges evolved from three different key drivers. Firstly, the 
individual business unit agendas and priorities stimulated CRM Convergence-related 
challenges from which various challenging effects arose. Different business units 
sought to align the CRM Convergence objectives and goals with their priorities based 
on individual agendas. Secondly, conflicts with the existing organisational structure 
and routines with differing management support created an imbalanced decision 
power among the individual business units. In this regard, the driver was related to the 
increasing attention of the GSO to the emerging CRM topics. In comparison to the PS 
and SSO business units, the GSO represented a strong stakeholder of the CRM 
Convergence initiative from the very beginning. 
'To establish CRM in Sun, we need to involve and get 
buy-in from all three business units (GSa, PS, SSO) '" 
GSa was the strongest business unit in terms of 
decision power and influence to decide and steer the 
CRM initiatil'e: it was difficult for the other business 
units to get realZv involved .. , We know that Scott 
A kNeal(l , (Former CEO and Co-Founder) and the rest 
olthe Executil'e ;\fanagement Team hm'(! a strong GSa 
orientation and mindsct and a!lt'ars support GSa 
interests. ' (Senior Executive & CRM Team 
Switzerland, 2004, [5]) 
In the context of the CRM initiative, business units like PS and SSO felt penalised and 
limited in their ability to gain advantage from the CRM Convergence initiative, which 
increased the risks of the emerging organisational resistance. The CEO and his 
executive board always gave the GSO organisation higher priority, more resources 
attention and trust to drive the business in comparison to PS and SSO. Thirdly, the 
product-oriented sales capabilities challenged the transformation of CRM 
Convergence-related activities as the means for the company to become more 
customer and solution-oriented. Furthermore, the existing sales capabilities created 
barriers and stimulated the creation of challenges, generating various effects. 
Figure 16: The context of the interaction between the organisation and the Initiative. 
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Figure 16 illustrates the context of the CRM Convergence initiative related key 
drivers from which different challenges arose from Sun's existing organi ational 
tructure. From these situations, different (dysfunctional) effect evol ed within the 
organisation and within the CRM Converg nee initiati e to create different hall ng 
for Sun which arc de crib d in detail in thc following ub- cction . 
6.3.1.1 Challenges from the Organisational Silos and Misaligned Business 
Operations 
Different challenging effects arose from the existing organisational silos (GSO, PS, 
and SSO) and their misaligned business operations, as the CRM Convergence 
initiative was implemented. These effects can be classified into two different groups 
of effects. 
The first group of effects emerged from the asymmetries between the decision power 
and solution sales capabilities in the context of the three main business units (GSO, 
PS, and SSO). GSO was the organisational unit with the greatest decision power and 
influence, followed by the decision power of SSO and PS. PS had the weakest 
decision power of the three main business units and the most advanced solution sales 
capabilities of the three. Each single organisation (silos) differed in terms of its 
collaborative engagement skills and solution-oriented sales capabilities. PS was 
organised as a project organisation and it was already working closely with its 
customers. Therefore, at a very early stage, PS developed collaborative skills, 
solution-oriented capabilities, and mind-sets. Selling solutions as add-ons to various 
customer projects was not a particularly new undertaking for PS. In addition, GSO 
and SSO were highly product-oriented, and solution selling was new for the GSO 
customer and sales teams. These teams had concentrated mainly on product sales in 
the past, while solution selling and business integration work were transferred to 
various partners (Bearing Point, Accenture etc.). The consequence was that GSO had 
the strongest influence on the CRM initiative, and, in comparison to PS, less solution-
oriented business understanding, business experience and developed solution-selling 
capabilities. These asymmetries generated different challenges, which are now 
described by means of the following two examples. 
Firstly, GSO's power to influence the CRM Convergence initiative was used by 
various GSO executives and decision-makers to support the activities and goals which 
matched their interests and expectations. 
190 
, '" We had always, in general, three management 
positions. Three managing directors: one for 
professional services, one for support services and one 
for the global sales organisation. All of them need to 
speak the same language otherwise the company loses 
money ... ' (Former Sun Executive & CRM Team 
Switzerland, 2004, [5]) 
' ... every business unit had its own and controversial 
ideas on how to improve our customer relationship 
management (CRM) , (CRM Key Accounts, 2006, [50]) 
The illustrated citations outline how the three mam business units stimulated the 
challenge of the controversial management expectations, agendas, and business 
issues. Each organisation pushed its own ideas, requirements and priorities with 
regard to the CRM Convergence initiative, with the consequence that the necessary 
decisions were controversial, without consensus and delayed. These delays slowed 
down the initiative's overall progress, and the overall CRM Convergence initiative 
objectives and goals started to drift according to the different business unit agendas 
and priorities. 
Secondly, the CRM Convergence initiative developed initiative-specific overheads. In 
order to manage, address, and integrate the expectations of different organisational 
"silos", the initiative generated an increasing amount of administration, formal 
communication and information exchange processes. Initiative team members were 
constantly communicating with various controversial stakeholders from the PS, GSO, 
and SSG, and increasingly became the "diplomats" of the initiative. 
it was "CIT difficult to manage our d[fferent 
- .. 
busincss unit stakeholders. E,'elY business unit had its 
011'11 agenda and priorities: fftheyfound some time they 
supported our CR;\! initiath'e. Sometimes. individual 
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business units tried to stop our activities if we were not 
in-line with their expectations ... I felt, sometimes it was 
very hard to move forward, every single activity 
required negotiations between the three business units. ' 
(EMEA SBAP Project Manager CRM, 2005, [35]) 
'Every business unit and region established their own 
ways of managing Sun's customer relations. It was 
difficult to implement our CRM project across these 
heterogeneous environments.' (EMEA SBAP Project 
Manager CRM, 2006, [32]) 
Therefore, these complexities raised initiative specific issues, such as growmg 
resource demands, additional project administration, drifting initiative goals and 
objectives, and formal adjustments of the next steps among the different business unit 
silos and misaligned regions. 
The second group of effects emerged from misaligned business operations. In 
particular, the de-fragmented methodologies, approaches and routines, based on 
different operating models, concepts and processes deriving from the organisational 
"silos", increased the complexities of the initiative. For example, PS was organised to 
engage with their customers on the basis of the AIM concept (Architect, Implement, 
and Manage). The AIM model was very much a collaborative engagement approach 
developed by PS to engage early with potential customers, while "Architect" was the 
solution for their customers' business problems. The next step for Sun would be to 
sell the solution and implement it for their customers, and in the last stage to 
"Manage" the solution for their customers. In comparison, SSO managed their 
customer relations mainly on the basis of an indirect and nationally localised partner 
network model. The SSO did not work particularly closely with their customers, nor 
did it deal with their business issues. MoreoYer, SSO mainly operated a local partner-
network which allocated partner sefyice companies to their customer's business 
issues. Instead, GSO operated through three different organisational models. Firstly, 
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Tier I customers, which make up less than 10% of the company's customer base and 
are responsible for more than 80% of the global revenues, received special attention 
through the global SEM organisation (Strategic Engagement Model). SEM was 
developed to manage the company's most important Key-Accounts through one SEM 
team for each individual Key-Account (e.g. UBS). Secondly, Tier 2 included local 
(county level) customers, which were responsible for over 60% of the revenue for a 
specific selling unit region or country. For those customers, the company nominated a 
local Key-Account Manager, following a standardised key account process. The rest 
of the local client potentials were called White Space Accounts (Tier 3): White Space 
Accounts included all customers from different industries with little or no revenues. 
These customers were managed indirectly by Sun's local partner networks. 
Nevertheless, the GSO account performance was measured by means of the GSO 
account scorecard. These various concepts were not aligned, and the individual 
executives and groups pushed for their integration into the strategic goals of the CRM 
Convergence initiative. 
'We have too many concepts and structures. Our SEM 
model was not aligned with the CRM initiative. Our 
KAM organisation tried to integrate the SEM concept 
into the CRM scope. For example, PS implemented and 
follows the AIMframework. AIM and SEM are still not 
integrated. Our people work in different departments 
with different, structures, concepts and methodologies. 
Each department and business unit protect their 
structures and concepts' (Global Key Account Manager 
& Solution Architect, 2005, [24]) 
These misaligned business operations affected the initiative's current resources and 
facilitated deviations in reaching the initiative's strategic goals (strategic goal 
deflections). Moreover, the different forces engendered transformations in the 
following initiative resource areas: form and administration, processes and routines, 
and roles and responsibilities ( skills). 
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Table 23: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities 
(16) 
• Integrate and 
align different 
organisations 
(business units) 
with CRM goals 
and objectives 
(17) 
• Enhance existing 
business 
operations with 
CRM capabilities 
to become more 
customer oriented 
Effects 
• Business unit 
integration 
(organisations) 
reduced initiative 
progress and 
efficiencies 
• Consolidation of 
misaligned 
business 
operations created 
resistance against 
CRM and 
weakened existing 
operations 
Implications 
• Different levels of knowledge and capabilities created different 
organisational perspectives on future CRM expectations 
• Different levels of decision power were used to push 
organisational interests before CRM goals and objectives 
• Initiative team member roles changed 
• Initiative specific management processes changed 
=> Organisational alignments through the initiative created 
complexities within the different business units and created 
additional demand for resources and reduced initiative progress 
• Established approaches and routines were protected by various 
business units 
• Detached approaches, methodologies, and processes were 
incompatible between each other 
• Existing business operations and skills related to individual 
organisational procedures, processes and definitions 
=> Misaligned business operations reduced their overall 
efficiencies during the transformation and consolidation period, 
triggered by the CRM Convergence initiative activities. 
6.3.1.2 Barriers arising from the existing Sales Capabilities 
Sun's existing product-driven sales capabilities were protected by a large community 
within the firm, which increased the resistance against the transformation into a 
customer- and solution-oriented company. These groups had developed the 
company's past success through transaction-oriented sales capabilities, and found it 
difficult to accept and trust the changes and the intention to adopt a more solution-
oriented sales approach. 
' ... our sales and account managers ·were really 
transaction orientated. They had a strong product and 
"box moving" mentality ... our sales did not recognize 
what wc tried to achiel'e with the CRM Convergence 
initiative (Strategic Key-Account Engagement 
Manager & CRM Representative, 2004, [6]) 
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The shift from a product-oriented sales approach to a collaborative and more solution-
oriented one created various barriers for the CRM Convergence initiative. 
Firstly, besides the close relationship of the SBAP team with GSO, all of the CRM 
Convergence initiative team members had a strong GSO background. All of the team 
members, except for one person, had been recruited from the GSO organisation, and 
they had a strong GSO mindset and a great deal of knowledge about GSO processes, 
procedures, and concepts, such as the customer engagement processes or account 
management concepts. Hence, if the CRM Convergence team required support, or if 
staffing questions needed to be solved, the CRM Convergence team first recruited 
from GSO. Those teams were not open-minded nor prepared to initiate radical 
changes to build a customer-oriented company. 
Secondly, the executive steering committee for the CRM Convergence initiative 
consisted mainly of GSO executives. Consequently, the SBAP office was highly 
GSO-oriented and managed in its form, structure, routines, and physical location. This 
GSO-oriented set-up created mistrust within the other business units and strengthened 
the GSO mindset within the different project teams. Hence, because of the dominance 
of the GSO, the CRM Convergence initiative's goals and objectives constantly 
changed and became increasingly GSO-oriented. 
'In the beginning, CRM Convergence focused on SMI. 
aver time we reduced the scope and focused primarily 
on GSa. Gsa financed the CRM initiative and various 
GSa managers expected that their interests would be 
addressed first. ff we had some budget problems and we 
H'crc forced to reduce the scope - we increased the GSa 
focus. '(Program Manager CRM Convergence, 2006, 
[28]) 
However, as mentioned in previous sections, in comparison with the PS organisation, 
GSO lagged far behind in terms of customer orientation, solution selling, and 
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collaborative customer engagement capabilities. Therefore, vanous new concepts 
created complexities for the initiative, because the organisations supported the new 
CRM directions in different ways and to various extents within their individual 
commitments (GSO; SSO, and PS) to change. For example. GSO and SSO failed to 
act truly as a trusted business advisor for their customers. The wide range of sales 
people were engaged only in product sales and had a limited knowledge of their 
customers' business problems. Those people had experienced the company's past 
success in the e-business bubble by successfully selling computing equipment 
(products) in a fast growing market. Insecure and afraid of losing their decision 
making power and control, the sales people did not readily accept the CRM 
Convergence goals, but attempted to influence and change the initiative's new 
directions. 
'Everything that our sales people want was to continue 
selling and selling products ... It was difficult to get 
their attention and support for our CRM initiative goals 
and plans '(CRM Project Manager Switzerland, 2006, 
[49]) 
'Only two sales people of 65 invitations registered for 
our CRM trainings in Switzerland. The rest had some 
excuses or still didn't came to the sessions H'ithout any 
feedback to us .,. in other regions we had the same 
reserved "euphoria'" (CRM Project Manager 
Switzerland, 2006, [49]) 
In comparison, PS was already customer- and solution-oriented. The PS organisation 
strongly supported the shift in the expectation of increasing its influence and position 
within the global company. Nevertheless, GSO continuously controlled the progress 
and direction of the CRM Convergence initiative. The overall consequence was that 
the results becamc aligned with the GSO interests, and the initiatiyc cncountercd 
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difficulties within the areas in which the project teams sought to initiate more radical 
changes that were in conflict with the GSO mindset and product orientation. 
Table 24: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities 
(18) 
• Change product 
oriented sales 
capabilities into 
solution oriented 
sales capabilities 
(19) 
• Involve Sun 
executives and 
establish 
commitments for 
new CRM 
directions 
(20) 
• Strengthen new 
customer- and 
solution-oriented 
sales directions 
Effects 
• Solution oriented 
sales concepts and 
project ideas were 
dominated from 
existing product 
oriented sales 
capabilities and 
slowed down the 
transformation 
process 
• I nvolvement of 
various sales 
executives within 
the CRM 
Convergence 
initiative created 
barriers against 
new directions 
Implications 
• CRM Convergence project teams had GSa mindsets and 
backgrounds 
• Existing sales and customer-facing teams had strong experience 
in product sales 
• Existing routines, concepts and processes were build on product 
sales oriented capabilities 
=> Pre-selection and configuration of product-sales-minded project 
teams reduced the power to push radical change 
enhancements through the initiative 
• GSa executives controlled the CRM Convergence progress by 
participating in the CRM Convergence initiative steering boards 
(decision influence) 
• Various product-oriented sales executives and managers 
constantly undermined the initiative's activities and aims 
• Various executives created difficulties for the initiative by 
distrusting and ignoring new concepts and approaches 
=> The involvement of product-oriented managers and executives 
reduced the options for the CRM Convergence initiative to 
establish new concepts and approaches 
• CRM Convergence • Involvement of de-fragmented business units impacted on the 
initiative objectives 
and goals 
initiative's progress and created barriers for defined goals and 
objectives 
continuously drifted • Mistrust of and resistance against defined goals and objectives 
stimulated the definition of new goals and objectives 
=> Initiative goals and objectives were impossible to maintain and 
follow within upcoming barriers and resistances 
6.3.1.3 Retroactions from Organisational Transformations 
Sun's organisation (SBAP department) of the strategic initiatives was not independent 
and isolated from organisational transformations within Sun. Instead, the changes 
brought about by the SBAP managed initiatives, like CRM Convergence, started to 
create retroactions in the SBAP group, and in the managed initiatives as well. These 
retroactions arose from the observed foregone organisational transformations of the 
eRrv1 Convergencc initiativc. 
In 2004, Sun started to implement its project for an integrated Sun Microsystems Inc. 
(SMI) by merging and consolidating the various organisations (PS, GSO, and SSO) 
together, mainly driven by the CRM Convergence initiative. These activities initiated 
changes within several areas of the organisation. Firstly, the initiative affected various 
business processes by establishing a consolidated customer view which integrated the 
various organisational planning processes into one business planning and account 
management process. Secondly, the initiative defined new roles and responsibilities 
within the new and re-engineered business operations by creating, for instance, the 
role of the new 'relationship manager'. 
' ... Today, our sales people have three main 
responsibilities; to generate leads, manage client 
troubleshooting and maintain our client relations. 
Today we have the RMO - Relationship Management 
Organisation, the former GSO.' (Strategic Key-
Account Engagement Manager & CRM Representative, 
2005, [6]) 
Thirdly, a new and unified technology changed the firm's technology set-up. The 
Siebel CRM system was integrated across the organisations and positioned as the new 
customer business platform. Fourthly, the CRM Convergence initiative launched a 
series of training and coaching sessions intended to mobilise the customer teams and 
support teams in developing new skill sets and business competencies. Fifthly, as 
already mentioned, the initiative stimulated and supported the organisation's 
transformation into a single Sun organisation (SMI). 
' ... the Convergence program was one of the key drivers 
to initiate the consolidation of PS, SSO, and GSO. 
During the dmvnturn, people realised that the}' should 
put the customer at the centre of all necessmy 
operations, supported bl' on(' organisation (5,\/1).' 
19R 
(Global Key Account Manager & Solution Architect, 
2005, [24]) 
In 2005, the new Sun SMI organisation was completed and put in place, as illustrated 
in Figure 17. The organisation consisted only of two main business units ; the 
Relationship Management Organisation (Former GSO) and the Delivery Organisation 
(Former PS and SSO). Furthermore, Figure 17 illustrates how the launched CRM 
Convergence initiative transformed different organisational resources with the aim of 
making Sun more customer oriented. During this process, new effects emerged, 
defined as retroactions, which ex post impacted the organisation and management 
(SBAP department) of the strategic initiatives as well. 
Figure 17: In itiative related transformations and emerged retroactions . 
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Retroaction arose from the consolidation of Sun 's de-fragmented and complex 
company tructures through the CRM Convergence initiative. Tho e retroaction can 
be t be e plained through the tran fonnation of th SBAP department to the new and 
more customer oriented GDA (Global Deployment and Adoption) team. A de cribcd 
in the pre iou chapter the SBAP group a re pon ibl for managing un 
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strategic initiatives. Nevertheless, especially in the context of the CRM Convergence 
initiative, the SBAP group pushed transformations within Sun's organisation. Those 
transformational activities and dynamics created new actions (retroactions) which 
affected the SBAP organisation ex post, illustrated through the following three steps. 
Firstly, the SBAP department learned to become more customer oriented and the team 
was forced to reduce complexities within their own mission. The SBAP department 
expected that reducing the complexities would help sharpen their focus on their actual 
programme portfolio and heighten the effectiveness of their ongoing programme 
activities to increase the value for their "customers". In this relation, SBAP activities 
and business operations were not isolated from the organisational transformation 
dynamics of the CRM Convergence initiative. 
'Our SBAP group was as well impacted by our 
initiatives. One consequence was that we were forced to 
reduce the complexities, align with our changing 
organisational environment and transform into a new 
group, which we called Global Deployment & Adoption 
group. The GDA aim was to increase the effectiveness 
of our key program execution.' (Head of Global 
Strategic Change ProgramslHead SBAP/GDA, 2005, 
[ 15]) 
The transformation of the SBAP department was one of the outcomes from the 
learning the department was experiencing during the CRM Convergence initiative 
transformation of Sun's organisational structures and business operations into the new 
and customer oriented Sun organisation. Secondly, the changes within the SBAP 
direction stimulated the endeavour to start simplifying SBAP-related processes and 
methodologies. Those changes transformed the SBAP department into a single 
organisational unit - the GDA Team - with the main focus on increasing the 
acceptance of their customers in the context of the ongoing strategic initiatives and 
planned programmes. 
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'Our group [SBAP] was affected by our own programs 
[CRM Convergence initiative] to make the organisation 
more customer oriented. The CRM programme 
increased Sun's customer focus and challenged our 
group in the same time to be more customer oriented 
for our internal customers' (Program Manager CRM 
Convergence, 2006, [28]) 
Thirdly, the new GDA Team centralised the management of strategic initiative 
operations and initiative resource allocation. The aim was to increase the effectiveness 
with which the firm's strategic needs were addressed by improving the environment 
of the strategic initiative operations. Those centralisations changed how initiatives 
were rolled out and allocated and re-allocated the requisite resources. As in the past, 
initiatives were rolled out in two steps. Firstly, the roll-out was conducted within a 
selected time zone (mostly EMEA); it was then extended globally, after successful 
completion of the first step. This approach changed as the GDA team acted globally 
and started to centralise the structure and approaches of various ongoing initiatives. 
Table 25: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities Effects Implications 
(21 ) • Org. transformation • SBAP group was impacted by org. transformations and changed 
• Improve created additional into GDA team 
structures through changes within the • The new GDA team changed how they managed their initiatives 
org. CRM Convergence as the CRM Convergence initiative 
transformation initiative through • The CRM Convergence geographical scope changed into a more 
according to the retroactions global one 
CRM 
Convergence 
objectives and 
goals 
• Changes in the geographical scope created CRM Convergence-
related re-planning activities impacted on resource demand, 
timelines and results 
=> The CRM Convergence-related foregone organisational 
transformations created retroactions on the initiative which 
created additional complexities 
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6.3.2 Interactions between Strategic Initiatives 
Interactions between the CRM Convergence initiative and other ongoing strategic 
initiatives produced challenging situations for Sun during different initiative related 
transformation activities. These challenging situations can be summarised as 
conflicting perspectives and focuses between initiatives, challenging dependencies 
between initiative goals and objectives, and challenging boundaries and barriers from 
ongoing initiatives. They gave rise to complex effects for Sun. Furthermore; three 
different drivers (similar to the drivers in relation to Sun' s organisational context) 
were identified as key means to facilitate the three different challenges in the context 
of the CRM Convergence initiative. Firstly, initiative-individual priorities and 
agendas led to specific activities, with the outcome of challenges for other ongoing 
strategic initiatives. Secondly, decision structures and priorities on initiative related 
resource allocations sometimes produced unexpected outcomes and effects within 
other ongoing initiatives. Thirdly, the existing sales capabilities (product orientation) 
created challenges from which various effects within the CRM Convergence initiative 
and other ongoing initiative arose. 
Figure 18: Context of interactions of the CRM Convergence initiative. 
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Figure 18 illustrates the effects observed based on the interactions among different 
strategic initiatives. These examples are related to the CRM Convergence initiative 
and classified alongside the various challenges described in detail in the following 
sections. 
6.3.2.1 Conflicting Perspectives and Focuses between Initiatives 
The CRM Convergence initiative team produced certain results which conflicted with 
other initiative objectives and business perspectives and the stakeholders expectations 
involved in those initiatives. These conflicting perspectives and controversial focuses 
created the challenging outcomes (effects) described through the following two 
examples. 
The first example illustrates conflicting perspectives between the CRM Convergence 
initiative and the Deal Management Process initiative. Both initiatives developed new 
lead management processes (inefficient overlapping and resource spending), with the 
consequence that the CRM Convergence initiative was forced in the end to adopt new 
processes and the relative new roles from the Deal Management Process initiative. 
The global Deal Management Process initiative (1) tried to establish a unified 
customer process with which to engage and sell complex, risky, and multi-country 
customer projects. In this context, the new lead management process design activities 
became disharmonised between the Deal Management initiative (1) and the CRM 
Convergence initiative (a), both of which developed their own lead management 
process perspectives. From a deal management perspective, new customer 
engagements were classified according to their complexity risks. Instead, the CRM 
lead management processes were targeted on identifying the potential business 
volume and sales-lead time. Both perspectives used different qualification criteria and 
produced differently weighted forecasts and necessary actions to be taken. 
'We were forced to change our process design several 
times. The Deal Management program 'H'as closer to 
our finance exec II til'(Js. We get the order to include the 
deal manager role into our clistomer processes and 
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their risk measures to qualify the lead pipeline.' 
(Program Manager CRM Convergence, 2006, [28]) 
This example illustrates how the Deal Management programme interacted with the 
CRM Convergence initiative through its higher-valued authority to achieve the 
strategic goal of establishing one unified and integrated deal management process. 
The authority to change the CRM Convergence process design focus was supported 
by the company's financial executives, who had strong decision power and influence, 
especially in those challenging company times. The outcome was that the CRM 
initiative-oriented lead management process changed, and new roles and 
responsibilities were added to the already designed process, with additional risk 
measures to qualify customer potentials. The example illustrates how an initiative 
interacted with another initiative of Sun, with the consequence of creating additional 
complexities and inefficiencies overlapping in project tasks and resource allocations. 
The second example illustrates how different perspectives on strategic improvement 
areas between the Sun Sigma initiative and the CRM Convergence initiative created 
inefficient overlaps between the initiatives and created an inefficient convergence of 
both initiatives. Through the CRM Convergence initiative, various selling units, 
including several regional executives and managing directors, increased their attention 
to customer satisfaction and started to re-schedule their priorities and current business 
Issues. 
'Through the CRM Convergence initiative, several 
selling units [subsidiaries] increased their attention on 
customer satisfaction and customer orientation. They 
used Sun Sigma to start new projects to improve the 
utili::alion of their customer assets. ' (Program Manager 
CRM Convergence, 2006, [28]) 
The Sun Sigma initiatiYc originally planned to roll out a set of process improvemcnt 
methodologies and guidclines. In this context, the Sun Sigma-oricnted perspectivc 
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aimed to improve Sun's back-office operations which were somehow in conflict with 
the CRM Convergence perspective of putting the customer at the centre of all 
business operations. The consequence was a convergence between the Sun Sigma 
initiative perspectives and focus and those of the CRM Convergence initiative. The 
CRM Convergence perspective induced Sun Sigma to become increasingly 
"customer-oriented". Therefore more and more Sun Sigma-oriented customer 
improvement projects were launched, in addition to the ongoing CRM Convergence 
initiatives. Furthermore, management teams started increasingly to invest their 
attention and scarce resources to support both initiatives; the CRM Convergence 
initiative and the Sun Sigma initiative with somehow strange and unproductive 
outcomes, as outlined in the following example. 
'1 was leading the intention to merge our new CRM 
methodology with the Sun Sigma methodology. We had 
a lot of workshops and sessions to get one CRMlSun 
Sigma methodology - 1 don't know for what we did 
this. ' (Senior Program Manager CRM Projects, 2006, 
[20]) 
The result of the harmonisation dynamics between the CRM Convergence initiative 
and Sun Sigma perspective was that the CRM Convergence programme interacted 
with the Sun Sigma initiative in regard to its scope (sales and engagement processes), 
plans (business priorities and justifications) and content (methodologies and tools). 
Furthermore, at the same time the CRM Convergence initiative adopted some of the 
Sun Sigma specific concepts and approaches and got closer to Sun Sigma within three 
areas. Firstly, the Sigma initiative rolled out a wide range of new methodologies and 
tools, and the CRM Convergence programme was forced to use these new 
methodologies and tools to "improve" existing approaches and project activities. On 
the other hand. various Sun Sigma executives and management sponsors thought that 
use of these new methodologies and tools in other initiatives would help establish Sun 
Sigma across the organisation. Secondly, CRM Convergence team members were 
invited to undertake mandatory Sun Sigma training and certification. Every project 
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around the globe was urged to send candidates for the Sun Sigma training sessions, 
with the consequence that the focus was more on Sun Sigma training than on solving 
actual CRM Convergence problems. Thirdly, the new CRM Convergence customer 
tools and processes became increasingly Sun Sigma oriented, with additional routines, 
administrational and communicational processes. The CRM Convergence programme 
started to change its templates and documentations in order to be Sun Sigma 
compliant. Moreover, additional organisational customer advocacy units and roles 
emerged across the organisation and created administrative overheads. 
The outcome of this harmonisation of initiative perspectives was that inefficient 
overlaps arose between the CRM Convergence and Sun Sigma initiatives within the 
areas of resource allocations, business priorities, and results. Furthermore, those 
complexities hampered progress towards the original goals of the Sun Sigma initiative 
and created misunderstandings (e.g. additional stimulations on misinterpretations on 
ROSS). Both examples illustrate how different perspectives on two strategic 
initiatives created inefficiencies and additional complexities. The consequence of 
these inefficiencies and complexities was that some of the initiative's original plans 
and aims slowed down because of the convergences between the two initiatives. 
Table 26: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities Effects 
(22) • Collisions and 
• Establish new conflicts emerged 
organisational from new and 
procedures, overlapping 
processes and processes and 
roles roles 
(23) 
• Follow and 
establish the 
defined business 
perspective and 
vision per initiative 
(customer 
orientation. 
• Different business 
perspectives of 
individual initiatives 
facilitated 
conflicting results 
and created 
inefficient 
convergences of 
Implications 
• New processes, procedures and new/necessary roles were 
designed by different strategic initiatives 
• Some of the processes designed per initiative included some 
overlapping with different business configurations 
~ ~ The CRM Convergence initiative created complexities as 
overlaps with other initiatives within the area of similar 
processes and roles, with the result of inefficient resource 
allocations/growing resource needs per initiative 
• The Sun Sigma initiative aimed to improve the company's back 
office operations and establish process excellence standards 
across the company 
• The CRM Convergence initiative aimed to transform Sun's 
business operations into a customer oriented company 
• The Sun Sigma initiative get closer to some of the CRM 
Convergence initiative aims and hampered progress towards the 
original goals 
process 
excellence etc.) 
(24) 
different initiatives => The CRM Convergence forced the convergence between the 
CRM Convergence initiative and the Sun Sigma initiative with 
the result of additional complexities and inefficiencies within the 
Sun Sigma initiative 
• Following and 
executing initiative 
related project 
tasks and 
methodologies 
• The convergence 
of the Sun Sigma 
initiative with the 
CRM Convergence 
initiative created 
confusions and 
increased 
unproductive 
outcomes 
• The Sun Sigma initiative pushed and merged established Sun 
Sigma methodologies (like ROSS) with the CRM methodologies. 
Those activities absorbed scare company resources with no clear 
/ valuable results 
• The CRM Convergence initiative induced the Sun Sigma initiative 
to become more customer-oriented, with the consequence of 
changes within existing Sun Sigma initiative related activities and 
methodologies 
=> The convergence of the Sun Sigma and CRM Convergence 
initiatives changed some of the applications of the Sun Sigma-
and CRM related methodologies and reduced their specific 
effectiveness and increased misunderstandings and 
unproductive outcomes 
6.3.2.2 Challenging Dependencies between Initiative Goals and Objectives 
Different dependencies between the CRM Convergence initiative and other strategic 
initiative goals and objectives emerged, and they had challenging effects with various 
outcomes. In the context of the CRM Convergence initiative, those challenges can be 
illustrated by the following two examples. 
The first example describes the dependencies between the CRM Convergence and 
BSC initiatives. The CRM Convergence programme grew in size and investments, so 
that it increased in authority and legitimacy and "received" higher priority to 
implement the CRM Convergence initiative's goals and objectives from Sun's 
management teams. 
'CRM Convergence required a lot of resources; it was 
one of the larger-scaled programmes. They always had 
a higher priority to get additional resources and 
support. Because our 
challenged to roll-out 
EMEA executives were 
the CRM Convergence 
programme in the same year 11'hen we started the BSC 
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initiative.' (EMEA Operations Manager & BSC 
Initiative Core Team Member, 2005, [29]) 
This evolution created dependencies with the BSC initiative goals and objectives. The 
CRM Convergence programme absorbed management attention and "slowed down" 
other activities like those of the BSC initiative, which was hampered in fulfilling its 
goals and objectives because the BSC initiative did not receive all the necessary 
programme resources (involved in the CRM activities). 
indeed, our CRM activities and project efforts 
required more and more resources... '(Program 
Manager - CRM Convergence Program, 2006, [28]) 
This example illustrates how the progress of CRM Convergence initiative goals and 
objectives hampered the progress of the BSC initiative by absorbing relevant 
resources and management attention. 
The second example illustrates the evolving dependencies between the CRM 
Convergence and Passport initiative. In detail, Passport forced CRM Convergence to 
reprioritise some of its goals and objectives so as to fulfil some of the Passport-related 
requirements. Both initiatives followed their plans and time lines to fulfil specific 
goals and objectives. The Passport initiative started to develop and consolidate an 
international approval process and a tool-set for Sun. The aim was that the sales teams 
should be able to minimize their approvals and engage early with customers. 
Every country or selling region had its own and different processes and tools. For 
example, Germany developed a Database-oriented engagement tool, whilst Spain 
used various sheets and templates supporting only the specific process and 
blockbuster products for the region. In comparison, the CRM initiative sought to 
establish one consolidated view and offering process to their customers supported by 
one central platform - the new Sicbel platform. The Passport programme's goals and 
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objectives came into conflict with the CRM Convergence initiative with its 
proprietary tools and stored information and increased the latter's scope. 
'One of Helmut's [German Senior Executive and VPj 
goals was to successfully roll-out the global passport 
processes and tools. He already promised different 
sales teams to deliver the program benefits. We briefly 
explained to him the pros and cons and that we would 
not be able to deliver the passport process and tools 
without the CRM customer data exchange interface. He 
decided that the CRM team needed to develop the 
required customer data exchange interface. You know 
Germany and UK still deliver over 50% of the overall 
EMEA revenue goals. ' (Senior Project Manager, Global 
Programs - Passport Program, 2004, [4]) 
In this relation, the programme manager was temporarily responsible of the passport 
initiative as part of an internal task force. The task force aimed to establish the new 
passport approach in Germany and the UK as part of an internal revitalisation plan. 
The overall passport programme progress slowed down, based on higher priorities of 
larger scaled programs such as the CRM Convergence initiative and required to be 
revitalised again. Short decision paths and strong involvement of decision makers was 
one of the key characteristics of the temporarily nominated passport initiative task 
force. Later, the task force leader and temporary passport programme manager 
became strongly involved in the BSC initiative as part of the BSC core team. 
Nevertheless, the example illustrates how larger scale programs like the CRM 
Convergence initiative forced to allocate more resources, and to develop the CRM 
customer data exchange interface for the Passport system. In summary, this example 
illustrates how the Passport initiative affected the scope, timelines/plans, and 
resources of the CRM Convergence programme, which was given higher priority than 
Passport. Nevertheless, by utilising existing management objectives, the Passport 
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initiative "overruled" the higher priority goals and objectives of the CRM 
Convergence programme and engendered change in it. 
Table 27: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities 
(25) 
• The CRM 
Convergence 
initiative 
increased the roll-
out scope across 
the firm 
(26) 
• The CRM 
Convergence 
initiative 
increased the 
management's 
attention to the 
CRM topics 
(27) 
• The Passport 
initiative 
established 
consolidated 
Passport 
processes across 
all regions 
Effects 
• Additional resource 
needs for the CRM 
Convergence 
initiative created 
additional resource 
gaps within other 
initiatives 
• Increasing 
management 
attention to the 
CRM Convergence 
initiative reduced 
priorities for other 
initiatives like the 
SSC initiative 
• Additional tasks 
and work emerged 
for the CRM 
Convergence 
in iti ative to fu lfi I 
Passport initiative 
requirements 
Implications 
• CRM Convergence initiative increased their roll-out scope, with 
the consequence of growing resource needs 
• The CRM Convergence initiative increased in size and required 
more investments 
• Other initiatives like the SSC initiative slowed down as necessary 
resources were needed and absorbed within the CRM 
Convergence initiative 
=> The need for additional CRM Convergence resource needs 
hampered progress towards the goals and objectives of other 
initiatives like the BSC initiative 
• Additional CRM Convergence resource needs increased 
management attention 
• CRM Convergence initiative absorbed and reduced Sun's 
management attention to the SSC initiative and reduced the 
decision process for the SSC initiative 
=> Increasing management attention to the CRM Convergence 
initiative slowed down decision processes and priorities for other 
initiatives like the BSC initiative 
• The Passport initiative forced the decision to overrule the CRM 
Convergence initiative priorities and program priorities 
• The Passport initiative required additional support from the CRM 
Convergence initiative 
• The CRM Convergence initiative was forced to deliver additional 
results based on Passport initiative requirements 
=> Passport initiative requirements increased the CRM 
Convergence initiative objectives and challenged actual plans 
and timelines, based on the new Passport related goals 
6.3.2.3 Challenging Boundaries and Barriers between ongoing Initiatives 
The CRM Convergence initiative encountered various challenging constraints and 
barriers raised by ongoing initiatives. These barriers generated critical effects for the 
CRM Convergence initiative and other ongoing initiatives, which are described in 
detail in the following. 
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'1 think we are trying too much ... too many initiatives, 
programmes and buzzwords ... We need to increase our 
overall company focus.' (Program Manager CRM 
Convergence Program, 2006, [28]) 
, '" We need a "Chief Complexity Officer" in our 
company ... ' (Head of Global Strategic Change 
Programs/Head SBAP/GDA, 2005, [15]) 
Sun employees and stakeholders involved in various initiatives felt that they had 
become inefficient, and that it was difficult to follow all the ongoing initiatives. Each 
initiative developed its own vision and established its individual acronyms, 
expressions, concepts and approaches across the company. Those individual and 
initiative-specific activities sometimes created boundaries and barriers for other 
initiatives, as illustrated by the following two examples. 
The first example is provided by different challenges for the CRM Convergence and 
relate to three different initiatives; the Partner Relationship (PR) initiative, Solution 
Selling (SoS) initiative and the BSC initiative. All three initiatives were launched by 
Sun to address specific strategic issues. The PR initiative aimed to strengthen Sun's 
technology and product integration partners (like Accenture, BearingPoint, EDS etc.) 
to protect and utilize the companies' global customer bases. The SoS initiative started 
to develop and shape customer solutions, based on Sun's existing products and 
services, including the integration of additional products and services from third 
parties. The target was to offer competitive customer solutions such as banking 
solutions, supply chain management solutions etc and the BSC initiative aimed to 
improve and align Sun's customer oriented success metrics with overall company 
strategies. In this constellation, different challenges emerged and created barriers and 
boundaries between the ongoing initiatives. Firstly, the PR initiatiyc was focused on 
integrating the firm's business partners into Sun's engagement and customer project 
acquisition and deliyery processes. In this contcxt, Sun was more recognizcd by thcir 
integration partners as a product yendor who offered the products necessary to build 
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the solution. Hence, the PR initiative was defining and conceptualizing product 
oriented business processes around their partners which were in conflict with the 
CRM Convergence initiative to put the customer into the centre of all business 
operations. 
'We spend immense time discussing who is our 
customer and who is necessary to fulfil our customer 
wishes and orders ... we had problems to find a 
solution for both initiatives [Partner Relation initiative 
and CRM Convergence initiative] ... we faced ongoing 
difficulties and we spent too much project time to 
clarifY controversial results between our CRM and 
Partner initiatives ... ' (Program Manager CRM 
Convergence Program, 2006, [28]) 
In the perspective of the PR initiative the solutions were built by Sun's partners and 
not by Sun which was in conflict with the SoS initiative to shape customer solutions. 
Those activities created barriers and boundaries for the CRM Convergence initiative 
to manage Sun's new solution offerings through more customer oriented business 
processes and operations. Furthermore, every initiative created their own perspectives 
and sometimes controversial measures (sold products to partners vs. sold Sun 
solutions) of customer success which was furthermore challenging for the BSC 
initiative to consolidate all of them. Measuring the business strategy reflected more a 
top-down approach than the bottom-up consolidation of business performance 
measures and goals. In summary, this example illustrates how the CRM Convergence 
initiative faced and created different barriers and boundaries in the context of ongoing 
initiatives, which stretched scarce initiative resources and sometimes created delays in 
expected results. 
The second example illustrates how the CRM Convergence initiative faced emerging 
constraints and barriers raised by the Forecast Alignment initiative. The Forecast 
Alignment initiative aimed to improve and consolidate Sun's ditTerent forecasting 
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processes and concepts. In the past, every selling unit and region had had its own way 
of forecasting business and estimating the opportunities for Sun. This situation created 
challenges for the entire company as the management teams did not receivc the 
consolidated forecast figures necessary to plan accurately. Furthermore, forecast 
accuracy was nearly impossible, because unified forecast standards and methods were 
not established, which in addition increased the risk that the firm would be unable to 
scale the production plants accurately. To overcome those challenges the Forecast 
Alignment initiative was launched with a strong focus on consolidating Sun's 
different forecasting processes and concepts. At that time, Sun's product revenues 
covered over 80% of the company's revenue mix. Hence the Forecast Alignment 
project team focused its activities more and more around product-oriented forecast 
processes and estimations as the new product-life-cycle concept. The concept should 
have helped sales teams to become more proactive in the future by identifying "out-
of-day products" and offering their customers the latest product upgrades. This 
concept was announced by the Forecast Alignment initiative as a "quick win", and it 
rapidly gained recognition from the sales teams. Nevertheless, the concept supported 
Sun's product-oriented mindset and neglected the company's latest efforts to 
transform current sales capabilities into solution-oriented sales capabilities. Sales 
people started to reduce their support for the CRM Convergence initiative and 
increased their resistance against the solution-oriented process changes. 
'It was a little bit frustrating, we trained and 
evangelised our sales people to sell more solutions and 
the Forecast project team enforced their product mind 
sets.' (EMEA SBAP Project Manager CRM, 2006, 
[33]) 
Sales people received support from the Forecast Alignment initiative for their existing 
product orientation, with the consequence that the CRM Convergence initiativc 
increasingly encountered resistancc against new solution-oriented approaches. 
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'The life cycle concept from our Partner Relation 
program created additional difficulties to convince our 
Sales people to sell solutions instead of single products' 
(EMEA SBAP Project Manager CRM, 2005, [37]) 
The statement illustrates that sales people started to adopt the Forecast Alignment 
initiative processes and concepts, which created boundaries and barriers for CRM 
Convergence. Firstly, new concepts like the product life cycle strengthened the 
arguments of some of the sales people to continue focusing on product sales and 
increased their resistance towards selling solutions for their customers. Secondly, 
similar CRM-related concepts became more difficult for the sales teams to accept. 
Sales teams were only able to reserve a predefined amount of days for training and 
self studies per year. Furthermore, previously rolled-out training sessions like the new 
forecast process occupied the training days of the sales teams, which made it difficult 
to fill classes and gain the attention of the sales teams for additional training sessions, 
like the new solution-oriented ones in the context of the CRM Convergence initiative. 
Table 28: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities 
(28) 
• The CRM 
Convergence: 
initiative rolled out 
new customer 
processes, roles/ 
responsibilities 
and customer 
measures 
Effects 
• Controversial 
initiative directions 
and results created 
challenging 
barriers and 
boundaries for the 
CRM Convergence 
initiative to deliver 
the expected 
Implications 
• The CRM Convergence initiative changed/enhanced existing 
customer processes, new roles and responsibilities (e.g. 
engagement manager, solution managers etc.) 
• The Partner Relation initiative pushed product oriented 
relationship management business processes and operations 
• The Solution Selling initiative aimed to create new customer 
solutions - controversial to the Partner Relation initiative plans 
• Ongoing initiatives as the Partner Relation initiative, the Solution 
Selling initiative followed controversial directions which created 
results in time and barriers for the CRM Convergence initiative and the involved 
on budget, for the initiatives 
involved initiatives • The CRM Convergence initiative faced those controversial 
initiative directions, which absorbed scarce CRM Convergence 
initiative resources and delayed results 
~ ~ Controversial initiative results emerged from ongoing initiatives 
as the Partner Relation initiative. Solution Selling initiative and 
the BSC initiative and created barriers and boundaries for the 
CRM Convergence initiative 
(29) • Standardised 
• Enhance the training 
knowledge of the strengthened 
existing sales boundaries and 
force with CRM barriers for the 
Convergence BSC initiative 
initiative related 
improvements 
(30) • "Quick Wins" of 
• Successful roll-out product-dominated 
of a consolidated sales concepts 
and standardised raised boundaries 
forecasting and additional 
concept and barriers for the 
process CRM Convergence 
initiative in 
establishing 
solution-oriented 
sales capabilities 
• Development of standardised CRM related training programs for 
Sun's global sales force 
• Coaching and training sessions were rolled out globally to 
enhance the existing knowledge of the sales force with new CRM 
concepts and approaches 
=> New CRM trainings facilitated the adoption of new key 
measures and customer performance perspectives, which 
increased the difficulties for the BSe initiative to consolidate and 
changed them across the organisation in a later stage 
• The Forecast Alignment initiative simplified Sun's different 
forecasting concepts and processes into one consolidated 
forecast approach 
• The new forecast approach included product-oriented concepts 
like the product-life-cycle management approach 
• The new forecasting approach was product-oriented and 
supported existing sales capabilities and mindsets 
• The product-oriented forecast approach heightened resistance 
within the sales force to change in existing sales capabilities 
• Limited training days of sales people were occupied by the new 
forecasting process training, which strengthened product oriented 
sales approaches and reduced the possibility to fill additional 
training courses with new solution-oriented sales concepts 
=> The Forecast Alignment initiative created Quick Wins by 
supporting existing sales capabilities and created at the same 
time barriers against establishing solution-oriented sales 
capabilities 
6.4 Summary 
The CRM Convergence initiative case study has observed the challenges and effects 
that arose during implementation of the CRM Convergence goals and objectives. 
These challenges and effects arose from two types of interactions: fIrstly, interactions 
between the CRM Convergence initiative and Sun's organizational context; secondly 
between strategic initiatives, facilitating different challenges from which various 
effects evolved. 
Different challenges emerged during the CRM Convergence initiative 
implementation. Those challenges formed a group of evolved effects based on 
interaction between the CRM Convergence initiative and Sun 's organisational context 
or interactions between strategic initiatives. Moreover, those challenges were 
stimulated by the various initiative related drivers now explained. 
Figure 19: Related key driver and observed challenges , in relation to the CRM Convergence 
initiative. 
Observed Challenges 
Challenges from Organisational 
Silos and Misaligned Business 
Interactions between the Sun Operations 
Sigma initiative and Sun's 
organisational context 
f---------.. Barriers from existing Sales Capabilities 
Related Key Driver 
Retroactions from Decision Processes ~ ~ Organisational Transformations 
Organisational structures and 
resource allocation processes 
Existing Sales Capabilities 
Conflicting perspectives and 
~ ~ focuses between initiatives 
Challenging dependencies 
Interactions between the Sun between initiative goals and 
Sigma initiative and other - objectives 
strategic initiatives 
Challenging boundaries and 
barriers from ongoing initiatives 
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The Figure 19 illustrates the CRM Convergence related key drivers which stimulated 
the six different challenges that emerged from the two types of interactions. In this 
regard the first driver related to the company's existing decision processes. All 
business units maintained and supported their individual agendas and priorities and 
individual initiatives supported their agendas and priorities, which generated CRM 
Convergence-related challenges from which various challenging effects arose due to 
interactions with Sun's organizational context and interactions with other strategic 
initiatives. The second driver related to Sun's organizational structures and related 
resource allocation processes. Interactions between the organizational context and the 
strategic initiative as unbalanced decision power among individual business units led 
to different challenges and produced challenging effects. Furthermore, in the context 
of interactions between strategic initiatives, existing organizational structures and 
decisions gave rise to initiative-specific decisions on resource allocations which 
sometimes led to unexpected outcomes and effects within strategic initiatives. The 
third driver stimulated challenges during the CRM Convergence initiative 
implementations and related to the company's existing sales capabilities. Existing 
product-oriented sales capabilities challenged the transformation of CRM 
Convergence-related activities, which produced different challenges, such as 
emerging barriers and boundaries for the initiatives. The consequence was that 
various effects arose due to different interactions between the CRM Convergence 
initiative and Sun's organizational context and other strategic initiatives. In summary, 
these drivers produced different challenges during the implementation of the CRM 
Convergence initiative which had the various effects described above. 
Table 29: Summary of CRM Convergence related challenges and emerged effects. 
Observed Challenges 
Challenges from 
Organisational Silos and 
Misaligned Business 
Operations: This situation is 
characterised by the different 
organisational structures and 
related misaligned business 
operations with other units. 
Emerged Effects (Observed Examples) 
(16) Transformation of organizational structures increased the demand for new 
project resources and reduced the overall initiative's progress. 
(17) Transformation of misaligned business operations created resistance and 
barriers against the CRM Convergence initiative activities and reduced the efficiency 
of existing business operations. 
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Barriers from existing Sales 
Capabilities: This situation 
illustrates emerging barriers 
and resistance against the 
transformation of existing sales 
capabilities. 
Retroactions from 
Organisational Trans-
formations: This situation 
illustrates how the trans-
formation of organisational 
structures and initiative actions 
stimulated new changes within 
the same initiative 
(retroactions) . 
Conflicting perspectives and 
focuses between initiatives: 
this situation is defined through 
different perspectives and 
focuses of ongoing initiatives 
which may collide and create 
conflicts between each other. 
Challenging dependencies 
between initiative goals and 
objectives: this situation 
defines the situation where two 
strategic initiatives engaged in 
dependencies between initiative 
individual goals and objectives 
with the consequence of 
evolving challenges. 
Challenging boundaries and 
barriers from ongoing 
initiatives: this situation 
illustrates how an initiative 
encounters new barriers and 
boundaries created by other 
initiatives. 
(18) Solution oriented sales concepts and project ideas were dominated by existing 
product-oriented sales capabilities and slowed down the transformation of the CRM 
Convergence initiative. 
(19) The involvement of various sales executives reduced the chances and options 
for the CRM Convergence team to establish new concepts and approaches. 
(20) CRM Convergence-related goals and objectives became difficult to maintain 
and drifted continuously 
(21) The transformation of Sun's organisational structures created additional 
changes within the CRM Convergence initiative and additional complexities for the 
initiative, based on foregone initiative related organisational transformation activities. 
(22) Collisions created complexities for initiatives overlapping with other initiatives 
within the area of similar process designs and efforts to establish similar roles. 
Those similarities led to new conflicts and inefficiencies. 
(23) Different business perspectives of individual initiatives produced conflicting 
results and created inefficient convergences between initiatives. 
(24) The convergence of the Sun Sigma and CRM Convergence initiatives created 
confusions and misunderstandings between various stakeholders and produced 
sometimes unproductive outcomes. 
(25) Additional resource needs for the CRM Convergence initiative created 
additional resource gaps within other initiatives. 
(26) Increasing management attention to the CRM Convergence initiative reduced 
priorities for other initiatives as the BSC initiative. 
(27) Emerging requirements by another initiative increased the CRM Convergence 
initiative objectives and challenged actual plans and timelines, based on the other 
initiative related goals. 
(28) Controversial initiative directions and initiative specific results as the 
partner/product relationship orientation, difficulties in defining Sun's customers, 
related customer success metrics and an overall CRM approach created boundaries 
and barriers for the CRM Convergence initiative to deliver on time and in budget. 
(29) New CRM trainings facilitated the adoption of new key measures and customer 
performance perspectives, which increased the difficulties for the BSC initiative to 
consolidate and change them at a later stage. 
(30) Results from other strategic initiatives created new resistance and barriers 
against fulfillment of the CRM Convergence goals. 
In 2007, Sun's organisation is different from what it was in 2000. During the CRM 
Convergence initiative roll-out period of 2001 and 2004, various company resources 
changed, notably the organisational structures, processes/routines, knowledge. 
capabilities and technologies. Until 2005, the company dealt more openly with 
solution-oriented offerings, customer, and market approaches. However, the company 
still comprises a strong product-oriented community and rnindset. Nevertheless, the 
CRM Convergence programme required far more resources and investments than 
initially expected. All challenges and effects in the table reference the CRM 
Convergence initiative and related interactions between Sun's organizational context 
and other strategic initiatives. Overall and with hindsight, the CRM Convergence 
initiative case study illustrates that, besides the expected results, it gave rise to various 
challenging effects, complexities and related dynamics. 
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7 The Balanced Scorecard Initiative Case Study 
7.1 Introduction 
Decreasing markets and stagnating customer revenues and margins challenged Sun to 
achieve, and especially improve, progress in implementing the firm's strategy. In this 
regard, Sun's top management decided to improve the company's strategy execution 
process by launching the BSC initiative. The purpose of the new programme was to 
enhance Sun's existing management system and capabilities through a balanced 
scorecard-oriented management approach. Sun executives expected the BSC initiative 
to enhance the company's current management processes and strengthen Sun's overall 
strategy execution performance. 
As a result of a global executive workshop case study, Sun's management team 
realized the advantages of an integrated framework for describing strategy by means 
of performance measures linked in four, balanced perspectives: financial, customer, 
internal process, and employee learning and growth. In this regard, the balanced 
scorecard increased its interest for Sun's global executives as a measurement system, 
a strategic management system, and a communication tool. The BSC approach is 
based on the best practices to operationalise a firm's strategies developed by Kaplan 
and Norton (1993). 
Improving the overall strategy execution and decision making process through more 
factual based approaches became a critical task for Sun because the firm was unable 
to follow every ongoing trend. Furthermore, the BSC initiative aimed at determining 
how many strategic initiatives would be appropriate to execute and implement Sun's 
new business strategies, based on existing company resources. Moreover, it became 
essential for the company to be more selective in where it should invest its time. 
resources, and energy to achieve and sustain long-term competitive advantage and 
profitable growth. 
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The following in-depth case study discusses how the BSC initiative was implemented 
and how challenges and different kinds of effects emerged. The first section describes 
the BSC initiative, its particular characteristics and goals, and how the company 
launched the initiative. The next sections then illustrate how the BSC initiative was 
implemented and what kind of interactions between the BSC initiative and Sun's 
organisational context and other ongoing initiatives emerged. In particular, the 
sections discuss effects of various interactions on the organisation and other initiativcs 
in the context of the BSC initiative. Those effects and results had different 
consequences which are discussed in the light of various examples. The last section 
illustrates and summarises the overall findings of the BSC initiative case study. 
7.2 Rationale of the BSe Initiative 
During a period of implementing different changes and company improvements, 
Sun's executives decided to enhance the company's strategy execution processes and 
launched a strategic initiative - the balanced scorecard (BSC) initiative. The initiative 
was begun during a spring leadership conference held in Tokyo in 2002, where the 
global executive management team organised break-out sessions to work on strategic 
topics. In this context, the Tokyo leadership was organised to outline and discuss how 
to enhance Sun's existing planning and business monitoring capabilities. The 
company's growth rates had started to decline, market conditions were changing, and 
the management teams were called upon to measure the new business and strategy 
performance. Furthermore, the executive teams did not effectively 'operationalise' 
and measure their business strategies. There was no common decision platform on 
which the management teams could decide in which areas and capabilities the 
company should invest and de-invest. Sun did not know whether individual business 
units or regions were working on the same strategic goals or if regional activities were 
in conflict with each other on fulfilment of the strategic goals defined. 
The global management team, headed by Scott McNeally (Former CEO and Co-
Founder), was impressed by the balanced scorecard case study and decidcd to definc a 
follow-up task to discuss the possible advantages of applying the balanced scorecard 
concept to thc existing Sun management system and strategy exccution proccss. 
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At Tokyo, the EMEA Vice President was given the task by Sun's CEO of following-
up on a balanced scorecard proposal and validating the conceptualisation of a new 
balanced scorecard-oriented Sun management system. A follow-up EMEA executive 
management meeting was accordingly organised in Greece to discuss the newly-
defined strategic EMEA goals and how those goals could be operationalised and 
tracked using the balanced scorecard concept, especially in regard to the latest 
strategic goals and priorities. 
'The Balanced Scorecard will help us to improve our 
focus on strategy execution and to achieve our 
forthcoming plans .... It is a plan which is achievable 
and gets the company back to revenue grmvth and 
sustained profitability , (EMEA Vice President, 
2004, [40]) 
The statement illustrates that Sun's executive team integrated the balanced scorecard 
approach into their planning and management processes, with the expectation in mind 
of increasing Sun's focus on strategy execution. Moreover, the pressure to mobilize 
all available company forces to drive and implement the new business directions 
required an effective approach. At that time, Sun had too many ongoing and 
misaligned activities, which increased the difficulties in initiating and implementing 
new business directions. In this regard, the Bse rapidly received very close 
management attention, especially from the EMEA executives, which led to the 
decision to launch the BSe initiative. 
7.2.1 Definition and Vision of the Initiative 
Sun started to discuss and reshape the company's existing management system. One 
the first steps of the Bse initiative was to implement the balanced scorecard approach 
across the EMEA region before the new and centralized management approach was 
implemented globally into Sun's existing planning and management processes. In this 
context, the sse initiative core team members defined Sun's management system, 
which should be enhanced through the sse initiatiyc in the following. 
The EMEA Management Systems is a set of processes, 
events, metrics, and accountabilities by which the 
organisation plans and executes our strategies, priorities, 
and goals.' (Headquarters Director & SSC Core Team, 
2005, [17]) 
The SSC initiative received increasing attention as a solution for Sun's strategy 
execution and as a means of renewing Sun's existing management system - starting 
with the EMEA region and then rolled out globally. 
Overall, the SSC initiative can be described through three aspects. Firstly, the SSC 
was understood as an enabler in the management of Sun's existing business planning 
and strategy execution environment. Especially during a period when Sun was facing 
major challenges, more accurate and more comprehensive strategy execution 
capabilities became important. The selling units and regions worldwide, including the 
EMEA time zone, had not reached their sales and revenue targets over the last few 
quarters. The company was losing money and the management teams did not fully 
understand why. There was no common measure and management system in place. 
Secondly, Sun's EMEA executives saw the SSC initiative as a means of establishing 
an integrated framework in which to describe the strategy execution process 
transparently through the use of performance measures linked in four balanced 
perspectives: Financial, Customer, Internal Process, and Employee Learning and 
Growth. For Sun the balanced scorecard retained traditional financial measures. 
However, financial measures tell the story of past events, which may have been 
adequate in the case of industrial-age companies, for which investments in long-term 
capabilities and customer relationships were not critical for success. These financial 
measures were inadequate for guiding and evaluating the journey that information-age 
compames like Sun must undertake to create future value through investment in 
customers, suppliers, employees, processes, technology, and innovation. Secondly, 
the SSC initiative was defined as a means of increasing and consolidating Sun's 
different performance perspectives. Regional units and countries were not comparable 
with eaeh other. Management teams were unable to derive actions for i m p r o v e m e n t ~ ~
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and learn from better performing regions. Thirdly, the balanced scorecard initiative 
was characterized and recognised by the management team in terms of three 
characteristics. The first concerned the measurement system. All selling units should 
progress with their business operations in the same direction and with the same key 
performance measures based on a central measurement system applied across the 
company. The second characteristic concerned the new strategic management system 
of Sun. Executives and management teams should enhance their leadership style 
through a more fact-based decision-making process. Finally, the BSC initiative 
represented a new approach to the effective communication of Sun's business 
strategies and related changes. In this context, the balanced scorecard approach was 
used as an effective communication tool for Sun's management people in the future. 
In particular, the EMEA executive team strongly believed that it was the right time, 
and also essential, to invest in and enhance the firm's overall strategy planning and 
monitoring approach through the BSC concept. The balanced scorecard vision thus 
emerged, and it entailed transforming the de-centralised planning and monitoring 
capabilities of the entire company into one central concept. Everyone in the company 
should become integrated into the strategy execution process by understanding, 
following, and implementing Sun's strategic objectives in relation to their individual 
goals and objectives, as illustrated in Figure 20. 
Figure 20: BSe Initiative Vision and Scope. 
Sun's Vision to establish BSe related Key Management 
Processes to manage the firm 's Business Strategies 
Sun 
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Figure 20 shows the vision of how Sun's executive teams manages the company's 
business strategies across the entire organisation by including different aspects. 
Firstly, the BSC initiative would help Sun to establish strategic consensus across the 
different departments and business units. Everybody within Sun would follow the 
same vision and directions based on a common understanding. Secondly, the BSC 
initiative would implement a processes and concepts to enhance common 
understanding. Moreover, every business unit and department would receive the 
possibility to articulate their contribution to implement the shared vision and strategy 
of Sun and provide their feedback on their strategy execution experience to Sun's 
executives and management teams. In this context, "Playbooks" were used as a 
document template with which to formulate, describe, distribute, and communicate 
the company' worldwide strategies and goals across the organisation. Moreover all 
department , teams, regions and selling units started to r cord their goal and 
activitie in their playbook , which were referenced to the re pon ible manag m nt 
team playbook and u ed a template for the playbook of further ub di i ion and 
unit . Be ide mea urement of defined KPI' , Sun' playbook 
manag r re p n ibl and er u d a ollaboration and 
ere re iewcd b th 
mmunicati n t 
keep the organisation aligned with Sun's strategic goals across the different layers 
(EMEA layer, Selling Unit (SU) / country layer and individual employees). Hence, 
every employee would be linked to the same strategy planning and execution process, 
in which it was envisaged that regular feedback meetings would help management 
teams understand the issues and challenges that were confronting individual teams 
and employees during their strategy execution. These meetings would become the 
basis for establish a feedback and learning process on Sun's strategy definition and 
execution processes. Thirdly, the BSC initiative aimed to establish modifications of 
the existing planning processes and templates. Every management team of a region or 
country should follow clear defined and measurable objectives. Those objectives 
should be in-line with their local organisational units and Playbooks. The 
standardisation of Sun's business planning processes were necessary to increase the 
effectiveness of Sun's strategy execution and related resource allocation processes, 
including the alignment of different ongoing initiatives. Fourthly, the BSC approach 
should help to communicate the strategy implementation achievements and linking 
rewards to performance measures by establishing a performance culture across the 
organisation - moving in one direction. 
Overall, to establish the vision by enhancing and modifying the described focus areas 
the BSC initiative was defined by Sun's executives as a source for three enabling 
levers, illustrated in Figure 20. Firstly, the programme would establish all relevant 
approaches and concepts as the definition of key performance indicators to measure 
strategy performance and implement those concepts into Sun's new and centralised 
management system. Secondly, the new BSC approaches and concepts would be 
enhanced through new BSC tools and necessary processes (e.g. planning and review 
etc.). Thirdly, to establish those approaches, processes and concepts the BSC initiative 
would drive a substantial change in management approach to facilitate the required 
changes. 
Neve11heless, the BSC vision just illustrated created new areas of discussion within 
the management teams. On one hand, various regions and countries would have to 
givc up thcir strategy planning competencies, and on the other, the results of those 
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regions would be measured against the key performance defined indicators for their 
regions. Hence, the regions and countries would lose their flexibility in reporting their 
results and business performances. At that time, every region was struggling to 
achieve positive results and the central balanced scorecard-driven planning vision 
heightened some fears within regional management teams that they would lose 
control over their 'figures'. Nevertheless, the EMEA executive team was determined 
to tum the vision into reality and increase transparency and control in those 
challenging times. 
7.2.2 Strategic Objectives of the BSe Initiative 
The SSC initiative heightened EMEA top management's attention after the EMEA 
executive team met in Greece for a three-day follow-up strategic review and planning 
workshop. The outcome was that the top management team realised that various 
challenges were facing the current Sun organisation and the company's business 
operations. The employees were not aligned with the strategy, and a large number of 
them did not understand it. At the same time, uncoordinated programs were launched, 
for instance Sun Sigma, as well as various revenue improvement projects. Nobody 
could effectively determine whether the company was fulfilling its strategy and how 
those ongoing projects would help the company to achieve its strategic goals. At that 
time, no common management system was in place, including the measurement of 
key metrics which aligned with the strategy so that key business decisions could be 
made. 
'1 believe the balanced scorecard concept enhanced our 
current management system and created the chance to 
consolidate our de-fragmented management operations 
into a single management system ... ' (Headquarters 
Director & SSC Core Team, 2005, [17]) 
The EMEA top management team saw an opportunity to Improve the challenges 
identified through the SSC initiative because more consistent metrics of success 
would be established. In this regard, the EMEA executi\'es emphasized the need to 
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establish a single cohesive management system with fact-based perspectives which 
would drive qualitative business actions. Furthermore, they strongly believed that they 
were on the right track and formulated the strategic objectives of the BSC initiative in 
Greece, as now described: 
Table 30: Overview of the key objectives of the SSC initiative 
Key Objective 
• Make the Sun strategy 
more operational 
• Align organisations with 
the strategy 
Description 
• Align and break down the company's strategic directions into 
necessary business operations 
• Close the gap between high level vision and strategy 
definitions and existing business activities and projects 
• Provide a way to break high level strategies down into 
tangible business actions 
• Align different business lines like GSO, PS, and sse in 
executing Sun's strategies 
• Establish strategy consensus among the various business 
units 
• Reduce the organisational silos of the three main business 
units, GSO, PS, and sse, by establishing consolidated and 
cross-divisional business measures 
• Utilize business synergies (cost base) among different 
business units to execute the same business strategies 
• Make the strategy • Reduce the fragmentation of the organisation, support the 
"everyone's everyday job" process whereby all business units moved in the same 
directions 
• Improve strategy understanding among Sun employees 
through consistent measurements and goal definition 
processes 
• Establish strategy • Support the establishment of new business strategies and 
execution as a continuous directions in the market 
process • Establish a process for the measurement and monitoring of 
• Mobilise change through 
implementing SSC in the 
Sun leadership mindset 
Sun's new business strategies 
• I ncrease the focus of management attention and capabilities 
on the continuous monitoring and execution of the 
company's business strategies 
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• Establish the strategy definition process given Sun's need to 
find and execute competitive strategies in order to maintain 
its market shares in a shrinking and highly competitive 
market 
• Support the leadership process whereby the EMEA and 
global management team acted as a single Sun 
Microsystems, Inc. (SMI) 
• Improve Sun's leadership style and planning capabilities 
Besides defining the strategic objectives and launching the BSC initiative, the EMEA 
executive team decided to communicate their strategies and business directions 
through strategic objectives and priorities in relation to increasing strategy 
understanding and getting closer to the balanced scorecard approach. 
In 2003, the EMEA executive team defined Sun's strategic priorities and objectives, 
according to the BSC concepts. In this relation, Sun's somehow unclear and complex 
business strategies (feedback from different employee surveys) were broken down 
into 6 key focus areas. Furthermore, everybody within the company was challenged to 
follow and support the defined key areas with their individual contribution, illustrated 
in the following table. 
Table 31: Strategic key priorities and objectives for Sun in 2003. 
Key Objectives Description 
• Customer Excellence The aim was to improve Sun's quality to the point that its customers 
take excellence from Sun for granted. Sun's management team 
defined the number one priority as being to improve existing 
customer operations and take over responsibility for emerging 
customer issues from the sales force . 
• Empowered Selling The second priority and key objectives included directions for Sun's 
sales force to provide solutions for emerging customer issues. 
Furthermore, sales and customer-facing teams should be 
empowered to make decisions for their customers by responding 
and acting faster, and more as trusted business advisors. 
• Accountability Each employee should become more accountable for existing and 
------------------
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• Solution Selling 
• Improve Skills 
• Partnering 
future customer promises. This required turning promises into 
actions and delivering valuable customer solutions, instead of 
making other departments and business unit responsible for the 
fulfilment of different customer requirements. 
Changing the way Sun sold to focus more on engaging with Sun's 
customers should have established new revenue streams for the 
company. it was intended that offering business solutions instead of 
single products would characterise Sun's future customer 
engagements . 
A focus on building skills would allow Sun to work with its customers 
to deliver value from the products, solutions and technologies that 
the company produced. 
Partners became more and more essential for Sun. The 
management team believed that Sun's business solution, products, 
and technologies could be offered to more potential customers 
through effective partners by reducing sales costs at the same time. 
The way in which the SIX strategic objectives were communicated to the wider 
organisation was part of the result of enhancing the new EMEA strategic planning 
process with new balanced scorecard oriented elements. In relation to the strategic 
objectives illustrated, the EMEA executives expected everyone and all ongoing 
projects within the EMEA region to become aligned through the BSC initiative 
implementation in support of those strategic objectives and priorities. Therefore, the 
BSC initiative raised the expectations not only in improving the communication of 
Sun's business directions and key objectives. Furthermore, Sun's executives expected 
the BSC initiative implementations to go hand in hand with the improvement of Sun's 
overall strategy execution process, according to the defined key objectives and 
priorities. 
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7.3 Implementation of the BSC Initiative 
The EMEA executive team's plan was that the BSC initiative would be rolled-out 
globally. Like many other initiatives, it was rolled-out in two phases. The aim of 
phase I was the EMEA-wide implementation of the BSC approach, while phase II 
involved - after successful implementation of phase I - the worldwide implementation 
and roll out of the BSC approach. In detail, phase I was intended to be completed 
within 24 months, illustrated in Figure 21. 
Figure 21 : Phase I implementation road map of the BSe initiative. 
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Phase I was broken down into three steps. Step one, "The Construction Stage", was to 
run for a period of six months. The purpose of this Stage was to verify how Sun' 
trategy could be implemented by conducting a strategy implementation as essment 
and putting relevant prerequisites in place such a the change and communication 
plan and election of a feasible pilot SUo The econd stage, "Pilot S lling Unit", 
aimed at implementing the balanced corecard concept in one pre- lected elling unit 
within 6 to 8 month and collecting experience on thc planned change impr vement . 
Th la t tage, "Roll-out 6 U' would tend th nc\ balanc d corccard appr a h 
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to the rest of the EMEA time zone SUs within a period of 12 months. Overall. after 
two years, all 7 SUs within the EMEA time zone should be operating and measuring 
their business operations through the new balanced scorecard management system. 
Furthermore, phase I of the BSC initiative focused on establishing the new balanced 
scorecard driven strategy performance process within three relevant management 
layers of Sun. The first layer was the EMEA executive team; the second layer 
comprised the EMEA Selling Units (SU). One SU were represented by one or more 
countries. Sun organised smaller countries like Switzerland, Belgium etc. into one 
logical SU while larger countries like Germany or the UK were separate SUs. The last 
management layer of the BSC initiative comprised all employees of the EMEA time 
zone. After successful implementation of the BSC approach at all three EMEA 
management layers, it was envisaged that employees would be able to link their work 
to Sun's strategic objectives, and executives would be able to align their employees 
through the definition of integrated metrics and goals to execute Sun's business 
strategies effectively. 
Especially in the beginning, a large number of countries and selling units were 
spontaneously committed to supporting the new BSC initiative. Moreover, based on 
the growing pressure and growing in-transparencies on the company's strategy 
execution progress, a few countries had already started to enhance their planning and 
decision platforms with balanced scorecard-oriented concepts. For example, 
Switzerland had already tried to develop a balanced scorecard for their Swiss 
management team, and Sweden had developed a scorecard approach with external 
management consultants from Ernst & Young Consulting. These countries and 
management teams had already acquired an understanding of how the company's 
current planning platform and management systems could be enhanced . 
. ... We already conceptualised a balanced scorecard 
dril'{'n approach for Sweden. The current Sun planning 
and monitoring tools are not s l ~ f f i c i e n t . . We increased our 
market understanding per country and the relel'ant skills 
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we needed to develop. The balanced scorecard provided a 
vehicle to bridge the gap between Sun's goals and our 
account management activities.' (CFO CNE Region & 
SSC Core Team, 2006, [41]) 
Nevertheless, the concepts in Sweden and Switzerland did not become the vital centre 
of Sun's management processes, because they consisted more in bottom-up driven 
approaches isolated from the wider Sun management community and disconnected 
from the general Sun management approach and leadership styles. However, Sun 
regions, like Sweden and Switzerland, had already gained some experience with the 
balanced scorecard concept and the new way of planning and monitoring Sun's 
business strategies. Therefore Sweden and Switzerland, in particular, increased their 
support for the SSC initiative, according to the teams created to implement the 
initiative (Appendix 12). Those implementation teams and related stakeholders started 
to experience different dynamics and challenges during the implementation processes, 
as discussed in detail in the following sections. 
The following sections describe how the SSC initiative interacted with the Sun 
organisation. In this regard, different executive teams and related management 
processes were primarily targeted for enhancements by the SSC initiative. In detail, 
the SSC initiative challenged the existing Sun management approach and aimed to 
transform it into a more factually based and consolidated central planning one from 
which different interactions between the organisations and other strategic initiatives 
would emerge with various outcomes and challenging effects for Sun. 
7.3.1 Interactions between the BSC Initiative and the firm's Organisational 
Context 
The SSC initiative interacted with Sun's organizational context and created different 
situations within the organization which generated various challenging effects for the 
organization and the SSC initiative. These situations are summarised as initiative 
related challenges. In the context of the SSC initiative two diffcrent challenges 
dc\'elopcd: organi::ational resistance against the halanced scorecard and challenges 
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from misaligned focus areas within the organization. The creation of these challenges 
was stimulated by three different key drivers. Firstly, individual executives and 
business unit agendas and priorities stimulated the observed challenges and the 
growth of various challenging effects. Individual business unit agendas and priorities 
were pushed and protected by various executives and managers even if they conflicted 
with the company's strategic objectives and goals. Secondly, existing management 
capabilities and decision structures evolved within Sun 's decentralized management 
environment to challenge the new management approaches and the new management 
capabilities required. For example, managers created powerful relations over the year 
and protected each other against major changes. Thirdly, extraordinary challenging 
business situations (Mode of Operation) produced situations within Sun in which the 
BSC initiative faced difficulties in proceeding because the executives and managers 
involved became reactive to the business and developed a fear of losing control over 
their existing management processes. Furthermore, the employees became disoriented 
and overall motivation decreased as directions became unclear. Overall, the above-
described three key drivers arose within the context of interaction between the 
organization and the BSC initiative illustrated in Figure 22. 
Figure 22 : Context of interaction between the organisation and the initiative. 
Strategic .----. 
Assessment 
New BSC Management Processes (Initiative Actions and Change Enhancements) 
Emerging Challenges 
• Organisational Resistance against the 
Balanced Scorecard 
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Areas Wllhln Ihe Orgamsallon 
Emerging Effects (Dysfunctional) 
• Within the organisation 
• Within the SSC Initiative 
Execution 
The figure illustrates the new balanced scorecard-oriented management processes of 
Sun, which were developed and established by the BSC initiative. In this regard, the 
company vision, mission and values became the centre from which Sun's 
management teams derived the necessary company priorities and goals as a baseline 
for the individual business unit priorities and goals and related employee goals. 
Each business unit was challenged to align its specific priorities and goals with the 
SMI priorities and goals. Moreover, throughout the year, each BU was obliged to 
review performance against its goals. The BSC initiative conceptualized the cycle as 
beginning with strategic analysis of technology trends, competition, Sun's financial 
position, partners and channels, marketing and sales, operational efficiency, and the 
effectiveness of products and services. It continued through goal setting, execution, 
and evaluation. Sun's Mission, Vision, and Values guided the entire process. Overall 
the strategy performance reviews comprised two key aspects. Firstly, management 
teams were pushed to assess Sun's current business situation and derived appropriate 
priorities and goals to improve the overall strategy execution. Secondly, the 
previously defined priorities and goals were measured to increase understanding on 
how the company was performing in the strategy's execution. From these 
management interactions different (dysfunctional) effects arose within the 
organisation and within the BSC initiative, as described in detail in the following sub-
sections. 
7.3.1.1 Organisational Resistance against the Balanced Scorecard 
The BSC initiative started to validate and change existing management processes and 
related approaches within different regions of the EMEA time zone and created 
controversial reactions and resistance against the BSC initiative. In detail, 
controversial reactions from different countries created various challenges and 
consequences for Sun's organisation and the BSC initiative. The following example 
illustrates how organizational resistance emerged from individual regions against the 
balanced scorecard initiative approach and concepts, based on three aspects. The first 
was the fear of losing control over the existing management system, especially in 
challenging times. Secondly, the example illustrates ho\\' Sun's existing management 
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capabilities and decision structures created organizational resistance against the BSC 
initiative. In this regard, the third aspect relates especially to the established 
management relations between Sun managers and executives, who were inflexible 
and resistant against change. 
The first aspect was not observed in Sweden and Switzerland, because those countries 
proactively supported the BSC initiative and volunteered for the pilot country roll-out 
phase of the balanced scorecard approach. In contrast, France for instance, paid 
relatively little attention to the new ideas. France was in a very difficult situation at 
the time. The France SU reported significant drops in revenues and margins. Key 
customers in France turned to Sun's competitors and reduced the number of Sun 
projects in their organisations. Sun's management team in France was overwhelmed 
by this extreme situation, followed by hesitant decision behaviours and fear. Besides 
addressing these challenges, the BSC initiative aimed to increase transparencies and 
relations between key performance drivers and results for every country and SUo 
France increasingly dissociated itself from the idea of implementing the balanced 
scorecard concept. 
'] don't think the balanced scorecard would help us to fix 
the situation in France. We should try not to increase the 
complexities in France. The France selling unit faced big 
challenges and problems, which we needed to sort out 
first. ' (Senior PS VP Executive & BSC Core Team, 2005, 
[13]) 
This example illustrates two aspects. Firstly, those regIOns with difficulties In 
business operations like France resisted the new balanced scorecard approach. In 
especially challenging times, management teams like France feared losing control 
over their management systems. Those executives and managers were not ready to 
relinquish their control on the existing management approach and system and raised 
resistance against the BSC initiative. The outcome of this executive management 
behaviour was that the BSC initiative faced delays in increasing its transparency 
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across the EMEA time zone as countries like France raised barriers against 
implementing and executing the key performance measures of Sun's latest business 
strategies. 
The second aspect relates to the requirements of the new Sun management capabilities 
and how those obstacles created organizational resistance against the BSC initiative 
and related change enhancements. EMEA executives required to enhance their 
decisions base to avoid not taking decisions on financial indicators alone. In 
particular, customer perspectives, internal qualities and process excellence 
perspectives, and people perspectives should have been the centre of a Sun manager's 
interests and decision baseline. However, changing the existing planning and 
management capabilities required a major shift in existing management behaviours, 
routines, and styles and created organisational resistance. The management team in 
France was not sufficiently objective to accept the major changes taking place in 
markets. During the e-Business boom years, France was one of the regions with 
strong growth rates. Its young organisation increased its operations in a very short 
period of time. Therefore, Sun employees and managers in France, like in many other 
countries, were used to acting very entrepreneurially in a highly decentralised 
business environment and had a wide range of decision powers. 
'/ expected to reduce the ability of regional managers 
to make decisions which are good for their regions but 
bad for Sun ... the balanced scorecard should help us to 
sort out this difficulties ... '(EMEA Executive & BSC 
Core Team (Sponsor), 2004, [19]) 
Managers were used to making their own decisions and building up business 
operations. These capabilities became obstacles against the idea of establishing one 
central management system. New management capabilities were required, and the 
organisations in France and PortugaL for example, were not prepared for these 
changes. 
' ... Our strength became our weaknesses. Sun managers 
were always used to making their own decisions. The 
headquarters gave them a wide range of competencies and 
decision power. In my understanding, the balanced 
scorecard concept reduced the possibility that every 
country should define its own success metrics and 
interpretations. This is something against the company's 
DNA' (Senior PS VP Executive & BSC Core Team 2005 , , 
[13]) 
France and Portugal were reluctant to accept ideas on changing their existing 
management capabilities, and they increased their resistance against the new 
centralized balanced scorecard-oriented management system. The management style 
and routines of those countries did not match the BSC initiative's ideas, objectives 
and concepts. Management decisions became too slowly transparent, which was 
challenging because of the shrinking revenue and margin responsibilities for a wide 
range of managers. In this regard, two consequences emerged. Firstly, the BSC 
initiative was struggling to fulfil its goals and objectives, which raised challenges and 
additional complexities concerning BSC initiative resource needs and the value 
creation. Secondly, inadequate management approaches and related ongoing decision-
making process were strengthened, which reduced the option of optimizing company 
activities and ongoing projects due to the execution of the defined strategic objectives 
and goals. 
The third aspect of organizational resistance against the BSC initiative arose from 
inflexible management structures and personal relations between various Sun 
managers and executives. The BSC initiative was initially launched to enhance Sun's 
existing management system. However, the goal of bringing about sustainable change 
in the company's existing management capabilities and style could not be achieved on 
a wider scale. In the first step, key managers and leaders of Sun supported the vision 
of changing the way in which Sun planned and executed new business strategies. 
Nevertheless. too many reactive and traditional management forces minimised the 
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success in establishing new and sustainable management capabilities. One of the main 
reasons for these barriers was Sun's strong insider management network (' old boy 
network'). Sun managers and executives had known each other for years, and the 
manager and executive chum rate was very low in comparison to Sun's competitors. 
This situation and the compact network were very difficult to change. although some 
of Sun's managers decided to do so and launched individual Sun Sigma improvement 
projects similar to the BSC initiative. Therefore, no manager or executive was 
committed to taking the risk of pushing the organisation to change the existing 
management capabilities and style and reduce the competencies of other managers 
and executives. 
Table 32: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities Effects 
(31 ) • Critical business 
• Apply the situations reduced 
balanced acceptance of the 
scorecard concept balanced 
to the EMEA scorecard change 
region enhancements 
within some 
countries and 
created delays for 
the whole region 
(32) • Actual 
• Enhance current competencies and 
planning management 
perspectives and capabilities 
increase increased barriers 
transparency on according to the 
Sun's business planned balanced 
performance scorecard changes 
(33) • Existing 
• Consolidate and management 
change existing relations 
management established 
Implications 
• Countries like France were in a challenging business situation and 
reduced their business focus on the balanced scorecard activities 
• The fear increased among various managers and executives in 
France of losing control over their management processes and 
approaches 
~ ~ Challenging business situations increased resistance against 
change in existing management capabilities and approaches 
and increased the pressure on the BSC initiative to establish 
change enhancements 
• Sun managers and executives had a wide range of decision 
power and freedom in defining the management style and 
planning approaches 
• Existing management and planning capabilities (routines and 
processes) were de-centralised and differed from country to 
country and among SU within the EMEA time zone 
• Alignments of current project activities with Sun's strategic 
objectives and goals were delayed and created inefficiencies 
~ ~ Actual management capabilities were contrary to the BSC 
initiative plans and created barriers against changes, which 
increased the complexities within the organisation (e.g. lack of 
transparency and facts etc.) and BSC initiative (delays in 
expected changes, additional resources to intensify efforts etc.) 
• Managers had created a strong relationship network within the 
company over the years (low churn rates between managers) 
• Owing to the BSC initiative, some of the managers started similar 
improvement projects based on the Sun Sigma initiative support 
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approaches and 
styles 
solidarity against => Managers supported each other and established solidarities to 
the planned BSC protect their existing competencies and decision power, which 
initiative changes raised organisational resistance against the planned changes of 
the BSC initiative 
7.3.1.2 Challenges from misaligned Focus Areas within the Organisation 
Different complexities and effects arose from ongoing and misaligned organisational 
focus areas and challenged the organisation and the BSC initiative. The organisation 
was too fragmented and too many ongoing activities facilitated this challenging 
situation in the context of the BSC initiative, as illustrated in Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Ongoing and part wise misaligned strategic topics in 2002 . 
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The figure illustrates various focus areas in the company and the challenging situation 
of Sun not knowing where to invest its scarce company resources to drive execution 
of the firm 's strategic objectives. 
'There wa in my "\ iew a lack of focus definitely. In my 
vi It' it lI 'a a sort of muddling through thi itllatio11. 
Th ere lI 'a no r af lear tra/eg)', 110 real clear 
direction and no real clear messages coming out from 
the corporation ... ' (Senior Sales Manager & Customer 
Representative, 2004, [1]) 
The consequence of these misaligned focus areas was that too many ongoing activities 
were disconnected from Sun's current strategy execution plans and created different 
complexities and inefficiencies based on the interrelations between the organisation 
and the BSC initiative. Those complexities and challenges can be best described with 
the following three examples. 
The first example relates to the lack of information and the disorientation of Sun's 
employees as various ongoing activities and issues reduced the emphasis on providing 
information on the direction in which the company was going. The employees did not 
understand on which areas they should focus. On the other hand, those activities and 
issues as illustrated in Figure 23 required immense company resources and 
investments, at a time when Sun was reporting negative quarterly results. Surviving, 
saving money and cost cutting were the primary targets for a wide range of Sun 
managers. In this example, three different consequences for the organisation and the 
BSC initiative emerged. Firstly, individual managers supported the new balanced 
scorecard direction. However, those managers continued their support for various 
other ongoing and misaligned activities because those activities supported their 
individual business unit's or department's interests and agendas. Hence, the BSC 
initiative required more time and project resources to consolidate the misaligned 
activities. Secondly, people involved in the different ongoing initiatives, including the 
SSC initiative, became tired and disoriented because it was difficult for a wide range 
of Sun employees to understand the priorities and business focuses. Sun employees 
worked for different projects and those projects were often suddenly halted . 
. ... it is hard to get people on board ... first we invest a 
lot of e.ffort to get them on board and then they get 
sacked by Ollr management ... lH' reinforced ollr SH'iss 
BSC team sel'eral times - .first. ollr management 
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approved the required project headcounts and then they 
reduced it because of cost saving reasons or something 
similar ... ' (Deal Manager & BSC Team Switzerland, 
2005, [39]) 
This situation reduced the motivation of Sun's project teams, with the outcome that 
new projects became difficult to sustain, and results were often delayed. Thirdly, both 
outcomes, as the own interests and priorities of different Sun business units and the 
decreasing motivation of disoriented project team members, within an unstable 
project environment reduced the overall commitment of various project team 
members. In this regard, the initiative was challenged to receive enough project 
resources and the organisation became challenged to support the projects sufficiently. 
The second example relates to unclear decision competencies and related 
inefficiencies in deciding on the direction in which the company should go. In this 
context, the balanced scorecard affected the organisations strategic priorities and 
decision making processes. 
' ... our management system should provide the baseline for 
decision finding and making. I think the balanced 
scorecard increased the spectrum not only to make 
decisions which are based on financial indicators. ' 
(EMEA Operations Manager & BSC Core Team Member, 
2006, [29]) 
However, the BSC initiative paradoxically increased the existing situation of unclear 
decision competencies and the fuzziness of Sun's future business directions. Firstly, 
organisational units like PS and SSO lost some of their decision power. The nc\\' 
management system was mainly supported and conceptualised by GSO. Moreover, 
Sun's strategic objectivcs were defined and implemented through the GSO's 
executive management team, headed by a GSO Vice President. The purpose of this 
new concept \\'as to link all ongoing activities, projects and efforts with the current 
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strategic objectives. Nevertheless, the PS and SSO managers did not accept all the 
concepts from the GSO. The GSO's dominance within the BSC initiative created 
additional discussions and new requirements from the PS, and SSO organisations 
emerged as a prerequisite for fulfilment of the GSO-defined strategic objectives and 
goals. Furthermore, the balanced scorecards and goals formed the new baseline for the 
quarterly reviews. Various country and regional managers started to present excuses 
and justifications for not fulfilling the goals needed to be in line with the GSO-defined 
scorecards and goals. Hence, the BSC initiative faced complexities in integrating all 
relevant business units and stakeholders into the new strategy management process. 
The third example relates to Sun's management community and its freedom to take its 
own decisions on launching and managing strategic Sun issues. Before the balanced 
scorecard period, Sun managers had been free to manage and solve the company's 
strategic issues in their own ways. This situation was challenging in difficult times. 
The company was unable to find its focus and could not start to optimise existing 
resources with the company's top business priorities. Moreover, Sun was forced to 
reduce its workforce after the company reported a series of negative quarterly results. 
However, the company still continued to manage its business in the same way -
through individual managers and executive teams. Therefore, increasingly lost its 
business focus by starting individual activities without realising that the necessary 
resources were not available or the planned activities were not aligned with the 
overall company direction. 
The sales executives of Italy supported our BSC 
approach to consolidate misaligned project activities 
and promised to slow down its locanv started Tele 
Account improvement projects as the CRM 
Convergence initiative would roll-out a unified 
collaboration tool ... it H'as exhausting, thev agreed 
and still continued to implement their own plans and 
tools in I t a ~ v v ... ' (EMEA Marketing Operations & sse 
Core Team, 2006, r .+2]) 
2.+J 
Existing management capabilities like the managers' freedom to make their own 
decisions on strategic company issues conditionally influenced the process of 
increasing the misaligned focus areas of the organisation. Those managers facilitated 
the situation of 'doing too many things' at the same time. In a situation where 
company resources became scarce and expensive, this example illustrates how Sun's 
existing management capabilities increased complexities to link ongoing activities 
and projects with Sun's current goals and strategy performance processes as some 
activities and projects were halted by Sun's management team. Nevertheless, new 
projects were still misaligned, individually launched, and contrary to overall 
improvement in Sun's strategy execution efforts through the BSC initiative. 
Table 33: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities 
(34) 
• Enhance the 
strategy's 
execution focus 
and 
communication 
within the Sun 
organisation 
(35) 
• Improve the 
overall strategy 
execution 
according to the 
defined Sun 
priorities and 
goals 
Effects 
• Various managers 
and executives still 
supported 
misaligned 
activities alongside 
their balanced 
scorecard support 
Implications 
• The BSC initiative identified a wide range of misaligned and 
controversial organisational activities and projects 
• Misaligned projects were still supported by individual managers to 
sustain their individual agendas and interests 
• Individual managers still continued to decide on their own 
concerning strategic company issues and possible solutions 
• It was difficult for managers and executives from different 
departments to immediately discard projects started within their 
business units 
=> The continued support for misaligned activities and projects 
within different business units heightened the complexity of 
improving the strategy execution focus for Sun 
• The project reviews • The BSC initiative reviewed various organisational activities and 
of BSC initiative ongoing projects regarding their impact in driving and fulfilling 
increased 
disorientations on 
Sun's strategic 
focus and reduced 
motivation to 
progress within 
Sun's strategic objectives and goals 
• The need to consolidate, reorganise and conclude various 
ongoing projects and organisational activities increased the 
disorientation of project team members 
• It grew increasingly difficult to sustain the progress of Sun projects 
because the overall opinion within the project teams was that 
some project projects were unstable, and they were often stopped. 
teams, with • Continued support of misaligned projects and the growing 
growing initiative disorientation of project teams caused delays in BSC initiative 
delays and growing results and increased demand for additional project resources 
resource needs for => The project reviews and consolidation activities of the BSC 
the BSC initiative initiative increased disorientation regarding the Sun strategy and 
reduced the motivation to progress within some project teams 
(36) 
• Increase the 
understanding of 
the Sun 
strategies and 
directions within 
the wider 
organisation 
• The BSe initiative 
changes made to 
follow pre-defined 
company priorities, 
strategic objectives 
and goals 
increased 
confusion about 
Sun's strategies 
and key priorities 
within different 
business units 
• The BSe initiative was mainly driven and supported by GSO 
managers and executives 
• GSO managers and executives started to apply the new concepts 
first and defined strategic objectives and goals for all Sun 
business units 
• Managers from other business units did not understand the GSO-
defined strategic objectives and goals and raised new 
req u i rements 
• Balanced scorecard-oriented business reviews caused 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations among various 
executives and managers and increased their confusion 
~ ~ Following pre-defined company priorities and strategic 
objectives which were mainly developed by one business unit 
(GSO) caused confusion and misunderstanding within other 
business units, with the consequence of I BSC initiative results 
contrary to those originally expected 
7.3.2 Interactions between Strategic Initiatives 
Sun started to establish concepts to monitor progress in the implementation of Sun's 
strategy through global key programs like the BSC initiative. These strategic key 
programs interrelated with each other, and they produced different situations with 
different effects on the BSC initiative and other strategic initiatives. In detail, 
interrelations between the BSC initiative and other strategic initiatives came about in 
various ways. The BSC initiative was started at a challenging time and focused on 
how strategies could be defined and implemented within Sun. Furthermore, Sun 
launched through its SBAP department a wide range of complex and global strategic 
initiatives - in the opinion of some, far too many. Moreover, various strategic 
initiatives started to drive activities and changes which did not go in the same 
direction within Sun's complex and fragmented organisational structures. 
'You know, our scope was to align all ongoing strategic 
initiatil'l!s "with the strategv ... it was a mess, el'ery 
program moved on with their plans ... I think the 
Balanced Scorecard program faced a huge challenge to 
align all those programs and ongoing projects H'ith 
Sun's strategy' (EMEA Operations Manager & SSC 
Core Team, 2005, [29]) 
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The company resources invested in various initiatives and activities were immense 
and not transparent for the management teams responsible. In the context of the BSC 
initiative, the overall challenge emerged whereby managers on one hand recognised 
growing business complexities, and on the other, lost their focus and identification 
with Sun's existing and new business strategies. Over time, fewer managers were able 
to link their activities to the strategy performance process. This challenging BSC 
initiative environment created two different challenges for Sun in the context of 
interactions between strategic initiatives: firstly, strategy execution inefficiencies 
between strategic initiatives and, secondly, challenging boundaries and barriers 
between ongoing initiatives. Those two challenging situations were produced by three 
different key drivers. Firstly, initiative individual agendas and interests facilitated the 
rise of these challenges. Initiative-specific teams and related executives took different 
decisions or influenced other decisions in order to protect their individual plans and 
initiative activities according to Sun's existing decision structures. Secondly, the 
company capability to manage scarce initiative resources within Sun created different 
challenging situations from which various effects on the ongoing initiatives arose. 
Thirdly, Sun's existing initiative related resource allocation processes and related 
company priorities produced difficult situations for the BSC initiative and other 
initiatives, with somehow unexpected effects. 
7.3.2.1 Strategy Execution Inefficiencies between Strategic Initiatives 
Inefficiencies in Sun's strategy execution process emerged between the BSC initiative 
and other ongoing strategic initiatives, with the outcome of deleterious effects on the 
sse initiative and other strategic initiatives. As already described in the previous 
sections, the BSe initiative aimed at enhancing Sun's current management systems. 
In this regard, the BSe initiative interrelated with all other key initiatives and projects 
by classifying them according to their value and intensity in driving Sun's strategic 
goals. Management teams started to apply the balanced scorecard concepts to the 
current situation. 
rOllr halanced scorecard program helped us 10 
elm-if)' "1-le\'(JI goals ", you bum', these goals are 
absolutely critical for Sun and "B-level goals" which 
are defined as quite necessary for our company ... any 
project that we do at the moment must be able to relate 
very closely, very tangibly to the A or the B level goals 
or we should stop doing it' (Executive Management 
Team Member, 2005, [3]) 
The management team began to realize the positive contribution of the BSC initiative 
to existing business complexities and ongoing initiative activities through the 
measurement of individual initiative contributions to Sun's strategy execution 
performance. This contribution stimulated the various inefficiencies now described. 
The first inefficiency of this challenge induced change in ongoing initiative goals and 
objectives. The BSC initiative stimulated other teams to produce their own 
scorecards: for example, the Sun Sigma and the CRM Convergence initiatives started 
to create their own scorecards. In detail, the CRM Convergence initiative produced 
not only new account and engagement management processes but also performance 
scoring and measurement concepts, defining them as "Account Scorecards". The aim 
of the latter was to improve (a) account penetrations, (b) solution selling, (c) 
transparency of account information, and (d) transparency of goal achievement. In 
this example, the CRM Convergence initiative was inspired by the BSC initiative and 
created four additional success metrics and objectives. These objectives were then 
linked to Sun's corporate goals, and the CRM Convergence initiative team ensured 
that all its objectives and measures related to Sun's strategic goals and priorities. 
Furthermore, the BSC project induced the CRM Convergence initiative to change its 
goals and measurement criteria. 
'Ovcr time el'CJ:" program followed similar goals and 
objectil'(!s ... the balanced scorecard program was 
launched to strengthen Ollr executil'(!s in their decision 
making to priorities and reduce the complexities of 
ongoing activities - the opposite happens - ( ~ t t e r r a while 
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every project or program became very similar. It was 
difficult to measure individual program contribution on 
supporting the execution of Sun's strategies as every 
initiative tried quickly to adapt to the new company 
objectives and key measures without providing the 
promised results' (Global Marketing & BSC Core 
Team, 2006, [48]) 
Other strategic initiatives began similar activities, such as the CRM Convergence 
project, "inventing" new goals and success metrics in order to relate more closely 
with Sun's priorities and to protect current initiative activities. The challenge of 
drifting initiative objectives and goals had various consequences, which are now 
described. The first consequence was that strategic initiatives in conflict with their 
original aims reduced their effectiveness in supporting Sun's strategy execution. This 
dynamic emerged from the BSC initiative's efforts to increase the effectiveness of 
Sun's strategy execution within different strategic initiatives. The BSC initiative was 
initially faced by a heterogeneous landscape of goals and objectives for ongoing 
initiatives, such as CRM Convergence and Sun Sigma. It was thus possible for the 
Sun management team to start discussing Sun's strategic goals and priorities in the 
context of the various ongoing initiatives and the relevance of their objectives and 
goals. Each initiative could be described through its individual goals and objectives 
and the initiative-specific priorities. Nevertheless, after the first reviews, various 
initiatives started to extend and interpret their goals in different ways. The idea of the 
initiative stakeholders was to optimise arguments on the linkage between the 
initiative's goals and objectives and the strategic goals of the company. Hence, over 
time every goal and objective of each initiative seemed similar. It became 
increasingly difficult for the management teams to identify priorities and reduce 
complexities. The second consequence was that different executives used the drifting 
initiative objectives and goals for their own interests. Managers and indi\'idual 
cxccuti\"cs started to influence various ongoing initiatives according to their OW11 
agendas and interests. Moreover, \"arious executi\"cs started to sponsor thcir own 
initiati\"cs and sought to incrcasc thc priority of thcir initiati\cs by changing their 
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objectives and goals, which reduced the overall effectiveness of Sun's strategy 
execution. These changes created additional complexities for the BSC initiatives and 
other strategic initiatives. Firstly, additional resources were required to fulfil the new 
objectives and goals. Secondly, some of the existing results became irrelevant which 
increased the overall initiative implementation time and the risk of growing delays. 
The second inefficiency related to the emergmg and inefficient overlapping of 
ongoing strategic initiatives according to their activities and implemented change 
enhancements. Initiative teams and related management stakeholders started to 
increase the complexities in Sun's current initiative portfolio as each individual 
initiative now began to address and fulfil similar objectives and goals. Hence. 
inefficient overlaps and unnecessary spending on scarce firm resources evolved. 
Furthermore, different initiative teams started to monitor more carefully what other 
initiatives were aiming to achieve and how those individual initiative aims would 
relate to the actual company objectives and goals. In this regard, initiatives started to 
overlap or to 'cannibalise' others initiative resources by launching the same activities. 
'We received more and more KPI's from varlOUS 
initiatives. All of them claimed to support Sun's strategy 
performance process... We had far too many, something 
between 40 - 60 KPI's ... ' (EMEA Operations Manager & 
BSC Core Team Member, 2006, [29]) 
That initiative related 'cannibalizations' of scarce firm resources was the dynamic 
outcome of every single initiative's claim that it was essential for Sun to assure the 
implementation of the firm's strategic objectives and goals. Moreover, initiatives 
started to derive their 'right' initiative specific success metrics (KPI' s) in order to 
increase their individual initiative's priorities and demonstrate its contribution to 
Sun's strategy execution performance. The consequences for the related initiatives, 
including BSC was that the overall scope of individual activities extended. At the 
hq;.inning. the management teams viewed this development as useful. Their 
assumption was that the teams would increase their focus on Sun's strategic goals and 
priorities and challenge their initiatives to increase their support. However, the teams 
were more interested in increasing the strategic relevance of their initiatives for the 
top management and executives. The teams recognized that they would gain more 
attention and resources if the strategic relevance of their initiative increased. Hence, 
the just-described consequence produced several challenging effects. Firstly, the 
extent of the initiatives and their objectives produced increasing delays. Initiatives 
were unable to finish according to their plans and milestone delivery dates. Secondly, 
individual initiatives became more complex as they sought to address all relevant 
issues of Sun's strategic objectives. Therefore more and more roll-out and delivery 
delays were acknowledged by the management teams and the planned improvements 
deriving from the initiatives could not be utilized in the time expected by the 
organisation and this was occurring during a critical period when Sun's margins were 
decreasing and its operational costs were increasing. 
Table 34: The effects and their implications. 
Initiative Activities 
(37) 
• Reduce the 
complexities and 
ongoing activities 
due to the defined 
company 
objectives and 
goals 
(38) 
• Close the gap 
between Sun's 
strategic 
directions and 
ongoing initiative 
activities and 
plans 
Effects 
• Initiative objectives 
and goals and 
related activities 
started to change 
(drifting) and 
increased the 
challenge for Sun 
to prioritise and 
focus on the 
defined strategic 
directions 
• Ongoing initiatives 
were continuously 
influenced by 
various executives 
and managers and 
the gaps increased 
for the SSC 
initiative and 
related initiatives to 
optimise initiative 
Implications 
• Different initiatives included different aspects of supporting Sun's 
strategic objectives and goals 
• Initiative objectives and goals started to drift from the defined 
company objectives and goals 
• Within the initiatives, different teams started to align their 
objectives and goals to the Sun priorities 
• Initiative stakeholders fear ed that their initiatives would lose 
relevance for Sun, and information on how initiatives supported 
the Sun strategy became difficult to interpret 
~ ~ The dynamics of changing and drifting goals of individual 
initiatives increased the challenge for the management teams to 
define priorities and reduce complexities of the ongoing initiative 
activities 
• Different managers and executives used the drifting initiative 
objectives and goals for their own interests 
• Managers and executives started to influence ongoing initiatives 
due to their individual agendas and interests 
• Demand started to grow for additional initiative resources and 
skills 
• Initiative started to follow other objectives, and some of the 
original defined initiative goals became Irrelevant and caused 
additional gaps 
:::;, Different managers and executives simulated the dynamics of 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - ------
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(39) 
• Increase the 
effectiveness of 
Sun's strategy 
execution 
performance 
activities 
• Ongoing initiatives 
started to overlap 
with each other 
changing ongoing initiative goals and directions due to their 
individual agendas and priorities - which increased the 
complexity of closing potential gaps 
• According to the changes of individual initiative objectives and 
goals, initiatives started to pursue increasingly similar objectives 
and goals 
inefficiently - which • Inefficient overlapping (cannibalisation) between initiative 
reduced the 
effectiveness of 
Sun's strategy 
execution 
performance 
resources and activities emerged 
• Initiatives derived and established new performance measures 
• Initiative-specific performance metrics increased and reduced 
effective control on Sun's strategy execution performance 
• Initiative delays in expected results increased 
=> Initiative objectives, goals and related activities became 
increasingly similar followed by a wide range of different 
performance measures per initiative, which increased the 
inefficiencies in Sun's strategy execution performance progress 
7.3.2.2 Challenging Boundaries and Barriers between ongoing Initiatives 
Different challenging boundaries and barriers emerged for individual initiatives 
during the interaction of the BSC initiative with other strategic initiatives. These 
boundaries and barriers gave rise to different effects on related and ongoing strategic 
initiatives. The situation where the BSC initiative and other ongoing initiatives faced 
challenging boundaries and barriers can best be described with the following two 
examples. 
The first example shows how the BSC initiative faced challenging boundaries and 
barriers from the Sun Sigma initiative, with the consequence of various upcoming 
effects. The BSC initiative was launched at a time when Sun Sigma was at its peak 
within the Sun organisation. There was great euphoria about Sun Sigma. Everybody 
was talking about it, and the initiative was moving like a wave across the 
organisation. Several Sun Sigma experts and related executives proposed to 
'converting' the BSC initiative into a Sun Sigma project which should follow the 
processes and procedures of Sun Sigma. There was little understanding in the growing 
Sun Sigma community as to why the BSC initiative should not become a Sun Sigma 
project, follow its rules and processes, and apply its methods. This situation raised 
boundaries and barriers for the BSC initiative to progress with its initiative plans and 
activities to tulfil its defined initiative targets. 
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'It was hard to start and continue our work for the 
balanced scorecard initiative. In the beginning near/.v 
every day I was asked by somebody why we don't follm1,' 
the Sun Sigma guidelines and procedures ... It absorbed a 
lot of energy and we started be late with our first deliver}' 
results. ' (Senior Program Manager & BSC Core Team, 
2004, [4]) 
The Sun Sigma boundaries and barriers increased pressure on the BSC initiative, with 
different consequences. Firstly, the BSC initiative team became increasingly absorbed 
with "Sun Sigma Alignment" discussions and how the balanced scorecard concepts 
related to the Sun Sigma concepts and methodologies. Those interactions forced the 
BSC initiative to postpone its first delivery results because they could not be delivered 
on time. Too many alignment and verification meetings absorbed team members of 
the BSC initiative. Secondly, the BSC initiative was forced to integrate a Sun Sigma 
expert into its core team. This change increased the BSC initiative costs (additional 
team member) and the BSC initiative team structure changed. Thirdly, the new Sun 
Sigma core team member tried to promote Sun Sigma across the teams, which created 
additional complexities and discussions about the overall BSC initiative objectives 
and goals and slowed down some planned activities. This constellation was sub-
optimal but unavoidable for the BSC team. Sun Sigma applied excessive pressure on 
the BSC initiative so as to become closer to it. 
The second example illustrates that, over time, vanous ongomg initiative teams 
increased their barriers against the BSC initiatives. The BSC initiative concepts of 
focusing and re-aligning Sun activities with the company's strategic goals and 
objectives created fear and resistance within the different initiative teams. Not all of 
the initiatives were willing to reduce their activities and reallocate some of their 
resources to other initiatives with higher priorities. The BSe initiative concept 
heightened the competition for resources among initiatives by measuring their 
contribution on Sun's strategic goals. This approach created fear and resistance, so 
that various teams started to increase pressure on the management teams to reduce 
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BSC activities and efforts. The general argument was that the balanced scorecard 
concept would become increasingly complex for other initiatives. 
I felt an increasing resistance against our BSC 
initiative from other programs ... I think it was fear of 
being reduced in their project scope and being 
controlled by us on how their programs are performing 
against Sun's strategy execution. We all know there 
were a lot of potential for improvements ... '(EMEA 
Operations Manager & BSC Core Team Member, 2006, 
[29]) 
Executives from other initiatives increased their criticism that the BSC project was 
slowing down the progress of their initiatives. Alongside criticisms by other initiative 
teams, nearly all initiatives had already re-engineered their communications on the 
initiative goals and measurements and how their individual initiative was driving the 
company's strategy performance. This revision of goals and objectives increased the 
difficulties of Sun's management team in selecting and prioritising resources. On the 
other hand, the initiatives communicated increasing delays and the need for more 
resources. The question arose as to what was responsible for the increasing delays. 
Two answers emerged. The first group of managers blamed the BSC initiative for the 
increased complexities between the initiatives. The second group of managers realised 
that the initiatives had tried to catch up with all relevant strategies and goals, after the 
management teams had announced them to the organisation and started to measure 
performance through the BSC initiative. This effect created complexities and 
additional activities within the various initiatives which produced further complexities 
and delays. 
In summary, the first stage of initiative boundaries and barriers can be describcd as 
strong. Strategic initiativcs like Sun Sigma utilised their existing structure and 
dominancc to influcnce the BSe programme. After the BSe initiati\'c had startcd to 
execute its mission and goals, barriers from othcr programmes decrcased. The BSe 
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initiative facilitated the overall dynamic that other initiatives started to align and 
change their objectives, goals and related activities according to the defined company 
objectives and goals. Those activities encouraged the different initiatives to catch up 
with the new Sun directions and balanced scorecard-related concepts. Furthermore, 
other programme teams and executives created overlapping activities within their 
individual initiatives and started to compete for additional resources, which created 
additional conflicts and complexities within the different ongoing initiatives. The 
growing complexities of the different initiatives stimulated other initiatives to increase 
resistance and barriers against the BSC initiative, which reflected the last stage of this 
challenging situation in the BSC initiative case study. 
Table 35: The effects and their implications 
Initiative Activities Effects Implications 
(40) • The Sun Sigma • Growing euphoria on the Sun Sigma initiative and related 
• Progress with the initiative raised activities across the organisation 
BSC initiative boundaries and • Requests from different Sun Sigma oriented managers to 
activities and barriers for the transform the BSC initiative into a Sun Sigma project 
plans and BSC initiative and • Increasing complexities and alignment activities between the BSC 
establish the slowed down the initiative and the Sun Sigma initiative 
balanced BSC initiative's • The BSC initiative ran into delays as alignment activities between 
scorecard concept progress the Sun Sigma initiative and the BSC initiative absorbed scarce 
across Sun initiative resources 
~ ~ The BSC initiative progress slowed down due to the emerging 
Sun Sigma euphoria to transform the BSC initiative into a Sun 
Sigma project, with the consequence of BSC initiative delays in 
their expected results 
(41) • New Sun Sigma • Alignment activities between the Sun Sigma initiative and the BSC 
initiative gave rise to a request to integrate a Sun Sigma expert 
into the BSC initiative core team 
• Challenge all 
ongoing initiative 
spending due to 
the defined 
company priorities 
and goals 
(42) 
• Integrate the 
balanced 
expertise reduced 
objectivity and 
created additional 
barriers against 
validating existing 
initiative activities, 
according to the 
defined company 
objectives and 
goals 
• Complexities and 
delays arose from 
uncoordinated 
• The new Sun Sigma expert created additional discussions and 
inefficiencies within the existing team structure 
• Additional Sun Sigma expertise within the BSC initiative team 
reduced progress in some of the planned initiative activities and 
tasks 
~ ~ New Sun Sigma expertise added to the existing BSC core team 
created additional complexities and barriers for some of the 
planned initiative activities and tasks 
• The BSC initiative integrated the strategy review and monitoring 
processes into Sun's existing business operations 
• Initiatives started up individual activities to align their activities 
scorecard 
concept into 
Sun's existing 
management 
structures and 
processes 
initiative changes 
in their objectives, 
goals and activities 
created resistance 
from other 
initiatives to the 
BSe initiative 
with the defined company priorities, objectives, and goals 
• The emerging inefficiencies of the overlapping initiative activities 
created barriers against the BSe initiative 
• Other initiative teams blamed the BSe initiative for their increased 
complexities and delays 
=> Individual initiative related and uncoordinated alignment 
activities increased complexities for various initiatives and 
created resistance against the BSC initiative to progress with 
their plans and activities 
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7.4 Summary 
This case study has outlined and discussed challenges and effects in the context of the 
BSC initiative on the basis of interactions between the BSC initiative and Sun 's 
organizational context and interactions with other strategic initiatives. Those 
interactions gave rise to different challenges from which various effects emerged. 
These challenges were stimulated by different drivers and can be classified into two 
main categories. Firstly, they can be classified according to the observed interactions 
between the BSC initiative and Sun's organizational context. Secondly, they can be 
classified according to the observed interactions between the BSC initiative and other 
strategic initiatives. 
Figure 24: Related key driver and observed challenges , in relation to the BSe initiative. 
Observed Challenges 
Interactions between the BSC Organisational Resistance initiative and Sun 's ---. 
against the BSC Initiative 
organisational context 
Challenges from Misaligned 
.... Focus Areas within the 
Related Key Driver Organisation 
Decision making proceses 
Capabilities to manage scarce firm 
resources 
Resource allocation processes and 
priorities 
Challenging business situations 
(Mode of Operation) Strategy Execution 
~ ~ Inefficiencies between Strategic 
Initiatives 
Interactions between the BSC 
initiative and other strategic t---- Challenging boundaries and 
initiatives ~ ~ barriers from ongoing initiatives 
The figure ummanse the BSC initiative related key drivers which timulated th 
four different challenges cia ified into two type of interaction. In thi r gard, the 
fir t dri cr r lated to Sun' e i ting de i ion making pro e unit and 
ng ing initiati upported and protected their indi idual intere t and ag nda" 
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which generated challenging situations for Sun. Various effects emerged according to 
interactions with Sun's organizational context and other ongoing initiatives. The 
capacity to manage scarce firm resources illustrates the second driver in the context 
of the BSC initiative, which aimed to establish new management capabilities and 
stimulate critical situations based on the company's existing capacity to manage 
scarce firm resources. Those existing capabilities stimulated different situations and 
emerging effects within the company. In this regard, the third driver, resource 
allocation process and priorities, created different situations and dynamics, especially 
within various ongoing initiatives, which generated various challenging effects and 
outcomes. The fourth driver related to extraordinary challenging business situations 
(Mode of Operation) for Sun, in the context of the BSC initiative. Difficulties within 
various regions of the Sun organisations created situations which hampered the BSC 
initiative plans and ongoing activities. Furthennore, those situations caused various 
difficulties for Sun's strategic initiative and organizational context. Overall, these 
drivers generated four different challenges during the implementation of the BSC 
initiative, as now described. 
Table 36: Summary of sse initiative related challenge and emerged effects. 
Observed Challenges Emerged Effects (Observed Examples) 
Organisational resistance (31) Challenging and critical business situations increased resistance against 
against the balanced change in existing management capabilities and approaches, caused sse initiative 
scorecard: This situation is delays, and increased the pressure on the sse initiative to establish change 
characterised by emerging enhancements 
organisational resistance 
against the balanced scorecard (32) Actual management capabilities and competencies increased barriers against 
and sse initiative related the planned balanced scorecard changes which increased the complexities within 
activities and plans. the organisation and sse initiative 
Challenges from Misaligned 
Focus Areas within the 
Organisation: This situation 
illustrates Sun's fragmented 
organisational structure and 
related and misaligned ongoing 
activities, which raised different 
challenges. 
(33) Existing management relations established solidarity against the planned sse 
initiative changes to protect their competencies and decision power 
(34) Various managers and executives still supported misaligned activities alongside 
their balanced scorecard support, which increased the complexity of improving Sun's 
strategy execution focus for the sse initiative 
(35) The project reviews and consolidation activities of the sse initiative caused 
disorientation on Sun's strategic focus and reduced motivation to progress within 
some project teams 
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Strategy Execution 
Inefficiencies between 
Strategic Initiatives: This 
situation illustrates inefficient 
(36) Following pre-defined company priorities and strategic objectives mainly 
developed by one business unit (GSO) caused confusions and misunderstandings 
within other business units and raised additional challenges 
(37) Initiative objectives and goals and related activities started to change (drifting) 
and increased the challenge for Sun to prioritise and focus on the defined strategic 
directions and reduce complexities in ongoing initiative activities 
dynamics and overlapping (38) Ongoing initiatives were continuously influenced by various executives and 
between initiatives during their managers and the gaps increased for the sse initiative and related initiatives to 
individual implementation to optimise initiative activities 
support Sun's overall strategy 
execution progress. (39) Initiative objectives, goals and related activities became increasingly similar 
followed by a wide range of different performance measures per initiative, which 
increased the inefficiencies in Sun's strategy execution performance progress 
Challenging boundaries and (40) The sse initiative's progress slowed down due to the emerging Sun Sigma 
barriers of ongoing euphoria to transform the sse initiative into a Sun Sigma project with the 
initiatives: this situation is consequence of sse initiative delays in their expected results 
defined by different emerging 
boundaries and barriers (41) New Sun Sigma expertise added to the existing sse core team created 
between ongoing initiatives in additional complexities and barriers for some of the planned initiative activities and 
the context of the sse initiative. tasks 
(42) Complexities and delays due to uncoordinated initiative changes in their 
objectives, goals and activities created resistance by other initiatives against the 
sse initiative 
Sun's business is specifically focused on products and servIces for network 
computing. The latter has been the company's focus for the twenty years of its 
existence, and it is based on the premise that the power of a single process, computer, 
or device can be dramatically increased if it is interconnected with other systems. In 
this context, the company began to focus on new business strategies which arose from 
Sun's mission, vision, and values, and from ongoing assessment of how best to help 
Sun customers achieve competitive advantage through the strategic use of network 
computing and information technology. The BSC initiative was launched as a 
strategic enabler to establish a platform for Sun to start a consolidated business review 
and prioritisation process to increase the effectiveness and support of Sun's strategy 
execution. In this regard, various challenges, complexities and dynamics were 
addressed. At first, the BSC initiative achieved some successes, but these were 
ditlicult to maintain over time. A major challenge emerged in the context of other 
strategic change i n i t i a t i \ " l ~ s . . Each initiative sought to reshape and communicate its 
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unique value creation and results according to Sun's strategic objectives and goals 
differently over time. It became difficult for the management team to identify 
differences and gaps within Sun's strategic initiative portfolio supporting the new 
business strategies and directions. These advertising and marketing efforts by 
individual initiatives created additional complexities and delays. On the one hand. 
each initiative increased its promises to execute Sun's business strategies over time; 
on the other, those promises created additional complexities and delays. The promises 
of various initiatives to support all of Sun's strategic objectives led to extensions in 
the scope and deliverables of those initiatives. The consequence was that the company 
was unable to utilize the promised change improvements in time. This result was not 
expected by Sun's managers; moreover, it was surprising that the Sun strategy 
execution performance decreased instead of becoming optimized through the new and 
more factually based management approach. One reason for this response may be the 
various observed challenging effects and complexities which often produced 
unexpected dynamics within the implementation process. 
8 Analysis of the Findings 
The empirical chapters on the three case studies focused on each strategic initiatiyc 
individually within the firm. This chapter analyses and discusses the findings of three 
strategic initiatives within the firm. Furthermore, the following sections compare 
some of the findings of the three company case studies to increase the range of the 
analysis and discussion of the case studies conducted and to find answers to the 
research questions. In this regard, the main concepts identified from strategic 
initiative interactions, related challenges and the creation of dysfunctional effects 
emerged from the analysis of the research. These concepts are less definitive than they 
might seem. Different research findings may arise from similar social settings, 
because the research locus and the perspectives taken to anticipate the social reality 
may vary. Nevertheless, the following analysis is based on the researcher's 
interpretations and knowledge deemed best able to conceptualise the dynamics of the 
phenomena studied. Table 37 provides a 'roadmap' to guide the reader through the 
different analyses and discussion areas of this research project. 
Table 37: Analysis and discussion roadmap. 
Analysis 
(1 ) 
Strategic initiatives 
(2) 
Strategic initiative 
interactions 
Description 
Analysis, comparison and discussion of the three strategic initiatives: 
• Sun Sigma initiative 
• CRM Convergence initiative 
• BSC initiative 
To provide an overview of the specific characteristics of each individual strategic initiative. 
Analysis, comparison and discussion of the observed interactions: 
• 
• 
between the firm's organisational context and the case study strategic initiative 
between the case study strategic initiative and other ongoing strategic initiatives 
Analysis, comparison and discussion of the challenges emerging from strategic initiative 
interactions: 
• the formation of the emerging challenges observed 
• types of challenges emerging from initiative implementation 
Analysis, comparison and discussion of the consequences arising from the emerging 
challenges - dysfunctional effects: 
• 
• 
Types and characteristics of dysfunctional effects 
Definition of dysfunctional effects 
Developing a theory of dysfunctions from the strategic initiative related dysfunclions which 
emerged from initiative implementations. 
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(3) Theoretical reflections on the analysis results in the perspective of the main bodies of 
Theoretical analysis literature selected, focusing on: 
and discussion of the. Interactions of Strategic Initiatives 
findings 
• 
• 
• 
Challenges emerging from Strategic Initiative Interactions 
Drivers of such Challenges 
Theoretical reflections on the challenges and dysfunctional effects observed 
In accordance with the analysis illustrated and roadmap discussed, this section starts 
with an analysis of the main characteristics, differences and similarities among the 
three strategic initiatives observed. In addition, the analysis of the observed strategic 
initiative interactions and discussion of the challenges and various dysfunctional 
effects observed as emerging challenges and threats to strategic initiative 
implementation are discussed in this section. 
Finally, this chapter discusses the findings on strategic initiative related interactions in 
light of the resource based theory and the strategic initiative concept, focusing on 
problematic aspects of combining new and old firm resources, on the knowledge 
based theory, with theoretical reflection on the implications of the strategic initiative 
related knowledge creation process, and on the drivers identified in the context of the 
dynamic capability concept and the theoretical debate on challenges and dysfunctional 
effects. 
8.1 Comparison of the Strategic Initiative Characteristics 
All three initiatives observed and studied - the Sun Sigma initiative, CRM 
Convergence initiative, and the BSC initiative - represented strategic profiles for the 
company. The initiatives related to Sun's strategic agenda, and their purpose was to 
implement the company's new business strategies. Each single strategic initiative 
envisaged changes and renewed the firm's existing capabilities and competencies, 
sometimes with substantial consequences for the entire company and its current 
sources of competitive advantage. In this regard. all three initiatives had a similar 
organisational background and reflected the way in which Sun intended to implement 
its business strategies as part of global and strategic improvements of the company. 
Ilowcver, whcn analysis is made of the interactions and the emerging effects and 
challengcs of the threc strategic initiativcs "is-a-l'is Sun's organisational contcxt and 
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other ongomg initiatives, each individual initiative exhibits umque characteristics 
despite the similarities of organisational background and organisational structure 
outlined in what follows. 
The aim of the three strategic initiatives was to renew key areas of Sun's existing 
capabilities and competencies. Nevertheless, because of Sun Sigma's strategic 
renewal focus, the initiatives' target audience and areas included the entire 
organisation and all employees of Sun Microsystems Inc. Almost every employee was 
involved in the global process excellence programme. By contrast, the CRM 
Convergence initiative focused on the firm's customer facing and support teams. 
These areas account for between 30% and 40% of Sun's entire workforce. 
Furthermore, the Balanced Scorecard initiative's target audience was smaller in size 
than that of the CRM Convergence initiative. The Balanced Scorecard initiative 
mainly concerned Sun's management and executive teams, which make up between 
100/0 and 20% of the company's workforce. The next unique characteristic relates to 
the organisational integration of the initiatives. The Sun Sigma initiative became 
strongly integrated into Sun's existing organisation. In view of Sun Sigma's 
objectives, the initiative started to enhance Sun's existing organisational structures 
with the new Sun Sigma organisation (CAO; Customer Advocacy Organisation). In 
this context, the Sun Sigma initiative underwent strong organisational integration 
during the implementation process. In comparison, the CRM Convergence initiative 
was only to some extent integrated, and during its implementation it focused on the 
consolidation of Sun's existing and de-fragmented organisational structures, whereas 
the Sun Sigma initiative represented during its implementation the new Sun Sigma 
organisation, CAO. The Balanced Scorecard initiative was rather autonomous because 
it focused on the alignment of organisational and other ongoing activities and 
objectives. In detail, the initiative did not engage with Sun's organisational 
environment during its implementation phase. Instead, it sought to review the 
company's business operations priorities and align them with current strategies in one 
strategic direction. Moreover, all three initiatives differed in the duration of their 
implementation. The Sun Sigma initiative was implemented during a period of 
approximately 5.5 years across the entire company. In contrast, the CRM 
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Convergence initiative was implemented in 3 years and the Balanced Scorecard 
initiative in 1.5 years. According to the three initiative case studies, these differences 
in implementation times may have been due to two factors. Firstly, the target audience 
and area of each individual initiative differed in size. Whereas the Sun Sigma 
initiative covered nearly the entire organisation, the CRM Convergence and Balanced 
Scorecard initiatives only focused on specific areas of Sun's organisation. Secondly, 
the size and resource requirements of the three different initiatives varied 
significantly. The Sun Sigma initiative began with a manageable number of different 
quality and process improvement projects and increased its project activities and 
scope during the implementation phase, so that, within four years, there were up to 
4000 projects ongoing around the globe, and between 10-15% of the worldwide staff 
had became closely involved in ongoing Sun Sigma improvement activities and 
projects. The CRM Convergence initiative increased its scope to Sun's global 
customer facing and support teams and aimed at transforming and renewing Sun's 
sales and solution delivery capabilities over a period of 3.5 years. In this regard, the 
CRM Convergence initiative interrelated with between 30 and 40% of Sun's global 
workforce. The Balanced Scorecard initiative instead had a rather rapid 
implementation time of 1.5 years, which may relate to the characteristic that the 
initiative concerned only Sun's global management and executives teams, providing 
new processes to review and align ongoing company operations and programmes with 
actual business strategies and priorities. Hence, the initiative was not taken up with 
intensive transformational activities such as renewing departments, business units, 
and the skills of sales teams. Nevertheless, all three initiatives addressed the creation 
of new capabilities with strong deviations from the company's current capabilities and 
competencies. 
The implementation approach used for the three different strategic initiatives IS 
another characteristic which differed for each individual initiative. The Sun Sigma 
initiative can bcst be described as adopting a de-centralised implementation approach. 
Starting with a manageable number of quality impro\'cment projccts, the initiati\'c 
c\'ol\'cd mcr timc into a global and de-centralised programme across thc entirc 
organisation. Each busincss unit, dcpartmcnt, and rcgion increasingly dC\'clopcd ib 
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own Sun Sigma competencies and individual improvement and locally-focused 
quality and process excellence improvement projects, according to the Sun Sigma 
methodologies and approaches. By contrast, the Balanced Scorecard initiative was 
based on a centralised initiative approach. The company's de-fragmented and de-
centralised business planning and monitoring processes and capabilities were to 
become centralised and consolidated across the different regions and selling units. 
Therefore, the Balanced Scorecard initiative activities were rather centrally 
implemented and managed. In comparison, the CRM Convergence initiative included 
characteristics of both de-centralised and centralised initiative approaches. The 
initiative focused on centrally organising the basic CRM business processes in every 
single region and selling unit. Nevertheless, the initiative also initiated and supported 
the creation of de-centralised CRM competence centers in order to renew and enhance 
local sales and customer services with market individual solutions and sales 
capabilities like knowledge of individual target industries. Therefore, the CRM 
Convergence initiative approach can be characterised as a trade-off between a 
centralised and a de-centralised initiative approach. 
The last characteristic, which varied by initiative, concerned the intensity of the 
interrelations, principally those between the strategic initiative and the firm's 
organisational context and between the strategic initiative and other ongoing strategic 
projects. Through its de-centralised initiative approach, the Sun Sigma initiative 
generated strong and sometimes regional independent interrelations across the entire 
organisation. Therefore, the Sun Sigma initiative reflected a programme which 
stimulated strong interrelations with the firm's organisational context and other 
ongoing initiatives, whilst the CRM Convergence initiative created strong 
interrelations with parts of Sun's existing organisation and other ongoing initiatives. 
These interrelations related to such specific CRM Convergence topics as solution 
selling and solution delivery capabilities. Hence CRM-related organisational units and 
customer-oriented programmes generated interrelations with the CRM Convergence 
initiative. The Balanced Scorecard initiative had a rather moderate interrelation \\ith 
Sun's organisational context. because its aim was to align current activities and 
priorities with Sun's new business strategies. ]n this dynamic context. the initiative 
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closely interrelated with other ongoing initiatives, such as those aimed at 
implementing the company's strategic objectives. The Balanced Scorecard irutiati e 
therefore interrelated with other ongoing strategic initiatives in order to align their 
ongoing activities with the firm's objectives and priorities. The differences among the 
above-described strategic initiative characteristics are summarised in the following 
Table 38. 
Table 38: Strategic initiative parameters and unique characteristics . 
Characteristics Sun Sigma Initiative CRM Convergence ) Balanced Scorecard Initiative Initiative 
Strategic Focus on Improvement and transformation Transformation of Sun's current Improvement and transformation 
Sun 's existing of Sun's existing bus iness sales capabilities , especially of Sun 's de-centralized and de-
capabilities and operations and business increase Sun's sales fragmented business planning 
competencies processes, especially the effectivness by transforming and monitoring capabilities , 
improvement of Sun's product existing transaction- and especially the improvement of 
and service qualities through product-oriented sales Sun 's strategy implementation 
operational excellence capabilities into solution sales processes and capabilities, 
standards, capabilities . 
Duration 5.5 Years 3 Years 1.5 Years 
Organisational Strong Integration: extension Part wise Integrated: Autonomous: Validation and 
Integration of the current organisation Transformation and improvement on organisational 
through a new Sun Sigma consolidation of existing and initaitive priorit ies and 
organisation (CAO). organisational structures. objectives, 
Implementation De-Centralized Trade-Off between Centralised Central ized 
Approach and De-Centralised Approach 
Target Audience and Business-Operations, strong Strong front-office scope, Sun 's management and 
Areas back-office focus , Later on front- especially the customer facing executive teams, includ ing 
offices were included in the teams and support teams . planning and finance 
initiative's scope . All employees. Between 30-40% of Sun 's departments, Between 10-20% of 
employees. Sun's employees, 
Initiative Size Large-scale, over 3000 Moderate-scale, focus on Sun's Narrowed-scale, focus on Sun's 
(Allocated registerd Sun Sigma projects, sales , customer support and management teams . 
Resources) over 15% of the worldwide staff key-account teams 
became strongly involved 
Intensity of Strong interaction with Sun 's Strong interaction with Sun 's Moderate interaction with Sun 's 
Interactions organisation and other global sales organisation and market- organisation, Strong interaction 
programs . oriented initaitives. with other ongoing programs. 
The table outlines the distinctive features of each single strategic initiative, together 
with their similarities of organisational structure and operational background within 
the case study company. Overall, the Sun Sigma initiative was the largest-scale 
initiative, in comparison to the CRM Convergence and Balanced Scorecard initiatives, 
due to its implementation time target audience and company areas affected, and ize. 
Furthermore in all thr e initiati e inten interaction wer ob erved between Sun 
org l1i ational cont xt and other ongoing trat gic initiati e , 
8.2 Analysis of Strategic Initiative related Interactions 
The following section analyses, compares and discusses the strategic initiative related 
interactions on the basis of the three in-depth case studies. The first part focused on 
analysis and comparison of the different interactions observed between the strategic 
initiative and the firm's organisational context and interactions between the strategic 
initiative and other ongoing strategic initiatives. The second part of the section 
focused on strategic initiative implementation challenges which emerged from 
different strategic initiative interactions: in detail, the formation of the initiative 
related challenges, the characteristics of the challenges identified, and the main 
challenges identified through comparison. The third section defines analyses, 
compares and classifies the dysfunctional effects consequent on the challenges that 
emerged. The last part of this section discusses and illustrates an emerging theory of 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions, constructed with the main concepts resulting 
from the analysis conducted in the previous parts of this section. 
Individual interactions with the firm's organisational context and other ongomg 
initiatives were observed in all three case studies. In this regard, each individual 
strategic initiative created different interactions and exhibited different similarities in 
interactions between Sun's organisational context and different ongoing strategic 
initiatives. In detail, the different strategic initiative related interactions observed and 
compared can be summarised as three different interactions between the strategic 
initiative and Sun's organisational context and five different interactions between 
ongoing strategic initiatives. 
The three types of interactions observed between the strategic initiative and Sun's 
organisational context related to specific organisational characteristics and 
management competencies. Firstly. strategic initiative collaborations with Sun's 
cxisting organisational structures created interactions during structural changes made 
to the cxisting organisation. The changes in the existing organisational structures 
stimulated interactions and can be defined as the first interaction platform betwcen a 
strategic initiatiyc and Sun's organisational context. Secondly. collaborations betwcen 
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the strategic initiative and Sun's organisational context were stimulated throuah 
c 
decentralised and de-fragmented organisational structures. In particular, the degree of 
decentralisation and de-fragmentation reflected the degree of individuality per 
organisational unit and facilitated different types of interactions. Thirdly. 
collaborations between the strategic initiative and fIrm-individual and well-
established management processes and routines generated the last group of 
interactions between ongoing strategic initiatives and Sun's organisational context. In 
particular, existing and empirically developed management capabilities established 
decision routines, resource allocations processes and routines to defIne resource 
priorities as part of the fIrm's management capabilities. These areas and processes 
stimulated interactions between ongoing strategic initiatives and the organisational 
context of the company. 
The various interactions between ongoing strategic initiatives can be summarised in 
fIve main units. Firstly, ongoing strategic initiatives interacted during the 
implementation of initiative related efforts to drive and establish new standards and to 
implement consolidations across different ongoing initiatives. Standards as unifIed 
methodologies, processes, measurement criteria etc. and alignment efforts between 
ongoing initiatives, like orienting ongoing initiative activities to new business 
strategies. The second group of interactions between ongoing initiatives occurred 
during initiative-specifIc efforts and implementation activities to enhance and change 
existing strategic initiative administration and management processes and routines. 
Thirdly, managing initiative objectives, initiative results and expectations involved 
different interactions with other ongoing initiatives. In particular, activities to manage 
and review initiative related activities according to their strategic value and fIt with 
the overall fIrm strategies activated different interactions between strategic initiatives. 
Fourthly, convergence dynamics between two or more ongoing strategic initiatives 
established new interactions between these initiatives. In detail, convergence activities 
like thc hannonization of specifIc initiative goals and objectives stimulated initiative-
spccific interrelations. The last group of interactions betwcen strategic initiativcs 
related to emerging, dc-fragmented and specialised knowledge bases of different 
strategic initiatives. Those different knowledge bases clashed with other specialised 
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and initiative related knowledge bases and created new interactions across ongomg 
strategic initiatives. 
Figure 25: Summary of the comparison among the different initiative related interactions. 
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formations 
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The various observed and summarised interactions between the strategic initiative and 
Sun's organisational context and between the strategic initiative and other ongoing 
strategic initiatives gave rise - together with the expected results - to different 
challenges with problematic consequences, and which were stimulated by different 
drivers. These challenges and the relative consequences of emerging dysfunctional 
effects and their drivers are discussed and analysed in the following sections. 
8.2.1 Strategic Initiative Implementation Challenges 
The three trategic initiatives show that initiative specific drivers produced, along ide 
the e pee ted initiative re ult , diffl r nt challeng during the strategic initiati e 
impl mentation proce . Furthermor tho e dri er repre ented initiati c related 
proce e which were acti ated through the interaction ob erved or through 
indi idual initiati e implementation acti itic and 
hallengc during th implem ntation pr cc 
m time gave ri e t d i f ~ ~ r nt 
All three strategic initiatives - Sun Sigma, CRM Convergence, and the Balanced 
Scorecard - were officially defined and communicated by the company as successes. 
Some managers and executives claimed that the company had seen great 
improvements in the driving and implementing of the business strategies defined. 
However, despite the officially-announced and initiative related success stories and 
results, there were still critical voices, as well as empirical evidence that the company 
had been subject to strong tensions, and that the strategic initiatives launched had 
partly failed to implement the firm's business strategies successfully. Today, the Sun 
Sigma initiative is still under discussion inside and outside Sun, the main issues being 
that the overall programme was too expensive, and that it is difficult to determine 
whether the initiative achieved the expected results. Moreover, internals claim that the 
Sun Sigma initiative was too expensive, and various strategy review papers have 
documented that the initiative to some extent led nowhere, with the consequence that 
Sun's management team has decided to reduce its Sun Sigma investments. By 
contrast, the CRM Convergence initiative has been celebrated as a success story, and 
since 2005 it has been apparent that the overall company is dealing more openly with 
solution-oriented offerings, customers, and market approaches. Nevertheless, the 
company still comprises a strong product-oriented community and mindset. 
Furthermore, the CRM Convergence initiative required far more resources and 
investments than initially expected. The third programme; the Balanced Scorecard 
initiative, was launched as a strategic enabler to establish a platform for Sun to start a 
consolidated business review and prioritisation process to increase the effectiveness of 
and support for Sun's strategy execution. In this regard, various challenges emerged 
during the strategic initiative implementation process and created various challenging 
effects which often produced unexpected and destructive outcomes within the 
implementation process. Those side-effects and challenges emerged within all three 
strategic initiatives and were among the reasons why the overall strategic initiative 
successes and expected results were slowed down and diminished to a certain degree. 
In the three case studies conducted, the related drivers and emerging challenges were 
analysed in detail and compared. 
269 
The observed drivers can be described as idiosyncratic processes which stimulated the 
strategic initiative related transformation activities: in detail, the integration and 
recombination of old and new firm resources to reshape the firm's sources of 
competitive advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Winter, 2003). Moreover, comparison among the strategic initiative specific drivers 
led to the classification of six different processes which were critical for the 
implementation's success, as illustrated in the following Table 39. 
Table 39: Overview and definition of the strategic initiative related driver. 
Driver 
Management Support 
Process 
Decision Process to 
prioritise and implement 
changes 
Organisational 
Administration and 
Support Process 
Process of Interpretation 
Definition and Characteristics 
• Support by managers and executives for planned implementation activities and 
transformations 
• Support processes and routines by different organisational units, and other ongoing 
initiatives to support initiative related activities 
• Focusing management attention on specific topics and implementation plans 
• Decision structures, processes, and routines within the company 
• Defining priorities and goals based on new business strategies and company 
agendas 
• Establish decisions for initiative related activities and plans, including changes and 
transformations 
• Relations with managerial roles, responsibilities, competencies and decision power 
to drive and implement initiative plans 
• Processes and routines of allocating and re-allocating required and initiative related 
resources 
• Strategic initiative related administration and support processes, including 
methodologies, skills and approaches 
• 
• 
• 
Facilitation of and support for initiative related prerequisites to implement individual 
objectives and plans 
Includes initiative related communications and information exchanges with other 
organisational business units and ongoing strategic initiatives 
Interpretation and sense making of the strategic initiative's goals and how those 
goals relate to the business strategies and executive agendas 
• Realising and understanding the projected changes in the strategic initiative plans, 
objectives and aims 
• 
Matching and comparing the initiative aims and plans with individual agendas and 
interests of different organisational units 
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Process of Acceptance • Judging strategic initiative objectives, goals and planned results 
Process of Combination 
• Judging the value generation power of individual strategic initiatives 
• Accepting initiative objectives, goals, and planned aims 
• Recognising, accepting and approving the value of the strategic initiative 
• Accepting the changes envisaged for a planned or launched strategic initiative 
• Ability to combine existing skills, approaches, methodologies and approaches with 
novelties 
• Ability to apply new knowledge bases to existing environments and activities 
• Ability to construct and extend existing initiative knowledge bases with new aspects 
and activities and content from other ongoing initiatives 
• Ability to combine new skills and with existing skills 
The six different initiative specific processes emerged in similar ways in the context 
of various strategic initiative implementation activities and sometimes alongside the 
expected results, producing unpredictable outcomes, as now discussed. 
The definition of different objectives and priorities of the case study initiatives related 
to the processes of defining priorities and implementing changes (decision process to 
prioritise and implement changes). Various managers supported specific business unit 
objectives and agendas by pushing and defending higher priorities in regard to 
specific objectives of the initiatives, and this led to disconnections from the overall 
perspective to implement the firm's business strategies efficiently. Furthermore, 
defining priorities for implementing changes required interpretation of the relevance 
of the different objectives and goals of ongoing initiatives for the actors involved 
(process of interpreting and understanding changes): These activities were followed 
by the process of acceptance. Before executives started to support various changes 
they judged and approved those changes during the strategic initiative implementation 
activities. 
The next observed and classified driver enabled initiative implementation by 
mobilising Sun's decentralised organisational and management structures. In detail, 
this initiative related driver activated the company's management support processes 
for various initiativc plans and activities. These included the activation of different 
administrative and management processcs for the initiatives, for example by 
allocating and rc-allocating experts from deccntraliscd business to ongoing initiatives. 
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Furthermore, the decentralised organisational units faced the challenge of 
individuality. Various strategic initiatives had developed their own cultures, skills, 
approaches and processes over time and had to link their local priorities, agendas, and 
needs with the overall initiative expectations and objectives. In the context of an 
individual strategic initiative, various organisational units and other ongoing 
initiatives which interacted with the individual initiative were required to combine 
new approaches, skills and methodologies with their ongoing operations and activities 
(process of combination). 
In the context of the strategic initiative case studies conducted, different types of 
challenges emerged from the drivers described. Those drivers are discussed in the 
following sub-sections. 
8.2.1.1 Formation of Challenges 
Challenges arose from the strategic initiative implementation activities observed in 
the three in-depth case studies. All three strategic initiatives stimulated, through their 
implementation activities, different challenges, which in this study are defined as 
dysfunctional effects of the initiative related strategy implementation process. These 
challenges occurred alongside the expected and planned initiative results and 
expectations in so far as the results of a strategic initiative can be divided into two 
different groups. The first group reflects the planned transformation and includes the 
planned and utilized strategic initiative results and expectations relating to the 
company's strategic intent to implement its defined business strategies. The outcomes 
and results of this group are well-known to the management team of the company, 
and they reflect the implemented rationale of the strategic initiative, including the 
vision of the overall strategic initiative and the definition of initiative related 
objectives and goals. The dynamics and changes of this group are widely 
acknowledged by the company's different management teams, and they illustrate how 
the company is implementing its defined business strategies. In comparison, the 
second group of results is rather unexpected and less predictable. This group includes 
various upcoming challenges from which somewhat uncontrolled dysfunctional 
effects emerge, as illustrated in Figure 26. 
Figure 26: Challenges and emerging dysfunctional effects. 
Strategic 
Initiative 
Implementations 
Mobilisation 
Strategic Initiative Results 
Planned transformations 
• Recognition of expected results 
• Measurable and visible values 
• Improvements in the targeted areas 
• Successful strategy implementation 
achievements 
Emerging Challenges 
Unplanned and unexpected, non-
linear and unpredictable 
dysfunctional effects. 
Challenge n 
The challenges observed are stages at which existing firm resources interact with new 
resources and fail to establish new and competitive resource combinations often 
described as new bundles of resources (Barney, 1991 ; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 
1991; Peteraf, 1993). Instead of the strategic initiative's expected result of 
reconfiguring existing resource configurations, the initiative gives rise to problematic 
situations from which uncontrolled dysfunctional effects ensue. All three strategic 
initiatives stimulated different challenges, which can be classified into three different 
categories. 
(AJ Challenges based on interactions between the strategic initiative and the 
organi ational context 
(BJ Challenge based on interaction betrveen ongoing slrategic initiative 
Thc fir t ob crved challenge can be ummari ed a a ituation in which organi alional 
re i Ian e and barri r again I rh on oing tralegi initiati1'e (AJ acti itie and plan 
m rged . In d tail, all three [ th trategic initiati e exp rienccd chall ngc. in 
') 
overcommg organisational resistance and barriers against the ongomg initiative 
activities and plans. The Sun Sigma initiative faced situations of resistance raised by 
actors such as various executives, managers and project members, who impeded the 
Sun Sigma initiative's progress with their activities and plans. The CRM Convergence 
initiative encountered similar obstacles in that it aimed at improving the company's 
existing product-oriented sales capabilities and transforming them into solution and 
service-oriented sales capabilities. During the endeavour to transform existing sales 
capabilities, the situation arose where barriers and resistance from organisational units 
transformed the existing sales capabilities. Furthermore, the Balanced Scorecard 
initiative faced a similar situation of organisational resistance against the initiative 
related activities and plans. The Balanced Scorecard initiative specifically 
encountered resistance from challenging business situations and solidarity between 
different management teams and executives to protect individual business unit 
interests and agendas. Those situations generated organisational barriers and 
resistances against the Balanced Scorecard initiative. In summary, the first challenge 
was based on interactions with the firm's organisational context and can be 
characterised in terms of emerging barriers and resistance by organisational business 
units against the initiative related activities and plans. 
The second challenge can be classified as different reactions due to conflicting 
perspectives and misaligned business operations (AJ due to the ongoing activities and 
plans of the individual strategic initiative. The Sun Sigma initiative faced obstacles 
where organisational misinterpretations generated different challenging effects 
because of the complexities and challenges produced by different interpretations, 
expectations, and different supporting activities and decisions by the various actors 
involved. Sun Sigma became a teterogeneous synonym for actors as different as 
project teams, executives and decision makers, and line of business representatives. In 
detail, different perspectives emerged on the ongoing and planned Sun Sigma 
initiative activities and created different understandings on the Sun Sigma aims and 
topics. By extension, the CRM Convergence initiative was obstructed by de-
centralised organisational structures and de-fragmented and misaligned business 
operations from which various challenging ctTects arose. The Balanced Scorecard 
initiative experienced similar reactions from de-fragmented organisational structures 
and misaligned activities and ongoing operations and faced the challenge of different 
upcoming effects. In summary, the second observed challenge was based on 
interactions with the firm's organisational context and can be characterised in terms of 
different and sometimes controversial reactions from conflicting perspectives and 
misaligned business operations by different organisational business units and 
departments. Those controversial reactions generated various effects. 
The third observed challenge can be defined as challenging iterations and multiplier 
effects due to organisational and initiative related interactions (A). In this context, 
three different case studies are compared and similarities were identified. Firstly, the 
CRM Convergence initiative transformed the company's organisational context. This, 
in tum, affected the further development of the initiative by extending its scope (from 
local to global) and shifting its priorities (from three main business units to global 
sales organisation). This observation illustrates that the emerging challenges able to 
stimulate various critical effects comprised possible iterative characteristics which 
gave rise to further emerging challenges and additional unexpected effects. In 
comparison, similarities can be found within the initiative challenges arising from 
uncontrolled growth of Sun Sigma projects across the organisation (Sun Sigma 
project proliferations). This challenge emerged during the implementation phase of 
the Sun Sigma initiative, and it illustrates that, because of Sun Sigma-related initiative 
activities, uncontrolled proliferations of new Sun Sigma projects increased and 
produced new effects across the company as a multiplier of emerging challenges and 
new effects. Hence, findings illustrate that observed challenges emerge as tensions in 
the strategic initiative related implementation process and include iterative and 
multiplier characteristics from which new challenges and effects may emerge. 
The fourth observed challenge can be described as challenging dependencies betl1-'een 
difFerent ongoing strategic initiatil'e goals and objectives (B). This challenge can be 
found in all three strategic initiative case studies. The Sun Sigma experienced 
different challenges where the initiative engaged with other ongoing strategic 
initiatives in new dependencies based on the initiative-individual goals and objectives, 
with the consequence that challenges and effects evolved. The CRM Convergence 
initiative faced similar situations where emerging dependencies with other ongoing 
initiative goals and objectives created new challenges. Both strategic initiati\"es 
engaged and became engaged through other ongoing strategic initiatives in the 
complexities and challenges of emerging dependencies between individual initiative 
goals and objectives which in tum created challenging effects for the company. 
The fifth observed challenge can be described as challenging boundaries and barriers 
between ongoing strategic initiatives (B). The CRM Convergence and the Balanced 
Scorecard initiative faced barriers and boundaries raised by different ongoing 
initiatives which impeded both strategic initiatives from proceeding with their 
individual activities and plans. In detail, the CRM Convergence initiative created new 
customer metrics and success measures which were difficult for the Balanced 
Scorecard to change at a later stage. Furthermore, the Balanced Scorecard initiative 
faced the challenge of the emerging Sun Sigma euphoria and the requirement to be 
transformed into a Sun Sigma project, with the consequence that the Balanced 
Scorecard-related activities and plans slowed down and important milestones could 
not be reached in the expected time. Hence, this challenge illustrates how ongoing 
strategic initiatives created, with their activities, unexpected boundaries and barriers 
for other ongoing strategic initiatives. 
The sixth observed challenge can be summarised as de-fragmentations and 
inefficiencies between ongoing strategic initiatives (B). In this context, all three 
strategic initiatives faced the complexities of specific situations in which strategic 
execution inefficiencies, compliance challenges and conflicting perspectives between 
ongoing initiatives created challenges of strategic conflict between initiatives, with 
thc consequence of emerging and critical effects for the company. The Sun Sigma 
initiative cxperienced compliance challenges between other strategic initiatives 
because of its aim to combine existing initiative related knowledge bases \\'ith new 
Sun Sigma-related knowledge base. The CRM Com'ergcnce initiative experienced 
conflicting perspectivcs and convergence dynamics bct\\TCn ongoing strategic 
i n i t i a t i \ ' l ~ s s from which challenges emerged, and the Balanced Scorecard initiative 
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experienced inefficient overlaps between strategic initiatives, from which strategic 
threats emerged. 
The foregoing analysis, definition and classification of the observed challenges by the 
three strategic initiative case studies lead to the next step: comparison and definition 
of the main challenges in the context of strategic initiative implementation activities. 
Furthermore, analysis of their characteristics, according to the theoretical concepts 
derived from the literature review of this study, is conducted in the next section. 
8.2.1.2 Characteristics of the Main Challenges identified 
The discussion in the previous section summarised similarities on the basis of analysis 
and comparison of the strategic initiative related challenges (15 challenges) observed 
in the three in-depth case studies and the two different categories of challenges (A: 
Challenges based on interactions between the strategic initiative and the 
organisational context and B: Challenges based on interactions between ongoing 
strategic initiatives). The analysis and comparison of those similarities of the 
challenges from the three strategic initiative related case studies led to the final result, 
which highlights the three main challenges in the context of the strategic initiative 
case studies conducted, outlined in Figure 27. 
Figure 27: Overview of the emerged challenges, based on the case studies. 
Summarlsed main challenges 
Emerging resistance . 
boundaries and barriers 
against and between 
ongoIng strategic 
initiatives 
Similar challenges 
Organisational 
resistance and 
barriers against 
the ongoing 
strategic 
initiative 
Different 
rganisational misinterpre ta tions of Sun 
Sigma 
Organisa tional resistance against Sun 
Sigma 
Compliance challenges between 
strategic initiatives 
Challenging dependencies between 
initiative goals and objecti ves 
Emerging iniliative challenges ~ ~ o m m
uncontrolled project proliferations 
Sun Sigma initiative 
Challenging 
iterations and 
multiplier effects 
from 
organisational and 
initiative related 
interactions 
Challenging 
dependencies 
between 
different ongoing 
strategic 
initiative goals 
and objectives 
e'tfoactions from Organisational 
Transfonnations 
Conflicting perspectives and focuses 
between initiatives 
Challenging dependencies between 
initiative goals and objectives 
Challenging boundaries and barriers from 
ongoing ini tiatrves 
CRM Convergence initiative 
Conflicting perspecwes 
and challengIng 
dependencies between 
ongoing initiative 
strategies and 
Implementation plans 
Strategic de-
fragmentations 
and strategic 
inefficiencies 
Challenging 
boundaries and 
barriers bet'Neen 
ongoing 
strategic 
initiatives 
bet\¥een ongoing 
strategic 
initiatives 
Organisational ReSistance against the 
SSC Initiative 
Challenges from Misaligned Focus 
Areas Yw'ithin the Organisation 
SSC initiative 
The first mam challenge was summarised and defined as emergzng resistance, 
boundaries and barriers against and between ongozng strategic initiatives. This 
challenging situation emerges from both interactions due to strategic initiative 
interactions with the company's organisational context and from interactions between 
different strategic initiatives. The challenging situation comprises different forms of 
emerging and challenging resistances, boundaries and upcoming barriers against the 
ongoing strategic initiative. Or the strategic initiative facilitates blockages against 
other ongomg strategic initiatives and organisational units with tensions and 
complexities occurring because of the overall strategy implementation process. Both 
types include changes which somehow strongly deviate from existing capabilities, 
competencie and knowledge bases. 
Th econd mam challeng wa defined a conjhcting p er p ective and challeng ing 
d'P nd 17ci b h1'e n ongomg ini/iath e trategie and implementation p lan . Thi 
hallenging ituation include the problematic of diffi rent prioritie c nflicting 
p r pecti mi aligned ag nda , indi idual interc and chall nging d p nd nCI 
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between different ongomg strategic initiatives. In detail, strategic initiative 
implementations are sensitive, and they easily enter into critical dependence relations 
with other ongoing initiatives, in two areas especially. Firstly, dependencies arIse 
from different initiative strategies as the positioning and recognition of their 
individual objectives and goals. Secondly, strategic initiatives form difficult 
dependencies with other strategic initiatives during their implementation as 
unexpected overlaps among activities or different understandings and 
implementations of similar processes with sometimes inefficient outcomes. 
The two mam challenges are extended through the third mam challenge or 
characteristic, described as challenging iterations and multiplier effects due to 
organisational and initiative related interactions. This characteristic reflects 
especially that previously emerged challenges comprise iterations and multiplier 
dynamics which may lead to multiplications and other emerging challenges and 
hamper ongoing strategic initiatives. Furthermore, this challenge is based on 
comparisons among strategic initiative interactions with the company's organisational 
context and other ongoing strategic initiatives. Therefore, this type of challenge acts 
more as a facilitator of the two main challenges by generating iterations and 
multipliers from existing challenging situations and emerging effects which may give 
rise to the new challenges and additional effects described in the empirical case study 
chapters (see retroactions from organisational transformations - CRM Convergence 
initiative, and emerging initiative challenges from uncontrolled project proliferations 
- Sun Sigma initiative). 
In addition, analysing and comparing the strategic initiative characteristics (see Table 
38) and the challenges emerged from the three strategic initiatives (see Figure 27) 
several interesting aspects evolve for future research projects within the area of 
strategic initiative implementation. Firstly, the Sun Sigma initiative stimulated the 
most challenges of the three strategic initiatives. Reasons may be found within the 
long implementation time (duration) and implementation approach. A de-centralised 
implementation approach of the Sun Sigma initiative stimulated a wide range of 
improvement projects which were not always fully aligned between their individual 
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implementation activities. Hence, a wider range of challenges and critical 
dependencies between ongoing initiatives and de-centralised improvement projects as 
part of the Sun Sigma initiative emerged in comparison to the CRM Convergence and 
Balanced Scorecard initiative. Secondly, the large target audience and wide range of 
improvement areas increased the challenges of misinterpreting the Sun Sigma 
objectives and created part wise strong organisational resistance against the Sun 
Sigma initiative in comparison to the two other observed strategic initiatives. Thirdly, 
the Balanced Scorecard initiative was the smallest initiative in terms of target 
audience and initiative size. Therefore, the intensity of interactions was moderate in 
comparison to the Sun Sigma initiative and the CRM Convergence initiative. 
However, each Balanced Scorecard stimulated interaction could lead to strong 
challenges for other ongoing initiatives as challenging boundaries and implementation 
inefficiencies (strategic execution inefficiencies). The reasons for this may be found 
within the centralised (top-down) implementation approach and the narrow-scaled 
initiative resource focus on Sun's management team. The close and intensive 
involvement of the firm's management team facilitated short decision processes, 
which sometimes strongly affected other ongoing initiatives. Fourthly, the 
autonomous (organisational integration) positioning of the Balanced Scorecard 
initiative provided the space to affect strongly the firm's organisational context and 
other ongoing initiative. In comparison, the CRM Convergence initiative where part 
wise integrated and a trade-off between a centralised and de-centralised approach, 
which leaded to a wider range of emerging and sometimes more moderate challenges 
due to their affect on other ongoing initiatives. 
In summary and having emerged from strategic initiative related interactions, a 
challenge is a stage at which the company's knowledge creation processes facilitated 
through strategic initiative related drivers to create upcoming dysfunctional effects. In 
this context, two aspects relate to the stage of a challenging situation: firstly, the 
ambiguity of strategic initiative related interactions and expected outcomes (Khanna 
et a1., 2000; Kownatzki, 2002; Zott, 2003); secondly, the causal ambiguity of the 
RBV, as researchers has pointed out an ambiguity in the connections between actions 
and results. In this regard, managers and stakeholders are in general unable to 
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understand exactly what they are doing right, and whether their decisions will lead to 
the expected results (Lippman and Richard, 1982; Reed and Robert, 1990). Hence, the 
challenge arises from the ambiguous connections between initiative actions and 
results. 
8.2.2 Consequences from the emerged Challenges - Dysfunctional Effects 
The following section discusses in detail the consequences of the challenges observed 
between new and old resources and knowledge bases during the strategic initiative 
implementation process. In the context of this research project, dysfunctional effects 
arise from specific situations during the strategy implementation activities described 
and classified in the previous sections as initiative related implementation challenges. 
These dysfunctional effects can best be described as unexpected disorders and 
emerging threats for the entire company. In detail, dysfunctional effects are the 
unexpected dimension of transformational activities undertaken to renew and sustain a 
firm's competitive advantage in the context of strategic initiatives. The basic 
characteristics of dysfunctional effects can be classified into four different groups. 
1. Planned - Business Supportive Effects: this group can be described as planned 
changes in existing resource structures in the context of strategic initiatives 
with valuable and business supportive outcomes. 
2. Unplanned - Business Supportive Effects: this group of effects emerge in the 
context of strategic initiative activities; they are unplanned but nevertheless 
useful and business-supportive outcomes. 
3. Planned/Accepted - Business Destructive Effects: this group of tensions and 
effects form a special group where destructive impacts of strategic initiatives 
on resources and knowledge base are partly accepted or "planned". 
4. Unplanned - Business Destructive Effects: these effects are the destructive 
outcomes of strategic initiative activities. Moreover, this group includes 
resource transformation outcomes which emerge without being anticipated. 
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In general, the first group of effects are planned and business supportive effects which 
relate to a strategic initiative's objectives and goals. The initiative's stakeholders 
require these changes in relation to the strategic initiative implementation plans and 
activities. The second group of effects are unexpected but business supportive ones 
which constitute additional and valuable business outcomes for the firm: for example, 
the SBAP department managing the portfolio of the firm's strategic initiative was also 
affected by various CRM Convergence consolidations. These iterations, described as 
retroactions, partly increased the efficiencies of further initiative operations. The third 
group of planned or accepted business destructive effects comprises resource effects 
where strategic initiative activities give rise to useless and business-destructive 
outcomes, for example "political games" and vindications of ROSS. ROSS was used 
in various ways to justify new investments and resource (re-)allocations to justify new 
activities, even ones contrary to the overall company objectives and goals. The last 
group of unplanned and business destructive effects comprises ones which are 
business destructive but unplanned. This group formed the most challenging and 
undiscovered area in the context of the strategic initiative related implementation 
activities. Overall, the first two groups generally comprise changes defined in the 
strategy and expected by the company to be implemented and realised through the 
launched initiative. This was the regular and commonly accepted transformation 
realised through the firm's strategic initiatives. However, the strategy implementation 
process in the context of strategic initiatives included the danger of various tensions 
which might tum into dysfunctional effects with the business destructive outcomes for 
the company reflected by the third and fourth group. Therefore, strategic initiatives 
may always create two types of effect. The first type is expected or sometimes 
unexpected, and it produces business supportive outcomes which are commonly 
agreed by the company and related key stakeholders. Effects of the second type are 
dysfunctional and often unexpected by the company and related key stakeholders. 
These dysfunctional effects create business destructive outcomes across the entire 
company in the context of strategic initiatives. 
According to the results of the case study analysis and case comparison, five different 
groups of dysfunctional effects can be identified and described. The first group of 
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dysfunctional effects can be summarised as Drifting Targets of strategic initiative 
related implementation activities. Drifting targets include the problem where initiative 
related activities lead to a drift in strategic initiative objectives and goals. In this 
regard, the affected initiative faces the problem where the initiative resources and 
implementation structures do not match with the new and drifting objectives and 
goals. The affected strategic initiative is at risk of losing the control and capability to 
fulfil the new and drifting objectives and goals. Furthermore, the strategic initiatives 
become increasingly stretched between the original goals and objectives and the new 
ones, with the consequences of sub-optimal supported and misaligned initiative 
related and invested resources and structures. 
Table 40: Drifting targets per strategic initiative. 
Drifting Targets Dysfunctional Effects 
Sun Sigma Initiative: 1, 11 
CRM Convergence Initiative: 17, 20, 23, 24, 27 
BSC Initiative: 37, 38, 39 
The following example illustrates the characteristics of drifting targets, glvmg the 
numbers of the dysfunctional effects relating to the effects observed in the three 
empirical strategic initiative case studies. For example, effect number 39 occurred in 
the context of the BSC initiative, which was aimed at improving overall strategy 
execution performance by reviewing individual initiative goals and their strategic 
relevance to the company's objectives and goals. Initiatives which did not provide 
strong support for the new company objectives and goals were terminated, and the 
resources were reallocated to other initiatives with stronger strategic relevance. 
However, after a period of initiative consolidations, strategic initiatives continuously 
adapted their objectives and goals to the firm's overall objectives in order to maintain 
their relevance and justification. Hence, strategic initiative objectives and goals 
started to drift. The consequence was that different initiatives targeted similar 
improvement arcas. These situations generated higher strategic implementation costs 
as more and different resources were needed for different ongoing initiatives to fulfil 
thc new targets. Furthermorc. this situation included oyerlaps among initiativc-
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specific activities, and resource priorities were increasingly difficult to set for the 
firm's management teams, which eventually reduced the overall effectiveness of the 
firm's strategy execution process against the BSC initiative's purpose of improving 
the firm's overall strategy execution process. The BSC initiative related activities led 
to drifts in various ongoing strategic initiative targets. 
The second group of dysfunctional effect consists of Emerging Resource Lacks. This 
group of effects relates to the challenge where strategic initiative related activities 
gave rise to additional resource needs which could not be covered by the firm. 
Therefore, resource lacks emerged and affected the progress of various strategy 
implementation activities and plans. 
Table 41: Emerging resource lacks per strategic initiative. 
Drifting Targets Dysfunctional Effects 
Sun Sigma Initiative: 5, 6 
CRM Convergence Initiative: 16, 25, 26 
SSC Initiative: 40, 42 
The following example illustrates the notion of emerging resource lack. Effect 
number 16 occurred in the context of the CRM Convergence initiative, whose purpose 
was to integrate and align different organisational business units with the defined 
CRM goals and objectives. Every organisational unit should become more customer 
oriented and should increase its customer focus within its daily business operations. In 
this context, the CRM Convergence initiative transformation activities encountered 
different levels of knowledge and capabilities within the different organisational 
business units. Furthermore, each business unit had different levels of decision power 
on the planned CRM Convergence initiatives. This situation created different 
perspectives and interests within each business unit, producing additional discussions 
on thc initiative plans and slowing down the overall implementation process. Hence, 
to fulfil the dcfined CRM Convergence initiative timelines and to avoid delays, the 
initiativc \\as forced to speed up some of its activities, which led to requests for 
additional and unbudgeted initiative resources and created different resource lacks 
.... 
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within the CRM Convergence initiative. This example illustrates how the CRM 
Convergence initiative's implementation was faced by different interests and agendas 
in different business units which led to resource lacks within the initiative. 
The third group of dysfunctional effects are summarised as the Neglect of Available 
Resources. The neglect of available resources occurred through strategic initiative 
related activities, with the consequence that the utilisation of resources decreased and 
slowed down the strategic initiative related implementation process. 
Table 42: Neglect of available resources per strategic initiative. 
Drifting Targets Dysfunctional Effects 
Sun Sigma Initiative: 3, 4, 10 
CRM Convergence Initiative: 18, 19, 22, 30 
BSC Initiative: 35, 36 
The following example illustrates the characteristics of the neglect of available firm 
resources. Effect number 3 occurred in the context of the Sun Sigma initiative 
intended to roll out the Sun Sigma concept to the wider organisation, including 
different customer service teams like the firm's customer troubleshooting and support 
teams. In this regard, the Sun Sigma initiative introduced standardised approaches, 
methodologies and templates to solve emerging customer problem fields. 
Nevertheless, the Sun Sigma standardisations decreased utilisation of the firm's 
strengths and its existing abilities to solve upcoming customer problems 
unconventionally. Employees started to shift their result-driven activities to Sun 
Sigma-oriented and template-driven activities. This example illustrates how existing 
resources like unconventional problem-solving skills and capabilities became 
neglected through Sun Sigma related roll-out and implementation of standardised 
methods and approaches. 
The fourth group of dysfunctional effects comprises Operational Complexities. In the 
context of the strategic initiative case studies, strategic initiative related activities gave 
rIse to additional operational complexities. These unexpected operational 
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complexities affected the performance of the company's different ongoing strategic 
initiative activities and ongoing business operations. 
Table 43: Operational complexities per strategic initiative. 
Drifting Targets Dysfunctional Effects 
Sun Sigma Initiative: 2, 7, 8, 9 
CRM Convergence Initiative: 28,29 
BSC Initiative: 31,32,33,34,41 
The following example illustrates the characteristics of the operational complexities 
observed. Effect number 28 occurred in the context of the CRM Convergence 
initiative intended to roll out new customer processes, including new roles and 
responsibilities and customer success metrics. In this regard, the initiative faced 
similar but conflicting activities within other ongoing initiatives, such as the partner-
relation and the solution-selling initiatives. All three initiatives comprised 
controversial activities. The partner-relation initiative pushed product-oriented 
relationship management business processes and operations, which conflicted with the 
CRM Convergence's purpose of establishing a customer and solution oriented 
relationship management approach. Additionally, the Solution Selling initiative aimed 
at creating new customer solutions, which was contrary to the Partner Relation 
initiative's plans. These conflicting activities generated operational complexities for 
the different initiatives in fulfilling their strategic objectives because the firm's 
customer oriented teams became confused and used those controversial issues to push 
their individual business unit's agendas and interests. 
The fifth and last group comprised Problem Multipliers, which constitute a specific 
category of dysfunctional effects. This group includes dysfunctional effects such as 
effect iterations and multiplications. In detail, emerging dysfunctional effects may 
sometimcs lead to new challenges and dysfunctional effects which generate further 
challcnges and complexities for the entire company, including ongoing strategic 
initiati\'c acti\'itics. 
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Table 44: Problem multipliers. 
Drifting Targets Dysfunctional Effects 
Sun Sigma Initiative: 12,13,14,15 
CRM Convergence Initiative: 21 
SSC Initiative: 
The following example illustrates the characteristics of the operational complexities 
observed. Effect number 13 occurred in the context of the Sun Sigma initiative 
undertaken to facilitate the launch of various new Sun Sigma projects in various 
organisational units across the globe. In this regard, the Sun Sigma projects increased 
greatly, with the consequence that after two years the firm had over 3000 such 
projects registered and ongoing. This uncontrolled proliferation of Sun Sigma projects 
stretched Sun's scarce resources and increased overheads within various 
organisational units. Furthermore, CAO became increasingly a support and 
administrative unit for new Sun Sigma projects instead of providing Sun Sigma 
expertise to the wider organisation. This situation escalated as more and more Sun 
Sigma projects were launched at the same time as administrative and bureaucratic 
inefficiencies within CAO increased. Hence, increasing resources was required to 
implement the Sun Sigma objectives and goals because of the new Sun Sigma project 
demands and the growing CAO organisation. In summary, this example illustrates 
how uncontrolled Sun Sigma project proliferations increased the overall company's 
need to maintain the Sun Sigma implementation activities, and they multiplied 
inefficiencies within different business processes and operations. New Sun Sigma 
projects stimulated further interactions with other ongoing initiatives and 
organisational units and multiplied the likelihood of new dysfunctional effects. 
The dysfunctional effects observed form the basis for the classification of the five 
different groups of dysfunctional effects: Drifting Targets, Emerging Resource Lacks, 
Negleel of Available Resources, Operational Complexities, and Problem ;\1ultipliers. 
The three case studies could only identify Problem Multipliers within the Sun Sigma 
and CRM Convergence initiatives. The BSC initiative did not provide any evidence of 
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dysfunctional effects relating to the group of Problem Multipliers. Therefore, Problem 
Multipliers may reflect optional characteristics, because not every initiative related 
challenge and emerging dysfunctional effect generates further dysfunctional effects 
and multiplications of challenging situations. The five different groups of 
dysfunctional effects are compared and defined in Figure 28. 
Figure 28: Overview and definition of the dysfunctional effects observed . 
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Figure 28 illustrates the dysfunctional effects groups identified across the three 
different strategic initiative case studies. The five different dysfunctional effects 
groups emerged from comparison among the three different strategic initiatives and 
their initiative-specific dysfunctional effects. The observed effects highlight that 
ongoing strategic initiatives largely reduced the overall effectiveness and utilisation of 
existing firm resources and stimulated an increase in operational complexities across 
the company. Furthermore, the dysfunctional effects observed closely related to the 
eomplexitie of transforming and extending the company's current knowledge base by 
re-configuring existing resource and adding new resources to existing configuration . 
Th con qu nce of th re ource challeng and ineffici DCle ob er d in r lation to 
th d functional eft! ct affect d the c mpany m four mam area . Fir t1 
dysfunctional effects of ongoing strategic initiative activities and transformations led 
to more resources needs over time, with the consequence that the company was forced 
to invest and allocate more resources to current initiative operations than originally 
expected and planned. Secondly, some of the emerging effects affected the overall 
strategic initiative's progress and reduced the capacity to deliver the expected 
initiative related transformations on time, which reduced the relevance of the initiative 
related strategy implementation processes. Thirdly, dysfunctional effects emerging 
from ongoing strategic initiative activities led to an overall decrease in the company's 
current resource and asset utilisations. Existing firm resources were neglected because 
of various dysfunctional effects which hampered the progress of different strategic 
initiative activities. Fourthly, value creations expected from different strategic 
initiative implementations did not produce the expected results and values because of 
the business destructive characteristics of the dysfunctional effects that emerged. 
These consequences corroborate the assumption of various strategists (Porter, 1979) 
that threats to s firm's sustainable competitive advantage may not only arise from 
forces external to it (Porter, 1980; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Volberda, 2004). 
Moreover, the analysis and definition of strategic initiative related dysfunctional 
effects underlines the strategic importance of avoiding the creation of dysfunctional 
effects, as those effects arise from a destructive knowledge base which grows within 
the firm's knowledge base once destructive grounds become established through 
strategic initiative related implementation and transformation processes. 
8.2.3 Emerging Concept of Strategic Initiative related Dysfunctions 
Managing and improving the strategy implementation and transformation process in 
the context of strategic initiatives starts with the understanding of emerging 
interactions. The case studies identified different interactions between a strategic 
initiative and the firm's organisational context and different interactions between 
ongomg strategic initiatives. These interactions activated strategic initiative 
implementation and transfOlmation processes by connecting the firm's resources. 
knowledge base. and the activation of firm-specific knowledge creation processes. 
Furthermore, during those periods, different strategic initiative related implementation 
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and transformation activities gave rise to, besides their expected results challenging 
situations - defined as challenges in this study - from which various dysfunctional 
effects arose to challenge the entire strategic initiative related strategy making 
process. The three strategic initiative case studies, and analysis of the data collected 
produced the following conceptualization of strategic initiative related dysfunctions . 
Figure 29: Strategic Initiative related challenges and emerging dysfunctions. 
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Strategic initiative interactions can be defmed as the first stage and the starting point 
of strategic initiative related implementation activities which lead to interactions 
between the initiative's emerging resources and knowledge base and existing flfm or 
other ongoing strategic initiative's resources and distinct knowledge base. Those 
interactions reflect new connections between old and new firm resources' they 
connect idio yncratic and elnerging knowledge bases; and they activate firm-specific 
knowledge creation proce e. This gives rise to the second stage of strat gic 
initiative related tran fonnation. This stage invol e the creation and facilitation of 
initiati e- pccific dynamic capabilitie. Six different typ of uch dynamic 
apabiliti ha c been ob ervcd by thi tudy : management and upport proce e I 
(f, i ion pro to prioriti and implement change I or ani afional 
administration and support processes, processes of interpretation (understanding 
changes), processes of acceptance (judging and approving changes), and processes of 
combination (combining new skills and methodologies with existing content). These 
processes stimulated two possible transformational directions for initiative related 
transformation activities. The first was the planned, commonly agreed and finally 
expected results of the strategic initiative-specific transformations. This direction is 
the reason why a strategic initiative is launched by a company. The second 
transformational direction was rather unexpected and problematic and constitutes the 
third stage in the conceptualization. It involves the formation of dysfunctional 
knowledge, from which emerge, not value-creating dynamic capabilities but 
destructive dynamic capability-specific situations - defined in this study as initiative 
related challenges. These transformations generated various emerging dysfunctional 
effects, which can be classified into five different groups in light of the strategic 
initiative case studies: Drifting Targets, Emerging Resource Lacks, Neglect of 
Available Resources, Operational Complexities, and Multipliers. All five types of 
dysfunctional effect affected the company, as well as the ongoing strategic initiatives 
in four different and business destructive areas: the challenge to invest more resources 
than planned; delays in the expected results; missed opportunities and decreasing 
value of results; and an overall reduction in the utilisation of existing company 
resources. 
In summary, three different aspects characterise the emerging concept of strategic 
initiative related dysfunctions. Firstly, dysfunctional effects can evolve over time 
alongside the intended changes, and transformation occurs in the strategic initiative 
related activities. Dysfunctional effects do not per se emerge in every strategic 
initiative related implementation activity. Secondly, dysfunctional effects arise from 
initiative related challenges which are the result of different initiative related drivers -
driving and mobilising the performance of different firm-specific processes and 
routines, with sometimes problematic outcomes classified as dysfunctional effects. 
Thirdly, the baselines of emerging challenges are facilitated by different forms of 
strategic initiative related dysfunctional knowledge, based on different interactions 
with the firm's organisational context and other ongoing initiatives. In this context, all 
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strategic initiative related interactions, emerging challenges and dysfunctional effects 
are strategic-initiative specific. Every strategic initiative creates its own knowledge or 
dysfunctional knowledge base which may be multiplied through further combinations 
and transformations with the firm's or other ongoing strategic initiative related 
resources and knowledge bases. 
The following section compares the findings from the case studies in the perspective 
with the main bodies of literature selected. 
8.3 Theoretical Reflection and Analysis of the Findings 
This section discusses the results of the strategic initiative analysis conducted in the 
previous sections, doing so from the perspective of the main bodies of literature 
selected in relation to answer the derived research questions. Answers on how 
strategic initiatives affect existing resource and knowledge base in the context of 
renewing a firm's competitive advantage are discussed and outlined in section 8.3. 1, 
8.3.2, 8.3.3 and 8.3.4. 
In particular, the debate on how strategic initiative interact with the firm's 
organisational context and other ongoing strategic initiatives are discussed mainly in 
the section 8.3.1 and 8.3.3 in the context of the main bodies of literature selected, 
especially strategic initiative concepts, the resource based theory and the knowledge 
based theory. The theoretical discussion starts with the debate on strategic initiative 
related interactions in the perspective of the strategic initiative concept and the 
resource based theory. The discussion starts with how strategic initiative related 
interactions facilitate the connection of new and existing firm resources to establish 
new sources of competitive advantage, and with the problematic aspects of the aim to 
connect new and existing firm resources through strategic initiative interactions. 
Furthermore section 8.3.1 and 8.3.3 describes how the observed challenges emerged 
from strategic initiative related interactions can be understood through the different 
main bodies of literature. 
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Section 8.3.2 provides answers on the drivers of the observed challenges and leads to 
the debate of linking the strategic initiative concept to the dynamic capability theory. 
The discussion extends the main bodies of literature through a more dynamic and 
process-oriented perspective: theoretical reflection on the role and value of the 
identified strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities in the context of the case 
studies conducted. 
In addition, section 8.3.3 extends the discussion on strategic initiative related 
interactions and their potential challenges by linking the strategic initiative concept to 
the knowledge based theory. In detail, in the context of the knowledge based theory 
section 8.3.3 focuses the discussion on the concept of strategic initiative related 
knowledge bases and especially on how finn and strategic initiative specific 
knowledge bases are affected by ongoing initiatives. Furthermore, the discussion in 
the context of the knowledge based theory narrows the focus on the strategic initiative 
related knowledge creation process in reflecting on the interactions observed between 
a strategic initiative and the finn's organisational context, and interactions between a 
strategic initiative and other ongoing strategic initiatives. Finally, the theoretical 
reflections in section 8.3.4 summarise the discussion of the challenges that emerged 
from strategic initiative implementation activities and their consequences - defined as 
dysfunctional effects - by considering the main theories in the literature selected. 
8.3.1 Strategic Initiative Interactions in the context of the RBV 
The following section discusses the phenomenon of strategic initiative related 
interactions mainly in the context of the strategic initiative concept and resource based 
theory. The discussion of this section focuses on how strategic initiative related 
interactions facilitate the configuration of new resource bundles to establish new 
sources of competitive advantage and which kind of problematic aspects concern the 
aim of connecting new and existing firm resources through strategic initiative 
interactions. 
The strategic initiative related interactions observed highlighted two challenging 
aspects to successful transformations of a firm's competitive advantage. in the context 
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of the strategic initiative concept. Firstly, strategic initiatives compnse a certain 
degree of autonomous behaviour which constantly surrounds management teams and 
stakeholders related to the initiative with ambiguity (Khanna et aI., 2000; Kownatzki, 
2002; Zott, 2003). This aspect of ambiguity concerns the environment of strategic 
initiative related interactions, as in periods when information is missing or possible 
outcomes are difficult to foresee. In relation to the three empirical strategic initiative 
case studies conducted, and according to the strategic initiative literature. many 
strategic initiatives - like the three discussed here - enter uncharted territory. 
Therefore initiatives are difficult to plan and control, like a journey with limited 
forecast opportunities and unexpected outcomes (McGrath, 2001; Wielemaker, 2003; 
Lechner et al., 2003). Hence strategic initiative related interactions comprise at the 
beginning of their evolution aspects of ambiguity in achieving the expected results. 
By comparison, the causal ambiguity in the perspective of the resource based theory is 
an ambiguity in the connections between actions and results. In this regard, managers 
and stakeholders are in general unable to understand exactly what they are doing 
right, and whether their decisions will lead to the expected results (Lippman and 
Richard, 1982; Reed and Robert, 1990). 
Secondly, strategic initiative related interactions raise one of the key problems for 
strategists. All rent-generating competitive advantages will erode over time, and the 
purpose of strategic initiatives is to manage transformation of existing firm sources of 
competitive advantage by replacing or changing those resources and capabilities 
which are no longer able to yield rent (V ollmann, 1996; Wielemaker et aI., 2001). 
These perspectives lead to the assumption that strategic initiative related interactions 
are the first step in transforming existing firm resources and knowledge base which 
are no longer able to yield rent. Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict the outcomes of 
specific initiative related interactions because 'strategic initiative' includes 
Bargeman's (1988) concept of retrospective rationalism, where competitive advantage 
are only recognized retrospectively after a strategic initiative has been launched and 
executed. In the context of the observed strategic initiative interactions with the firm's 
organisational context and other ongoing strategic initiatives, it was difficult for the 
firm's management team to determine at the outset whether those emerging 
interactions would lead to successful implementations and whether the strategic 
initiative would create new sources of competitive advantage. This may be one of the 
reasons why the theoretical concept of 'strategic initiative' includes aspects of 
continuous ambiguity - identified in this study as unpredictable consequences of 
upcoming interactions. In this regard, the assumption emerges that strategic initiative 
related interactions are ambiguous at the beginning and do not necessarily support the 
creation of new sources of competitive advantage. Hence, those interactions 
potentially undermine the ability of strategic initiative related activities to transform a 
firm's sources of competitive advantage (Daft and Weick, 1984; Dunbar and 
Ahlstrom, 1995; Kanter, 1999; Volberda, 2004). 
Furthermore, within the resource based theory, strategic initiative related interactions 
link with Black's (1994) concept of "cogency relationships", in that resources are 
surrounded by various kinds of relationships which connect and establish the firm's 
idiosyncratic bundles of resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Black and Boal, 
1994). The observed strategic initiative related interactions can be interpreted as 
upcoming relations between existing firm resources and new resources for the 
strategic initiative to establish new bundles of resources. Hence, in the context of the 
resource based theory, the observed interactions constitute the first step in creating 
new bundles of resources by connecting established firm resources with new ones 
transformed and deployed through strategic initiative implementation actions. 
Furthermore, emerging bundles of resources should comprise specific attributes which 
are valuable, rare, inimitable and not substitutable (Teece, 1982; Barney, 1991). 
According to the three empirical case studies conducted, these attributes can be 
achieved through two different types of relations between new and old firm resources. 
Firstly, through three different interactions between the strategic initiative and the 
finn's organisational context, and, secondly, through five different interactions 
between the strategic initiative and other ongoing initiatives, according to the 
interaction types, classified in Figure 25. In this regard, the interactions identified by 
the case studies included connections between different types of resources, especially 
intangible assets and capabilities, as the firm's organisational processes and individual 
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knowledge base (Wernerfelt, 1984; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Peterafand Barney, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the static nature of the RBV makes it difficult to apply the resource 
based theory to the dynamic perspective of emerging interactions in the context of the 
strategic initiative implementation process. The RBV may aid analysis of static 
situations in strategic initiative related implementation processes. If in such situations 
new resource combinations emerge with the qualities of being valuable, rare, 
inimitable and not substitutable, the RBV can help with classification of the new 
resource combinations as future sources of the firm's competitive advantage (Teece, 
1982; Barney, 1991). However, the theory does not deal with the dynamic process 
perspective of managing and reshaping the firm's competitive advantage. New 
resource combinations may, within specific implementation stages of the strategic 
initiative, reflect qualities which qualify the new resource combination as a future 
source of the firm's competitive advantage. However, those qualities may erode in 
later strategic initiative related implementation stages. 
In short, the strategic initiative related interactions observed are emerging connections 
between existing and new resources of the firm and the sources of new resource 
combinations and emerging challenges for the strategic initiative related strategy 
implementation process. Moreover, the strategic initiative related interactions yield a 
new concept and the opportunity to identify, create, or facilitate a firm's new bundles 
of resources with which to establish new sources of competitive advantage. In this 
regard, the dynamic capability theory and the knowledge based theory extend the 
theoretical discussion of the three empirical strategic initiative case studies findings 
with a more dynamic and process-oriented perspective. 
8.3.2 The Role and Value of Strategic Initiative related Dynamic Capabilities 
The following section focuses on the role and value of the identified strategic 
initiati\'c rclated dynamic capabilities in the context of the case studies conducted. 
Thc first part of the discussion compares the identified initiative related dri\'crs with 
thc theoretical concept of dynamic capabilities. The next part of the discussion 
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focuses on the role of the drivers identified in the context of renewing a firm's sources 
of competitive advantage. The last part of the debate deals with the value of the 
drivers identified and relative challenges in facilitating the renewal process of a firm's 
sources of competitive advantage. 
Interactions among strategic initiatives started knowledge creation processes and 
created - alongside the expected initiative results - various challenges. Those 
initiative results, and especially the emerging challenges, were stimulated by strategic 
initiative related drivers with the consequence of dysfunctional effects. Relating 
similarities to the concept of dynamic capabilities, the observed drivers were strategic 
initiative related processes that used resources to integrate, recombine, gain and 
release resources to establish new sources of competitive advantage (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). In addition, in 
accordance with Amit and Schoemaker's (1993) dynamic capability concept, the 
drivers observed enabled the firm's strategic initiative capacities to deploy resources. 
Furthermore, the drivers were information-based, tangible or intangible processes that 
were strategic initiative-specific and were facilitated over time through emerging 
interactions between a strategic initiative and the firm's organisational context or 
between ongoing initiatives or through strategic initiative-individual implementation 
activities (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Therefore, six strategic initiative related 
drivers are identified and outlined in the following: 
• a Management Support Process, 
• a Decision Process to prioritise and implement changes, 
• an Organisational Administration and Support Process, 
• a Process of Interpretation, 
• a Process of Acceptance, and 
• a Process of Com hi nation. 
These drivers can be defined as strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities which 
arc necessary for successful strategic initiative implementations. Furthermore, they 
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stand for initiative-specific processes which are similar to dynamic capabilities. 
Hence, those initiative related processes are dynamic capabilities, and they are linked 
to the strategic initiative related implementation activities and their success. 
The analysis and companson of the drivers observed within the three strategic 
initiative case studies led to their definitions (see previous Tables) and the conclusion 
that the initiative specific processes observed are similar to the concept and definition 
of dynamic capabilities. However, the dynamic capabilities observed were not per se 
sources of competitive advantage; instead, the value of the emerging dynamic 
capabilities related to their capacity to enable the observed strategic initiative to 
improve the firm's existing resource configurations, in accordance with Eisenhardt 
and Martin's (2000) concept of dynamic capabilities. 
According to the three case studies, before executives started to support varIOUS 
changes they judged and approved those changes during the strategic initiative 
implementation activities. These processes relate closely to the concept of sense 
making (Drazin et al., 1999; Crossan et al., 1999), according to which the knowledge 
creation process consists of intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalising 
the emerging knowledge. Therefore, the next assumption is that the observed strategic 
initiative related dynamic capability facilitated the transformation of specific 
knowledge bases of the firm and other ongoing initiatives. This assumption is 
supported by the findings where strategic initiatives create their own knowledge base 
over time through initiative specific dynamic capabilities. 
Those dynamic capabilities can also affect other knowledge bases from ongomg 
initiatives on the basis of previously established interactions which create connections 
between different initiative specific knowledge bases. Another example from the 
strategic initiative case studies can help illustrate the influence of strategic initiative 
related dynamic capabilities on other ongoing initiative knowledge bases. The Sun 
Sigma initiative related dynamic capability activated the company's management 
support processes for various initiative plans and activities. These included the 
activation of different administrative and management processes for the initiatives. for 
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example by allocating and re-allocating experts from decentralised business to 
ongoing Sun Sigma activities. Furthermore, the decentralised organisational units 
faced the challenge of individuality. Various strategic initiatives had developed their 
own cultures, skills, approaches and processes over time and had to link their local 
priorities, agendas, and needs with the overall Sun Sigma initiative expectations and 
objectives. 
In the context of an individual strategic initiative, various organisational units and 
other ongoing initiatives which interacted with the Sun Sigma initiative were required 
to combine new approaches, skills and methodologies with their ongoing operations 
and activities (process of combination). The influence exerted by the Sun Sigma 
initiative on other ongoing initiatives was not always successful. Therefore, in 
analysing, comparing and discussing the dynamic capability concept with the 
processes analysed, several aspects can be summarised. 
Firstly, the processes analysed are similar to Teece et aI.' s (1997) dynamic capability 
theory of managerial and organisational processes. In this perspective, dynamic 
capabilities are complementary assets of the firm and are tied to managerial beliefs, 
analogously to Tripas and Gavetti's (2000) notion of dynamic capabilities as 
managerial beliefs and cognitions. Furthermore, the observed strategic initiative 
related dynamic capabilities related to Van de Ven et aI.' s (1999) study, where 
dynamic capabilities play an important role in managing the stages of change. In this 
context, Leonard-Barton's (1992) concept of core capabilities and core rigidities 
could be applied to strategic initiative related implementation and transformation 
activities. If those activities drifted too far from the firm's existing core capabilities, 
the strategic initiative faced challenges, because at a certain point the dynamic 
capabilities involved became traps or rigidities. From the perspective of the 
know ledge based theory, the processes identified related in part to Verona and 
Ravasi's (2003) concept of continuous innovation, and in part to Lawson and 
Samson's (2001) concept of innovation management. New transformations were 
stal1ed by means of different strategic initiatives to change the way in which the 
company had been doing business in the past. OveralL the strategic initiative related 
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and specific dynamic capabilities observed included marked elements of 
organisational and strategic decision-making, resource allocation and customer related 
processes, which received increasing attention from the strategic initiatives observed, 
and involved management teams (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Griffith and Harvey, 
2001; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Rindova and Taylor, 2003; Ethiraj et at., 2005). 
Moreover, all the processes identified and described related to the strategic initiative's 
idiosyncratic knowledge base and played an important role in the success of strategic 
initiative implementation activities. However, besides their ability to facilitate the 
renewal processes of firm resources to establish new and competitive bundles of firm 
resources, dynamic capabilities are improvisational and dissipative processes, 
meaning that they require constant energy to stay on track - if they have too little 
structure, they may easily slide to the edge of chaos, according to the descriptions of 
various scholars (Griffith and Harvey, 2001; Ethiraj et at., 2005). This characteristic 
implies a risk for firms implementing their strategies through strategic initiatives: on 
the one hand, strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities are necessary for 
successful implementations; on the other, they may create additional complexities and 
challenges for the firm's organisational context and other ongoing initiatives. In the 
context of the strategic initiative case studies conducted, different challenges and 
complexities were observed and classified into different types of emerging challenges 
with the consequences of various dysfunctional effects. This aspects leads to the next 
theoretical discussion from understanding the role of initiative related dynamic 
capabilities to understanding of the value of those dynamic capabilities. 
Dynamic capabilities play an important role in the creation of challenges and the 
consequences of emerging dysfunctional effects. According to Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000), dynamic capabilities reflect four main processes through which resource 
manipulations are facilitated across the firm to establish new sources of competitive 
advantage. Those main processes reflect the value and ability of dynamic capabilities 
to facilitate the renewal of a firm's sources of competitive advantage. Dynamic 
capabilities are not per sc valuable in renewing a firm's sources of competitive 
advantage. Their ability to manipulate idiosyncratic resources to establish new 
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sources of competitive advantage is the core value of strategic initiative related 
dynamic capabilities. Table 45 compares the strategic initiative related dynamic 
capabilities identified in this study with the core functions of dynamic capabilities 
recognised in the academic literature (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece et at., 
1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). 
Table 45: Mapping the identified dynamic capabilities to the recognised core functions. 
Resource Manipulations in the 
Academic Literature 
A. Resource Creation 
8. Resource Integration 
C. Resource Re-Combination 
D. Resource Releases 
Identified Dynamic Capabilities in this Study, in 
comparison with the Academic Literature 
• Management Support Processes 
(D): Resource Release 
• Decision Processes to prioritise and implement changes 
(A): Resource Creation 
• Organisational Administration and Support Processes 
(D): Resource Release 
• Process of Interpretation 
(8): Resource Integration 
• Process of Acceptance 
(8): Resource Integration 
• Process of Combination 
(C): Resource Re-Combination 
The table highlights similarities between the processes identified as playing a key role 
by the three strategic initiative case studies challenges and the key dynamic capability 
processes described in the academic literature (Mitchell et aI., 1999; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Winter, 2003). Moreover, dynamic 
capabilities are often described in the academic literature as processes which rapidly 
yield new knowledge (Collis, 1994; Grant, 1996). 
On the basis of strategic initiative stimulated interactions between different resources 
and knowledge base, the assumption emerges that initiative specific dynamic 
capabilities evolve and facilitate the creation of dysfunctional knowledge and 
dcstructi\"C resource combinations. According to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), 
dynamic capabilities are facilitators which enable the creation of new resources and 
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transformation of the knowledge base of the firm. Hence, idiosyncratic strategic 
initiative-specific dynamic capabilities can initiate knowledge creating processes 
which are dysfunctional. Therefore, the new and emerging bundles of resources can 
become problematic and unstable in producing the expected values for the firm. 
Furthermore, connections between different distinctive strategic initiative related 
knowledge bases can stimulate incompatibilities and rejections which iteratively 
strengthen the evolution of destructive dynamic capabilities which reinforce 
previously established boundaries and barriers. In this regard, dynamic capabilities 
depend closely on existing knowledge - and especially on the existing knowledge 
base of the strategic initiative - which gives rise to experimental and non-linear 
outcomes (Ethiraj et al., 2005). This explains why different strategic initiatives faced 
similar resistances and barriers as initial stimulations of "destructive" dynamic 
capabilities created new ground for destructive knowledge from which new and 
"destructive" initiative related dynamic capabilities emerged and created multiplier 
effects across the organisation and other ongoing strategic initiatives. In addition, the 
production process of combining new and old resources and different knowledge 
bases relates to strategic initiative specific dynamic capabilities. Hence, if strategic 
initiative related interactions between different specialised knowledge bases lead to 
dysfunctional outcomes, destructive knowledge is created and the dynamic capability 
changes from value creating to being destructive of stimulating the dysfunctional 
effects and knowledge, as identified through specific challenges, analysed by this 
study. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that dynamic capabilities in the context of 
strategic initiatives can stimulate two transformational processes: a business 
constructive process which reflects the planned and expected results of the strategic 
initiative; and a business destructive process which generates dysfunctional effects 
similar to the evolution of the "bad" and "good" habits of a human being. Hence, the 
value of dynamic capabilities relate to both facilitating the creation of new sources of 
competitive advantage and to facilitating the termination of existing and future 
sources of the firm's competitive advantages due to the quality and value of the 
relative knowledge base emerging from strategic initiative related resource and 
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knowledge base interactions. These conclusions lead the discussion of strategic 
initiative interactions to the knowledge based theory. 
8.3.3 Strategic Initiative Interactions in the Context of the KBV 
The following section focuses on the discussion on the concept of strategic initiative 
related knowledge bases and particularly on how the firm and strategic initiative 
specific knowledge bases are affected by ongoing initiatives. Furthermore, the 
discussion on the strategic initiative related knowledge creation process is based on 
the interactions observed between a strategic initiative and the firm's organisational 
context and interactions between a strategic initiative and other ongoing strategic 
initiatives. 
8.3.3.1 Affecting Firm and Strategic Initiative specific Knowledge Bases 
The concept of interactions between a strategic initiative and the firm's organisational 
context or other ongoing strategic initiatives highlights new and emerging connections 
with a firm's idiosyncratic knowledge base. Wielemaker (2003) argued that strategic 
initiatives create their own knowledge base over the entire life cycle from the idea to 
the implementation. In this regard, the interactions observed strengthen the argument 
that strategic initiatives are linked to other knowledge bases of a firm (Lechner et aI., 
2003; Marx, 2004). However, the quantity of interactions may not be always a driver 
for successful strategic initiative implementations because those interactions comprise 
the problematic aspect of ambiguity in leading to new sources of a firm's competitive 
advantage. 
Furthermore, strategic initiative related interactions provide the theoretical bases on 
which different mental models (Senge, 1990), working procedures (Hackbarth and 
Grover, 1999), histories (Hall, 1984), organizational routines (eyert and March, 1963) 
and organizational cultures (Walsh and Ungson, 199 L Walsh, 1995) can be combined 
across the organisation. The strategic initiative related interactions are able to connect 
with a firm's different and idiosyncratic know ledge bases, including the connection 
with other ongoing strategic initiative related knowledge bases, by creating the 
opportunity to transform existing resources into ne\-" sources of competitive 
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advantage. However, especially the emerging connections among strategic initiative 
related knowledge bases are affected by the form and rationale of a strategic initiative 
as radical, autonomous, internal or globally oriented ( Burgelman, 1988; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Birkenshaw, 1997). Therefore, strategic initiative related knowledge 
bases are individual, heterogeneous and specialized in so far as they serve specific 
strategic purpose. Hence it follows that the knowledge base of strategic initiatives and 
the possibility to interact and connect different knowledge bases of strategic 
initiatives relate to their degree of individuality and the homogeneity of the strategic 
initiatives which create them. This argument implies that strategic initiative 
interactions generate both other emerging knowledge bases of the firm and the 
problematic of potential conflicts among different strategic initiative related 
knowledge-base interactions. These characteristics lead to the consequence that 
strategic initiative implementation and transformation activities may raise challenges, 
because some interactions between different knowledge bases are business destructive 
and hamper the firm's strategy making process. Those kinds of challenges are 
observed in all three strategic initiative cases studies, and they are classified and 
defined as main challenges based on the analysis and comparison of the three strategic 
initiative case studies as: 
• Emerging resistances, boundaries and barriers against and between ongoing 
strategic initiatives 
• Conflicting perspectives and challenging dependencies between ongoing initiative 
strategies and implementation plans 
This includes the iterative feature that an emergmg challenge can stimulate new 
challenges, defined as Challenging iterations and multiplier effects due to 
organisational and initiative related interactions. Furthermore, strategic initiatives 
often occur for a specific strategic reason (Kownatzki, 2002; Zott, 2003). Therefore, 
strategic initiatives that relate to emerging knowledge bases reflect a wide range of 
specialized knowledgc. often described in the academic literature as 'deep 
knowledge' (Demsetz, 1991; Leonard-Barton. 1995; Hansen, 1999). Deep knowlcdge 
is specialized, functional and complex and it cnables a strategic initiative to achic\'c 
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its objectives as strategic initiatives pursue specific strategic purposes. This 
specialization and focus leads to the assumption that conflicts arise among ongoing 
strategic initiatives. An illustrative example - classified as effect (22) within the CRM 
Convergence initiative case study - concerning interactions between the Deal 
Management Process initiative and the CRM Convergence initiative will help 
strengthen the assumption that knowledge bases conflict among ongoing strategic 
initiatives. The Deal Management Process initiative classified new customer 
engagements according to their risks, whereas the CRM Convergence initiative 
classified new customer engagements according to their sales potential and business 
volume. This led to inefficient overlaps and conflicts between initiative specific 
knowledge bases. Hence it follows that knowledge bases, and especially strategic 
initiative related knowledge bases, are highly specialised and limited in their ability to 
be connected and combined. In this regard, strategic initiative related knowledge 
bases are highly heterogeneous according to their specialised combination of broad 
and deep knowledge. There arises the dilemma whereby strategic initiatives are forced 
to be highly specialized to increase the chances of achieving their strategic purpose, 
whereas an increase in specialization leads to incompatibilities between strategic 
initiative related knowledge bases with challenging outcomes and effects. Hence, 
strategic initiative related interactions with other strategic initiative related knowledge 
bases provide the opportunity to interact with different sources of potential 
competitive advantage as far as the interaction is feasible and able to produce valuable 
results for the firm's strategy implementation process. 
To enrich the discussion of the strategic initiative related interactions in the context of 
knowledge based theory, discussion of the strategic initiative related knowledge 
creation process provides additional insights into how relevant dynamic capabilities 
emerge. 
8.3.3.2 Stimulating Knowledge Creation through Initiative related Interactions 
This section discusses strategic initiative interactions in the context of knowledge 
creation. E\'cry strategic initiati\'e creates knowledge \vhich is necessary for 
succcssful initiati\'c implementations. However, initiative-specific kno\dedge creation 
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processes may overlap with other knowledge creation processes within ongoing 
initiatives and challenge the value of the emerging knowledge stored in the initiative-
specific knowledge bases. 
The KBV and the related academic literature describe strategic initiatives as 
knowledge creating entities which facilitate different phases of linking, interpreting, 
and integrating new knowledge (Wielemaker et af., 2001; Wielemaker. 2003). These 
phases imply that the strategic initiative connects to other knowledge bases of the 
firm. These connections are established in the three strategic initiative case studies 
through the interactions classified. The interactions with the firm's organisational 
context created new connections with the firm's repository and related processes or 
routines to guide organisational action for initiative related implementation activities 
(Argote, 1999; Argote et af., 2000; Patriotta, 2003). The interactions between other 
ongomg initiatives created new connections between ongoing initiatives, where 
emerging and initiative-specific repositories engaged with other emerging initiative-
specific repositories to activate the creation of new tacit and explicit knowledge 
(N elson, 1991; N onaka and Takeuchi, 1995; N onaka and Konno, 1998; Patriotta, 
2003). The consequences of interactions between different ongoing initiatives seem to 
be more complex and neglected by the academic literature in comparison to the 
interactions between a strategic initiative and a firm's organisational context 
(Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). 
On the basis of emerging interactions between different ongoing strategic initiatives, 
this study has identified various aspects within the idiosyncratic knowledge creation 
process of the firm. Strategic initiatives are dynamic action units from which 
interactions with other ongoing initiatives emerge to acquire, share, and combine 
knowledge into a collective product through experience with each other (Argote et al.. 
2000; Wielemaker et aI., 2001). In the context of the case studies conducted, 
interactions between ongoing initiatives emerged in five different ways. Interactions 
based on the strategic initiative were intended to establish new standards across other 
ongoing initiatives and to align or consolidate ongoing initiative activities and goals 
with the initiative's own objectives and activities. Furthermore, strategic initiative 
administration and management processes were influenced by other ongomg 
initiatives: in particular, how to manage initiative individual objectivcs, results, 
expectations and expected values according to the firm's overall strategies. This 
stimulated another group of emerging interactions between ongoing initiatives _ 
interactions which facilitated the convergence of different initiative-specific activities. 
The last group of interactions emerged from de-fragmented and specialised initiative 
related knowledge bases. This characteristic related to the problem that strategic 
initiatives created more interactions between emerging and distinct knowledge bases 
of ongoing initiatives which were faced by the challenge of incompatibilities between 
two or more previously disconnected knowledge domains. 
The reasons for this may be that strong deviations between the interconnected 
knowledge bases of the initiatives, as the organisation, and especially other ongoing 
initiatives, established individual and controversial skills and capabilities between 
each other, which provoked resistance by some of the action units involved, according 
to Leonard-Barton's (1992) concept of emerging core rigidities. Furthermore, 
strategic initiative related knowledge bases comprise heterogeneous decision-making 
mechanisms and individualised ways of sense-making. In this context, sense making 
is defined in the academic literature as an important driver of new organizational 
knowledge (Thomas et at., 1993). Therefore, established sense making routines within 
the individual initiative started to create challenges during the interaction with other 
initiative related decision- and sense making capabilities and sometimes generated 
difficulties between the initiatives. These consequences relate to the heterogeneity of 
tacit knowledge carriers, because initiatives can be defined as tacit knowledge carriers 
which address the challenges of heterogeneity and incompatibility, according to 
Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995) theoretical concept of "knowledge carrier'. 
Another aspect concerns the possibility of facilitating additional complexities 
alongside initiative-specific and incompatible knowledge bases. For strategic 
initiative related knowledge bases are highly specialised and therefore heterogeneous. 
Different ongoing strategic initiatives may pursue different strategic purposes and 
therefore create different forms of relevant knowledge, which may give risc to 
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specialized knowledge bases for each strategic initiative. Emerging interactions 
between the two specialised and controversial knowledge bases may create difficulties 
because both controversial strategic initiatives related knowledge bases are necessary 
on their own for successful implementation of the firm's strategies. Hence, strategic 
initiative related knowledge bases may not be always useful for interacting with other 
specialised knowledge bases and are therefore problematic for the strategic initiative 
related knowledge creation process. The problem depends on the number of ongoing 
strategic initiatives within a firm and their implementation range and focus. 
In summary, and on the basis of Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995) definitions of 
knowledge creation as a process of continuous and dynamic interaction between tacit 
and explicit knowledge, all the interactions observed between a firm's organisational 
context and ongoing initiatives activated strategic initiative specific and sometimes 
uncontrolled knowledge creation processes. In this context, the observed initiative 
related interactions played an important role in activating the reconfiguration of firm-
specific resource configurations and knowledge base transformations. Furthermore, 
the interactions observed can aid understanding of the strategic value of the emerging 
knowledge because not all knowledge is equally valuable (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 
2000; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). The interactions observed stimulated the 
creation of new knowledge and qualified the knowledge creation process as 
supportive or not supportive according to the development process of new sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage. In the three strategic initiative case studies, the 
interactions observed actively drove the firm's specific knowledge creation process in 
the context of strategic initiatives for successful strategy implementations. Those 
strategy implementation activities were influenced by strategic initiative individual 
drivers. Those drivers played a key role in strategic initiative implementation 
processes and are discussed in previous sections in the context of the dynamic 
capability theory. 
8.3.4 Closing Reflection of the observed Challenges and Dysfunctional Effects 
This section summarises the discussion on the challenges observed as emerging from 
strategic initiative implementation activities by reflecting established theories. Those 
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theories are based on the results of the literature reVIew chapter and provide a 
theoretical ground for discussion of the categorised findings of the main challenges 
and dysfunctional effects. 
The finding of this study helps to extend the understanding of how core rigidities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992) emerge in the context of strategic initiative implementation. 
Existing firm resources and the new resources combined and deployed by strategic 
initiative related dynamic capabilities are business destructive and leads to potential 
core rigidities. Instead of establishing new sources of competitive advantage based on 
Barney's (1991) definition, the old and new resources create rejections and sever the 
established connections of the new resource reconfigurations stimulated through 
initiative specific and dysfunctional dynamic capabilities (Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992; Black and Boal, 1994). Outlined through the first main challenge of initiative 
implementation, defined as emerging resistance, boundaries and barriers against and 
between ongoing strategic initiatives, initiative related activities sometimes derive 
from existing competencies in the organisation and other ongoing initiatives, with the 
consequence that organisational units or other ongoing strategic initiatives facilitate 
resistance and establish boundaries against the ongoing strategic initiative actions. 
Hence, the findings of this study illustrate a way on how core rigidities can emerge 
through strategic initiative implementation. 
Furthermore, the created rejections between old and new resources in the context of 
initiative implementations are based on conflicting perspectives and challenging 
dependencies beflveen ongoing initiative strategies and implementation plans, which 
relates alongside the problem of incompatible resources to the concept of emerging 
knowledge bases, especially strategic initiative related knowledge bases (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996; Patriotta, 2003). These challenges are facilitated by 
detached knowledge creating processes stimulated through the dynamic capabilities of 
individual initiatives (Teece et at., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). According to 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), instead of producing new inventions, knowledge 
crcation creates o\'crlapping and controversial results between ongoing strategic 
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initiatives, with the consequence of conflicting perspectives and challenging 
dependencies. 
The third main challenge of strategic initiative implementation, defined in this study 
as challenging iterations and multiplier effects due to organisational and initiative 
related interactions, connects to Wielemaker's (2003) initiative related knowledge 
creating phases of linking, interpreting, and integrating. A strategic initiative does not 
necessarily have to proceed sequentially. Moreover, a strategic initiative creates 
knowledge through iterative loops (Van de Ven, 1992; Wielemaker, 2003). Hence, the 
repetition of different challenges and emerging dysfunctional effects is connected to 
the concept of iteration. Strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities stimulate 
knowledge creating processes and transformations which are iterative and able to 
create - alongside the expected results - repetitions of new challenges and emerging 
dysfunctional effects for the organisation and other ongoing strategic initiatives. 
Those observed and classified dysfunctional effects from the three in-depth strategic 
case studies (see Figure 29) are the following: 
• Drifting Targets, 
• Emerging Resource Lacks, 
• Neglect of Available Resources, 
• Operational Complexities, and 
• Problem Multiplier 
These are groups of dysfunctional effects, and they can best be described as 
unexpected disorders which impact upon the entire company and produce business 
destructive outcomes. Furthermore, those dysfunctional effects are the consequences 
of the challenges arising from initiative related implementation activities - facilitated 
through strategic initiative specific dynamic capabilities. The dysfunctional effects 
observed and classified closely relate to McGrath et aI.' s (1995) argument that 
competitive advantage is unlikcly to emerge from a strategic initiativc unless the 
related activities are able to develop capabilities in what they are doing. In this 
contcxt, the dc\clopmcnt of the required capabilities may not always be successful 
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because the dysfunctional effects result from the strategic initiative's limitation in 
implementing its goals and objectives successfully. According to the results of the 
strategic initiative case study analysis, dysfunctional effects are one of the main 
reasons why companies fail to implement their strategies through strategic initiatives. 
Furthermore, dysfunctional effects add to the theoretical debate the additional aspect 
that an initiative's success relates to its organisational embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996; 
Soda and Usai, 1999; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Chung et aI., 2000; Lechner et aI., 
2003; Marx, 2004). Scholars have shown that increasing the organisational 
embeddedness of a strategic initiative improves its performance (Lechner et aI., 2003; 
Marx, 2004). These arguments do not take the problematic aspect of business 
destructive outcomes from dysfunctional effects into account, because the strategic 
initiative's success relates only partly to its organisational embeddedness. Strategic 
initiative related interactions with the firm's organisational context or other ongoing 
initiatives comprise a certain amount of autonomous behaviour which constantly 
surrounds management teams and stakeholders related to the initiative with ambiguity 
(Khanna et aI., 2000; Kownatzki, 2002; Zott, 2003). Furthermore, the initiative 
related dynamic capabilities identified by this study perform a twofold role in the 
successful implementation of the firm's various strategies. On the one hand, those 
dynamic capabilities enable the successful initiative implementations. However, on 
the other hand, the dynamic capabilities observed create additional complexities and 
challenges for the firm and ongoing initiatives which in this study are termed 
'dysfunctional effects'. Hence, an increasing interaction of the initiative with the 
firm's organisational context and other ongoing initiatives increases the potential 
destructive outcomes from dysfunctional effects. Therefore, greater organisational 
embeddedness can increase the interactions with the firm's organisational context and 
other ongoing strategic initiatives and reduce the overall performance of the strategic 
initiative because of the production of dysfunctional effects. Accordingly, the result of 
this thesis is that a strategic initiative's success depends on its ability to facilitate 
related dynamic capabilities for a successful implementation and not to become lost in 
challenging dependencies and interactions with other ongoing initiatives. In addition, 
hcsides organisational embeddedness, interactions with other ongoing initiatives are 
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crucial for the success of a strategic initiative. Hence, the discovery of the 
dysfunctional effects increases the importance of focusing on interactions with other 
ongoing initiatives and it enriches current strategic initiative related implementation 
concepts with the findings of this study (McGrath, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Soda and Usai, 
1999; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Chung et aI., 2000; Lechner et aI., 2003; 
Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). 
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9 Conclusions 
In order to develop one of the key debates in the strategic management literature 
further, this thesis has centred in particular on how strategic initiatives affect a firm's 
most valuable sources - idiosyncratic resources and knowledge bases - and what 
kinds of challenges emerge in the context of strategic initiatives to implement new 
business strategies (McGrath et al., 1995; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Floyd and Lane, 
2000; Lechner et al., 2003; Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). The concept of 'strategic 
initiatives' refers to a progressive form of strategy making whereby idiosyncratic key 
sources of a firm's competitive advantage are mobilised and renewed (Bower, 1970; 
McGrath et al., 1995; Marx, 2004). In this regard, the study has addressed, combined 
and extended the various issues debated within the selected main bodies of literature 
in light of the following research question: 
How do strategic initiatives affect the existing resources and knowledge base in the 
context o/renewing afirm 's competitive advantage? 
In finding answers to this research question, several aspects have been covered by this 
research. The research objective has been to increase understanding on how the 
idiosyncratic resource and knowledge base of a firm is affected by strategic 
initiatives. A further purpose has been to identify the interactions of strategic 
initiatives and emergmg challenges m the context of strategic initiative 
implementation, with the consequence that how those challenges arise has been 
analysed. Finally, the research has concentrated on identifying the drivers facilitating 
different challenges, and on what consequences arise in the context of strategic 
initiative implementation. 
The theoretical findings contribute to the main bodies of the literature selected. The 
strategic initiative literature has been extended through an integrated perspective on 
initiative related strategy making. The resource based theory has been enriched 
through new synergies between the RBV and the strategic initiative concepts. These 
synergics augment the overly static RBV \vith insights into how competitivc resource 
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combinations can emerge and become both valuable and problematic for the firm, and 
with discussion on the combination of old and new resources in the context of 
strategic initiative implementations. The dynamic capability literature has been 
enriched with additional insights into the role and values of strategic initiative related 
dynamic capabilities in the context of successful implementations. The knowledge 
based theory has been extended through new insights into how strategic initiatives 
affect and relate to the know ledge base creation of a firm. Furthermore, this study has 
highlighted the consequences of business destructive knowledge creation 
(dysfunctional know ledge) due to strategic initiative related interactions between 
differences in a firm's and other strategic initiative related knowledge bases. Finally, 
the thesis has provided cross-theory integration in the context of strategy making. 
Despite the growing importance of strategic initiative implementation in management 
practice, the research findings provide guidelines on how such implementations can 
be managed professionally. This aim of the dissertation has been to provide insights 
and specific suggestions for the professional management of strategic initiatives in 
regard to their implementation. More specifically, the aim has been to highlight the 
following aspects. Firstly, strategy making in the context of strategic initiatives 
reqires the reinforcement of the management of strategic initiative related interactions 
with the firm's organisational context and other ongoing initiatives. Secondly, 
strategic initiatives develop their own knowledge bases and connect to other strategic 
initiative specific knowledge bases. These knowledge base combinations must be 
managed according to their potential synergies and potential challenges. Thirdly, not 
all strategic initiative related knowledge is equally useful for the achievement of the 
company's strategic objectives. Therefore, prioritizing the strategic relevance of the 
knowledge arising from strategic initiative implementations is necessary to prevent 
upcoming challenges. Fourthly, the case studies in this dissertation highlight that 
challenges may emerge during strategic initiative implementations. These challenges 
need to be detected at an early stage in order to avoid problematic situations during 
the initiative's implementation. Finally, the management team must constantly 
reinforce value creation by the strategic initiative by preventing the escalation of 
potential challenges from generating various dysfunctional effects for the entire 
314 
company. Therefore, constantly reinforcing and energizing the value creation of 
ongoing strategic initiatives requires managers involved take on a different role and 
perspective. 
In summary, this study has achieved its stated aIm by filling the research gap 
identified with an analysis of the dysfunctional effects that arise during strategic-
initiative implementation processes. The analysis has compared the three different 
strategic initiatives and their interactions with the organisational context and other 
ongoing initiatives. Moreover, it has discussed the formation of initiative related 
implementation challenges and the emerging consequences defined as dysfunctional 
effects. These dysfunctional effects and the relative findings led to theoretical 
discussion of the results of the analysis in light of the main body of the literature 
selected, as now described. 
9.1 Contributions and Implications 
In seeking to explore one of the currently underdeveloped areas of strategic initiative 
directed strategy making for the purpose of transforming a firm's resources and 
knowledge base, a grounded theory that depicts the dysfunctional effects of strategic 
initiative implementation has been proposed. Building on a critical examination and 
analysis of the phenomena selected, this thesis has provided an empirical account that 
is exploratory in design and integrative in nature. By placing the emphasis primarily 
on outcomes instead of purely on the processes of strategic initiative implementation 
and emerging dysfunctional effects, the insights generated by this study enhance our 
understanding by providing a more comprehensive picture of the area investigated. 
Furthermore, the contribution made by this study is not solely theoretical; it also has 
managerial implications. The following sections highlight the main theoretical and 
managerial contributions and implications of this study. 
9.1.1 Theoretical Contributions and Implications 
This study has contributed to the strategy making literature in vanous areas, 
especially those of resource based theory, the theory of dynamic capabilities, and the 
knowledge bascd theory of thc firm in light of the strategic initiatiYc concept. One 
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central topic of the strategy making literature concerns renewal of the firm's sources 
of competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959; Grant, 1996; Barney, 1991; Teece et aI., 
1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), in regard to which strategic initiatives can playa 
crucial role (McGrath et al., 1995; Wielemaker, 2003). This study has gone beyond 
discussion on how strategic initiatives can facilitate the renewal of a firm's unique 
sources of competitive advantage. Furthermore, it has described and illustrated the 
challenges that emerge during the renewal process as existing firm resources are 
combined with new resource bases. Moreover, the study has extended the work of 
strategic initiative related studies by highlighting the relevance of strategic initiative 
interactions with the firm's organisational context and other ongoing initiatives 
(Lechner et aI., 2003; Wie1emaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). In this regard, the study 
contributes in different ways to renewing a firm's most valuable sources of 
competitive advantage through the creation of new knowledge. Strategic initiative 
related knowledge creation processes may produce dysfunctional effects over time 
which may in tum hamper the renewal of the firm's sources of competitive advantage 
in different ways. In this context, strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities 
perform a twofold role during the renewal process. Besides their value-creating 
resource manipulation functionalities (Mitchell et aI., 1999; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Karim and Mitchell, 2000), dynamic capabilities can tum into business 
destructive processes based on the creation of dysfunctional knowledge within an 
initiative's knowledge bases and described in this study in terms of emerging 
challenges and the creation of dysfunctional effects. Finally, these various research 
findings have enabled this study to furnish an integrated perspective on initiative 
related strategy making by enhancing existing strategy implementation concepts in the 
context of strategic initiatives (McGrath, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Soda and Usai, 1999; 
Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Chung et aI., 2000; Lechner et aI., 2003; Wielemaker, 
2003; Marx, 2004). 
9.1.1.1 Contribution to the Strategic Initiative Literature: An Integrated 
Perspective 
One of the main contributions of this study is its integrative and novel perspcctiyc on 
strategic initiative related dysfunctions in the context of successful strategy 
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implementation. In this regard, the study proposes a new conceptualization which 
yields new insights into strategic initiative related strategy implementations. Three 
different main concepts have been proposed, which not only enable critical 
comparison with current empirical findings but also synthesise and integrate different 
areas that to date been examined in isolation. 
The discussion of strategic initiative interactions with the firm's organisational 
context and other ongoing initiatives has identified three different aspects. Firstly, the 
making of new and competitive bundles of resources through strategic initiative 
related interactions between new and old firm resources and the combination of 
strategic initiative related knowledge bases (Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992; Black and Boal, 1994; Grant, 1996). In this regard, new bundles of resources 
emerge from the five different types of strategic initiative related interactions that 
have been observed and classified. Three different types of interactions have been 
identified between the strategic initiative and the firm's organisational context, and 
five different types of interactions among ongoing strategic initiatives. Secondly, 
these interactions have been shown to create connections between different 
idiosyncratic knowledge bases of the firm and other ongoing initiatives (McGrath et 
aI., 1995; Wielemaker, 2003). In this regard, different boundaries of knowledge base 
heterogeneity and incompatibilities have been observed and discussed in detail. 
Thirdly, the strategic-initiative interactions activate controlled and uncontrolled 
processes of knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Wielemaker, 2003). 
The second concept concerns the drivers of strategic initiative implementation, 
conceptualised as strategic initiative related processes. Those processes equate to the 
theoretical concept of dynamic capabilities and generate two different implementation 
outcomes as initial, commonly planned and expected results. Secondly, the strategic 
initiative related processes identified create knowledge, especially dysfunctional 
knowledge based on the incompatibilities and heterogeneity of interacting knowledge 
bases in the context of initiative implementations. These interacting knowledge bases 
with the characteristics of being controversial, inoperative and inefficiently redundant 
with regard to other knowledge bases of the firm - and especially in the context of 
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strategic initiatives - generate the dynamic capabilities classified: dynamic 
capabilities which tum into business-destructive processes with various challenging 
outcomes (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Mitchell et aI., 1999; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Winter, 2003). 
The third concept relates in particular to the analysis and classification of the 
observed strategic initiative related implementation challenges such as resistances, 
boundaries, and barriers against ongoing initiatives or conflicting perspectives and 
dependencies between ongoing initiatives with problematic iterations and multiplier 
effects. These challenges arise from the ambiguity of strategic initiative related 
interactions and implementation activities (Zott, 2003). This ambiguity relates to the 
connections between an initiative action and their results. Therefore, the managers 
and stakeholders of a strategic initiative are unable to understand exactly what they 
are doing right, and whether their decisions will lead to the expected results (Lippman 
and Richard, 1982; Reed and Robert, 1990). Hence strategic initiatives are able to 
achieve two different results: firstly, the successful implementation of a firm's 
strategy by transforming existing firm sources of competitive advantage; secondly, 
the creation of business destructive processes which limit a firm's ability to utilize its 
key resources to reshape its competitive advantage. These findings enrich the current 
understanding and theories of strategic initiative related strategy implementations 
with the conceptualised theory of strategic initiative related dysfunctions (McGrath, 
1996; Uzzi, 1996; Soda and Usai, 1999; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Chung et aI., 
2000; Lechner et aI., 2003; Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). 
9.1.1.2 Contributions to the Resource Based Theory 
The findings of this study increase the theoretical understanding of how existing firm 
resources are combined with new firm resources in the context of strategic initiative 
implementation. Firm resources are combined through strategic initiative interactions. 
The concept of emerging interactions relates to Black's (1994) concept of "cogency 
relationships" as resources are surrounded by various kinds of relationships. These 
relationships connect and shape a firm's existing resource configuration, often 
described in the academic literature as a 'bundle of resources' (Barney, 1991: Petcraf, 
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1993; Black and Boal, 1994). Therefore, the findings of this study contribute to the 
resource based theory in two different ways. 
Firstly, strategic initiatives created interactions connect new resources with existing 
ones through different kinds of emerging relationships. These relationships are 
established by strategic initiative related implementation activities which affect the 
potential capacity to determine a firm's competitive advantage. These emerging 
interactions comprise aspects of ambiguity in achieving the initiative's expected 
results because information is missing, or because possible outcomes are difficult to 
estimate and the strategic initiative is entering uncharted territory. In this regard, the 
strategic initiative combines new resources with old ones through interactions without 
knowing exactly whether the new combinations will lead to the expected results and 
establish new sources for the firm's competitive advantage. 
Secondly, emerging strategic initiative interactions explain how new bundles of firm 
resources come about. These new bundles of resources can give rise to new 
competitive bundles of resources if they are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable (Teece, 1982; Barney, 1991). The interactions observed represent the 
first step in creating new bundles of resources by connecting established firm 
resources with new ones transformed and deployed through strategic initiative 
actions. Furthermore, those new bundles of existing and new firm resources may not 
always lead to competitive resource configurations and new sources of competitive 
advantage. Therefore, the observed interactions combine the strategic initiative 
concept with the resource based theory through the explanation of causal ambiguity 
whereby strategic initiative related implementations may not always lead to the 
expected results (Reed and Robert, 1990). 
In summary, the findings highlight new synergies between the RBV and the strategic 
initiative concept. These synergies enrich the overly static RBV with insights into 
how competitive resource combinations can emerge and become both valuable and 
problematic for the firm. In the case of the RBV. no adequate explanation is available 
on how and why successful firms able to allocate the resources required fail to rencw 
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their sources of competitive advantage, especially in competitive environments where 
such renewal is essential. The synergy of the RBV with the strategic initiative concept 
provides explanations as to why the combination of existing and new resources in the 
context of strategic initiatives may not always lead to competitive bundles of 
resources. According to Barney's (1991) description of resource attributes as 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, emerging resource configurations can 
be qualified as new sources of competitive advantage. However, dysfunctional 
knowledge as a specific resource may emerge from new resource combinations of 
existing and new resources, and may be again combined with different firm resources. 
These combinations are challenging for the firm as dysfunctional effects emerge 
which become business destructive. Moreover, new resource configurations emerging 
from strategic initiative interactions comprise ambiguities and may become business 
destructive for two further reasons. Firstly, strategic initiatives are faced with the 
dilemma of protecting a firm's current idiosyncratic competencies by reconfiguring 
the firm's resource base at the same time. This challenge is risky and may not always 
lead to constructive business outcomes. Secondly, ambiguous interactions between 
existing and new firm resources may at a later stage become inefficient and 
incompatible because dysfunctional knowledge emerges, so that the initially 
promising resource configuration generates higher costs which reduce the firm's 
ability to gain above-average and sustainable rents (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; 
Foss and Knudsen, 2003; Peteraf and Barney, 2003). 
9.1.1.3 Contributions to the Dynamic Capability Literature 
Dynamic capabilities that are critical and supportive to initiative implementations are 
major prerequisites for successful strategic initiative implementations. This study has 
shown that strategic initiative related implementation activities are influenced and 
affected by five different key processes which relate to the theoretical core 
functionalities of the resource manipulation processes of dynamic capabilities. 
namely: management support processes, decision processes to prioritise and 
implement changes, organisational administration and support processes, processes of 
interpretation, processes of acceptance, and processes of combination (Mitchell et aI., 
1999: Eisenhardt and Martin. 2000; Karim and MitchelL 2000; Winter. 2003). 
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Moreover, these processes reflect strategic initiative specific dynamic capabilities by 
facilitating and enabling the renewal of a firm's sources of competitive advantage 
through strategic initiatives. Therefore, these five observed strategic initiative related 
processes are a source for the initiative to renew a firm's sources of competitive 
advantage. However, the value of the five initiatives related dynamic capabilities 
identified by this study relates mainly to their ability to improve the firm's existing 
bundles of resources and knowledge bases. According to Eisenhardt and Martin's 
(2000) theoretical analysis on how dynamic capabilities facilitate the manipulation of 
firm resources through their functionalities, the processes observed drive resource 
manipulations across the firm to establish new sources of competitive advantage for 
it. 
Furthermore, the dynamic capabilities observed relate to a firm's idiosyncratic 
knowledge base, including the five different key processes that use resources to 
integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources and extend current knowledge bases 
to establish new sources of competitive advantage for the company (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). 
Besides the ability to facilitate reconfiguration of a firm's resources and knowledge 
bases, the strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities are improvisational and 
dissipatory, meaning that they require constant energy to stay on track: according to 
Griffith and Harvey (2001), if they have too little structure, they may easily slide to 
the edge of chaos (Ethiraj et aI., 2005). These characteristics match the observations 
in this study. 
Moreover, the strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities identified by this study 
perform a twofold role in the successful implementation of the firm's strategies 
through strategic initiatives. On the one hand, the strategic initiative related dynamic 
capabilities support the implementation of new strategies and business directions 
accordingly to their plans and expected results (goals and objectives). However, on 
the other hand, the dynamic capabilities observed create additional complexities and 
challenges for t h ~ ~ firm and ongoing initiatiycs which lead to business dcstructiyc 
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outcomes and results, termed in this study as 'dysfunctional effects'. These 
dysfunctional effects reflect the production of dysfunctional knowledge within the 
firm's knowledge bases and tum the dynamic capabilities involved from value-
creating entities into business-destructive processes, producing various and sometimes 
iteratively new dysfunctional effects. 
Moreover, dynamic capabilities are often described in the academic literature as 
processes which gain new knowledge quickly (Collis, 1994; Grant, 1996). Therefore, 
activated through strategic initiative-driven interactions between different resource 
and knowledge bases and facilitated by the strategic initiative related dynamic 
capabilities to manipulate the firm's existing resource and knowledge bases, the 
strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities are constantly shaped by initiative-
implementation activities to produce the expected results or to stimulate the onset of 
dysfunctional knowledge, based on destructive resource and knowledge base 
combinations. In this context, the observed strategic initiative related dynamic 
capabilities are idiosyncratic, initiate, and are initiated by, knowledge creating 
processes which are dysfunctional. The emerging dysfunctional knowledge is 
integrated with the firm's existing knowledge bases in the same way as non-
dysfunctional knowledge, which in turn iteratively influences the evolution of new 
idiosyncratic dynamic capabilities of the strategic initiative and the firm. 
This finding helps enrich current understanding on how strategic initiatives utilise 
emerging and interconnected knowledge bases, and it strengthens the argument that 
strategic initiatives are knowledge creating entities which create new knowledge 
through linking, interpreting and integrating new knowledge (Wielemaker et al., 
2001; Wielemaker, 2003). In addition, the finding enriches the conception of 
initiatives as knowledge creating entities because strategic initiatives are able to create 
new dysfunctional knowledge which leads to business destructive outcomes, 
alongside the creation of new and supportive knowledge. Therefore, the new resource 
configurations and knowledge bases emerging from strategic initiatives may be 
problematic. and unstable in producing the expected values for the firm. 
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In summary, the dynamic capabilities observed in the context of strategic initiative 
implementations can facilitate the generation of two different outcomes: business 
constructive outcomes which reflect the planned and expected results of the strategic 
initiative, and business destructive outcomes which stimulate dysfunctional effects 
similar to the evolution of "bad" and "good" habits in a human being. Therefore, 
strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities have the power to facilitate the 
creation of new sources of competitive advantage and the power to facilitate the 
termination of existing sources of the firm's competitive advantages, doing so on the 
basis of knowledge emerging from strategic initiative related resource and knowledge 
base interactions. 
9.1.1.4 Contributions to the Knowledge Based Theory 
This section outlines the contribution of the thesis to the knowledge based theory, in 
particular its new insights into how strategic initiatives affect and relate to the 
knowledge base creation of a firm. In this regard, the study has shown that not all the 
knowledge created through strategic initiatives is equally valuable, and that it may 
even become business destructive. The second part of this section outlines the 
consequences of business destructive knowledge creation (dysfunctional knowledge) 
based on strategic initiative related interactions between different specialised and 
distinct knowledge bases of the firm and other ongoing initiatives, and finally outlines 
its strategic implications. 
9.1.1.4.1 Insights into Strategic Initiative related Knowledge Base Creation 
Knowledge creation plays a vital role in strategic initiative related implementation 
activities to renew of a firm's sources of competitive advantage. In this regard, the 
finding of this study that strategic initiative related interactions create connections 
with other knowledge bases furnishes additional insights into how a strategic initiative 
facilitates the development of its own knowledge base over time (Wielemaker et aI., 
2001; Wielemaker, 2003). Moreover, during the connection of distinct knowledge 
bases through strategic initiative stimulated interactions, the initiative encounters 
rejections and incompatibilities among emerging know ledge basc combinations, for 
s ~ v e r a l l reasons. Firstly, strong deviation, or when controvcrsial knowledge bases 
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create inefficient overlaps which neutralise the effectiveness of individual initiative 
transformations and cannot be avoided completely because every strategic initiative is 
launched for a specific strategic reason (Kownatzki, 2002). Therefore. strategic 
initiatives and emerging knowledge bases reflect a wide range of specialized 
knowledge, often described in the academic literature as 'deep knowledge' (Demsetz. 
1991; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Hansen, 1999). Such knowledge is specialized, 
functional and complex and it enables the strategic initiative to achieve its objectives 
successfully because strategic initiatives pursue specific strategic purposes. This may 
create conflicting knowledge bases among different ongoing initiatives which are 
described as 'dysfunctional' in this study. 
Strategic initiative related knowledge bases are necessary for successful 
implementation of the firm's strategies and the focus of an individual initiative 
implementation process, but they are not necessarily helpful in combination with 
different ongoing strategic initiative implementation processes. Therefore, specialized 
knowledge bases are necessary for successful strategy implementations, but they are 
not necessarily compatible with all other emerging knowledge bases, with the 
consequence of overlapping and redundant knowledge - utilization of dysfunctional 
knowledge - in the context of ongoing strategic initiatives. Secondly, strong 
deviations between connected and initiative related knowledge bases create 
boundaries and barriers. These barriers relate to the idiosyncratic knowledge creation 
process of ongoing initiatives. Individual ongoing initiatives establish mutually 
conflicting skills and capabilities which, according to Leonard-Barton's (1992) 
concept of emerging core rigidities, generate resistance by some of the action units 
involved. Thirdly, strategic initiative related knowledge bases are highly specialized 
and subjective. Therefore, individual initiatives create their own ways of sense 
making. In this regard, sense making is defined in the academic literature as an 
important source of new organizational knowledge (Thomas et at., 1993). 
Consequently, established sense making routines, different forms of mental models 
(Senge, 1990). working procedures (Hackbarth and Grover, 1999), histories (HalL 
1984). organizational routines (Cyert and March, 1963) and organizational cultures 
(Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Walsh, 1995) within the individual initiati\'e can create 
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challenges during the interaction with other initiative related capabilities. These 
consequences relate to the theoretical heterogeneity of tacit knowledge carriers. 
According to N onaka and Takeuchi's (1995) concept of 'theoretical knowledge 
carrier', initiatives can be defined as tacit knowledge carriers which face the 
challenges of heterogeneity and incompatibility. Fourthly, strategic initiative 
interactions activate the firm specific knowledge creation process and provide a new 
framework in which to create measures with which to quantify emerging knowledge 
according to its strategic relevance, given that not all knowledge is equally valuable 
(Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). In particular, the 
interactions observed stimulate the creation of new knowledge and qualify the 
knowledge creation process as supportive or otherwise due to the development of new 
sources of sustainable competitive advantage. Finally, this study has examined the 
creation of dysfunctional knowledge in relation to initiative-oriented strategy 
implementation processes. Dysfunctional knowledge is stored within the firm's 
various knowledge bases and emerges through interactions with the firm's 
organisational context and other ongoing strategic initiatives. This kind of knowledge 
is a strategic threat for organisations because emerging knowledge bases may become 
imbued with dysfunctional knowledge which gives rise to dysfunctional effects and 
hampers the firm's value-creation process and its ability to renew its sources of 
competitive advantage. 
9.1.1.4.2 Insights and Consequences of Dysfunctional Knowledge Creation 
Strategic initiative related interactions between different specialised and distinct 
knowledge bases stimulate idiosyncratic knowledge creation processes of the firm and 
give rise to dysfunctional effects which emerge through initiative implementation 
challenges. Those challenges reflect a specific context in which differently emerging 
dysfunctional effects can be described. These challenges occur alongside the expected 
and planned initiative results and divide the strategic initiative implementation results 
into two different types of emerging knowledge. 
The first type of emerging knowledge is the outcome of the initiativc implementations 
conductcd, and it includes the expectations relating to the rationale of the strategic 
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initiative implementation activities undertaken to implement the defined business 
strategies. These transformations create new and business supportive knowledge 
which extends the firm's current knowledge bases and enables successful 
implementation of the business strategies defined in relation to established concepts 
of knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Moran and Ghoshal, 1996; 
Nonaka and Konno, 1998; Wielemaker, 2003). However, alongside the creation of 
business supportive and commonly expected knowledge, dysfunctional knowledge 
emerges through strategic initiative implementations and addresses to the firm's 
existing knowledge bases in the same way as generally new knowledge does. 
Furthermore, the emerging dysfunctional knowledge within the distinct and strategic 
initiative related knowledge bases turns the dynamic capabilities involved into 
destructive processes which generate various dysfunctional effects. Moreover, the 
emerging dysfunctional effects iteratively accumulate the existing knowledge bases 
with dysfunctional knowledge. Therefore, this type of knowledge is rather 
unexpected, undiscovered, and less predictable, and it has the capacity to stimulate 
various upcoming challenges from where uncontrolled dysfunctional effects arise. 
In detail, strategic initiative related challenges are emergmg situations m which 
existing firm resources interact with new resources in the context of strategic initiative 
implementations. However, the strategic-initiative interactions and implementations 
that thus emerge fail to establish new and competitive resource combinations (Barney, 
1991; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Instead of the strategic 
initiative's expected results in reconfiguring the existing resource configurations, the 
initiatives observed in this study produced three main challenges with sometimes 
diverse uncontrolled outcomes for the entire company. 
The first phenomenon observed was emerging resistances, boundaries and barriers 
against and between ongoing strategic initiatives and which related closely to 
Leonard-Barton's (1992) concept of core rigidities. More specifically, strategic 
initiative related activities sometimes derived strongly from existing competencies of 
the organisation and other ongoing initiatives, with the consequence that those 
organisational units or other ongoing strategic initiatives raised resistance and 
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established boundaries against the ongoing strategic initiative actions. Moreover. the 
resulting bundles of resources, including old and new ones, created barriers and 
severed the new connections within the emerging resource configurations (Mahoney 
and Pandian, 1992; Black and Boal, 1994). The second main challenge of conflicting 
perspectives and challenging dependencies between ongoing initiative strategies and 
implementation plans related to the problematic of incompatible resources and 
emerging knowledge bases, and in particular the strategic initiative related ones 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996; Wielemaker, 2003; Patriotta, 2003). More 
specifically, the new connections between distinct strategic initiative related 
knowledge bases faced incompatibilities which iteratively produced destructive 
dynamic capabilities that reinforced the boundaries and barriers previously observed 
in the case studies. Instead of creating new inventions, as reported by Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998), the strategic initiative related knowledge creation processes activated 
led to overlaps and controversial results between ongoing strategic initiatives and 
their emerging knowledge bases, with the consequence of conflicting perspectives and 
challenging dependencies. The third main challenge related to challenging iterations 
and multiplier effects due to emerging initiative related interactions. This situation 
displayed iteration and connects to Wielemaker's (2003) initiative related knowledge 
creating phases of linking, interpreting, and integrating. In this regard, a strategic 
initiative does not necessarily have to proceed sequentially. Instead, a strategic 
initiative creates knowledge through iterative loops (Van de Ven, 1992; Wielemaker, 
2003). Furthermore, initiative related dynamic capabilities closely rely on existing 
knowledge, which gives rise to experimental and non-linear outcomes (Ethiraj et aI., 
2005). This explains why different strategic initiatives faced similar resistances and 
barriers as initial stimulations of "destructive" dynamic capabilities created a new 
basis of destructive knowledge from which new and "destructive" dynamic 
capabilities emerged and created multiplier effects across the organisation and other 
ongoing strategic initiatives. Therefore, strategic initiative implementation stimulates 
knowledge creating processes which are iterative and able to create - alongside the 
expected results - new challenges and emerging dysfunctional effects for the 
organisation and other ongoing strategic initiatives. 
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In light of the findings of this study, challenges can be summarised as stages where 
dysfunctional knowledge emerges and produces unexpected dysfunctional effects. 
according to the most accredited knowledge creation theories (Nonaka and Takeuchi. 
1995; Grant, 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Wielemaker, 2003). These 
dysfunctional effects can best be described as unexpected disorders and emerging 
challenges for the entire company. In addition, dysfunctional effects are the 
unexpected dimension of transformational activities undertaken to renew and sustain a 
firm's competitive advantage in the context of strategic initiatives. According to the 
results of the case study analysis and case comparison, five different groups of 
dysfunctional effects were presented in section 8.2.2 and illustrated in Figure 28. 
The dysfunctional effects observed and classified closely relate to McGrath et al.' s 
(1995) argument that competitive advantage is unlikely to emerge from a strategic 
initiative unless the related activities are able to develop capabilities in what they are 
doing. In this context, the development of the required capabilities may not always be 
successful. Dysfunctional effects can emerge as the results of the strategic initiative's 
limitation in implementing its goals and objectives successfully and reflect the reason 
why companies fail to implement their strategies through strategic initiatives. In this 
regard, the initiative related dynamic capabilities identified by this study perform a 
twofold role in the successful implementation of the firm's various strategies. On the 
one hand, these dynamic capabilities enable successful initiative implementations. 
However, on the other hand, the dynamic capabilities observed create additional 
challenges for the firm and ongoing initiatives and lead to dysfunctional effects. 
Accordingly, one result of this thesis is that a strategic initiative's success depends on 
its ability to facilitate related dynamic capabilities for successful implementation and 
not to become lost in challenging dependencies and interactions with other ongoing 
initiatives. In addition, alongside organisational embeddedness, interactions with 
other ongoing initiatives are critical for the success of a strategic initiative. The 
discovery of the dysfunctional effects highlights the importance of focusing on 
interactions with other ongoing initiatives due to the initiative's success and enriches 
current strategic initiative related implementation concepts with the findings of this 
study (McGrath, 1996; Uzzi, 1996; Soda and Usai, 1999; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; 
Chung et aI., 2000; Lechner et aI., 2003; Wielemaker, 2003; Marx, 2004). 
9.1.1.5 Cross-Theory Integration in the Context of Strategy Making 
There are few studies that have sought to show a link among the resource based view, 
dynamic capabilities and the knowledge base view in the context of strategic initiative 
implementations to reshape a firm's most valuable sources of competitive advantage. 
As observed and conceptualised, emerging strategic initiative driven interactions 
enable the initiative to combine new and resources and connect with different 
knowledge bases in the firm, especially knowledge bases from other ongoing strategic 
initiatives (Grant, 1996; Wielemaker, 2003). These interactions enable the initiative to 
extend and transform the firm's existing knowledge bases and create new bundles of 
resources to establish new sources of competitive advantage. Furthermore, the 
extension and transformation of existing idiosyncratic knowledge bases and new 
resource combinations require strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities (Teece 
et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003). These dynamic capabilities 
are processes which facilitate and enable the re-combination of the firm's existing 
resource and knowledge bases, according to the main functions of dynamic 
capabilities described by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000): resource creation, resource 
integration, resource re-combination, and resource releases. However, recombining 
new with existing resources and combining emerging and initiative specific 
knowledge bases of the firm are problematic tasks in the context of strategic initiative 
implementation. These re-combinations may lead, besides the expected result, to the 
creation of dysfunctional knowledge which turns the value creating functionalities of 
the strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities into business destructive processes, 
with the consequence of producing dysfunctional knowledge which is a strategic 
limitation on the renewal of the firm's most valuable sources of competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). Therefore, strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities 
are crucial for successful initiative implementation, and they are interrelated with the 
strategic quality of the emerging resource combinations and knowledge bases 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Patriotta, 2003; Wielemaker. 2003). In this context, 
dysfunctional knO\\"ledge reduces the strategic importance of emerging knowledge 
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and creates strategic Issues for the existing and future sources of the finn's 
competitive advantage. Moreover, dysfunctional knowledge becomes embedded in 
the firm's emerging knowledge bases, reduces the value of the strategic initiative 
related dynamic capabilities involved, and raises challenges as an emerging resource 
within the new resource and knowledge base of the firm (Barney, 1991; Chatterjee 
and Wernerfelt, 1991; Grant, 1996; Nonaka and Konno, 1998; Peteraf and Barney, 
2003). 
In summary, this study has outlined new aspects in regard to the reshaping of a finn's 
competitive advantages through strategic initiatives. Firstly, a strategic initiative 
establishes new sources of competitive advantage through interactions among 
different resources and distinct knowledge bases of the firm. In this regard, emerging 
resource reconfiguration and knowledge-base combinations are limited and 
challenged by the production of dysfunctional knowledge. Secondly, strategic 
initiatives facilitate their implementation activities through dynamic capabilities 
which can become both business supportive and problematic in establishing new 
sources of competitive advantage. If dynamic capabilities become connected to 
dysfunctional knowledge, their value creating functionalities tum into business 
destructive outcomes reflected in various dysfunctional effects. Thirdly, the emerging 
dysfunctional knowledge as a new type of firm resource creates challenges if it is 
involved in the firm's reconfiguration process to create competitive resource 
configurations. Finally, dysfunctional knowledge represents a strategic threat for the 
strategic initiative related strategy making process because dysfunctional knowledge 
becomes embedded in the firm's emerging knowledge bases and potentially restricts 
the firm's long term ability to reshape its sources of competitive advantage. 
9.1.2 Managerial Contributions and Implications 
One of this study' s key managerial implications is that managers must be aware of. 
and able to plan and manage strategic initiative implementation professionally, in 
pal1icular the emerging challenges and dysfunctional effects deriving from strategic 
initiative implementation. The reason is that strategic initiatives are able not only to 
achieve their expected results but also to develop dysfunctional knowledge which 
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may induce the related processes to stimulate challenging situations from which 
dysfunctional effects emerge with business destructive outcomes. The latter may 
create strategic threats for managers during the strategic initiative implementation 
period. According to the findings of this study, managers must act more dynamically, 
exploring more proactively the possible implications of emerging strategic initiative 
interactions and reducing potential risks from emerging dysfunctional know ledge 
bases in order to facilitate and assure the firm's renewal of its competitive advantage. 
9.1.2.1 Managing the Range of Strategic Initiatives related Interactions 
Managers should balance and reduce the complexities from ongoing initiative 
interactions with the organisational context and other ongoing initiatives. Before a 
strategic initiative is launched, it should be discussed and judged in the context of 
ongoing and planned strategy implementation activities. A strategic initiative may 
have a strategic rationale for the firm in isolation. However, its potential for 
unexpected interactions with other ongoing initiatives may produce challenging 
outcomes and limit the firm's ability to renew its sources of competitive advantage by 
challenging the ongoing initiatives. Therefore, managers must be able to manage 
strategic initiative implementation step by step by monitoring and judging ongoing 
and emerging interactions between strategic initiatives according to their potential 
range and scope. Hence, managers need to extend their existing repertoire of 
management tools with scenarios of emerging and potential strategic initiative 
interactions. 
9.1.2.2 Managing the Synergies of emerging Knowledge Bases 
Managers should manage the potential synergies and limitations of the firm's 
emerging knowledge bases in the context of strategic initiatives. Knowledge bases 
emerging from strategic initiatives comprise strategic and valuable knowledge which 
is idiosyncratic and resists being combined with the firm's other specialised 
knowledge bases. This is especially the case during strategic initiative implementation 
and transformation activities. Managers should therefore increase their understanding 
of the firm's emerging and specialised knowledge bases, including the mix of deep 
and broad knowledge. Those knowledge bases may not lend themsehcs to 
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interconnection with other specialised knowledge bases because specific knowledge 
bases of the firm are necessary to implement specific strategies. The Sun Sigma 
initiative focused on enhancing the firm's process qualities and establishing process 
excellence standards. Nevertheless, at a later stage the Sun Sigma initiative interacted 
with the CRM Convergence initiative, with the consequence that the focus drifted to 
customer orientation instead of establishing process excellence standards across the 
organisation. In this context, the specialised and emerging knowledge base of the Sun 
Sigma initiative became combined with the CRM Convergence initiative, with the 
consequence that the Sun Sigma initiative became restricted in its deep knowledge 
and therefore in the effectiveness of its idiosyncratic knowledge base. Therefore, 
managers must be able to understand the synergies of their potential and emerging 
knowledge bases in order to prevent inefficient overlaps and incompatibilities among 
strategic initiative related knowledge bases. 
9.1.2.3 Prioritising the Strategic Relevance of Emerging Knowledge 
Managers should understand and prioritise the strategic importance of emerging 
knowledge across their organisation. In this regard, strategic initiatives facilitate the 
creation of new knowledge. Furthermore, existing knowledge is replaced by new 
knowledge. In detail, not all emerging knowledge from strategic initiatives is equally 
relevant and valuable; it needs to be quantified according to its ability to promote the 
renewal of the firm's sources of competitive advantage in a supportive, less 
supportive or even destructive way. In this context, this study's identification of 
dysfunctional knowledge can help managers increase their understanding of irrelevant 
knowledge and create profiles on their dysfunctional knowledge so as to eliminate it 
through the prioritisation of strategic initiative implementation and transformation 
activities. 
Furthermore, dysfunctional knowledge can be stored in different emerging knowledge 
bases, as when the Sun Sigma knowledge base became partly extended with CRM-
oriented knowledge. This interaction stimulated additional medium-term Sun Sigma 
projects to improve existing customer satisfactions, with the consequence of 
inctTicient overlaps between the Sun Sigma initiative and the CRM COl1\ergence 
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initiative. The example outlines the need to define priorities between the Sun Sigma 
and CRM Convergence initiative to avoid doing everything at once by creating 
inefficient overlaps and dysfunctional knowledge within the Sun Sigma knowledge 
base. 
Therefore, new knowledge may not always be strategically valuable for the emerging 
knowledge base of ongoing initiatives in a specific period of time; and once this kind 
of knowledge has been stored, iterations of ineffective and inefficient outcomes may 
occur. Hence, during their strategic initiative related strategy implementations, 
managers must both increase their understanding of potential emerging dysfunctional 
knowledge and determine where this kind of knowledge is stored. Furthermore, 
continuous prioritisation of initiative related resources may help to protect scarce firm 
resources and minimise the creation of ineffective knowledge. 
9.1.2.4 Early Detection of Critical Situations during Initiative Implementations 
The findings of this study should help managers develop management tools with 
which to detect and manage critical situations during the strategic initiative 
implementations from which dysfunctional effects may arise. These critical situations 
have been defined in this study as initiative implementation challenges. 
The first challenge has been summarised and defined as emergzng resistance, 
boundaries and barriers against and between ongoing strategic initiatives. This 
situation can emerge from interactions between the strategic initiative and the 
organizational context or from interactions between different ongoing initiatives. The 
situation is characterised by different forms of emerging and challenging resistances, 
boundaries and upcoming barriers against the ongoing strategic initiative, or the 
strategic initiative facilitates blockages against other ongoing strategic initiatives and 
organisational units, so that challenges and complexities occur in the overall strategy 
implementation process. Managers may counter this kind of situation through a 
collaborative and proactive knowledge-sharing culture where team spirit and 
challenging the status quo are part of the firm's daily business operations. 
FUl1hermore, managers can avoid those sihmtions by hiring innovative personnel \\'ho 
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challenge the firm's given rules, support interdisciplinary teams, and boost the firm's 
innovative potential through continuous improvements. 
The second mam challenge has been summarised as conflicting perspectives and 
challenging dependencies between ongoing initiative strategies and implementation 
plans. This challenging situation comprises the problems of different priorities, 
conflicting perspectives, misaligned agendas, individual interests, and challenging 
dependencies between different ongoing strategic initiatives. Managers can detect 
such situations in growing complexities among different ongoing strategic initiatives. 
Furthermore, initiatives may not always support each other in implementing their 
strategic objectives. Challenging dependencies and overlaps among the different 
initiative goals and directions may create critical dependencies between ongoing 
initiatives. Considering and facilitating continuous consolidations of excessively 
complex strategic initiative portfolios may help prevent this kind of challenge from 
which problematic effects may arise. In addition, the third situation of challenging 
iterations and multiplier effects highlights that a strategic initiative can facilitate 
iteratively different challenges during their implementation period. 
In summary, managers must be aware of those specific situations - challenges during 
the initiative implementation and transformation activities which illustrate critical and 
unexpected environments for the strategic initiative implementation and 
transformation activities. However, they can help managers proactively to increase 
their awareness of the potential threats of dysfunctional effects. Furthermore, 
managers are able to identify problematic initiatives and decide on the next activities 
to prevent challenging outcomes for the firm and secure the strategy implementation 
process. In this regard, strategic initiatives are not necessarily a guaranteed and sure 
way to implement new business strategies for companies with little strategic initiative 
implementation experience and scant awareness of potential threats. 
9.1.2.5 Enforcing the Value Creation of Strategic Initiatives 
Managers should focus on the value-creation process of strategic initiatives. Through 
challenges, strategic initiatives may give rise to dysfunctional effects w'hich can lead 
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to business destructive outcomes during the strategy implementation process. These 
outcomes limit the value creation of individual strategic initiative and represent a new 
strategic threat for the company as it implements its strategies through strategic 
initiatives. According to the findings of this study, there are five groups of such 
dysfunctional effects: 
• Drifting Targets 
• Emerging Resource Lacks 
• Neglect of Available Resources 
• Operational Complexities 
• Problem Multiplier 
Each of these five categories comprIses specific types of potential dysfunctional 
effects which may create difficulties for the entire organisation during its strategy 
implementation and reduce the value creation of strategic initiatives. Drifting targets 
may be avoided through a defined strategic intent of the initiative, which does not 
overlap with the firm's other strategic initiative objectives and does not allow any 
further interpretation for the implementation teams involved. Moreover, additional 
resource lacks can be minimized through redundant resources across the firm which 
can be utilised if required during the initiative's implementation. The neglect of 
available resources reflects incompatibilities between different knowledge bases and 
inefficiencies between the firm's new resource combinations. Such effects can be 
minimized by empowering initiative teams to decide on their own how to implement 
the initiative's defined objectives and overall strategies. In particular, initiative teams 
should be able partly to select their own methodologies and ways to implement the 
initiative, instead of a policy driven culture. In the example of the Sun Sigma 
initiative, other initiative teams were pushed into adopting the Sun Sigma 
methodologies and approaches, which reduced the effectiveness of the available 
resources. To mInImIZe operational complexities, a company needs managers 
possessmg competencies in both the firm's daily business operations and in 
implementing and supporting strategic initiatives across the organisation. In this 
regard, managers need to be project team members. explorers, inno\'ators and 
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decision-makers who understand both fields and bring them together through 
progressive transformations. Finally, the fifth category of dysfunctional effects, 
Problem Multiplier, illustrates that emerging effects may iteratively stimulate new 
effects and specific situations from which additional and new dysfunctional effects 
can emerge. Therefore, managers are constantly required during the strategic 
initiative's entire implementation period to enforce the value creation of ongoing 
initiatives by preventing the onset of challenges, and by reacting rapidly to neutralise 
emerging dysfunctional effects across the organisation. 
9.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Despite the significant contributions at theoretical and managerial levels discussed 
above, the thesis obviously has some limitations that call for further research. This 
section outlines the study's shortcomings in its investigation of emerging challenges 
in the context of strategic initiative related implementations. 
Firstly, it is clear from the way in which the current literature is reviewed that this 
study emphasizes primarily the challenges and effects that arise during the 
reconfiguration of a firm's resources and knowledge bases to renew competitive 
advantage in the context of strategic initiatives. In this regard, the identified strategic 
initiative related dynamic capabilities play a crucial role in assuring the success of 
strategic initiative related implementations. Therefore, additional research on 
classification and competitions of strategic initiative related dynamic capabilities and 
the concept of strategic initiative influencing dynamic capabilities may be required in 
the future. This limitation can be explained by the focus of this study, which has 
concentrated on challenging effects in the context of strategy implementation by 
understanding how strategic initiatives affect a firm's resource and knowledge base 
during the renewal of the firm's competitive advantages, rather than on classification 
of dynamic capabilities and strategic initiatives. 
Secondly, in exploring dysfunctional effects during strategy making in the context of 
strategic initiatives, this study has been limited in its obseryation of strategic 
initiatives during the implementation stage rather than oycr thcir entire life cycles. 
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Further research should examine emergmg dysfunctional effects in the context of 
strategic initiatives within a more complete observation where a more comprehensive 
longitudinal approach is taken. In particular, the employment of a longitudinal 
approach would enable future research to observe changes and mutations in the 
knowledge bases of a firm by including the history of combining new and existing 
firm resources within a broader organisational context. 
Thirdly, this study has identified different types of dysfunctional effects in the context 
of strategic initiative implementation activities. However, the analysis has been 
restricted to the three case studies conducted on different types of business destructive 
qualities, and especially in relation to the strategic initiatives' evolving and changing 
knowledge bases. Therefore, the limited scope of the present research indicates that 
more research efforts are needed to address the issue of business destructive qualities 
as a means of understanding strategic initiative-driven implementations to renew a 
firm's sources of competitive advantages. More importantly, future research efforts 
should take into account the interplay between the two dimensions - dysfunctional 
effects and renewing a firm's sources of competitive advantage - rather than treating 
them as two separate concerns. 
Fourthly, the present study has focused closely on the strategy implementation 
process. In this regard, strategic direction and strategy definition have been defined in 
this study as prerequisites. Nevertheless, understanding the interrelations between the 
strategy definition and strategy implementation processes in the context of strategy 
initiatives requires further research. 
Fifthly, the present study focuses on three different strategic initiatives which aimed 
to implement the firm's strategic objectives and visions by transforming part wise the 
firm's organisational structures and processes and enrich the firm's current business 
tools. However, additional studies on different types of initiatives as product 
development initiatives (R&D initiatives) and Strategic Change initiatives would 
provide additional insights on the current findings. Furthermore, a comprehensive and 
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more holistic account on different types of strategic initiative would rely on more 
empirical analysis and strengthen the generalizability of the findings of this study. 
Finally, this study has examined the nature of emergmg challenges from the 
perspective of affecting a firm's resource and knowledge base through strategic 
initiative implementations. However, the processes through which organisations 
prioritise their strategic initiative related implementation activities are still largely 
unexplored. This evidently requires more research which examines how these 
decisions are made, and what issues in particular influence such decision-making 
processes. The concepts of sense making and decision-making, especially in the 
context of strategic initiative implementation, can provide a useful foundation for 
addressing such issues. 
9.3 Conclusions 
This study has shown that the interactions between ongoing strategic initiatives are 
critical factors in the success of initiatives. Therefore, strategic initiatives require 
management capacity to bring together the competencies of the firm's daily business 
operations to drive an initiative's implementation and transformation activities. In this 
regard, companies may not secure themselves against failure by only allocating and 
providing sufficient resources for strategic-initiative implementation. Moreover, 
managers need to understand critical constellations of ongoing strategic initiatives and 
areas of potential challenges. Those areas must be continuously managed, because the 
value creating capabilities of the ongoing initiative may, because of inefficient 
constellations with other ongoing initiatives or because of the firm's organisational 
context, turn into business destructive outcomes. Such outcomes may create 
dysfunctional knowledge which iteratively turns the value creating capabilities of 
strategic initiatives into challenges from which dysfunctional effects may arisc. These 
dysfunctional effects are strategic obstacles against the management tcam' s 
implementation of its strategies through strategic initiatives. Therefore, managers are 
required to balance effective strategic initiative implementation with their role as 
initiati\'e dri\'cn cxplorers and inno\'ators. 
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Appendix 
1 Case Study Protocol Details and Questionnaires 
Prerequisites - Researcher's Case Study Preparation Check List 
• Collection of relevant background information about the next interviewees 
• Update status and presentation of this research work to the scheduled interviewees 
(including introduction slides of the research project) 
• Review current status of conducted interviews and prepare preliminary results of the 
research work for the next interviewees, if required 
• Update, optimisation, and extension of the case study questionnaires 
Used from the researcher before every scheduled interview. 
Questionnaire - Line-of Business, Management and Decision Maker 
Introduction and purpose of the discussion: 
• The company's strategy implementation process 
• Strategic initiatives and management experience 
• Vision and Strategy formulation and decision making process, according to the 
company's strategic portfolio 
• High level (strategic change) capabilities 
• Management challenges and measurements (Key Performance Indicators) 
Questions: 
Company Environment: 
• Can you describe the strategic challenges the company is facing today? 
• How would you describe the actual situation of the firm? 
• Which parts and company areas are affected by the firm's strategic challenges? 
Strategic Initiatives: 
• Describe your personal experience with strategic programmes and initiatives. 
• How are the firm's key programs and initiative initiated and managed? 
• Further ad-hoc questions on his/her specific strategic initiative experience. 
Strategic Company Needs and Capabilities: 
• Describe the vision, strategy formulation and implementation process according to the 
company's strategic needs and capabilities? 
• How do you plan to transform the actual company capabilities? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
362 
Challenges during the strategic initiative related strategy making process: 
• How do you recognise and manage the upcoming challenges during the strategy 
implementation process? 
• Which kind of challenges are you/the company facing during the strategy 
implementation period? 
• What role do strategic initiatives play within the company to transform the existing 
capabilities of the firm? 
Questionnaire - Project and Competence Centre Team, Strategic Initiative Team 
Introduction and purpose of the discussion: 
• Strategic initiative integration and management processes 
• Strategic initiative related challenges 
• Programme or project challenges 
• Transformation of business capabilities 
• Decision making processes and resource (re-)allocation processes 
• Value and value generation of strategic initiatives 
Questions: 
Strategic initiative processes and related issues: 
• Describe your strategic initiative related integration and management processes. 
• Describe your strategic initiative related challenges. 
Managing strategic initiatives: 
• Describe your experience of programme or project challenges. 
• How do you manage the strategic capabilities? 
• How do you plan to transform the strategic capabilities? 
• How are your strategic initiative related to the firm's overall strategy making process? 
Decision making and resourced allocation processes 
• Describe the strategic initiative related decision making processes. 
• Describe the resource re-allocation processes of your strategic initiative. 
Capabilities/Core Capability Challenges during the transformation period: 
• How do you recognise the effects and challenges during the transformation period 
and strategic initiative implementation period? 
• Which role is played by the strategic initiatives in changing the existing capabilities? 
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Questionnaire - Strategic Initiative "Customer" and Representatives 
Introduction and purpose of the discussion: 
• Customer, Competitor and Market (external) challenges in the context of existing or 
new strategic initiatives (Strategic Relevance of Strategic Initiatives) 
• Competitor reactions to and imitations of company's strategic programmes 
• Customer reactions to company's strategic programmes 
• Expected value of the ongoing /related strategic initiatives 
-------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
Questions: 
Customer perspective on the companies strategic initiatives: 
• How are the expected values of the firm's strategic initiatives recognised? 
• Do you have particular strategic initiative experience? 
• How does the business react to the company's strategic programme activities? 
• How do customers react to different strategic company programmes? 
Line-of business perceptions of strategic initiatives: 
• How do line-of business teams/individuals react to different strategic company 
programmes? 
• What are the challenges and issues that line-of business teams/individuals are facing 
with the different strategic initiatives? 
• How do you recognise the change in capabilities through the different strategic 
initiatives? 
Decision making and resource allocation processes 
• Describe the decision making processes in relation to the strategic initiatives. 
• Describe the resource re-allocation processes in relation to the strategic initiative 
activities. 
Transformation Challenges during the strategic initiative implementation period: 
• How do you recognise the effects of transforming the existing company capabilities to 
prepare for the future business environment in the context of the strategic initiative? 
• What role do the strategic initiatives play in changing the existing capabilities? 
-----------------------------
---------------------------
----------------
--------------------------
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2 Case Study Interview Schedule 
Nr Sun Background Source Role/Res- Interview Revised 
and Roles ponsi bilities Date 
emor aes eneral Source; Line of 10/27/2004 11 /20/2004 
Manager & Involvement in Business & 
1 S SI G 
Customer different Key Management 
Representative Programs/lnitiatives 
3 Executive General Source; Line of 11/17/2004 03.01 .2005 
Management Team Involvement in Business & 
different Key Management 
Programs/Initiatives 
12 Senior Key Account General Source; Customer 06.01.2005 
Manager Involvement in Projects 
different Key 
Programs/Initiatives 
14 EMEA Business General Source; Customer 07 .01 .2005 
Development Involvement in Projects 
Manager different Key 
Programs/I nitiatives 
15 Head Of Global General Source; Project / 04.02 .2005 
Strategic Change Involvement in Competence 
Programs / Head of different Key Center 
SBAP/GDA Programs/lnitiatives Organisation 
22 Head of Sun General Source; Line of 02.01 .2005 
Educational Services Involvement in Business & 
Switzerland different Key Management 
Programs/Initiatives 
23 Senior Key-Account General Source; Customer 02 .12.2005 
Manager Involvement in Projects 
different Key 
Programs/Initiatives 
25 Senior Engagement General Source; Customer 07/19/2006 
Manager Involvement in Projects 
different Key 
Programsllnitiatives 
36 EMEA Sales General Source; Project 1 11 .12.2005 
Operations Involvement in Competence 
different Key Center 
Programsll n itiatives Organisation 
40 EMEA Vice General Source; Line of 10.10.2004 
President Involvement in Business & 
different Key Management 
Programs/lnitiatives 
Nr Sun Background Source Role/Res- Interview Revised 
and Roles ponsibilities Date 
2 Senior Project Sun Sigma Project / 11 .12. 2004 18 122004 
Manager/Sun Sigma Competence 
Projects Centre 
Organisation 
8 Head of New Sun Sigma Line of 10.01 .2005 
(Merged) Service Business & 
Delivery Org . Management 
6 
9 Senior VP, Global Sun Sigma Line of 10/21/2005 
Teams and Business & 
Programs . Co- Management 
Founder of Sun 
Switzerland in early 
80s - Six Sigma 
Champion 
10 Senior Practice Sun Sigma Line of 12/28/2004 
Manager, Sun Business & 
Sigma Green Belt Management 
11 Senior Project Sun Sigma Customer 12/29/2004 
Engineer, Sun Projects 
Sigma Green Belt 
16 Former Head of Sun Sigma Line of 11 .12.2004 
Professional Business & 
Services UK and Management 
Storage Solutions 
UK & Sun Sigma 
Project Manager 
21 Senior Program Sun Sigma Project 1 03.02 .2005 
Manager & Sigma Competence 
Black Belt Centre 
Organisation 
26 District Manager - Sun Sigma Customer 07/26/2006 
Central Switzerland Projects 
& Sun Sigma 
Champion 
27 Sales of the Year Sun Sigma Customer 07/28/2006 
(2001) - Sales Projects 
Manager 
Switzerland & Sun 
Sigma Green Belt 
30 Sun Sigma Expert & Sun Sigma Project 1 02.08 .2005 
Special Projects Competence 
Centre 
Organisation 
34 EMEA Sales Sun Sigma Project 1 02.03.2006 
Operations & Sun Competence 
Sigma Projects Centre 
Organisation 
38 Sun Sigma Master Sun Sigma Project 1 02.08.2005 
Black Belt Competence 
Centre 
Organisation 
43 Special Projects - Sun Sigma Customer 11 .12.2006 
North America & Projects 
Sun Sigma Project 
Manager 
44 Special Projects - Sun Sigma Customer 11 .12.2006 
North America & Projects 
Sun Sigma Project 
Manager 
45 Controlling - North Sun Sigma Line of 10.01 .2007 
America & Sun Business & 
Sigma Black Belt Management 
46 EMEA Sales Sun Sigma Project 1 08 .08.2006 
Operations & Sun Competence 
Sigma Projects Centre 
Organisation 
47 CTO EMEA & Sun Sun Sigma Line of 06.07.2005 Sigma Black Belt Business & 
Management 
Nr Sun Background Source Role/Respon Interview Revised 
and Roles sibilities Date 
em or xecutive CRM Line of 12120/2004 (former Sun Business & 
Employee) & CRM Management 
Team Switzerland 
5 S E 
6 Strateg ic Key- CRM Customer 12/29/2005 
Account Projects 
Engagement 
Manager & CRM 
Representative 
7 CFO Sun CNE CRM Line of 07.01 .2005 01 /28/2005 (Central- and Business & 
Northern Europe) & Management 
CRM Core Team 
20 Senior Program CRM Project 1 14.03.2006 
Manager & CRM Competence 
Projects Centre 
Organisation 
24 Global KAM & CRM Customer 10/18/2005 
Solution Architect Proiects 
28 Program Manager CRM Project 1 08.12.2006 
CRM Convergence Competence 
Program Centre 
Orqanisation 
32 EMEA SBAP Project CRM Project 1 05.05.2006 
Manager CRM Competence 
Centre 
Orqanisation 
33 EMEA SBAP Project CRM Project 1 10.05.2006 
Manager CRM Competence 
Centre 
Organisation 
35 EMEA SBAP Project CRM Project 1 11 .12.2005 
Manager CRM Competence 
Centre 
Orqanisation 
37 EMEA SBAP Project CRM Project 1 02 .08 .2005 
Manager CRM Competence I 
Centre 
Orqanisation 
49 CRM Project CRM Project 1 08.08.2006 
Manager Competence 
Switzerland Centre 
Organisation 
50 CRM Key Accounts CRM Line of 03 .1 0.2006 
Business & 
Management 
51 CRM Cusomer CRM Customer 03.1 0.2006 
Sevices Switerland Projects 
6 
Nr Sun Background Source Role/Respon Interview Revised 
and Roles sibilities Date 
emor rogram SSC Project / 12113/2004 12115/2004 
Manager, Global Competence 
Programs & SSC Center 
4 S P 
Core Team Organisation 
13 Senior PS VP SSC Line of 06.01.2005 
Executive & SSC Business & 
Core Team Management 
17 Headquarters BSC Line of 12.06.2005 
Director & BSC Business & 
Core Team Manaqement 
18 Senior BSC Customer 15.02 .2005 
Engagement, Project Projects 
Manager & BSC 
Team Switzerland 
19 EMEA Executive, BSC Line of 12/23/2004 
Sales Operations & Business & 
BSC Core Team Management 
(Executive Sponsor) 
29 EMEA Operations BSC Project 1 10.03.2005 20.06 .2006 
Manager & BSC Competence 
Core Team Member Centre 
Orqanisation 
31 EMEA Sales BSC Project 1 04.06.2006 
Operations & BSC Competence 
Core Team Centre 
Orqanisation 
39 Senior Project BSC Customer 05.08.2005 
Manager and Deal Projects 
Manager & BSC 
Team Switzerland 
41 CFO CNE Region & BSC Line of 02 .07.2006 
BSC Core Team Business & 
Management 
42 EMEA Marketing BSC Project 1 05.08.2006 
Operations & BSC Competence 
Core Team Centre 
Orqanisation 
48 Global Marketing & BSC Line of 02.07.2006 
BSC Core Team Business & 
Manaqement 
51 conducted semi-structured interviews 
Pilot-Interview Schedule 
Nr Sun Background Source Role/Res- Interview Revised 
and Roles ponsibilities Date 
1 Senior Sales General Source; Line of 10/27/2004 11/20/2004 
Manager & Involvement in Business & 
Customer different Key Management 
Representative Programs/Initiatives 
3 Executive General Source; Line of 11/17/2004 03.01 .2005 
Management Team Involvement in Business & 
different Key Management 
Proqrams/lnitiatives 
40 EMEA Vice General Source; Line of 10.10.2004 
President Involvement in Business & 
different Key Management 
Proq rams/I n itiatives 
2 Senior Project Sun Sigma Project / 11.12.2004 18.12.2004 
Manager/Sun Sigma Competence 
Projects Center 
Organisation 
5 Senior Executive CRM Line of 12/20/2004 
(former Sun Business & 
Employee) & CRM Management 
Team Switzerland 
4 Senior Program BSC Project / 12/13/2004 12/15/2004 
Manager, Global Competence 
Programs & BSC Center 
Core Team Orqanisation 
3 Company Sources - categories 
Company sources can be categorized into public and non-public documentation . 
Public documentation includes internet content and official published document . 
Non-public documentation includes intranet content, internal and unpubli hed 
documents, and interview data. The following table illustrates the differences between 
the two categories of documentation. 
Categorisation of Important Company Sources 
Public Documentation Non-public Documentation 
Steve McGowan, CFO and Exec. Vice Papadopoulos Greg and Yen David. The Future of 
President Corporate Resources . Sun's Network Computing. 2004 : 1-44. Notes : Strategy 
Financial Overview 0211112004. 2004: 1-26. Presentation, Headquarters Palo Alto , US 
Notes: Analyst Presentation 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Corporate Overview Ver ion 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Sun: The Best Choice 1.1. 2002a: 1-77. Notes : Internal Presentation 
Of Your Business. 2002c. 
--- . Corporate Vision and Strategy Paper V.S.2. Sun 
Microsystems Inc.2002b : 1-18. Notes: Internal 
Presentation 
--- . Sun Vision 08/27/04.2004: -. Notes: Internal 
Documentation 
The list evolved over time. Based on the confidentiality of the non-public 
documentation the list outlines only an extract to illustrate the categories. 
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4 R&D Investment Overview 
R&D Investment: Comparison 
Fiscal 2001 Fiscal 2002 Fiscal 2003 
R&D spending R&D spending R&D spending 
i1M2 % of sales L$.M.l % of s a l e ~ ~ (SM) % of sale! 
Cisco $3'922 18% $3'448 18% $3'135 17% 
Sun Microsysterr $2'016 11% $1 '832 15% $1'837 16% 
Intel $3'796 14% $4'034 15% $4'360 14% 
Microsoft $4'379 17% $4'307 15% $4'659 14% 
EMC $929 13% $781 14% $718 12 0 
Oracle $1'139 10% $1'076 11 % $1 '180 12% 
IBM $4'986 6% $4'750 6% $5'077 6% 
Hewlett-Packard $4'115** 5% $3'890** 5% $3'652 5% 
Source: 1 O-K filings. Fiscal year as each company reports 
- Includes Compaq results 
Source: (McGowan, 2004) 
5 R&D Innovation Overview 
R&D I nnova t • IOn Reducing Cost 
and Complexity 
Reducing Cost • Sun Fi re-
and Complexity El900 
- Sun Fi re E4900 
Serious Software - Sun Fi re E6900 - AMD Op"teron 
- Sun Fi re ElOK Made Simple alliance 
-Sun Fire- B100x iSW n Fire E25K 
- Su n Fi re V20z. 
The Low Cost • J a v v ~ ~ Blade Server - Sun Fi re 8l00x 
Move Is On En"te rpri se . Neua 240 server. 5 Reference 
Sys"tem 
- Net ra CT820 s erveArchitectures 
·Java Desk"top 
-Sun Blade 2500 Reducing Cost 
• Sun StorEds.' Sys"tem Works tat.; on 
and Complexity 6000 family • Java St.udi 0 
-Sun Fire 
• Sun Fire V60165x • Sun Fi re Visual iz.ati on 
• Sun Fir. Blad. Platform • Sun F ~ ~ V:llOm O V2S0. V440 Grid SyHem 
- NI P P o v i i l ( ( ~ ~ Server • N l Dat8 Platform • Sun 81 ade - 7 Reference 1500 Arch i tec"tures 3 0 Blad .. Edition • Sun Manased Services, 
• 8 Reference -Nl Servi ce 
- Sun F ... V1180 Ublrty Computing, Architectures Provi sioning System 
- Sun Fir. V8S0, N.\ COlU\oc\ 4 . 1 
• Sun N 1 Service, • 4 R. ferenco Archrtocturos 
NC03Ql ( '{)3Q2 ~ ( ( O'3Q3 N '03Q4 KC04Ql 
urec : (Me 0\ an, _00-.. 1-) 
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6 Sun's Service-driven Network Architecture 
Source: (Sun Microsystems, 2002) 
7 Glossary - Acronyms 
Acronym 
GSO 
PS 
SSO 
SBAP 
Description 
Global Sales Organisation: the organisation was mainly responsible for 
driving the company's sales activities, customer engagements, and 
market penetrations. Officially, this organisation had the greatest 
decision power and influence on the company's strategies. 
Professional Services: this organisation was mainly responsible for all 
customer deliveries like projects, products or specific expert knowledge 
(e.g. Java Expertise). 
Support Service Organisation: this arose from Global Sales Organisation 
and handled all support services, contracts , and partner networks for al l 
customer maintenance services, for example mission critical 
environments . 
CRM 
ROSS 
Staroffice 
Strategic Business Architecture Programme: this department was 
responsible for setting up and rolling out the company's strateg ic 
initiatives. The group was close to the Global Sales Organisation . 
Customer Relationship Management: a management concept and 
operating model to improve a company's overall sales and marketing 
effectiveness. 
Return On Sun Sigma: a cost-benefit analysis which outlined the cost 
savings which could be achieved through a Sun Sigma proJect. Each 
Sun Sigma project was asked to provide a ROSS business case. 
Staroffice is Sun's equivalent to Microsoft Office. It provides different 
office software components as Word , Excel , Powerpoint etc. Sun sells 
Staroffice to their customers as a competitive alternative to MS Office. 
8 Five Core Customer-Centric Processes 
Sun 
... ... 
The Five Core 
Customer-Centric Processes 
7 
9 Overall Sun Sigma Roadmap 
+Sun 
........... 
Sigma Roadmap to Becoming 
a Customer-First Company 
FYO 1 I FY02 FY03 , FY05 , FY06 and 
Beyond 
10 Process Improvement Goals for Sun's 5 Core Processes 
Process Excellence Goals 
Dcli\ erables 
Port/olio 
i'v\allagement 
rllldlil ( 
LIfcl') LIe 
Suspeet 
to ( )rdcl 
( )rdll 
tll <. lllleLl 
lIstnl1lCI 
~ e l \ \ I e 
Sun 
4 
11 EMEA CRM Convergence Project Plan 
EMEA Overall Plan Sun ~ ~
Global CRM Programme 
Siebel R4.0 Release 
CRM Deployment Kit Development 
EMEA CEM/CRM Programme 
R3 Deployment 
R4 Testing 
R4 Delta Training 
R4 New User Training 
Phase 1 - Iberia 
Change Acceptance Process 
Data Clean-up & Preparation 
Process & Organisation Al ignment 
Phase 2 - Iberia 
Siebel Dep loyment Proof of Concept 
Phase 3 
Wave 1 - Single country Geo 1 (Germany) 
Wave 2 - Sing le country Geo 2 
Wave 3 - Single country Geo 3 
Wave 4 - Multi-country Geo 1 
Wave 5 - Multi-country Geo 2 
• 
-
TBe 
12 BSC Teams and Key Roles 
l EMEA VP Council - Strategy Owner 
- -
Business Strategy translation 
into operational terms 
through BSC 
, [ EM EA BSC Strategy 
Implementation Change 
r--
. .&' 
(; 
o 
• CEMlCRM Deployment (12 EMEA Accoonls) 
Non·application dependent process WQf1( 
Siebel toolkit deployment 
Member of the Steering Committee 
EMEA 
Management System 
Team 
L-
Strategy 
Performance 
Measurement 
Implementation 
Core Team !.---+l Extended BSe Team (Sell ing Unit) 
f -
EMEA BSC 
Functional Team 
Change Change 
Management Management 
EMEA Operationa l Teams 
(GSO, PS , SS, Fin , Cust.) 
[Business Operations] 
Sun EMEA wide: Organisational Alignment, Consolidation, and Change 
75 
• The BSC Steering Committee was formed from the EMEA VP Senior Management Team in order 
to ensure that that the balanced scorecard implementation project was initiated , developed, and 
executed as a top management initiative. 
• The EMEA Strategy Implementation Leader (Program Manager) was responsible for coordinating 
and driving the BSe project correctly. 
• The EMEA Core Team consisted of representatives of the different lines of business : the global 
sales organisation , professional services, support services, customer advocacy, finance, 
marketing and HR. HR was necessary to support the overall change management. 
• The Extended Team consisted of representatives of the different lines of bus iness and selling 
units. After the construction and piloting stage , the extended team members would remain with 
their SU's after the pilot roll-out and drive the change of their SU individually. 
• The EMEA Functional Team consisted of representatives of important departments supporting the 
BSC initiative company-wide. The departments involved were legal , IT, marketing , channel , 
solutions, and customer advocacy. Those team resources were individually involved in order to 
align different departments with the Sun EMEA strategy. 
13 Summary of Sun Sigma Initiative Interactions 
Sun Sigma Initiative: 
Platform of Interactions 
Development of new and 
emerging Sun Sigma 
organisation CAO 
- New roles and responsibilities 
- Training programs 
- New certification standards 
r-
Collaborations and 
engagements With Sun's I-
existing organisation 
- Executive and decision boards 
- Prioritising ongoing plans 
r P oJect assignments 
- BU Sun Sigma goals 
~ ~
Drive to establish new 
standards and 
consolidations 
- New skills and methodologl es 
- Consolidate ongoing Initiallv e activities 
Enhance administration 
and management 
processes 
- Implementation of new deci sions 
- Mandatory project reviews 
- Integrato," of Sun Sigma ch ampions 
Managing expectations 
on initiative objectives 
and expected results 
- Defining and changing expectations 
- Re-shaping initiative expectations 
14 Summary of CRM Convergence Initiative Interactions 
CRM Convergence Initiative: 
Collaboration between 
different organisational 
business units 
- Decentralised org. structures 
- Defragmentation of org. 
structures (Degree 
individuality per org. unit) 
Transformation and 
consolidation of existing 
organisational structures 
- Consolidation of 
defragmentation (processes , 
roles , approaches, priorities 
and experiences) 
Platform of Interactions 
r-
i-
'--
Convergence dynamics 
and activities between 
strategic initaitives 
- Methodologies and tools 
- Scope and directions 
Interactions with 
initiative admin and 
management processes 
- Overlapping and over-ruling 
- Resource prioritisation 
- Definition of activities 
De-fragmentation and 
specialisation of specific 
Knowledge 
- Aligning Incompatibilities 
- Aligning results and Individual expectallons 
3 7 
15 Summary of Balanced Scorecard Initiative Interactions 
Balanced Scorecard Initiative: 
Platform of Interactions 
Collaboration with different 
Org, Units facing 
different business pressures 
- different business challenges 
- Varieties across regions and 
business units 
Collaborations between r-
empirically grown r-
management capabilities 
- variations of mgmt capabilities 
- Autonomous decision making 
- strong personal relationships 
Collaborations with 
decentralised organisational t-- ~ ~
structures 
- decentral project activities 
- decentral information exchange 
Reviewing values and 
strategic fit of ongoing 
strategic initiatives 
- Fragementatlon and overlapping of activities 
- Variations of different business measures 
Collaborations of strategic 
initiative alignments 
- Alignments , onsolidatlons and In 
enhancements of initiatIVe goals 
priorities 
- Calibrations of initiative pnonties 
dlVldual 
and 
- Conver-'lence of initiative-.JI.oals a 
and goal 
nd pnontles 
Standardising and enhancing 
existing admin and 
management processes 
- Unified approaches and processes 
- Standardising Initiative feedbacks and 
management processes 
16 Analysis of the Sun Sigma Initiative Driver 
r. 
, 
, 
Sun Sigma Initiative 
'-
, 
Related Key Driver 
Decision Support and Managemenl , I--
Support C a p ~ b i l i t i e s s
Apply new Knowledge and Skills JL-.i 
Authority to achieve the Strategic f-
Goals and O ~ e c t i v e s s
, 
, 
, 
, 
Key Characteristics 
- - - - - --- - --- ------- ------ _. ------. - i: 
Establishing Management 
Commitment , 
Decision Support 
Facilitation of strong 
decision support across 
Sun 's managemeent 
teams 
Development of a new 
Sun Sigma Organisation 
(CAO) to support the Su 
Sigma Implementation 
Understand and 
Communicate new Sun 
Sigma Knowledge and 
Skills 
Apply (integrate) Sun 
Sigma Knowledge to 
existing knowledge base 
Transform I Extend 
Relevant Processes 
Management Support 
Process 
DeCISion Process to 
prioritise and Implement 
Changes 
Organisational Admin 
and Support Processes 
Processes of 
Interpretations 
(Understanding 
Changes) 
Processes of 
Acceptance (Judging 
and ApprOVing Changes) 
cu rrent skill sets - : 1 / - - 7 , { - - - ~ - ~ ~ Processes of 
Combination 
Decision Power 
Authority (Competencies 
and Responsibilities) to 
Implement 
(Combining new Skills 
and Methodologies With 
eXlslstlng content) 
17 Analysis of the CRM Convergence Initiative Driver 
CRM Convergence 
Initiative 
Related Key Driver 
Decision Structures 
Organisationa l structures and 
resou rce allocation processes 
EXisting Sales Capabilities 
-
Key Characteristics 
r----------------------------- ----- ---; 
: Different Business Agendas : 
and Priorities per 
'1 
, 
, 
, 
, 
-
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
Department or Business Unit 
DiametraVConflicting 
Decisions 
~ ~
Different skills and 
competencies to support the 
initiative 
Different initiative support 
from the management teams r- , 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
Different roles , competencie 
and responsibi lities per 
organisational un it 
Strong deviations from 
existing sa les capabilities 
raised barriers 
Protectionism of existing 
mindsets and competencies ' 
:. - - --- -- -- --- --- - --- - --- --- ----- --- -- ! 
Relevant Processes 
Management Support 
Process 
Decision Process to prioritlss 
and implement Changes 
Organisational Admin and 
Support Processes 
Processes of Interpretations 
(Understanding Changes) 
Processes of Acceptance 
(Judging and Approving 
Changes) 
Processes of Combination 
(Combining new Skills and 
Methodologies with eXisisting 
content) 
18 Analysis of the Balanced Scorecard Initiative Driver 
SSC Initiative 
Related Key Driver 
Decision making proceses 
Capabilities to manage scarce firm 
resources 
Resource allocation processes and 
priorities 
Challenqing business situations 
,---: 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
Key Characteristics 
Defining business unit 
objectives and priorities 
Protecting business unit 
interests and needs 
through individual 
initiatives 
Diametral business unit 
objectives with fi 
: : - - - - - - - - = ~ ~ : r ; - ; ; _ d - - - - - - - - : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------, c 
, 
en 
organisational and 
management structures 
Long-term and 
established manager 
r e l a ~ i i _ ~ ~ ~ __________________ _ 
r- , , 
~ ~
, 
- - - - - - D j ; , : ; . ; - ~ t r ~ 1 1 and changing 
Initiative support through 
individual business units 
Initiative priorities and 
resources through different 
management and business 
teams 
Fear of lOSing control through 
challenging business periods 
L..-' Re-orientatlon and re-
motivation of work forces and , 
, teams 
~ ~ ...... -.- - ---_ .. -----
Relevant Processes 
Management Support 
Process 
Decision Process to prioritise 
and implement Changes 
Organisational Admin and 
Support Processes 
Processes of Interpretations 
(Understanding Changes) 
Processes of Acceptance 
(Judging and Approving 
Changes) 
Processes of Combination 
(Combining new Skills and 
Methodologies With eXlsistlng 
content) 
19 Data Analysis 
19.1 Open Coding Examples 
(A1) Line-by-Line Analysis: Example of the Scope and Value of the Passport Initiative 
... Interview Example/Extract .. . 
WK: You . s ~ y y ~ u s i n e s s s approvals should be simplified . In your opinion what was the most important value of the 
passport Initiative? 
Interviewee: Well , first of all it is because of history. A salesman or account manager needs about 3-4 different 
approvals -In the worst case if he wants to push something through (Simplification of appro al pro(.;ess v' 'I red e 
a.dmln for a s s l ~ ~ . ~ a n n from 3-4 approvals to 1). Especially, salespeople need approvals from finance or service 
Side. T h o ~ e e a C ~ l v l t l e ~ ~ need a special service management approval. Or high end products need a review regarding 
the technical Side. S I ~ C ~ ~ about 2 years the whole Yield Management is involved and is one main part. That is why 
always the same or similar data had to be entered in to different tools because these tools were not connected 
with e a ~ h h other (Before the passport in itiative - different tools eXist and data were country speCific. and not 
compatible) . Processes, time zones and countries, depending on how strong the country was, served themselves . 
There were always on 'ly complaints about it which had to be taken by the management (Customer c . o m ~ l a l n t s s
cou ldn't .be analysed p r o ~ e r l y y by the management because of process tool and data inconsistencies). Although it 
worked In several countries there will always be complaints which have to be taken by above levels . Now it was all 
combined that data does not always have to be entered , like basis information which are always necessary and 
after all is a worldwide similar process . This one works simplified . It is a big step in a positive and negative way _ 
part wise to train and educate countries or regions, or the fact that things are different if you want to simpl ify 
something worldwide (Passport initiative standardises the worldwide approval process and related data) . 
(A2) Line-by-Line Analysis: Example of Interactions between the Passport and the CRM Convergence 
initiative 
... Interview Example/Extract ... 
WK: How are you organised within the different project and initiatives? How do you communicate and act between 
the initiative teams? 
Interviewee: Depends on what is connected with my field . I first of all have the main contact and the cooperation 
with the vertical project teams of the different initiatives. We belong together but there are interfaces and points of 
contact with other vertical teams when implementing and executing. For example , the Siebel CRM Convergence 
initiative is a vertical line regarding project and all their project development activities . The horizontal task is not in 
my scope anymore - other members of Graham's team are responsible for that. They have the main contact with 
the team . But we have got the approval tool and the interface with Siebel to CRM regarding execution . We make 
sure everything is working even if the approval project team of the Passport initiative and CRM initiative work 
independent on the vertical level. Below you see the influence of these vertical development teams through 
horizontal overlapping (The passport initiative has different interdependencies like With the CRM IrJltlatll.e (Siebel 
teams) . 
WK: For better understanding: The Siebel CRM team is next to you . They do their project work and you do your 
project work? (CRM/Siebel teams Improve customer process and Passport team Improve customer processes 
next to each other - Redundancies)? 
Interviewee: That is right. But in development area some are more focussed on CRM deployment and me on the 
Approval Process and the Balanced Scorecard Project. There are always interfaces between the projects which 
connect you with the other deployment (There are always Interfaces to other development ant deplv m ~ 1 1
projects). It is important to make sure everything is on the right line because there are always (d fferem project 
always interdependenUinteract to each other) (project interactions are based on ne' eSSclr. ( h.-mqes 
Improvements and adjustments eg CRM/Slebel and Passport initiative) necessary changes , Improvements and 
adjustments, for example at Siebel , which we need for the approval tool. 
o 
(A3) Line-by-Line Analysis: Example of Sun Sigma Initiative Implementation Challenges 
. .. Interview Example/Extract ... 
~ ~ : : W ~ a t t .was the S S . ~ m a a p r o ~ r a m m designed for? Was there a business case for Sun Microsystems, Inc. like 
Increasing Its competitiveness In the market? 
Interviewee: That is. a connection which was never rea lly outlined to our teams, me and my colleagues I guess. Of 
course , we g ~ t t all this general benefit ~ u n n Sigma messages but at the end of the day we had the customer who 
requested to I n c ~ e a s e e speed of r ~ s o l u t l o o . . We lost our interest and motivation over time to think how Sun Sigma 
could help us to .Increase profitability or leverage our projects to reach our strategic objectives (Sigma ace ertanl e 
decreased overtime - customer problems were still the same). 
WK: Was it not communicated from the top management to the project leaders like you? 
Interviewee: It wasn 't really communicated well enough (Low communication profile about the Sigma nl atl e . 
We. had some general roundtables and meetings but we never touched the core of the problem across the different 
project teams and we still didn't really now what the teams next to us are doing and how we could leverage their 
work to solve o u ~ ~ problems (no ~ o m m u n l c a t i o n n infrastructure different Sigma teams oUldn t ,e eraqe hp 
and results). I think one of the mistakes we made is that our people expected that Sun Sigma would save all the 
problems of sun (Failure that Sigma would solve all relevant problems of the organlsat 0n). We still had a to 
isolated project view (to isolated project view), all teams focused on its own project charter instead (teams ",'ere 
focused on their little project frame) of defining and understand ing the big picture and project landscape Ino big 
picture and project landscape). 
WK: How would you describe those challenges during your project work? 
Interviewee: We had many discuss ions in our teams and other ongoing key programmes about that point and we 
identified three lags of the success of a company: the leadership, the strategy and the execution . And Sun Sigma 
is focusing on strategy execution , its how valuable and efficient we improve our processes. But we cannot solve 
challenges like leadership , strategy, organizational weakness and challenging interdependencies between ongoing 
key programmes (Interdependencies between initiatives can be challenging) through Sun Sigma (Sigma lannot 
close gaps In leadership, strategy - it's a process improvement approach). 
(A4) Line-by-Line Analysis : Example of the Balanced Scorecard Initiative Interactions and Challenges 
... Interview Example/Extract .. . 
WK: if you decided case by case how you did make sure to address the big picture . I mean, maybe the Balanced 
Scorecard initiative challenging interactions and dependencies to to other ongoing initiatives? 
Interviewee: We didn 't discuss the project interdependencies (less focus on key programme Interdependenl es). 
We decided case by case , that was as well the way how we allocated our programme resources. I can imagine the 
advantage of discussing the big picture but we didn't (Potential advantage of analYSing and diSCUSSing programme 
Interactions and interdependencies). I'm not sure if every executive board member would agree on having the 
same big picture in mind (Many strategic pictures and priOrities of deciSion makers). For example during one 
EMEA executive board meeting, we had a discussion to consolidate our ongoing initiatives and activities based on 
the Balanced Scorecard goals and priorities. Everybody had its own goals, key projects and based on those goals 
our VP's started to argue how their initiatives support our strategy and which initiative is relevant for us and which 
not (changing/drifting priOrities and objectives of ongoing Initiatives). At the end we agreed on a prioritised list of 
key programmes . 
WK: how did you make sure to set the right priorities for ongoing initiatives? 
Interviewee: More and more we had long discussions and negotiations, but at the end we came Up with a list of 
prioritised initiatives and activities . Our key projects increased their scope more and more to. fit t? your balanced 
scorecard goals and priorities (Drifting goals and objectives of ongoing key programmes). It IS difficult to be 
objective, all our in itiatives are re levant and usefu l, but we had to decide because we didn't have the money 
anymore to finance all our initiatives (More and more difficult to measure judgp '1 j r:. r or &> l r ). 
WK: Did you have a more objective approach to discuss the priorities? 
Interviewee: Finally we implemented a balanced scorecard into our management system I d 
should enhan( the firm s current management system!. You know it very well. In the future the scorecard Will 
hopefu lly be used more and more to challenge our investments to drive strategy execution. The scorecard is an 
effective approach to set priorities, but I'm not sure if we will be able to sharpen the execution focus In our ongoing 
key programmes and reduce project execution complexities (c,t I ha IPn jf' t I 
qrOWlnq II rnpit It I ) and if every executive in our company understand the balance scorecard concept. 
(B1) Identification of Concepts (Example/Extract) : 
Initiative Properties and details on Interaction between ongoing Initiatives (e.g. CRM Convergence Initiative) 
••• 
Relsvance to implement an approval 
Process - Passport Initiative 
• First Approval started Wlth Intro of new 
product (E10k) 
• Sim plification of w w ~ ~ W W d e e approval tools 
and processes - Passport Inftiatlve 
• Customer complaint's need to be @ e.l 
analysed p r o p p ~ y y - unified process 
• Process standardisation 
A.ffected organisations of the 
Passport Initiative 
• Service and Finance Org. were affected 
- Inftlative are started and managed by 
sales operations 
Communication (type of 
interactions) between different 
Initiatives 
· Project updates and changes are @J 
communicated among different project 
leads 
· Regular updates are visuahsi ng Issues 
for delay 
• Deployment teams have regular update 
calls - sufficiently 
• Change program team members do not 
exactly know who is Involved from the 
Top Mgmt. Team 
. . . . - ~ - - - - -
Escalation and decision process 1 
between different Initiatives 
• different program teams are often equal, 
decision from above 
• deadlock between initlatives 
• Line Mgr. DeCide based on hiS goals 
• interdependencies are discussed throug 
escalations 
• Escalation end with a deCIsion of a 
line manager 
• different teams try to Informal convince 
the line manager 
• communication IS mostly verbally t;8\ 
• time delays because of many ~ ~
discussions 
Decision cnteria 's and different 
Rules between different Initiatives 
• Deaslons are supported by the overal l 
business objeClNes - simplify bUSiness 
. onentatlon of decisions are based on fa::\ 
overall company goals ~ ~
I n t e r a c t i ~ n s s between different 
ongoing initiatives 
• Passport Inlt/atNe has Interdependencle 
between CRM Initiative etc. 
• RedundanCies - Passport and CRM 
Initiative Improve customer processes 
• Passport and CRM Initiative exchange 
real-time data 
• Interfaces between deployment and 
development teams 
· InitiatIVes interdependent to each other 
• interdependencies are mostly @ 
Improvements and adjustments e 
• More than one projed Interface p 
InitiatIVe 
• Different ,"illatiVes have overlapping 
In thelf user groups \ 
Challenges of Interactions 
between different ongoing initiatives 
• pnontlsatlon of resources are difficlAt 
to manage betvoIeen different InttlaQVes 
• Interdependenaes between different 
IOltJabves are resource responSlblhbes 
• I"',abves (e.g. Passport, CRM) are 
managed Wlthout the "Big Picture" e 
· No dear resource responSlblhtJes to 
decide on resources for drtferent initIatIves 
• "Ping-Pong" Games between drfferent 
initiatives 
• To set pnontles - escalabon goes first 
• communicational problems stJmLiate 
often escalations 
• different deadline Inaease complexities 
to set resource pnonbes 
• narrow-mtnded program team members 
" focused only on their prOJect 
• roll--out deaclJnes are c:ntJcaI because at 
InterdependenCIes between different 
initiatives and org environments 
Indexed Data Source 
Organisation of key In itiatives 
• After 2001 Sun organised core pr"lects 
Into 4 core prOject frames 
· 4 core project teams are org. by lhemes 
• Escalations are executed along the 
reporting lines a 
• SBAP converted Into DDA Team 0 
Deployment & Adoption Department 
· honzontal ;:; deployment teams 
• vertical;:; development teams 
Fo cus and responsibilities of Q 
Initiative team members 0 
• every Single initIatIVe IS focused on Its 
specific project oontent 
• Project teams do not manage project 
Interdependencies enough 
• Change group Is responSible to deploy. 
adapt, and manage acceptance of theIr 
Projects 
• Change prOJect development and 
deployment are necessary to be m a n a ~ ~
• developmenVdeployment need to be 
managed across the time zones 
• deployments are managed by deadlines 
Resource AJlocation of initiatives 
• Future bUSiness requirements are the 
planning baseline for resource allocation 
• line of bUSiness mgr. Decide about 
resource allocation 8 
• resources are negottated based on 
bUSiness results and goals 
Management of Interactions 
between different ongoing inlt1ativ8s 
• Interfaces are haooled inSide different 
program (change) teams 
• Regular updates between teams - @ 
conf-calls, meelJngs and 
aNme presentabons 
A.nnoun cemen'ls of initi ative pro gr8S5 
• program announcements are Integrated 
In quarterly meetings 
• InitiatIves are concentrated on Sales and 
GSOthemes (3 
Integration of Initiatives into business 
operations 
• every seiling unit (GEM) has key contacts 
whIch are r ~ a t e d d to different change Q 
programs ~ ~
• every country has Its pnmary contact 
member to establIsh the link between the 
end users and the relevant Inrtlatrve 
· every change InitiatIVe has Its separate 
change program for GEM 
Management of changing program 
direction within the different ongolnh 
Initiatives ~ ~
• project changes are managed through 
project management methodologies 
. every Inlbatlve has a selected steenng 
group 
••• 
( -
(82) Identification of Concepts (Example/Extract): 
Emerging Challenges and related Dysfunctions during Initiative Implementation (e.g. Sun Sigma Initiative) 
••• 
/ Reasons to start Sun Sigma Initiative 
• Product quality decreased 
• Sun try 10 enter Data Centre high end 
market 
• No capabilities to produce qualitative 
high-end products 01 
• Customer feedbacks on decreaslngO 
product qualities 
• Threats: Competitors could use the story 
• Close relation to GE (Jack Welsh) 
First Sigma Wave (Root Motivation) 
• Sun Sigma as a platform for 13 key 
projects 
• GE provided consulting support (BB) 
• a) Improve customer issues 
• b) Avoid bad press (competitors) e 
• c) Establish a learning process 
Decreasing Top Mgmt. Attention 
• Strong attention in the beginning @ 
decreased over time 
• Increasing complexities (methods) and 
less results 
• Executives think Sigma is a "tax" 
,- - - Sun Sigma Inlllative Implementation created DystunC1JOns ________________________ , 
. ' : 
Unplanned increase in administration 
and bureaucracy Q 
• e.g. 3-4 month project charter 0 
• applYing methodology to all key projects 
Less Value than expected 
• No financ,," Impacts (ROSS) 
• Spending increased I No ROSS 
• Customer problems still the same. 
• No operatrve results miSSIng 
Interactions with other ongo ing 
Initiatives increased business 8 
Complexities 
• e.g. Prince 2 overlapPing (camplexllles) 
• Sigma increased projects from 6 to 15 
months 
• LOSing program control because of 
Increasmg buSiness c o m ~ e x r t l e s s (e.g 
applying methods 10 all prOfects .. ) 
• Sigma keep people away from executing 
their projects (e.g. training etc.) 
/ Stimulation of project generation 
I Increased buslnos s complexities e • BB created and searched prolects 
instead of solvmg bUSiness problems 
, Goals to certify x % of people 
Growing process comphwtl8.S f':"'::\ 
reduced business execution ~ ~
• people felt becoming slower and slower 
u"'ng "'gma toolsimethods 
• Silos - teams cotJdn't leverage the" 
"'gma wor1c results _____ ~ ~
Unplanned changellimil3tion of 
eXisting capabiUties 
• Inflabon of BB's 
• Org was forced to apply sigma to 
current problem sotvlng skils 
• addItIOnal routJnes & budget spendlngs 
• stop to think outside the box I rely on 
Sigma .) 
Sun Sig ma became a wildcard to 8 
solve all business issues ' 
• "PrOfect Sigma Ceremony' - everything 
can be solved wHh Sigma 
• process Improvement but not sotvu19 
per button push customer satisfaction 
Soma Sun Sigma projects created n 
posit ive Results 0 
• Best practice success story - MBB 
solved bUSiness problems by doser 
coIlabaranon WIth the bUSiness hnes 
• Battle plan => 27 prOfeds are now 3 
• Protect overlapping In the beginning 
poSitIVe effect - different solutiOns 
I 
, 
-------------- -------------------------------------------
- - - - - - - __ I 
(83) Summary of similar Concepts (Example/Extract) : 
Causal Conditions of the observed Phenomenon - Market Pressure of the Company 
Changing Business Environment 
and Market Pressure (after 2001) 
• Strong Compelltlon (FUD) 
• Major Shifts (Solutions) 
• Does IT really matler? 
• DecreaSi ng Revenues 
• BUSiness model not sustainable 
Growing Importance of Sun 's Q ~ ~
Partner Business \(3J 
• Lack of capa"'htles to sell sotutlons 
forces Sun to look atter partners With 
solution skills 
• dose oolaboratlon WIth partners 
• partners as additional sales channels 
New Capabilities Required 
• Delivery of customer solutions 
• Customer, bUSiness and Industry 
knowledge 
• Sun need to be a more customer 
onented organisation 
• Closer to customer requirements 
Similar 
Concepts 
Changing Business Environments 
• Sun need to change their approach to 
do bUSiness and how the company 
manage their costs In the future - some 
Improvements have been made e 
...... ~ ~ ~ " "
Different Sources 
••• 
Increasing Customer Pressu res 
• Sun must solve bUSiness Issues 
Strategic Challenges 
• Challenge to understand the directIOn 
of the senior management 
, understanding the direction of the 9 
executrve board IS the baseline to ~ ~
pnontJse resources 
• Understand customer requirements 
• PrOVide solutions 
• Customer fett , Sun iost focus 
(HW, SW-Strategy) Q 
• Customer \van1 more than \!!J 
-box-movlng" from Sun 
) 
t 
19.2 Axial Coding Examples 
(C1) Identification of Main Concepts (Example): Strategic Initiative Implementation (5) 
Identified Category: 5 
Sun 's Strategic Initiatives 
• not viSlble enough to the field teams 
• Yes for change from field teams 
• Executive Mgmt. detached from @ 
reality 
· Not sufficient communication of the 
change initiatives 
• ongoing changes of Initiatives 
;::===========-'" 
Communication of Change ~ ~
· Strategic initiatives were not commu-
nicated p r o p p ~ y y to the field teams 
• employees didn't understand why 0 
change and became reluctant to I.:.Y 
change 
• growing "tick In the box" mentality 
StrategiC Initiatives should stimulate 
adoption to changing environments 
· e.g. Change In commission plan to 
stimulate solution selling etc. 
• e.g. change in COmmiSSion plan to proted 
margins and revenues 
· Change in commission plan should 0 
stimulate solution selling \!..:J 
Relevance of strategic Initiatives 81 
• strategic change initiatrves are relevant 
to maintain profitability and growth 
Announcements of Initiative progress I r
• program announcements are mtegrated 
In quarterl y meetings 
· initiatives are concentrated on Sales ~ ~
GSa themes ~ ~ l 
After 2001 different change initiative. 1 
became more centralised 
• Pnnce 2 as the global change mgmt n 
methodology 0 
• resource allocation of change teams 
are centrally managed 
SCI process focus § 
· SCI are focusing 70% on back office 
issues and 30% on front office issues 
• Sun didn't have any common back office 
processes in the past 
Sun Strateg ic Initiat ive Context 
• SC I must address Suns top priorities 
• SCI must get all relevant resources tb 
deliver the desired results ~ ~
• SCI relate to the highest company goals 
• SCI a influenced by de-central countryl 
regional autonomy 
· SCI require a common direction and 
central top mgmt. attention 
Strategic Initiative Implementation 
Organisation of Strategic Initiatives 
- After 2001 Sun organised core pro)eds 
Into 4 core project frames 
· 4 core project teams are org. by themes 
· Escalations are executed along the 
reporting hnes 
• SBAP converted Into DDA Team 
Deployment & Adoption Department 
• honzontal = deployment teams @ 
...: vertical:: development teams ___ 
Every StrategiC initiative were managed 
and evaluated individually 
• every strategic Initiative has a 
stakeholder steenng committee 
• -DecIsions on strategic changes were 
made on quarterly basIs - deOSlon 
m e e ~ n g s s (hst of Initiatives) {3 
· case by case deCIsions of different 
Inltlattves 
• cost pressure (after 2(01) forced Sun to 
review different change initiatIVes 
• change Inltlatrves must support different 
bUSiness objectIves 
· Strategic InitIatives must create posItive 
Impact on bUSiness objecbves or they 
were stopped (golno go deCiSions) 
Sun Sigma Management Support 
• Highest Support from the Exec. Board 
• Mgmt. requested to hire MBB's as a 
keeper of knowledge and key-driver 
- Mismatch - Mgmt. decided how many 
employees need to be certified and 
the business Units were forced to pay 
for it (tax) Q 
• Latest Sigma VP IS In overlapping I(Y 
SMI position .. Assure synergies 
Resource prloritlsation process 
· Resources are challenged on how they 
support the Sun strategy r,90 
• Requests need to go through the ~ ~
global strategy and project counsel 
••• 
••• 
Strategic Initiative attributes @ 
• based on highest company pnontles 
everybody should know which Inltlatrves 
are strategic and which are not 
Initiative Resource allocation process 
• Resources are lustlfied by higher 
company pnontles e 
· Mgmt. deCISIons 
Resource Allocation (or the Initiatives 
• Future bUSiness reqUirements are the 
planntng baseline for resource allocation 
· line of bUSiness mgr DeCide about 
resource allocation n 
• resources are negotiated based on 0 
business results and goals 
" I, 
: : - ' d ; ~ ~ l f i - ~ d d ~ ~ ' " "
: __ S : ~ ~ ~ c : r y y "" 
, , 
~ ' '
Strategic 
Initiative 
Implementation 
(Characteristics) 
(4 
(C2) Main Concept Structure (Example): Strategic Initiative Implementation (5) 
Connections between Categories of Strategic Initiative Implementations 
Strategic 
Initiatives 
Implementation 
In 2001 17 Globall,.t,atives are managed by 
EMEA Sales Ops (Refer to InibatJve Ooc\J'T1entabon) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , ,
Initiative 
Organisation 
Org. in competence 
centre (SBAP) 
Later reorganised into 
4 core initiatives 
DDA Team 
Structure 
Individually managed 
Org. in program 
structure 
Limited internal/external 
communication 
Not visible and 
communica ted to all 
Scope of The 
Different Initiatives 
Maintain profitability 
and growth 
Create positive impact on 
new business objectives 
Drive strategy 
implementation 
70% focusing on back-office 
issues, 30% on front-offi ce 
Concentrated on GSa and 
sales themes 
Initiative 
Characteristics 
Must address Suns 
highest priorities 
Relate to the highest 
company goals 
Top Mgmt. attention 
Stimulate adoption 
to changing 
environments 
Global perspective 
Escalation along the 
SBAP reporting line 
Defined by the Mgmt. 
Teams as "Strategic·' 
Initiative Resource 
Allocation 
Resource allocation 
based on future 
business requirements 
Line-of business 
decide on resource 
allocations 
Resources are 
negotiated based on 
business results 
SCI must create 
positive business Impacts 
Decisions on SCI 
changes were made 
on quarterly basis 
Global Strategy and 
Project Counsel 
(C3) Identification of Main Concepts (Example): Challenging Initiative Implementation Effects (7) 
Identified Category: 7 
In'.IlIIct!ona) b.tw .. n dlff.rent Communicat ion (type of I 
~ n ~ ~ I ~ : : ; ~ ~ P d 8 8 e S S and changes are @ 
communicated ll/TIong different pl"Oject 
leads 
• Regular updates are vI5uatismg Issues I 
rOfd6lay 
• Deploymenlleams have r6gula( update 
calls_sufficiently 
• Key pr'Ogram leam members do nOl 
8XACtly know who Is Involved from the 
Top I\.igml. Team 
Interaction. betw •• n dln.,..nt 
~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ : ~ : : ~ s s t t l e r d e p o 1 n d e n c l e ~ ~
betWl)M CRM Initiative etc 
• Redu(ldandes - Passport and CRM 
Inltlab"'e Imprv.'e customer processes 
• Passport Md CRM ImtlatIVe eJ(change 
· ~ ~ ~ ~ : C : : ~ : w e e n n depoyment an<@ 
developmenlleams 
• InitiatN •• lnterd.pendenl 10 eech other 
• Int.ntepend.llCIes are mostly 
Improvements and adJustmenlS 
• Mor. than one project mtalface per 
Inltloll .... 
• Different InitiallvM have o v e r l a p ~ n g g
In their usef groups 
M.n.v.m.t\t of Interactions 
Betw .. n dlff.rent Initl.tlv.. 
• In\erl9Ces are handled In$lde different 
program (chenoa) team. 
• Regular updates between teams -
conf-cafls meetings and 
online presentations 
Challenges of Interaction. 
betw .. n dlff.rent Inltl.tlv .. 
• pnontlS8tJon of resourt:es are ditflCUl\ 
10 m81\8ge between dlfferentlnrtllrtrves 
• Inlerdependendes betv.e.o drtferent 
InltlatIV.s are resource responsibilities 
• ~ ~ ~ : : : : ~ t ~ o ~ ~ l ~ g g ~ : J ~ ~ ~ e 
• No deaf resource resporlSlbllltl8S 10 
decide on resources for drtfer.m InllllllIVes 
• 'Plng-POI'l!f Games betwflen diffew-enl 
mlll6\Nes 
• To sal pnootJes - escalation goes tim 
• communicational problems s1Jmulsta 
otten escalations 
• drft'eren\ dealtlne Increase oomplaKlltes 
10 set resource pnon1les 
• narrow-mInded program leam mernber& 
• f ocused only on Ihellr prOlec:t 
• roll-out deadlines are CI'Itlcai because d 
InterdependenCIes between different 
InllllJ!lves ond org en"'lronmllllls 
r- .. ~ ~
-------_. .. .. Effects between 
Initiatives 
Idenbfied ...... 
_ ~ ~ ~ . _ c . . a _ t ~ ~ ~ , , .. ," 
" : ~ : : ~ : ~ ~ : r : . ~ ~b : : : I ~ ~ " " 0) 
Compl.x.ttl .. 
• e g PrInce 2 overlapping (complul1lf1S) 
• Slgmo Increased prqed$ from 610 1S 
moo"" 
• l ~ n g g program control becel..l5tl d 
mCfaaSlOQ buslI'le65 comp!eJult_ (e 9 
applymg methods 10 AI pnlIedS 1 
• !)jgm.l keep people away trvm executing 
lnfllr prOjects (e g Irwr.ng ele 1 
Princ. 2 end Sun Slgm.-
Ch.U.,glng Interaction .• 
• Ponce 2 became Sun Sigma conform 
• Sun aligned Sun SIgma rand Pnnce 2 
metl\odologleli and lemplalBS 
• Sun Sigma Increased the complexities 
around Pnnce 2 
• SI.In railed out a 101 d templates mfllnods 
fIIC but d lenl problems WW"fI stJn lhe UITl8 
• Sun avet10aded their fII'T1)Ioyees WIth 
metncdoi0gt6s 
• The allgrvneni proceu absorbed a lot d 
energy and PS reso.n::es 
• Alignment kepi. Sun busy and nlernal 
focused ns\ead d CU51cmer fOOJIOd 
) ~ ~( -
Identified Category: 7 
Growing bU1llnen and prote" 
compl.xttle. through lt13teglc ~ ~
Initiative Implementation IctJVttiW 
• New control mechaN5m1 (a 9 SOX) 
slowed da'MI change 
• O&a'eal!ng etrec:1lVeness - lOSIng 
battles agBnt. IBM HP DELL ale 
• Internal prOjed add compl8XtlJes and 
COOl 
• Teams has to become mote self 
suffioent 
• ~ ~ redudion mods canatlled or 
repnontll.ed cfi fferent IntliEdIV8t; 
Stmeglc l n t t l ~ t 1 v . . (SCI) 
Impacts after 2001 
• The Prince 2 IruIJalN8s created posItIVe 
Impact - people try fa follow one 
methodology 
• No1 tNery individual a d o ~ ~ the same 
message acr06s the Prince 2 objedI'Y8S 
- why Sun 16 dojng thiS 
• Howev8r Sun 15 not applying the same 
methodology across the whole company 
• The InrtJalJVe created beneflta "' PS and 
~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ I. 10110'h1ng one@) 
• Con50/ldat1o"lQ methodologr85 helped S u ~ ~
to ~ 8 8 effectiVely 
Identified Category: 7 
LostiDutroy.d capabilltl •• att.r 2001 
• Empl0vees C 1 e o 1 l l ~ y y has been 1051 more 
and more 
• CreatNlty was In dlft'erenl processes like 
merketlng logls1IC1i 5818$ etc 
· ~ l d d : : : : g 8 b ~ e = ; ~ ~ ~ g 5 : : : 8 
centralised end destroyed 
HQ d.clslon pow .... dutroy.d r.I ...... nt 
capabilltl.s after 2001 
• HO lel.ng ~ 8 1 1 pr0C8S$&S lire nWeYanl-
· : ~ ' : ; : ~ = ~ : : S ~ ~ k j ~ d d ~ : : : u r _ @ @
makes II ImpoSSible to change - twen If 
5Qme countnes are more ad'v'af\ced 
• Countne6 ant mora axpenenced ""'Ih 
solution selhng - HQ has dedslon power 
and they are fhe process O'Mler¥ 
Identified Category: 7 
E,nvlronmenml Chang .. crNted 
N.w Sun offerings 
, .,me4lmes solution deals emerged @ 
from boil mOlllng deals 
• Local PS org dtweloped I n n C N a i l ' ~ . .
solutions. g flr1i1 duster " I ~ o n n In 
Germany 
~ r ; : . ; e \ : ~ ~ t r o J - = t t popUlation (3 
'''000 flmerg&d 'rom 13 key Plllledl After 
3-4 yeo,. 
• project, stMed 10 grow faller end fasl.r 
• ume lUll •• wet. hw:kJed In ditr.ren! 
"""" • BB need a project - proj.ctnr Increl\aed 
~ ~ : - : ~ : ! t ~ = ~ ~ : : , ; : ~ ~ e e
• R N O U ~ ~ bunclll'lg (PSlSE) IfI'Ipravod 
ru5tomer ull.adlan 
• ptanntn" beaIm. mor. and more 
lI1IdlC*1 - bftqtd 01"1 cu.1om., 19QutIII1l1 
, SE _rod Ps m&rg • .uppof1.c1 _<A,on 
.Ihng 
Affected organlntiof\$ of the 
Passport InltlatJ ..... 
• SeMee and H nanoe Org WBre afl'eaed 
• Il"IItJatwe are started ard managed by 
sales operatJons 
Adaptation of new bu51nus proense. 
In 200S (Onl Mgmt Process) 
• Process was Implemented and descnbed 
~ ~ ~ y y ~ ~
• rngmt people do nol know how to use ~ ~
the desl mgml process 
• mgml people often do not apprO'v'e new 
901U\Jon deals - e 9 telco example 
• Ielco deal was not apprO'v'ed because 
nobody unOen;tood Ihe new buSIness 
New requlr.ment5 in SaiB eap.ablHtI ... 
Impacted existing Sun Organisation 
• Service Departments l!Ime'lled @ 
• new processes and routmes emerijed 
e 9 InslallatJ()rl procedures 5)'stem 
hand-oYer rol1\lnes 
O . d ~ o n n maldng procBsln 200S, 
baud On new p r o ~ ~.... (OMP) and 
organisation 
• people were told to gIVe 9OIul/on deals 
10 partners (ft 9 teloo example) 
· escalatIOn I' gang alongSide the \Me 
line of buslneSli 
• People don 1 und8t'Stitnd new busme.sse.t; 
and appl'D'lallS negab .... e 
• DM:l5tons are nol really lransparem 
, OeQ.on people are mHOJte m Sun 
• Corporate people are Ihe last eacalabon 
and decl6lons are negall'v'e because they 
don I understand the bUSiness really 
• Oec&con maker mentioned lhallhey 
= ~ : ~ : = a n d d the doal and Its @ 
• real problem IS thai people donl 
und8llill.and the dY$ (1IOlutlon deals) 
• Decillion maker don I 'oWnt to Interfere 
In new blJ$lnfl55es 
~ ~ = . ; . g ~ n ~ ~ ~ . : n ~ : . : : : ~ ~ ~ r m m @ 
• Sun Stgme apI/mind Manufactunng o o ~ ~
end Increased sal_ COIls sales 
optimIsed their costs (PUSh P1oduc:tS....,th 
higher margins) aod gen8l8led 
weokntl:lis&sln the service orgaNI8tJOn 
(no sales for serviceS ) 
• uncontrolled Inlerdepetldency elTec(s 
PSISTG Swhch back effects In 200S 
• PSiSTG IS org In a pooI- honzo",aI 
: : ~ = ~ n g ~ ~ ~ ~ U U O n f O C U S S e 
R.-organlutlon.1 swttch back In 200S 
• PS and GSO 1$ starting to separate 
: ~ ~ ~ :rv=l:! ~ ~ ~ : : : ; ; : n n @ 
dlents compere 10 the STG model 
Unplanned InltL.tlv. Effects 
• IncreaSIng demand lOt prCj&ds @ 
~ u s e e d cet1lf/csl,on rules) 
• IncreaSIng Inl"rOependeno6lli belween 
.gma prOjects: and non-SIgma profeCIs 
• Ongomg clVlnge.s Wllhm the projaQ 
.".,Ironmenls (new people orv 
changew;) 
• lncr .. ..,lg ~ n e u u oomplul.JM 
(mote lOm'lal pfanl"lIng a ~ ' '
~ t m m ons l\d"t'Urll5tnlhon e4c ) 
, GrHn end 81_ belt v.ere rKrulted 
tram lOS_ ~ ~ C O ~ r K l e e WItS lhal 
111e bu.n .. o p e n I t , ~ ~ 10iNed down 
• Ina .... d 1JI"OI.c11 - r""leWS became 
mor. aM mcve dlt'fCUIt 
Effects 
Between 
Inltfadve and 
Context 
Organisational Effects of Inltlatlv .. to 
M.IlIa Into OM SMI organlsatlon 
, AIM 15 one example hO'N Sut) try 10 
push 601u\ion seiling 
• AJM descnbes roles and n!!SPOf\5lbll!tuu 
at Merent depa!1ment dunng solubon 
seiling and delrvery 
• DMP Process - Sal6lli ant re&ponsble 
EMdo, 
• OMP take 20-30% tlma 01 EM e 
• Nol many people undentand ....ny 
SI6I do 80 many re-organsal.Jon& lea 
!ovolvemeflt rI people 
• RMlrg has negatNe Impact on peoP/1I 
motr'v'abon and oomrnltmenl 
•• ______ 1 ~ . ~ ~
Idenbfied ........ 
_ ~ ~ ~ - _ c . .• . ' ~ o r y y / 
L ~ " "
Effects 
Between 
Context and 
InlUatlve 
i" ... 
: - - i d e - n - b f l ~ ~ .. ... 
: _ ~ ~ t : _ ~ _ t ~ f ' ? > ' ' ' ' ' '
,-
~ ~ ~ g _ ~ n : ! : ' ~ t : " s ~ o n n 8 
• Sun Signa was no( UMd properly 10 
lransform Sun 1010 sohJIQn MI&ng 
• Sun had a InflatJon 01 BB 
• HO loldSwrtze.rlendlodo .'"...12 
Sun SUilI'nII pro,eds pM Vear 
• Sigma focui8d 10 g8rtef11te mOte 
projects ,..stead aI addf'lg 'v'1II1H1 
Effect 
Types 
• Oeoenttal Sun Slgm. OIl! wu a mo&19i1.. 
• SLln SIgma dorIt ma"-e &oILiion _las 
out of hardware ale' 
Etfectl of ,..-ortIIanlsationei .whdl b.ck 
~ n p : ~ ~ G G 0t\1 I ~ ~ collom ... locua 0 
• PS ptqie ~ a a 'orced 10 do .... ervt"'f'19 
.Ct'Da the tndustn. 
'mal"xOt\1 ~ 1 p n : J V . o . ~ ~ ~
• PS and GSO r-..v ... bec:eme .Ieem 
• STG.'PS ... rted to 10M clJ5tamel' IOQJS 
w l " G S O ~ ~ on.n 
(C4) Main Concept Structure (Example) : Challenging Initiative Implementation Effects (7) 
Connections between Categories of 
Challenging Initiative Implementation Effects 
Challenging 
Initiative 
,- -- - -- - - -- - - - --- -- - - - - - - - -,-- -- - -------'--------,-, - -- - -- - - -- - -- - - - - --- -- --, 
, " 
, " 
Effects between 
Initiatives 
Initiative impact 
Other Initiatives on: 
- Decisions 
Operations 
- Resources 
- Communication 
Methodologies 
e.g. New processes, 
Tools, organisati ons, 
methods etc. 
Effects between 
Initiative and 
Context 
Initiative impact 
Context on: 
Decisions 
Processes 
Org. structures 
- Tools 
e.g. New processes, 
Tools, organisations, 
methods etc. 
Types of Identified Dysfunctions 
Identified Category: 7 
Dysfunctions: 
Bi-Directional Dynamics 
through Initiative Interactions 
Impacts on Resource and 
Knowledge Base 
Different Types of 
Dysfunctional Effects 
I Effects between 
Context and 
~ i t i a t i v e e
Environment 
impact Initiative on: 
- Resources 
Decisions 
Operations 
Communication 
e.g. Change in strategy 
I mpact Initiative priorities, 
org. consolidation 
stimulated Initiative 
portfolio consolidation etc. 
Impact Types 
Initiative 
(a) 
Initiative 
(b) 
Context (c) 
Effect Types 
Business 0 Supportive 
Business CD Destructive 
, 
Effect Types 
Planned 
Unplanned 
Business 
Support ive 
Business 
Destructive 
Initiative 
Context 
Initiative 
Planed Unplaned 
19.3 Selective Coding Examples 
(D) Final Paradigm Model of Strategic Initiative related Dysfunctions 
Causal Intervening 
Action I 
Phenomenon Context Interaction Consequences Conditions Conditions Strategies 
~ - - - - - - -- --- -------l , , i 
Changing t I Solution Resource 8uslness I Challenging : I Improvements Seiling A1 loc.atlon , Initiative , Trough I Environment , Barriers Processes 
(1) , Implementation Sun Sigma, CRM (12) (10) Selective , Effects and 
--
Resource 
, (7) Balanced Scorecard Management I New I , , Initiative I (9) Business , ---Pressures , Sun business 
· 
. 
(1 6) Suns Business 
(2) · operation Challenges · Partner Strateg ic 
· 
· 
And strategic Initiative 
· 
Initiative 
· I Implications , management Sun strategic (4) Operations 
· 
capabilities 
· 
management during (6) 
Strategic I 
· 
during strategic 
· 
strategic 
· Initiative :J change periods 
· 
Initiative 
Implementation (14) I implementation (51) - (5) · periods (13) Sales I Emerging Transformation: 
Resource Solution 
Complexities from 
· 
Seiling - (11) 
Strateg ic In1tlatlve 
I.;ns Implementation strategic (3) , direction 
- . 
__________ - _____ - ____ I (15) 1'::\- - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - ~ ~
B) • Sun Service 
'f Challenging : Organ isation 
: Dependencies : Transformation 
, between 
· 
Challenges 
: strategic Initiatives 
· 
(17) 
: and the organlsatlo 
· 
. 
(8) 
· . 
, 
,----------------- - -
o = Strategic initiative related dysfunctions 
® = Interactions of Strategic in itiative implementation 
_ l ( 
